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Abstract:  
The aim of the project has been to explore how landuse and transport planning can be used to 
achieve environmentally sustainable transport in cities. The spatial and transport development 
over the last decades in four cities have been analyzed, the cities are compared and lessons are 
drawn. All four are on an unsustainable trend, but with a marked difference between the US 
city Davis and the three European cities Kristiansand, Aalborg and Norwich. The European 
cities have expanded their area of influence across the city borders and commuting is 
increasing. Land use has been market-led in the three European cities and transport finance-
led in the sense that they rely on and strive to ge money for road building from Government. 
Kristiansand also finances road investments by a toll-ring. It is extraordinary how Davis has 
managed to control land use and prevented edge developm nts, and how cycling has been 
maintained as an important mode in a country totally reliant on cars.  
 
The lack of goal achievement in the three European cities is caused by the fragmentation of 
public administration with tasks and responsibilities separated by sectors, levels and layers 
giving skewed opportunities and incentives. The “car society” is embedded in the institutional 
system and the car mode comes out as the winner; in ffect the national policies in all three 
European countries make sustainable transport developm nt illusionary. There is a lack of a 
national framework making more sustainable alternatives to this car-fuelled development 
possible. The principle of subsidiarity is part of the US constitution giving Davis extensive 
self-rule and the opportunity to follow a path towards environmentally sustainable transport 
development. Davis has developed several measures to con rol land use. Especially important 
is the ballot, requiring that the citizens in a refe ndum must confirm city council decisions on 
urban extensions. There is a lot to learn from Davis, not as a direct transformation of the 
Davis experience, but as an inspiration to facilitate change. Lastly, the report discusses what 
should be done to change the development trajectory towards the cities’ long held goals. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
This study is in many ways retrospective looking into the recent city planning history and 
practice towards the end of my career. I thought it would be a journey in known waters, but it 
wasn’t. I have enjoyed the investigation all the way and learnt a lot, so much that I probably 
will continue to read and learn about planning. This is all the more the case since I have 
become convinced that land use and transport planning i  cites have an important future role 
to play in meeting the climate challenge.  
 
At the start of this study I looked at land use andtransport planning as an aim in it self. That 
perspective made it difficult to see why rational lnd use and transport planning was not 
achieving its aims completely, but only partially. Through the work I came to the 
understanding that land use and transport planning is an instrument in “the big modernization 
project” and that the need for population and economic growth in the cities overruled the 
attempts to change the paths towards sustainable city development.  
 
I am profoundly grateful to my tutor professor Petter Næss for his patience, endurance, 
meticulously scrutiny and detailed comments to all the different notes I have sent him over the 
years. Being the kind of person that is most enthusiastic and creative at the start of a project, 
and less productive when it comes to collect the lose threads and conclude, I might have 
dropped out of this study. Petter has challenged me intellectually by his constant questions “is 
that really so” and suggestions “you should read” and  list of references follow, challenges I 
had to take. Tusen takk, Petter.  
 
I sincerely thank the more than fifty persons I have interviewed. Without exceptions they have 
let me use their time and answered my questions. Many of the interviews became a dialogue 
more like mutual inquiry into the role of planning, which gave me deeper insights. I have 
been careful not to cite any from such interviews that might be controversial.  
 
Thanks to Aalborg University and professor Finn Kjærsdam for accepting me as student and 
help along the way. Many thanks to the University of Stavanger for its economic support and 
the good services rendered by the library. UiS also gave me a one-year sabbatical, part of 
which I with the help of professor Mark Francis was ble to spend at the University of 
California, Davis.  
 
Thanks to colleagues at UiS and Agderforskning and other friends that have been helpful with 
comments and support of this work. They have contributed to drive me forward. Also thanks 
to the many people that have been very helpful and provided statistics, documents and other 
data. I have tried throughout to notice the source of information and data, all mistakes or 
misunderstandings are my sole responsibility.  
 
Anders Langeland, November 2008. 
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Summary of the thesis 
 
Background  
Twenty years have elapsed since the Brundtland report Our Common Future was published. 
In these years the environmental problems associated wi h private car transport have 
increased. Car use contributes to the problem of sprawl across Europe1, to the continual 
depletion of fossil resources and to the CO2 emissions, as well as local emissions, traffic 
accidents, noise, etc. A wide gap has been created between our goals and intentions on the one 
side to the factual evidence with increasing car use on the other.2 Land use and transport 
planning is regarded as an important instrument or measure to achieve the sustainable 
development goals. There hardly exists a city in Europe without environmentally sustainable 
city transport as a goal. This project has studied th  use and effects of the land use and 
transport planning instrument in four cities that are renown and prize awarded for their 
sustainable development efforts: Kristiansand (Norway), Aalborg (Denmark), Norwich 
(England) and Davis (California, USA). The four cities were compared cross borders and 
lessons were drawn. 
 
The aim of this study 
The focus of this project has been to explore how land use and transport planning have been 
used to achieve environmentally sustainable transport (EST)3 in cities. The research question 
asked: How can land use and transport planning be used to create / increase environmentally 
sustainable transport in cities, what are the barrie s for sustainable transport development 
and what promotes such development?  
 
Theory and method 
The study starts with a model of a city that consists of two main elements: Building Structure 
and Transport Structure. There is reciprocal relationship or interdependence between the 
Building Structure and the Transport Structure. Activities in the Building Structure create 
demand for transport and the Transport Structure provides accessibility. This interdependence 
is crucial for the cities spatial development. Development Control, a prime tool for politicians 
and planners to manage development may influence both of theses elements. Development 
control can be applied in an active or passive way according to the understanding of the 
situation and indeed according to how the politicians in charge look at intervention in the 
planning and development processes.  
 
The urban development in each case city was viewed as a stream of events over time. The 
research process identified and described those events that had great impact on development. 
The events were analyzed in depth to find the mechanisms that worked together to produce 
each event and also those forces that represented barriers and hindrances. The analysis of the 
events, inspired by Critical Realism, focused on the causal relations behind an event and the 
mechanisms that triggered it. It was a cyclic process confronting the data with case 
description, redescription, more data, and so on. By placing the events in a time sequence the 
relationship between the events and the pattern of events that constitute a certain path could 
be identified and explanations looked for. The research process was both a longitudinal study 
                                                
1 European Environment Agency (2006) Urban sprawl in Europe. EEA Report No. 10/2006 
2 European Environment Agency (2008) Climate for a transport change. EEA Report No. 1/2008 
3 EST as defined by OECD  
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and cross sectional study of the land use and transport events that formed the city 
development. The spatial planning system in most countries is an important part of the 
national government set up. How legislation, planning law and the planning tradition and 
practice focus on land use management was one issue. How the organization of government, 
the financing of transport infrastructure and public transport services impact on development 
another issue. A third issue was how political attitudes to the market and to public versus 
private solutions impacted on development. To cope with the complex relations both 
horizontally and vertically, between levels, sectors and layers the following themes were used 
for cross comparison and analysis:  
• The importance of a broad, national, guiding, spatial framework. 
• Integration between levels, sectors and layers of planning. 
• The role of the rational planning model and planning doctrine.  
• Partnerships, collaboration, cross border cooperation and mechanisms. 
 
4 cities in 4 countries 
This study shows how four cities have perceived the problem (aims), how the cities wished to 
solve the problem (plans) and how the cities have act d to solve the problem (realpolitik). The 
land use and transport planning and policy making in the three European cities are fragmented 
and dysfunctional. National institutional structure represents a major hindrance for a more 
sustainable transport development at the city level. Among the four cities, only Davis has 
been able to control land use and implement a policy aiming at an environmentally 
sustainable transport system. Below follow some key comments to the four cities, which have 
been characterized by these metaphors:  
Kristiansand – the tale of two cities 
Aalborg – the mother of the famous Charter, but…   
Norwich – a puppet on a Government string  
Davis – the bike city, well prepared for a climate crisis 
 
Kristiansand – the tale of two cities 
The land use and transport planning in Kristiansand “the Sustainable City” has been praised 
and prized for sustainable development. However the structural institutions have prevented or 
excluded solutions other than car based plans. Eventhe seven year Government Sustainable 
City project failed to achieve its goals. The institutional structures give the actors incentives to 
work for more road building with the aid of media, organizations and individuals. The toll-
ring will for many years continue to finance a massive road building, which again will 
contribute to the transformation of land use and transport in the region. The CO2 emissions 
keep increasing and will probably continue to do so caused by this transformation. The 
BusMetro has so far not shifted many people from cars to public transport. Pursuit of growth 
led to the road building success, but the city failed to reach their sustainability goals and 
targets. The market-turn and the neo-liberal thinking have supported ad-hoc decisions on 
private plans, reduced public plan production and uermined steering through the plan 
hierarchy. “The car has come to stay” is the storyline coming out of the interviews, meaning 
that the car must be accommodated everywhere, even in the city center. The unprecedented 
building activity in the city center will generate substantial car traffic and threaten the 
renaissance city center plan. Kristiansand is at the same time the prize-winning Sustainable 
City and the Climate Villain. The Climate Villain caption was caused by the rapid increase in 
CO2-emissions from transport and subdued in the marketing of the city, which may be said to 
be double talk, or “the tale of two cities”.  
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Aalborg – the mother of the famous Charter, but…   
More than 1800 cities have signed the Aalborg Charter, but contrary to the Charter ideals, a 
market-led land use and location policy has spread homes over a large region and 
concentrated jobs to highly accessible areas along the major trunk road. Individual car 
transport is a major driving force in and caused by this transport-geographical development. 
The forces of sprawl seem stronger than the forces of concentration. Population growth has 
been low for decades. This lack of growth has pushed t  growth interests to use the 
institutional structure to maximize inward investment. The decision on the 3rd Limfjord 
crossing is inconsistent or even contradictory to the objectives of environmentally sustainable 
transport as adopted in the Charter and the Traffic nd Environment Action Plan. The Traffic 
and Environment Action Plan from 1994, with reviews in 1999 and 2005 has all the best 
intentions. The same can be said about most of the many EU projects in which the city has 
participated. Focus has been on how to attract car users to more environmentally friendly 
modes, i.e. on the “pull” side of a push – pull strategy. Hardly any measures that “push”,  
force or compel people to make the necessary mode change have been discussed. The 
development in Aalborg has many similarities to that of Kristiansand, but with less growth 
pressure and without the opportunity to finance road building by tolls. The great success for 
the Aalborg Charter and the Aalborg Commitments is so far mainly symbolic, with only 
marginal effect on land use and transport policy. 
 
Norwich – a puppet on a Government string  
Norwich is among the Top Ten retail cities in England and very proud of the 5000 Park & 
Ride places established. Although the pr dict and provide ideology – the traditional basis for 
road planning in England – should cease as a paradigm, the Norwich Northern Distributor 
Road has emerged as a traditional road building project to reduce major urban congestion 
problems contrary to the sustainable development aims nd the national guidelines. Land use 
planning is not integrated with transport planning. When combined with an unpredictable 
financing of transport infrastructure, a disjointed policy has become the result. The 
fragmented governance structure for the Norwich urban area both geographically concerning 
borders, across levels and organizations, and within layers (quangos, NGOs and business 
organizations) has made governing and a plan-led development very difficult, possibly 
impossible. The output and outcome of the land use and transport planning processes are very 
uncertain. The strong Government and formal institutional structure in England, has made 
Norwich the “a puppet on a Government string”, sever ly limited by the fragmented 
institutions.  
 
Davis – the bike city, well prepared for a climate crisis 
Davis has kept on a course towards sustainable developm nt and is the US Bike City. There 
has for years been a contest between fast growth and slow growth. Davis is a “contained 
island paradise” in a sea of regional sprawl. Davis is unique in several ways, firstly as a 
cycling city and secondly being totally dependent on he university as job creator. As 
residents the environment-orientated university staff and students have influenced the city 
land use and transport policy. The people in Davis have so far decided to follow a slow 
growth and environmentally friendly development path. A different mood in the population 
may change this. The future for Davis will depend o h w and to what extent the strong 
forces leading to sprawl in the Sacramento region will affect Davis. Up to now the city with 
extensive self-rule has in practice put Place value above Exchange value. Davis like Ulysses 
(binding himself to the mast not to be lured astray) has made rules that give the people power 
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over the city council and developers. These rules, among them referendum to be used for 
urban extension, enhance democracy. Davis has succeeded better than most cities to curb car 
use and promote public transport, walking and cycling.  
 
What are the future challenges for medium sized cities? 
Land use and transport planning is widely regarded as an important instrument to meet the 
future challenge of a threatening climate change, but what will be the effects of using this 
instrument? To explore this question three simulations have been done for the imaginary city 
of KAND, a city of about 200 000 inhabitants: 
1. A comparison of BAU4 and EST paths the next decades. 
2. Alternative locations of 15 000 new homes within the city close to the job, or in the 
region outside the city. 
3. What if an oil crisis occurred? 
The results of the three simulations are firstly that t e present BAU policies will lead to 
devastating climate consequences, but also that it is possible within a consistent national 
framework to bend the trajectory towards EST withou dramatic impact for people’s lifestyles. 
The second result from the simulation is that land use and transport policies that make people 
locate close to their workplace may reduce transport w k and CO2 emissions substantially. 
Dense, compact cities with a good bike and walk network and an efficient public transport 
system can to a large extent contribute to reduced CO2 emissions. Thirdly, if an oil crisis 
occurred, then most people in KAND would reduce their car use and shift to other modes for 
their local travel within the city without dramatic impact on their time budgets.  
 
Lessons and learning from the 4 cities 
Land use has become market-led in the three European cities and transport has been finance-
led in the sense that they rely on and strive to get money for road building from Government. 
The lessons are that the lack of goal achievement in the three European cities is caused by the 
institutional structure and the fragmentation of public administration with tasks and 
responsibilities separated by sectors, levels and lyers giving skewed opportunities and 
incentives. The car mode comes out as the winner of this system. There is also a lack of a 
national framework providing alternatives to this car-fuelled development possible, in effect 
the national policies in all three countries make sustainable development illusionary.  
 
It is extraordinary how Davis has managed to control land use and prevented edge 
developments, and how cycling has been maintained as an important mode in a country totally 
reliant on cars. There is a lot to learn from Davis, not as a direct transformation of the Davis 
experience, but as an inspiration to facilitate change in the three European cities where the 
trend is increasingly unsustainable. This study shows that there is a lack of integration, of 
comprehensiveness, of holistic thinking. It reveals that the need for changes is first and 
foremost changes at the national level – the devolution of power to the cities. An effective 
comprehensive planning that can underpin the development of a balanced transport system for 
all modes integrated with the land use is required.  
 
The main obstacle for change is our dependency of the car in everyday life, which over the 
years has embedded the car deeply in the structure. The vested interests in keeping the present 
land use and transport planning system are strong, so changes won’t come easily.  
                                                
4 BAU – Business As Usual  
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The general impression of the planning contribution – that 
denser, more compact, mixed use settlements, and mediu -large 
settlements tend to exhibit a greater propensity for travel by 
public transport and on foot, and to generate shorter journeys – 
is one often supported by evidence, and rarely if ever 
diametrically contradicted.  
P. Hall and S. Marshall, 2002. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
This thesis is about the worry many of us feel for the future, the challenge from climate 
change, the oil depletion, etc. More specifically it is about the successes and failures in the 
quest to make transport in four cities in four countries environmentally sustainable. How can 
medium sized cities contribute to solve the major gl bal issues? In this introduction the aim, 
research question and the theme of the study are outlined.  
 
1.1 Aim and research question 
 
When Bent Flyvbjerg’s thesis about the Aalborg project was published in 1991, one of the 
reviewers said that he could remove Aalborg and put his city instead, and the story would still 
be true. That feeling was also mine5, put in Kristiansand instead of Aalborg in the thesis and 
the Realpolitik and the power in Kristiansand became clearer in the sense of understanding 
what happened and who had the ability to achieve their goals. Ever since I have pondered on 
urban issues and how some interests seem to achieve t eir goals while other interests fail. In 
particular this has become evident with the increasing concern for climate change and the 
need to reduce CO2 emissions, etc. I believe that medium sized urban areas like Kristiansand 
should within a national framework contribute to a more sustainable development through a 
shift from cars to more environmentally friendly transport. This has indeed been an aim in 
Norway since the late eighties and major efforts have been done to achieve a change of course 
towards this aim. However, the use of the car and the associated emissions keep increasing 
both inside the cities and outside. This increasing gap between the goals and the transport 
reality in urban areas is one perspective for this the is. How can it be that cities are seemingly 
unable to direct their land use and transport development? The other part of this perspective is 
concerned with the management of land use and transport planning at the city level. How and 
to what degree can land use and transport planning and policy be used as an instrument to 
achieve overriding goals? 
 
                                                
5 I had then twenty years of working experience, several of these as a planner in Kristiansand.  
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Alexander6 wrote already twenty years ago about breakdown of the planning paradigm, but 
still planning continues to expand. This paradox is one basic question in this study. Land use 
and transport planning has been and is regarded as an important tool (OECD 2000, EEA 
2006). While the criticism against planning is strong, it seems that governments increasingly 
use planning as an instrument to steer local authorities. Local authorities plan for several 
reasons: because it is self-evident and it is statutory, or because they think it is rational to 
plan, or because other authorities plan and it gives legitimacy to plan for the future (Kleven, 
1990). But what can explain the gap between the intentions and the realities on the ground, 
and the lack of implementation of a comprehensive land use and transport planning as public 
policy? 
 
In professional planning circles there has since the 1970s been broad agreement that land use 
and transport planning should be coordinated to achieve the goal of reduced (growth in) car 
transport, with more people traveling by public transport, walking and cycling instead of 
using the car in cities “However, we are moving in the wrong direction. The aim of creating a 
sustainable society is slipping further and further away. It is necessary to achieve a more 
rational use of transport modes and shift to environmentally friendly transport” (LOKTRA 
2000:10). There are two distinct policy alternatives to solve this dilemma. Either one can 
change the goals, or the tools available must be used to implement the policy. If one wishes to 
achieve the goals then both the application of the instruments and the institutions together 
with the framework guiding the instruments, should change.   
 
Olsen (1994) sums up the experiences with municipal planning in four points: 
• It takes longer than expected 
• It is difficult to make all municipalities plan 
• There is poor agreement between the plan process and pl  documents content and 
national guidelines 
• It is common that plans are not followed by action 
 
The aim of this thesis with a focus on land use and transport planning is to describe, 
understand and learn how four cities have developed u  to the present. There is further an aim 
to try to explain the interests and outcomes – the power relations – that have gained of that 
particular development and what interests have beenlosi g. I want to produce mpirical and 
practically relevant knowledge through this study. Through this production and the 
discussions in the thesis I have also an aim to contribute to the theoretical knowledge 
production within the field of land use and transport planning in medium sized urban areas.  
 
Empirical research has been carried out into governm ntal and political processes of the state 
as well as the policy-making contexts of local planning practice. There is also the duality 
between land use and transport. Land use structures influence transport behavior, which again 
influences land use structures. The study will explore and use and transport development in 
cities to understand and explain how land use and transport planning and policy have been 
used to turn development towards environmentally sustainable transport (EST) as part of the 
broader concepts sustainable development and sustainable mobility, what has hindered and 
what has promoted such change (see ch. 2.2.4 for further discussion on EST). 
 
                                                
6 E Alexander 1984, After Rationality What? – A Review to Paradigm breakdown. APA journal  
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The study will also compare cities across national borders to explore how land use and 
transport planning and policy has developed under different regimes to highlight national 
policy influence versus local policy practice in cities.  
 
1.1.1 Research question  
 
Very few cities manage to break the trend of increasing car dependency even if the cities’ 
plans aim at sustainable objectives and that seemingly all the necessary means are there. On 
the contrary, travel by car increases rapidly in city regions partly because they are expanding 
fast (Hall and Pfeiffer, 2003). An expansion partly brought about by huge investments in 
transport infrastructure and the interaction with changing locations of jobs and homes. There 
seem to be a general need to increase our ability to attain the sustainability objectives.  
 
The main research question in this study is: 
How can land use and transport planning be used to create / increase environmentally 
sustainable transport in cites, what are the barriers for sustainable transport development 
and what promotes such development? 
 
More specifically this research question is based on the assumptions that land use and 
transport planning can function as an instrument for change, and that car use must be reduced 
in cities to make sustainable development possible. A further assumption is the thought that 
good practices, learning and knowledge transfer from one city to the next is possible. The 
main research question can therefore be reframed as: Are there any good examples of how 
land use and transport planning can be an important ool to reduce car use in cities and shift 
to more environmentally modes?  
 
Three sub-questions structure the analysis: 
• How was the connection and interaction between landuse and transport in the 
cities? What effect did planning and policy exert on the choice of transport mode? 
Was the development caused by a deliberate policy and was it sustainable, and in 
case how and why? 
• How could the observed land use and transport development be explained? What 
were the factors facilitating cycling, walking and public transport; and what were 
the factors inhibiting more sustainable transport development?  
• What if any, are the lessons from the case cities for other medium sized cities in 
Europe? 
 
1.2 On the theme for this dissertation 
 
The theme of this dissertation is land use and transport planning (LU&T) at the city level. 
LU&T planning is regarded as an important tool to obtain more sustainable development and 
in the environmental planning generally. The study looks into LU&T planning and policy in 
four cities in four countries: Kristiansand in Norway, Aalborg in Denmark, Norwich in 
England and Davis in California. All four cities have excelled in one way or another in their 
sustainable development efforts, and indeed been awarded prizes. Questions asked were: How 
has the land use and transport planning instrument b en used? What were the effects of this 
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use? Have any of the cities changed towards a more sustainable trajectory and how was land 
use and transport planning instrumental in such a cange? 
 
In this study land use and transport planning are defined as: 
 
Land use is concerned with the localization of activity, its scale, type, density, standard, and 
the pricing, charges and taxes on land. Parking as an important tool will be treated both under 
land use and transport.  
Transport is concerned with the use of the infrastructure and the development of the 
infrastructure like roads and facilities for cycling and walking, public transport infrastructure 
and services, traffic management, traffic calming, and the pricing, charges and taxes on the 
different transport modes. (This study concentrates on passenger transport, the transport of 
goods is excluded.) 
Planning is an activity pointing towards the future and canbe defined in many different ways 
as for example this one: planning is a method to prepare decisions on future actions through 
the coordination of interests and public steering of development (PAX leksikon 1978). In this 
study planning is defined broadly like the RTPI7 who defined planning “as what planners do”. 
The reason for such a broad definition is to include all the relevant data that can be used to 
understand what causes change and events (see ch. 2.3.4)  
 
The geographical scale of the study is the city or the urban area or space called the city. This 
area is difficult to delimit because most cities have sprawling development outside the city 
border and the car has further expanded the area of influence of the city. Norwich can be used 
as an example, the municipality (district) has 120 00 inhabitants, while the urban area has 
about 230 000 inhabitants and in the travel to work area there are about 370 000. There may 
often be dynamic change in growing cities. The fastest growing cities in Norway have above 
2% population growth per year, which is low compared to cities in the developing world.  
 
Compact versus dispersed city has been debated for years. The compact city is being favored 
in the sustainable development discussion. However, th e is ongoing a transformation of core 
cities with a strong city centre towards polycentric urban fields extending over large areas. 
Kristiansand for example is changing towards more lin ar development, while Aalborg has 
been spreading fairly evenly from centre, yet with a tendency to increasing locations along the 
trunk road E45.  
 
1.3 Car use, complacency or concern? 
 
Environment and energy were big issues in the seventies, but during the first half of the 
eighties the concerns subdued as indicated by Susan Owe s’ remark: “crisis reactions have 
become more considered, even dulled to complacency.”  (Owens 1986:5) The same may be 
said of the sustainable development debate the first decade of the new millennium.  
 
From a surge of attention about the future of the earth after the publishing of Our common 
future 1987, the environment wave lowered on the agenda during the nineties, although the 
sustainability debate in professional journals was kept up. The climate challenge and the 
                                                
7 Royal Town Planning Institute 
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recent rise in oil prices may give rise to a new wave of interest in environmentally sustainable 
transport, but so far complacency seems to rule the debate. A typical comment is this: “The 
price of petrol must be very high to make me travel less. I am totally dependent of the car to 
get the day together, and very many people have it as me. Just now I am feeding the parking 
meter.”8 A similar comment is that of president Bush cited in chapter 7. Both these comments 
from leading politicians indicate that to reduce thuse of cars will be very difficult. It will be 
even more difficult to change the structural conditions or the framework for the land use and 
transport policy, because many people and politicians do not see the need to or are uncertain 
about the need to reduce car usage, so why then control land use with such a purpose?  
 
Owens (1986:15) presents two alternative scenarios on the response to fuel price increases in 
transport. In the first scenario motorists will respond to increasing petrol prices by decreasing 
car use. In the short term they cut down on ‘unnecessary’ journeys such as social and 
recreational trips, but in the longer term they attempt to rationalize their trip making patterns, 
for example by changing employment or by moving closer to work or service centers. In the 
second scenario motorists maintain levels of car use but contain expenditure in the short term 
by driving more carefully or by reducing expenditure on other goods. In the longer term they 
buy smaller and more fuel-efficient cars, thus maintaining mobility but using less energy. In 
the real world a myriad of combinations will occur, but the two extreme scenarios may be 
interesting for planning. In a spatial land use andtransport context the first reaction is more 
important than the second alternative. 
 
With rising incomes, as all national forecasts predict will continue, the cost of car travel has in 
the past gradually taken less of the total income. In the future the rising income will therefore 
to some extent compensate for increasing fuel costs and the experience from twenty-thirty 
years ago show that people are willing to use substantially more of their income than today on 
car travel. It is therefore very difficult to predict how people will react to increasing fuel 
prices, and even more so the policies of the major political parties.  
 
Associated with the increase in car use has been a d cline in cycling and public transport. 
“Increasingly it is recognized that the decline in public transport is rooted in the inherent 
inability of public transport to compete with private transport in a system in which external 
costs and benefits go largely unaccounted for. In the absence of any significant restraint on 
car use, a ‘vicious circle of decline’ is established – driven essentially by rising incomes – 
which cannot be reversed by fare reductions, traffic management, or indeed appropriate 
urban development policies” (Hills, 1983 cited in Owens 1986:38). The increase in income 
has offset the subsidies to public transport, which can be read in the relative costs over time9. 
Several later studies confirm this knowledge (see for example Hull 2003, Nordheim and Ruud 
2007, Mobility200110). In general and in the four case cities, public transport mainly serves 
‘captive’ users and has an increasingly ‘welfare’ image (see the discussion in chapter 4 on 
Kristiansand). A shift from private to public transport, and indeed walking and cycling is 
                                                
8 Siv Jensen, the leader and prime minister candidate of Frp, the biggest party at the Norwegian polls, July 4th, 
2008 to Aftenposten. 
9 One model suggest that for every 1% increase in income, a 3% increase in subsidies would be required to 
maintain ridership (Oldfield cited in Owens 1986:38) 
10 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, WBCSD. (2001): Mobility 2001. World Mobility at the 
end of the Twenties Century and its Sustainability. www.wbcsdmobility.org 
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desirable from a sustainability perspective. Savings could be significant, but not enormous as 
shown in the table below11.  
 
Modal shift Potential energy savings 
Transfer of 50% of urban work trips by private vehicles to bus services 8-12% 
Reduction 50% of shopping & personal business travel by private vehicle 3-6% 
Reduction by 50% of other personal and social travel by private vehicle 16-19% 
 
Owens’ conclusions seem still to hold true: “Land use planning which encouraged higher 
densities, especially along transport routes, and clustering of employment and services could 
make a modest but significant contribution to the more efficient use of energy resources. But 
there are formidable political barriers to be overcome in transport policy before this 
contribution can be made. Significantly, constraints arise more from powerful vested interests 
than from any real conflict between energy and social or environmental objectives.” (Owens 
1986:40)  
 
1.4 Why study Medium sized cities? 
 
1.4.1 Focus on medium sized cities 
 
Megacities are developing fast all over the world, with their particular problems among which 
transport and emissions is one. With increasing city size public transport increases in 
importance as transport mode, but there are major diffe ences from one city to the next. On 
the other side there are shrinking cities where the population is going down (this is also a 
coming problem for many western countries with very low birth rates). Neither the major 
cities nor the shrinking cities are dealt with in this study.  
 
The focus is on medium sized cities because 
a) my background and experience is from such cities  
b) there are very many medium sized cities world wide (several hundred in the 
European Union alone) 
c) they are less researched than the major cities, and  
d) they can probably rely on the car as sole motorized mo e.  
 
The last point item d) that medium sized cities canrely on the car as sole motorized mode can 
be shown in practice and theoretically12. Theoretically such cities will in many countries have 
enough investment money to build an effective transport network and ample parking. Those 
without cars will have to rely on getting lifts from family or friends. In historic cities with 
valuable heritage I hope that such ideas won’t rise, but there are many attempts of planning 
for free car use in such cities. The interesting thing with size and free car use is that those who 
advocate environmentally sustainable transport often g t a hard time to convince people that 
restrictions on car use is necessary, because of the belief that the car can solve the transport 
                                                
11 Maltby et al, 1978, cited in Owens 1986:37  
12 Traffic in Towns (1963) discussed this issue and found a theoretical limit below 200 000 inhabitants. That was 
a discussion on the city before the global environme tal problems were on the agenda.  
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problem locally. It is absurd, but the western world is seemingly closing its eyes to the 
possibility of having to curb private car use. I will come back to this issue later. 
 
1.4.2 An explorative study 
 
I have worked for more than 30 years in planning and it is not without preconceived ideas I 
have started this research, a “pre-understanding” as it may be called13. Such “pre-
understanding” may have structured my work more than I can see. I have tried to keep an 
open mind starting this research, which implies looking at the object of study without a 
preconceived theory telling me to look for particular data at particular times and places.  
I believe that this study has been broader and more relevant because of this position of going 
to the data with as open mind as possible. 
 
I am in no way able to distance my self from that experience and approach the research 
questions without being strongly influenced by that p st. However, I have chosen to approach 
the case studies without outlining in detail a theory on which to base the research questions. 
That was done so that my obsessions and biases should not lead the interviews astray. 
Another very important side of this approach, which I didn’t see at the outset, was the impact 
the larger driving forces like ideology, internationalization and globalization had at the local 
level. With a set theory and a detailed questionnaire I feel that I might have overlooked the 
impact of these driving forces, which in retrospect proved very important. Because I was 
more open for alternative forces and explanatory factors, it was also easier during the 
interviews to follow up ambiguous statements with further questions.  
 
In some ways my approach resembles what Patsy Healey describes in her latest book: “I did 
not start off with a ‘theory’, or a hypothesis. I started off with a puzzle about practice. What 
was its nature? How could it be understood?” (2007:290).  
 
 
1.4.3 Organizing of the work with the study 
 
The aim was to explore how planning decisions are conceived and contested within the local 
context of history, economy and politics. This involves looking at the particular perceptions 
and understandings of the key actors involved. The cas  study approach allowed research to 
make explicit the decision making process of any given local policy and to understand how it 
is grounded in its particular context.  
 
The data consists of in-depth interviews with a wide range of key actors in the four cities. As 
a necessary background to the case study interviews, extensive amounts of documentary 
material (planning documents, plans and maps, newspaper articles, local history, etc.) and 
other local information (statistics and other types) were collected for each city in general and 
for the land use and planning history in the cities. To get an understanding of the national 
planning history and legislation wide reading of government white papers, proposals, etc. was 
required. This was especially so with England because of the number of such documents 
                                                
13 Kleven, T. (1990) ”   det rullerer og det går” NIBR-rapport 1990:23. Oslo: Norsk institutt for by- og 
regionforskning.  
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being produced by the Blair Government intending to change the land use and planning 
system, indeed the government system of the country.  
 
The aim was to interview a broad spectrum of participants from all sectors of the community 
focusing on the key actors. The list of interviews shown in the table below was developed 
gradually as I through the initial interviews got greater understanding of the processes in each 
city. The purpose of the interviews in each city was to establish, for each actor, the actor’s 
decision making as he or she perceived it, the local and political context (past, present and 
future) in which they took part and their connections with other key actors, both in the city 
and nationally.  
 
Table  1-1 Informants in the four cities. 
Interviews  
All Politicians Planners/ 
administrators 
Further talks & 
discussions 
Comments on additional 
information sources  
Kristiansand14  22 9 13 3-4 30 years residency in the city.  
Aalborg  10 3 7 4-6 UIS-UAA seminar 141206 
Norwich  14 6 8 2  
Davis  6 - 6 2-4 3 UCD seminars   
Sum  52 18 34 11-16  
Comment: The numbers don’t add because those I had further talks with come out of the column All. 
 
Of the more than 50 interviews, about 40 were taped, an  of these about 20 interviews were 
transcribed. The case study was developed around Kristiansand as model case and therefore 
the numbers of interviews are biggest here. In the thr e other cities, the persons interviewed 
were selected with that knowledge as basis. Therefore the numbers of interviews in Norwich 
are larger than in Aalborg, partly due to the fact that the political/administrative system in 
Denmark resembles the Norwegian one. It was difficult to fathom the complex and changing 
governance system in Norwich/Norfolk and I had therefore to interview more persons there. 
In Davis the land use planning system was more transp rent than in Europe, and it was 
possible to rely more on written documentation than interviews.  
 
All top leaders in Kristiansand municipality from the early eighties up to 2004 have been 
interviewed (2 mayors, 2 deputy majors, 2 city directors and 2 technical directors). In Aalborg 
both the county and the city mayors were interviewed, and also another top politician in the 
municipality. In Norwich five politicians in the municipality were interviewed and one top 
politician in Norfolk County.  
 
Two journalists, one in Norwich and one in Aalborg, were interviewed to get an outside view 
on the public planning. Both had followed local land use and transport planning and politics 
for years and gave depth to my understanding. None of the cities had active grass-root actions 
that had been challenging the present land use and tr sport policy with some effect, possible 
with the exception of Norwich. At the outset I also intended to interview activists and leaders 
of protest groups, however they were not a prominent part of the land use and transport 
planning history neither in Kristiansand nor in Aalborg these years. The lack of activists in 
these to cities the last two decades has not been pondered upon. The policy in Norwich was 
altered by the protest against the Inner Ring Road. Some of these protesters are now active for 
the Green Party and I have interviewed and had talks with some of them. In Davis action 
                                                
14 Five of these interviews were done in the late nineties for another project.  
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groups are formed around a particular issues and their ultimate success is to force the city 
council to put the issue up for ballot. The referendum in the Covell Village case in 2005 may 
be seen as a successful action, although it was strictly within the democratic rules laid down. 
None of those active have been interviewed.  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
 
The structure of this thesis is firstly an outline of the framework and theoretical perspectives 
in chapters 2 and 3. Thereafter one chapter each is used to describe the four case cities: 
Kristiansand in Norway, Aalborg in Denmark, Norwich in England and Davis in California.  
Kristiansand is the city where I have lived for close to thirty years and where I worked in the 
town planning office for seven years in the eighties. Some years ago I produced a report 
looking into 50 years of land use and transport planning in Kristiansand15. That report and my 
work in the town planning office and as a consultant, has kept me interested in what planning 
is and what it might achieve, and is an important background of this study. I have also used 
the knowledge I have about Kristiansand as a model f r the other three case cities.  
 
After nearly thirty years in varied practice, I came back to academia in late 1999. Then I 
started working at the now University of Stavanger. My colleges urged me to start working 
towards a doctorate at Aalborg University and here is the result. Aalborg then became a 
natural second city because it in a transport geographical sense resembles Kristiansand as the 
sole big city in the region, but most of all because of my admiration of Bent Flyvbjerg’s thesis 
published in 199116. Another reason was that both cities had an impressiv  sustainable 
development agenda and cycling had been strongly promoted. The cycling city of Groningen 
became my third choice to start with, and Norwich in England the forth city since it was one 
of the model cities in the “bible” of my student days in Edinburgh, Traffic in Towns. In the 
spring 2005 I spent part of a sabbatical at the Univers ty of California, Davis. That was my 
first visit to the US and I was struck backwards of the numbers of cyclists. Davis then had to 
be included in my comparative study. Groningen had to be dropped if I was to manage to 
finish, but not without regrets. This thesis is therefore a comparative study of land use and 
transport planning in the four cities, which are prsented in chapter 4 Kristiansand, chapter 5 
Aalborg, chapter 6 Norwich and in chapter 7 Davis. 
 
Looking at important events and going backwards through the recent history in the four case 
cities produced the case evidence. The last few decades up to the present situation have been 
studied. The understanding thus built is retrospectiv  and the relevance of this understanding 
may or may not be relevant for the future. To test he case results, three hypothetical 
situations exploring the future for such medium sized cities, are therefore created. Questions 
like How would the cities fare if an oil crisis occurred to morrow? and What can be obtained 
through a strong land use planning? are posed. These questions are together with a Business 
As Usual (BAU) scenario explored and tried answered in chapter 8.  
 
                                                
15 Langeland Anders, Planlegging i Kristiansand 1945-1995 Agderforskning  
16 Flyvbjerg Bent, 1991, Rationalitet og Magt I & II, Akademisk Forlag  
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The four cities are compared and discussed in chapter 9. Such a comparison of four cities 
across borders in four countries is challenging, but may also reveal new insights made 
possible because my own culture and understanding is contrasted in foreign settings.  
 
The last chapter sums up my experiences with this work and the lessons I think are relevant 
for land use and transport planning in medium sized cities in northern Europe.  
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2 Framework and theoretical perspectives 
The framework and theoretical perspectives set the res arch question within the real world 
and shall guide the research to the core issues of the question. The framework shall secure 
that the research is relevant to the real world problems. The theoretical perspectives shall aid 
the search for data and the interpretation and analysis of the data. (Lysgård 2000) 
 
2.1 The global challenges 
The world population growth and the migration from the rural areas to the cities raise 
unprecedented challenges. We have no experience from earlier of such a fundamental change, 
and in addition there is the climate challenge. In this section I outline two issues on the global 
scale because I believe those issues to be very important also for medium sized cities. 
 
2.1.1 Megacities and car growth 
 
Looking at medium sized cities in the western world as in this case study may make one 
forget the global picture. Therefore forecasts of population change and the increase in car 
ownership is briefly commented here. The rural population in the world is stagnating while 
the urban population is growing fast, doubling in 35-40 years. Megacities with very rapid 
growth are cropping up many places as pointed out in The World Cities Report 2004/2005 17. 
The report focuses on the uneven socio-economic impacts of globalization on cities and the 
daunting challenges ahead caused by the population growth and migration to the cities.  
 
Table  2-1  The Urban and Rural World population, 1975, 2000 and 2030. 
 Population size (millions) Growth rate 
 1975 2000 2030 2000-2030 
Total Urban 1 543 2 862 4 981 1.8 % 
Total rural 2 523 3 195 3 289 0.1 % 
Earth population 4 066 6 057 8 270 1.1 % 
Source: The World Cities Report 2004/2005  
 
More than half of the world lives in urban areas for the first time in history. The number of 
slum dwellers of the urban population is very large and probably increasing. The huge gap 
between rich and poor in each country and between cou tries does not seem to matter much 
when we in the next section look at global trends in car ownership. 
 
2.1.2 Car ownership 
 
Global numbers  
OECD expected in the middle of the nineties a formidable growth in the number of cars and 
vehicles the coming years.18 While the number of cars in the OECD area was expected to 
increase by 50% the growth in car numbers in the Rest of the World would be 150%. 
                                                
17 UN-HABITAT (2004): The state of the world’s cities 2004/2005. Globalization and Urban Culture. 
EARTHSCAN, London. 
18 World Bank, 1996 Sustainable Transport: Priorities for Policy Reform.  
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Developing cities are thus coping with an extraordinary combination of rapid motorization, 
10-15 per cent increase per annum, and an urban population that is growing by 6 per cent per 
annum.  
 
 1995 
Thousands 
2020 
Thousands 
 Cars Vehicles Cars Vehicles 
Total OECD 383 329 536 174 575.000 780 000 
Rest of the World 111 255 240 357 280.000 580 000 
Global Totals 494 584 776 531 855.000 1 360 000 
Table  2-2  The number of cars and vehicles in the World, 1995 and 2020. 
 
A more recent forecast confirms the fast increasing motorization in the world.19 The next table 
shows the expected change in population, income per capita, total number of vehicles20 and 
the number of vehicles per 1000 population for the OECD countries and Rest of the World.  
 
 Per capita income 
Thousands, 1995 $ PPP 
Population 
millions 
Total vehicles 
millions 
Vehicles per 1000 
population 
 2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030 
Total OECD 22.3 41.6 1 127 1 272 617 908 548 713 
Rest of the World 3.6 9.1 5 110 6 927 195 1 172 38 169 
Global Totals 7.0 14.1 6 237 8 199 812 2 080 130 254 
Table  2-3  Population, income and vehicles in the World, 2002 and 2030. 
 
The number of vehicles in the world is expected to grow from a total of 812 000 000 in 2002 
to 2 080 000 000 in 2030, a staggering increase of 45 million vehicles every year. The 
demand for fuel or alternative energy will of course increase and indeed will the negative 
impacts stemming from the production and use of these cars.  
 
Car ownership in the four “home” countries. 
The expected population growth in the four “home” countries of the four case cities, all of 
which well positioned in the OECD area, is low except for USA. Income per capita, a key 
driver in auto purchase and use, will probably as the trend forecasts show continue to increase 
with a staggering pace. The difference in car ownership between the four countries is large, 
but even larger is the difference between the numbers of vehicles. Especially should the USA 
numbers be noticed because the very popular small truck hat ”men” use for their daily travel, 
is not a car, only a vehicle.  
 
 Home 
Population, 1000 
Persons 
per  sq km 
Motor vehicles 
per 1000 persons 
Cars per 1000 
persons 
Norway 2006 4 640 14 653 449 
Denmark 2006 5 429 126 470 371 
Great Britain 2006 58 846 256 565 474 
United States 2005 296 410 31 829 456 
Table  2-4  Population and car ownership in the four “home” countries  
Source: IRTAD  
                                                
19 Dargay, Joyce. Dermot Gately and Martin Sommer. V hicle Ownership and Income Growth, Worldwide: 
1960-2030. Institute for Transportation Studies, University of Leeds, January 2007. 
20 Vehicles in this table are motorized vehicles with four wheels, about 80% of the total number of vehicles are 
cars.  
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It is interesting to note that the number of vehicles keeps increasing. Only in the course of 
four years from 2002-2006 have the numbers of vehicl s increased with a rate that if 
prolonged to 2030, it will overshoot the forecast in he next table.  
 
 Per capita income 
Thousands,  
1995 $ PPP 
Population 
millions 
Total vehicles 
millions 
Vehicles per 1000 
population 
 2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030 
Norway 28.1 47.5 5 5 2.4 4.0 521 805 
Denmark  25.9 46.7 5 5 2.3 3.9 430 715 
Great Britain 23.6 43.1 59 64 30.6 44.0 515 685 
USA 31.9 56.6 288 370 234 314 812 849 
Table  2-5  Population, income and vehicles in 4 countries, 2002 and 2030. 
 
The number of vehicles is expected to increase by 70% in Norway and Denmark, 44% in 
Great Britain and “only” 34% in USA between 2002 and 2030. The number of vehicles per 
1000 population in USA is already above 800 and it is expected that the growth will gradually 
be reduced. Still the forecast is an increase of 80 million vehicles in the 28 years period. The 
growth rate in vehicle numbers according to this forecast for Norway and Denmark, is a about 
2% per year and far above population growth rates. I  i  not certain that the case cities will 
experience the same growth rates, but it seems clear that there will be no major trend break in 
these four countries or four case cities in the next y ars without strong external forces 
happening.21  
 
The trends in population and income growth, and the increase in car ownership will continue 
to put strong pressure on oil resources, biodiversity and CO2 emissions the coming years. 
Therefore the need to shift towards environmental sustainable transport as part of sustainable 
development will increase in all four cities. From these staggering prospects we turn to the 
land use and transport planning challenges of medium s zed cities.  
 
2.1.3 The urban transport problems 
 
Urban sprawl and increasing car dependence is a major issue in many countries. The gap 
between policy goals and transport development keeps increasing and our ability to govern 
city expansion is being questioned. Angela Hull stresses the role of institutions in delivering 
land use and transport policy: “Two recent pieces of research evaluating the delivery of more 
sustainable transport solutions in the UK have drawn attention to the regulatory abyss and 
the institutional fragmentation of policy makers and public transport providers in the UK” 
(Hull 2003).  
 
Delucchi et al. (2002) points out that it is “impossible” to close the gap between policy aims 
and visions on the one side and the real world where p ople buy more and more cars on the 
other side: “When people get wealthy, they buy cars and live in bigger homes further away 
from central cities. In an era of rapidly expanding personal mobility, cities have been 
constructed and reconstructed for fast, heavy motor vehicles. Nothing short of outright 
                                                
21 The world financial crisis late 2008 may make such forecasts obsolete.  
 
 14 
prohibition or economic catastrophe – not high gasoline prices, not better public transit, not 
better zoning – will stop this trend.”  
 
Sheller and Urry remark that: Automobility has fragmented social practices that occurred in 
shared public spaces within each city    In particular, automobility divides workplaces from 
homes, it splits homes and business districts and separates homes and various kinds of leisure 
activities. Automobility turns access zones on urban fringes into wastelands (Sheller and Urry 
2000: 744).  
 
David Begg (Commission for Integrated Transport, 2001:24) worries about the future: 
“Today we all stand at a crossroads between a US-style car culture and a sustainable 
European multi modal system. The decisions we take now and the levels of investment that we 
attach to them will determine where we end up.” This challenge from increased car 
dependence is shared in most cities, see for example Pucher and Lefèvre, The Urban 
Transportation Crisis, and the UN-Habitat report, The State of the Worlds Cities 2004/2005.  
 
If it is “impossible” to close this gap as Delucchi laims, where does that leave land use and 
transport planning? Firstly, general measures that make people shift to more fuel-efficient 
vehicles will still be necessary at the national leve . Secondly, at the local level land use and 
transport planning will be important to create more livable and pleasant neighborhoods, cities 
and regions. Village Homes in Davis is an excellent example of a planned neighborhood in an 
ecological or sustainability perspective. There are also movements expanding these ideas to 
cities and regions, see for example Peter Calthorpe’s book “The Regional City” and the New 
Urbanism Charter.  
 
Delucchi is pointing at an important issue, which also has emerged in this study, that the car is 
so embedded in the western culture that it is close t  “impossible” to change our car affinity 
and dependence. It is not likely that reduction of our car use will come purely as the result of 
voters opting for such change on ethical grounds. However, I will still argue that it is possible 
to regain control with cars and traffic. The London Congestion Charging and the Stockholm 
Toll Ring both show that measures that shift people from cars to public transport can be 
effective, and further more that the public actually voted for car reduction. Davis is another 
example that car use can be contained and more environmentally friendly modes like walking 
and cycling are used instead. 
 
2.1.4 Sustainable transportation in cities 
 
The Brundtland Report: Our Common Future 
After the Brundtland report was published in 1987 the use of the concept sustainable 
development has exploded. Both national and local governments have made numerous 
“sustainability” plans and set their aims high. There are probably few reports in the world that 
have had a similar impact.  
 
Sustainable development was in Our Common Future defined as: Humanity has the ability to 
make development sustainable – to ensure that it mee s the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (World Commission 
on Environment and Development, 1987, page 8) This definition opens up for very broad 
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interpretations and some claim that that concept is so watered out that it has become 
insignificant. There are three dimensions to sustainable development:  
• Social/cultural 
• Environmental 
• Economic 
 
Spatial planners often add a fourth dimension that concerns territory or space to the three 
dimensions above: spatial development. In this study of land use and transport planning the 
spatial impact of sustainable development has a particular concern. Important issues in the 
sustainable development debate are:  
• Inter- and intra-generational impact 
• Equity (rich and poor, to-day contra to-morrow) 
• Biodiversity and ecology 
• Resources: renewable and non- renewable 
• Recipients and environment 
• Democracy, subsidiarity and governance 
 
The report and its recommendations, which were further strengthened after the summits in 
Rio 1992 and in Kyoto 1997, have caused profound changes in governments. The planning 
profession, which in the eighties became sidelined by the strong turn away from regulation 
towards market decisions, got a new life many places. The number of public plans concerned 
with the environment, sustainable development, climate, etc. has since flourished and seems 
to be increasing.  
 
Sustainable Mobility 
Karl Georg Høyer has discussed sustainable mobility in his thesis22. Sustainable mobility is a 
mobility that is in accordance with sustainable development requirements. The implications of 
sustainable mobility in cities in relation to the requirements of our modern transport systems, 
lead to a further limitation of this study to look at person transport within the urban area. 
Høyer has after a very thorough and broad discussion pinpointed a list of conclusions. Those 
most relevant for this study are:  
• The volume of private car transportation in the rich part of the world must be 
substantially reduced. This is equally necessary outside as inside urban areas. 
Principally there is no room for private car transportation in a future fulfilling 
sustainable development requirements. This is a global demand.  
• The effects of these reductions are considerable reductions in levels and changes in 
patterns of mobility in the rich part of the world. This applies both to person and 
goods mobility and on individual and societal levels.  
• The current high levels of mobility in the rich countries can not be upheld with 
alternative renewable energy sources, neither in regional contexts nor globally. With 
such energy sources as a substantial basis for the future transportation systems the 
implications will be reduced levels of mobility. 
• The basis for upholding of these sustainable levels of person mobility are the public 
transport means on the ground, buses and various rail-systems, both inside and 
outside urban areas. This applies equally to the rich and the poor parts of the world. 
                                                
22 Høyer, K.G. (2000) Sustainable Mobility – the Concept and its Implications. VF-rapport 1/2000 
Vestlandsforskning, Sogndal.  
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Høyer also points out that such substantial levels of mobility have on average been 
experienced in the rich part of the world only a couple of decades ago, and substantial groups 
of the population within the rich part of the world do even experience such levels of mobility 
today. This may help to moderate the social implications of sustainable mobilities. (Høyer 
2000:170) 
 
Environmentally sustainable transport (EST) 
To delimit and focus this study the more narrow concept environmentally sustainable 
transport (EST) as defined by OECD is used:  
 
“ Transportation that does not endanger public health or ecosystems and meets mobility 
needs consistent with  
• use of renewable resources at below their rates of regeneration  
• use of non-renewable resources at below the rates of development of renewable 
substitutes.”  
 
I also set a distinction between sustainable transport system and sustainable mobility. A 
sustainable transport system – in the long term – is one consisting of components “driven” 
with sustainable energy supply. The premise for the s udy is that the level of mobility of 
people should and must be adapted to the carrying capacity of an environmentally sustainable 
transport system, which might mean a reduction in idividual mobility from about 15 000 km 
per year to only 5 000 km (Høyer 2000).  
 
The land use and transport trends in most cities regions are expanding urban areas and 
increasing car use. This contrary to the requirements of sustainable mobility and the EST 
aims. In this study the focus is on how to bend the trend towards more environmentally 
sustainable transport development, although the need is for trend break or shift in the path. 
The main indicator of the person travel development within cities is the volume of transport or 
transport work per mode, which usually is measured as person kilometer traveled (pkm) or 
vehicle kilometer traveled (vkm). A shift from cars to public transport, cycling and walking is 
one way to move towards EST, another and more long-term is to reduce the distance between 
origin and destination. Both of these instruments are traditional in land use and transport 
planning, and the study focuses on to what extent these are supportive in achieving the EST 
aims. The widely held belief that new technology will solve the “Automobility” problems is 
not looked into.  
 
OECD produced EST guidelines already in 2000 as shown in the box below. However it takes 
time to spread the good practice and monitor the effects of such a policy. Twenty years after 
the Brundtland report, still very few cities adhere to these guidelines.  
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The depletion of fossil resources continues, biodiversity continues to be reduced and the 
emissions of CO2 and other green house gases keep increasing (EEA 2006). It will take time 
to make the change towards sustainable mobility. The first years after 1987 there were very 
few indicators on the progress of sustainable development: if and how it impacted. That has 
changed and the European Union is now developing an indicator system to Measure progress 
towards a more sustainable Europe. The latest monitoring report23 for 2007 reveals that 
progress on land use and transport is slow: “Changes are clearly unfavorable for two 
indicators (out of eleven): Climate change and energy as EU-15 reduction in greenhouse 
gases, and The increase in renewables in energy consumption are still far from targets set in 
strategy.”  
 
Already in a reader from 1992 questions were raised about sustainable development, land use 
planning and urban form24. Susan Owens stated that: Sustainable urban development is a 
contradiction. Urban areas will always be a net consumer of resources, drawing them from 
the world around them. She pointed out the limited role that urban planning can have on 
environmental issues. Potentially the biggest contribution that planning could make to the 
                                                
23 EUROSTAT 2007 Measuring progress towards a more sustainable Europe. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-77-07-115/EN/KS-77-07-115-EN.PDF  
24 Breheny, Michael. editor. (1992): Sustainable development and urban form. Pion ltd, London.  
EST – Environmentally Sustainable Transport Guidelines. OECD 2000 
Guideline 1. Develop a long-term vision of a desirable transport future  that is sustainable for 
environment and health and provides the benefits of mobility and access. 
Guideline 2. Assess long-term transport trends, considering all aspects of transport, their health and 
environmental impacts, and the economic and social implications of continuing with 'business as usual'. 
Guideline 3. Define health and environmental quality objectives based on health and environmental 
criteria, standards, and sustainability requirements. 
Guideline 4. Set quantified, sector-specific targets derived from the environmental and health quality 
objectives, and set target dates and milestones. 
Guideline 5. Identify strategies to achieve EST and combinations of measures to ensure technological 
enhancement and changes in transport activity. 
Guideline 6. Assess the social and economic implications of the vision, and ensure that they are 
consistent with social and economic sustainability. 
Guideline 7. Construct packages of measures and instruments for reaching the milestones and targets 
of EST. Highlight 'win-win' strategies incorporating, in particular, technology policy, infrastructure 
investment, pricing, transport demand and traffic management, improvement of public transport, and 
encouragement of walking and cycling; capture synergies (e.g., those contributing to improved road 
safety) and avoid counteracting effects among instruments. 
Guideline 8. Develop an implementation plan that involves the well-phased application of packages of 
instruments capable of achieving EST taking into account local, regional, and national circumstances. Set 
a clear timetable and assign responsibilities for implementation. Assess whether proposed policies, plans, 
and programmes contribute to or counteract EST in tra sport and associated sectors using tools such as 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). 
Guideline 9. Set provisions for monitoring implementation and for public reporting on the EST 
strategy; use consistent, well-defined sustainable transport indicators to communicate the results; ensure 
follow-up action to adapt the strategy according to inputs received and new scientific evidence. 
Guideline 10. Build broad support and co-operation for implementing EST; involve concerned   
parties, ensure their active support and commitment, a d enable broad public participation; raise public 
awareness and provide education programmes. Ensure that all actions are consistent with global 
responsibility for sustainable development. 
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reduction of energy consumption and pollution is to design urban forms to minimize the need 
for travel (cfr. Petter Næss’ book Urban structure matters (2006) and NOU 2006:18 
Lavutslipputvalget). Andrew Blowers in his article was skeptical regarding the political 
prospects for achieving sustainable development:  
 
• “self-interest will always be the determinant of change. Politicians will be motivated 
by: the net benefits of resource use, international competitive advantage and short 
term political survival.”  
• “only when the disbenefits arising from environmental damage outweigh the benefits, 
is self-interest likely to be compatible with sustainability”   
 
This skepticism seems to be right compared to the EEA reports, and I may add that national 
politicians always are in a squeeze between national/global aims, party politics and 
local/regional constituency politics. This squeeze ntails maximizing local benefits (say 
public investments, new state offices/departments, etc) and minimizing local disbenefits (say 
prevent the pulling of existing resources out, restructuring hospital structure, closure of 
defense institutions, etc). Blowers argues that four initiatives are necessary (but not sufficient) 
for sustainability to become anything like reality:  
1 for the nation state to surrender power upwards to supranational authorities and to 
devolve powers to regional and local authorities 
2 for the environmentally damaging operations of multinational corporations to be 
prevented by effective national and international controls 
3 planning within a participative democratic political system must be introduced at 
all levels to coordinate and enforce the conservation of resources and control of 
pollution 
4 resources must be redistributed to give priority to environmental conservation 
 
Peter Hall and Ulrik Pfeiffer25 express a similar type of thinking when they formulated the 
sustainable development challenge to planning as a need of a paradigm shift: “We need a new 
paradigm that starts from this meta-concern for the maintenance of every kind of 
irreplaceable resource, but then combines it with acceptance of market forces and also with 
an indicative style of planning that can gently bend those market forces, thus producing a 
series of policy innovations. The outcome, we believ , could be a pattern of integrated urban 
growth that is flexible and adaptive, but that also respects the demand for sustainable 
urbanism.” (Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000:38.)  
 
2.1.5 The wearer of the shoe feels the pinch - - - -  
 
Environmental problems are often of the kind that can have consequences at many levels and 
different spatial places. A dentist’s waste of small amounts of quick silver in a municipality 
will also contribute at higher levels if the quick silver concentrates upwards in the food-chain. 
Emissions in one place may lead to serious effects in quite another place, e.g. the SO2 
emissions in UK contributing to acid rain in Norway. It is also the small amounts of CO2 
emissions from our local car use that contribute to the green-house effect.  
 
                                                
25 Peter Hall and Ulrich Pfeiffer, 2000. URBAN FUTURES 21 page 38. Spon Press  
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In the next figure26 the environmental problems are divided into four categories after the 
emissions being concentrated or distributed and if the effects or damages are concentrated or 
distributed. The figure illustrates that the environmental problems have to be met by a 
comprehensive policy, both the national level and the local level therefore need to work 
together. The point is that both the problem generated nd the environmental damages caused 
cannot be confined to only one square, but it illustrates what kind of measures that may have 
effect at what level. 
 
  Problem generation 
  CONCENTRATED DISTRIBUTED 
 
CONCENTRATED 
 
I Local problems from few 
sources  
II Local problems from 
distributed sources  
 
 
Environment 
Damages  
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTED 
 
III One source emissions 
(power station). Spatially 
distributed downfall.  
IV Many sources distributed, 
e.g. cars. National/ regional/ 
global effects.  
Figure 2-1  Environment damages and problem generation in a two by two table.  
 
 
Even in square I local problems like traffic noise that is created locally and may be “solved” 
in different ways locally (noise barriers, speed limits, etc.) there is also a general component. 
The Government sets limits to how much noise vehicls are allowed to emit and it could set 
similar noise standards to the tires.  
 
Square IV  represent the problem of the “commons”. The enviromental problems are 
produced distributed and the consequences are common for all, collective problems. Typical 
for this square is emissions from cars, which may le d to lead concentrations along the roads 
(not in the western countries any more), NOx concentrations in areas with heavy traffic and 
green-house gas emissions with global effects.  
 
The focus in this study is on the car and the problems it causes, which one finds in box II, e.g. 
NOx and particle emissions from traffic, and in box IV, the car transport contribution to the 
climate challenge.  
 
2.1.6 The European Union policy 
 
The EU Thematic Strategy on the urban environment27 points out that four out five Europeans 
live in urban areas. They share the same type of problems, albeit with varying severeness of 
the situations: poor air quality, high levels of traffic and congestion, very high levels of 
ambient noise, poor-quality built environment, derelict land, greenhouse gas emissions, urban 
sprawl, and waste and sewage disposal. 
 
The cross-cutting nature of urban management issues means according to EU that any strategy 
for improving the urban environment needs to be coordinated with the other environmental 
                                                
26 Adapted from Naustdalslid, Jon, Nasjonale miljømål og kommunene, NIBR 1991 as presented in Næss, Petter 
Natur- og miljøvennlig tettstedsutvikling. NIBR-rapport 1992:2.  
27 Communication from the Commission of 11 January 2006 on a thematic strategy on the urban environment. 
COM(2005) 718 final  
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policies concerned, including climate change policy (sustainable construction to improve 
energy efficiency, urban transport plans, etc.), protection of nature and biodiversity (reducing 
urban sprawl, converting industrial wastelands, etc.), quality of life and health (reducing air 
pollution and noise, etc.), sustainable use of natural resources and prevention and recycling of 
waste. 
 
Because the problems are highly complex, and the causes are inter-related, an integrated 
approach is needed. Due to the wide variety of urban areas and the difficulties encountered in 
setting common urban environmental standards, the Thematic Strategy states that guidelines 
and coordination measures are more appropriate instruments than legislation. The strategy is 
therefore based on subsidiarity, giving priority to local initiatives while promoting 
cooperation between the different levels of decision-making (Community, national and local) 
and interweaving the various strands of urban management. (The principle of subsidiarity is 
discussed below) 
 
Transport in urban and metropolitan areas was discussed in the EU Economic and Social 
Committee 28: Improving the quality of life and environmental protection in cities and 
achieving climate change and energy efficiency objectiv s are necessary. Top priority for 
urban planning or transport policy should be, first, to prevent traffic 'arising', or at least to 
limit it, second should be meeting the mobility needs wherever possible through 
environmentally favorable means of transport such as public transport, cycling or walking. 
Municipalities should draw up transport plans for sustainable urban transport, with a binding 
objective of a modal shift to environmentally friendly transport (local public transport, 
cycling, walking), in accordance with minimum European requirements, which have not yet 
been established. If they fail to draw up such plans, they should be barred from receiving 
support from Community funds. This is another example of policy documents full of 
intentions, but without any measures to implement the aims. Have you heard before that 
traffic should be limited as a first priority? The EU committee demonstrates what Brunsson 
(see 2.2.8) calls double talk, talk which is not followed by action. The EU committee should 
primarily give the Commission advice, however it also gives plenty of advice to the 
municipalities, even demands as underlined above, but without being able to produce an 
effective EU policy supporting public transport. For this study there are two elements of 
particular interest. One is the principle of subsidiarity and the other is the general effect of this 
discourse on people’s attitudes and the lawmakers/politicians attitudes.  
 
2.1.7 The principle of subsidiarity 
 
Subsidiarity29 is an organizing principle that matters ought to be handled by the smallest, 
lowest or least centralized competent authority. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
subsidiarity as the idea that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing 
only those tasks which cannot be performed effectivly at a more immediate or local level.  
 
                                                
28 Bulletin 4/2007. Economic and Social Committee exploratory opinion on transport in urban and metropolitan 
areas. 
 
29 The word subsidiarity is derived from the Latin word subsidiarius and has its origins in Catholic social 
teaching.  
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The concept or principle is found in several constitutions around the world, and subsidiarity 
is, ideally or in principle, one of the features of federalism. The principle of subsidiarity is 
defined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing theEuropean Community. It is intended to 
ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks 
are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in the light of the possibilities 
available at national, regional or local level.30  
 
It is also interesting that the principle of subsidiarity is a guiding principle for the Aalborg 
Charter, which is discussed in chapter 5.3.5. A practic l definition of the principle of 
subsidiarity used in this report is: that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level 
commensurate with the achievement of the overall objectives. 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical perspectives  
In this section the focus is on the city level. First a typology of regimes is outlined followed by 
a discussion on the importance of growth. New institutionalist theory is briefly commented on 
and the definition of planning used in the study is discussed.  
 
2.2.1 Typology of regimes. 
 
Cities can be in different circumstances, the economy may grow or stagnate, the population 
may increase or decrease due to migration and so on. This will influence the city leadership 
and land use and transport planning as part of the management of a city. Attitudes are formed 
over time. Some say the bottle is half full, others that is it half empty. Some cities are known 
to have caretaker regimes, while others have more activist regimes striving for change. 
Attitudes may be influenced by the assessments of what economic situation a city is in: 
growth, stagnation, depression, as it may also influe ce individual and political outlook on the 
dimension market rule versus regulation.  
 
Nordregio in the report From trends to visions points out two major urban problems: uneven 
economic development and the competitive position: “some of the Community’s most acute 
problems associated with the lack of economic opportunity, low incomes and generally poor 
quality of life are found in urban areas. The growing tensions within European society are 
evident particularly in the serious level of social exclusion in an increasing number of inner 
city or peripheral urban areas”31. These problems of lack of cohesion and competition 
underline that the economic situation of a city is important and will together with the political 
ideology influence the city’s planning response. Brindley et al32 have proposed a typology 
based on these dimensions, the connection between th  fel  economic situation, the attitudes 
to the market and the strategic (land use) planning taking place.  
 
                                                
30 http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm 
 
31 Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C180/6 1994, cited in Nordregio From trends to visions 
R1999:4  
32 Brindley Tim, Yvonne Rydin, Gerry Stoker 1996 Remaking planning. The politics of urban change Routledge 
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The typology will be used to analyze planning response and in the comparison of instruments 
used. 
 
Attitude to the market Perceived nature of urban problems 
Market critical Market rules 
Buoyant area: minor problems and 
buoyant market 
Regulative planning Trend planning 
Pockets of urban problems and potential 
market interest 
Popular planning Leverage planning 
Serious problems and stagnation Public-investment planning Private-management 
planning 
Figure 2-2  Typology of urban problems and attitudes to market or regulation.  
 
 
Stoker and Mossberger present another typology of regimes, which also can be useful in an 
analysis of city development: 33  
 
Defining characteristics Organic Instrumental Symbolic 
Purpose  Maintain status quo Realize projects Redirect / transform 
ideology or image 
Main motivation of 
participants 
Local dependency Tangible results Expressive politics 
Basis for sense of 
common purpose 
Tradition and social 
cohesion 
Selective incentives Strategic use of symbols 
Quality of coalition 
congruence of interests 
Political communion Political partnership Competitive agreement 
Relationship with 
environment: 
      Local 
      Non-local 
 
 
 
Exclusive orientation 
Independent 
 
 
Exclusive orientation 
Dependent 
 
 
Inclusive orientation 
Dependent 
Figure 2-3  Typology of urban regimes.  
 
 
When I have been looking for the role and impact of land use and transport planning in the 
cities, I have been struck that politicians and top administrators in the interviews were 
primarily occupied with the future livelihood and conditions for people. Land use and 
transport planning were seen as a tool to safeguard and improve people’s daily life. How they 
perceived the future problems and their attitudes to the market would therefore guide their 
actions within the institutional framework given.  
 
2.2.2 The growth of cities 
 
Jane Jacobs inspired a whole generation of city planners with her book The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities. She criticized the planning and urban renewal policies of the 1950s, 
which destroyed communities and created isolated, unnat ral urban spaces. Instead of zoning, 
Jacobs advocated dense, mixed-use neighborhoods. In the books The Economy of Cities and 
Cities and the Wealth of Nations she claims a) that cities are the primary drivers of economic 
                                                
33 Stoker G and Mossberger K 1994. Urban Regime Theory in Comparative Perspective. In Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, vol 12 
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development, and b) that it is the city not the nation-state, which is the true player in the 
global economy. Both these ideas are important theories for this study. Firstly the city as the 
main driver in the economy underpins the Logan and Molotch argument commented on below 
and indeed the policies making cities “engines” in development. Jacobs' main argument is that 
all economic growth derives from urban import replacement. Import replacement is when a 
city starts producing locally goods that are formerly imported, e.g., Tokyo bicycle factories 
replacing Tokyo bicycle importers in the late 1800s. She claims that import replacement 
builds up local infrastructure, skills, and production, and also that the increased produce is 
exported to other cities, giving those other cities a new opportunity to engage in import 
replacement, thus producing a positive cycle of growth. 
 
In the book Cities and the Wealth of Nations she takes this role of the city further and 
discusses the consequences of considering the city first and the nation second, or not at all. 
There are two sides to this argument, firstly, as thi  study will show, that cities are far more 
ingrained and involved in the global economy than before and possibly this process is 
increasing in speed (the term Glocal - the global economy impacting on the local area, is often 
used of these processes). Secondly, land use and transport planning in the cities is clearly 
influenced by the changing role of the nation state. The nation state is “attacked” from the 
above by international and supra national organizations like the European Union and from 
below by demands of more self-rule and following Jacobs’ theory by more self-reliant city 
economies. This development has been coined the “worm-eaten national state” (Veggeland, 
1998). The division of labor is the basic formative force of cities “  cities are places where 
adding new work to older work proceeds vigorously. Indeed, any settlement where this 
happens becomes a city.” (Jacobs 1970:6 cited from Omland, 2002). The continual 
development of new products and work methods are the necessary conditions for and the 
engine in cities development and growth. The growing numbers of activities the division of 
labor creates, tend to seek together and form an agglomeration or a cluster of firms 
exchanging products and services. In the theory of agglomeration economies the closeness 
between firms creates a basis for confidence, trustand cooperation that reduces transaction 
costs, and makes a good atmosphere for innovation and growth. The complexity, diversity and 
versatility of the city should be protected according to Jacobs, and not be reduced as planners 
do by their zoning: “The future cities will be more intricate, comprehensive, diversified, and 
larger than today’s, and will have even more complicated jumbles of old and new things than 
ours do. The bureaucratized, simplified cities, so dear to present-day city planners and urban 
designers, and familiar also to readers of science fi tion and utopian proposals, run counter 
to the processes of city growth and economic development.” (Jacobs 1970:250 cited from 
Omland, 2002)  
 
Logan and Molotch have developed the theory of cities as growth machines, a view not far 
from Jane Jacobs. “Markets are not mere meetings between producers and consumers, whose 
relations are ordered by the impersonal “laws” of supply and demand. The fundamental 
attributes of all commodities, but particular of land and buildings, are the social contexts 
through which they are used and exchanged.” Any piece of real estate has both use value – 
your home, and exchange value – generating rent to owners.34 The sharpest contrast and the 
most important is between residents who use place to satisfy essential needs of life, and 
                                                
34 Logan John R and Harvey L Molotch (1987): Urban fortunes University of California Press  
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entrepreneurs who strive for financial return, ordinar ly achieved by intensifying the use to 
which their property is put.  
 
They explore the conflict between use value and exchange values in cities, examine the forms 
of this contradiction, and analyzes how it is ordinar ly managed. This conflict they claim 
determines: 
The shape of the city 
The distribution of people 
The way they live together 
 
In light of this tension a better understanding of the political dynamics of cities and regions 
can be made, and also to discover how inequalities in and between places – a stratification of 
place as well as individuals and groups – are establi hed and maintained. The importance of 
land use and transport planning in allocating and deciding the conflict between use value and 
exchange value is underlined: “The planning process is, of course, inherently political, any 
land-use designation distributes use and exchange value. Whether building a public amenity 
or allowing a high-rise office tower, officials making decisions on location, parking, security, 
and access to transportation will affect the balance between public and private gains.” Even 
if this statement of planning as a political process and hence that planners take part in such 
processes is fairly obvious, very many professional planners view their role as neutral and 
objective. That role comprehension came through in t e interviews for this study, but there 
were also other planners who openly admitted they enjoy d such a political role and the 
impact they could make.  
 
According to Logan and Molotch there is one issue that consistently generates consensus 
among local elite groups. The desire for growth creates consensus among a wide range of elite 
groups, no matter how they are split on other issue. “   elites use their growth consensus to 
eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of 
community. The issues that reach public agendas (and are therefore available for pluralists 
investigations) do so precisely because they are matters on which elites have, in effect agreed 
to disagree. Only under rather extraordinary circumstances is the consensus endangered.”  
This view of elite groups as important in city growth processes brings us to the new-
institutionalist theory and the theory of Clarence Stone on how cities are governed.  
 
2.2.3 Instruments and Institutions  
 
In development the planners use land use planning istruments (zoning, density, type of use, 
access, etc.) that are defined by the planning act. When a local plan (reguleringsplan) with 
ordinances (reguleringsbestemmelser) is adopted, th type of value and the amount of value of 
the land/properties is decided, but also new rules of how the area can be used are created, a 
new institution is formed. In the development process, one land use is converted to another, 
but the same occurs for the institutional arrangements regarding land use as these are also 
converted. The concept of institution has a multiple and complicated character. Planning is at 
the same time ‘an institutionalized practice’ and ‘a factor of institutionalization’, a duality that 
is according to Buitelaar (who builds on North, seeb low) complicated to capture.35  
 
                                                
35 Buitelaar, Edwin. (2007:6): The cost of land use decisions. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
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Uncertainty can be and is often reduced by using institutions. Property rights on land, means 
that there are rights and consequently duties with respect to a particular piece of land. 
Institutions are created and changed, after which they are used. The advantage of this more 
dynamic and less deterministic view on institutions is that the ‘duality of structure’, that is, 
the difficulty of separating structure and agency when it comes to explaining social behavior 
is incorporated. “It is with this approach not necessary to distinguish between the transaction 
costs that are caused by agencies using the institutions and the transaction costs that are 
caused by agencies when they make these institutions, hese are interwoven” (Buitelaar 
2007:49).36 In chapter 2.4.2 Critical Realism a further discussion on structuration and 
Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity follows.  
 
Ruling coalitions.  
Cities may have huge transport problems and are thefor  important places where to develop 
more sustainable transport. Hence, managing the city land use and transport development – 
the ability to change the course – is important. Regim  theory as developed by C Stone, is one 
theory I will use in the comparison of Kristiansand, Aalborg Norwich and Davis. 
 
A regime is defined as a set of arrangements by which a community is actually governed, or 
the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in 
order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions. (Stone 1989:6)37 The informal 
arrangements by which a community is governed vary from city to city, but is driven by two 
needs:  
1) institutional scope (that is the need to encompass a wide enough scope of 
institutions to mobilize the resources required to make and implement governing 
decisions)  
2) cooperation (the need to promote enough cooperation and coordination for the 
diverse participants to reach decisions and sustain act on in support of the decisions) 
 
The rules of the game and players. 
The Nobel laureate Douglass North38 defines institutions as: 
 
• formal rules (the state system with laws, judiciary, decisions, apparatus) 
• informal rules and constraints (norms for behavior, conventions and rules of conduct, 
etc.) 
• sanction mechanisms to both the formal and informal sphere (from psychological 
constraints to police by-laws and planning ordinance) 
 
The institutions define the rules for human conduct and what organizations may and may not 
do (and think). The Institutions are the rules of the game and the Organizations are the 
players, as North formulated it:  “institutions are the rules of the game – or – humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction   n consequence they structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social or economic.”  (North, 1990 page 145) 
 
                                                
36 Hedegaard Sørensen (2001) define institutions as Eksisterende rutiniserte praksisser og forståelser  
37 Johan Galtung had a similar concept in the BCR-gang (BKF-gjengen), the Bureaucrats, the Capitalists and the 
Researchers, 1977 Gyldendal  
38 After Synteserapport nr. 3 fra forskningsprogrammet LOKTRA, 2000. Mer effektive institusjoner og bedr 
planlegging, page 25. 
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Incentives for innovation:  
“The institutional structure defines organizations that will be viable at any moment of time. 
Organizations exists in the economic world of scarcity and hence competition. The degree of 
competition will be the primary determinant of the incentives of organizational entrepreneurs 
to innovate new institutional rules. Secure monopolies will have little incentive; competitive 
markets will produce more incentive to innovate, although it is not the competitive conditions 
of the economic theory of perfect competition but rather the institutional environment of 
organizations – the framework of rules and norms – which determines the incentives for 
innovative activities.” (cited from LOKTRA op. cit. page 26) 
 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development highlight the role of institutions in 
the report: Mobility 2001. World Mobility at the end of the Twenti s Century and its 
Sustainability. Institutions establish the context by which a city or region or country 
determines:  
1. which sustainable mobility goals to pursue and the priority given to each.  
2. which levers are acceptable to use to achieve any prticular goal 
3. how intensively these levers can be used 
4. the constraints that may be imposed on their use 
 
“Cities are the ultimate determinant of whether and how sustainable mobility is achieved.”  
 
Being active or passive matters: 
“New technology is intriguing and dominates in the m dia, but institutional capability 
determines the pace and direction of change in mobility systems. Political institutions 
determine which transportation modes get favored through subsidies, regulations, and 
protection from competition. Political and social institutions exert enormous influence over 
whether infrastructure can be built, where it can be built, and what it costs to build. 
Economic institutions – especially large corporations – can either take a lead in encouraging 
change or drag their feet and make change difficult and expensive.” (Mobility 2001 pp 7-9) 
 
2.2.4 Definition of planning  
 
Andreas Faludis’ A Reader in Planning theory from 1973 introduced the distinction between 
theory of planning and theory in planning. The reader also collected some of the most 
influential papers on planning, like Banfield’s Rational planning model and Lindblom’s 
Incrementalistic model. This study is mostly concerned with the theories of planning in trying 
to explore the role of land use and transport planning and how it functions. The rational 
planning model, also called the synoptic model, as described by Banfield has been the norm 
for planning legislation and practice in many years. It implies the setting of goals and 
identifying the possible alternatives and means to achieve the goals, an ends-means process. 
This definition of planning fits the rational model: “Planning is the process of preparing a set 
of decisions for action in the future, directed at achieving goals by preferable means” (Dror 
in Faludi 1973:330). There is a vast literature on n rmative and positive planning theory and 
planning models, which we are not going into here.  
 
The needs of this study is a planning definition that covers its role in relation to the three 
following themes:  
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• The development wanted, aimed at, wished   
• Vulnerable society. Risk and resilience. Preventive of unforeseen consequences, Brox’ 
demand for planning not to lead to: “Where we don’t want to end.” 
• Impact on the discourse, to what extent has planning facilitated change, innovation or 
laid the ground for a new course?  
 
Assessment of planning then can be related to these t re  sides of the planning definition: 
1. Conformance: to what extent is the goals achieved? 
2. Performance: to what extent has the planning and plans opened up for alternative 
views of the future? 
3. To what extent has planning and plans contributed to a broader discourse and 
challenged any hegemonic discourse positions?  
 
Patric Geddes advocated a regional view and the following slogan for planning: Survey, 
Analysis, Plan. Erik Lorange the former planning director in Kristiansand, followed Geddes’ 
ideas to a large extent when the plans for the Kristian and region were outlined in the fifties. 
The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung uses a simil r metaphor for planning and 
problem solving as Geddes: Diagnosis, Prognosis, Therapy. Amitai Etzioni “Mixed 
scanning” (in Faludi 1973) argues for a rough scanning of the field from high above and then 
go into more detailed planning on the most important issues. The most important problems 
should be adhered to while for most of the other problems solutions can be improvised. He 
puts more weight on the problems than on the opportunities, more use of tactics than strategy. 
Rolf Jensen advocates a similar planning model in his article “Nær og Fjern analyse” (Jensen 
1975). 
 
Ottar Brox defines planning as: “Planning is to clarify as far as possible, the connections in 
the world, create a collective conscience about these connections, and localize those 
opportunities to change the path of those processes, th  results of which we in the longer term 
can not live with” (translated by author from Brox, Ottar. (1995): “Dit vi ikke vil”  EXIL). 
This normative definition differs from the broad planning definition in ch.1.2, which was used 
to explore planning practice in the cities.  
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2.2.5 Urban structure and transport 
 
I will use much of the theory and models presented by Karin Book and Lena Eskildsson39 
who have asked the question “The urban structure – why and how?” The urban structure is 
affected both by general social forces and by power/development control. Development 
control is the concept they use for the structure of control that affects, influences or controls 
the physical changes in a city. The following model shows the relationship between the urban 
structure, the transport structure and development co trol.  
 
Figure 2-4 Model of land use and transport system and control.  
 
Source: Book and Eskildsson, 2001. 
 
The shift from the “blueprint” land use and transport planning the first decades after World 
Word Two, to the market turn in the new 21st century affects firstly the Development Control 
in the model. Depending on political ideology the D velopment Control can be applied with 
different strengths and timings (reactive, active, proactive – a term closer to pre-emption). 
The use of this instrument is also very dependent on the dual relationship between the urban 
structure and transport structure. New activity influencing transport demand, which again put 
pressure on the transport structure, can be viewed in different ways and hence the 
Development Control can be used to support new activity or limit such a tivity. On the other 
side the accessibility (the car being the most important mode) generates demand on the urban 
structure. This demand for improved accessibility has to a large extent led to urban expansion 
in the recent years, demonstrating a lack of willingness or ability to use Development Control 
to guide urban development or an acceptance of this development by the politicians.  
 
This model is in the next figure detailed further to show the contexts in the two structure 
boxes.  
 
 
                                                
39 Karin Book og Lena Eskildsson 2001. “Stadens struktur – varfør och hur?” Doktoravhandling Institusjonen før 
kulturgeografi och ekonomisk geografi. Lunds universit t. 
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Figure 2-5  The relationship between urban structure and transport structure in cities  
Source: Adapted from Book and Eskildsson, 2001. 
 
The urban structure is mainly formed by the building structure where land values, localization 
of homes and jobs, density and centre structure are important elements. Likewise the transport 
structure is formed by the demand for transport showed by the origin and destination of trips, 
the modal split and the transport supply decided in parts by the infrastructure. Accessibility 
refers to the ease of reaching destinations. People who are in places that are highly accessible 
can reach many other activities or destinations quickly, people in inaccessible places can 
reach many fewer places in the same amount of time.Th  mode of transport is also important. 
Dense cities are highly accessible on foot and hence ideally a feed-back from the Building 
structure box to the Accessibility box could included.  
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The elements in the model are:  
I  Land use and transport planning and control 
II Building structure 
III Transport structure 
IV Accessibility 
V Transport demand 
 
These elements form the mental picture I have used a  guiding for the study in order to 
acquire knowledge about each city, to collect data and as background during analysis.  
 
2.2.6 The municipality set in a national context 
 
Above we have focused on the city and a model on how land use and transport in the city can 
be managed through development control, which is a model that goes in depth of the changes 
in the built city environment and how urban structure and transport interact. In the next model 
the focus is on the how the city interacts with the outside stream of events and driving 
forces.40 A key focus of the research was on understanding how different forces and the ways 
in which the participants in the local policy process understood and acted on the land use and 
transport challenges ahead. The concept of sustainability in a market-led economy is 
ambiguous and requires redistribution of values. Different actors will, according to their time 
horizon and how costs and benefits relate to the particular context and spatial impact, view 
sustainability differently. The different actors have also different material interests in the local 
policy. The research attempted to clarify the decision making process in each city and through 
the comparative study highlight the different local processes.  
 
The approach to understand land use and transport planning and processes over time can be 
called broadly interpretive. Three dimensions or realms are distinguished: Territory, Sector 
and Politics. The three forces will entrench and influence the municipality (city). They may 
pull in the same direction and be creative forces in building the city, but they may also be 
dispersive and work in opposite directions. In the next figure the land use and transport events 
in the city are shown in the circle in the middle. Around this circle the three dimensions are 
symbolized with a triangle.  
 
 
 
                                                
40 Inspired by Mydske, P. K. (ed.) (2006): Skandinaviske regioner – plass for politikk? Bergen: Fagbokforlaget  
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Figure 2-6 Model to analyze forces impacting on a city.  
Source: Adapted from Mydske, 2006. 
 
 
 
Territory / geography 
Territory is used about city life in general and how people se  their daily life, which is very 
dependent on their time budgets. The land use and tr sport structure and the modes available 
decide to a far extent how the daily tasks of bringing children to the nursery, getting to work, 
shopping, etc. are put together. The spatial context is also influencing their views on the local 
discourse on sustainability and the measures to be used.  
 
In the city the national regulations are transformed into spatial effects with both wanted and 
unforeseen consequences. Effective land use management is often seen as a key to meet the 
climate challenge but requires control of land use across municipality borders not yet 
achieved in Norway 41. The territory of a city may or may not be the same as the municipal 
territory. This gives rise to border effects and these will vary in strength and importance 
according to the local geography. The well-known example is the rich jurisdiction close to the 
city where wealthy people have located to live in abetter environment than in the city.  
 
Sector  
Sector is used about the land use and transport planning realm covering the land use and 
transport planning process and the organizations and actors participating, such as the city 
planning office, the Highway Agency, the bus companies, etc. An important part of the Sector 
is that most of the Government interventions come through the vertical relationships between 
the levels. This put the Sector in special position regarding information, knowledg  and 
                                                
41 EEA Report No 1/2008, (2008) Climate for a transport change. TERM 2007: indicators tracking transport 
and environment in the European Union. Copenhagen: European Environment Agency  
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agenda setting. There exist an information privilege and an agenda setting privilege in such 
organizations with strong vertical relations and networks (Falkemark 1999). 
 
There are doctrines and forces tied to the different s ctor administrations and agencies, and to 
the professions as transport planners, spatial planners, etc. that may override local interests.42 
These organizations are central in communicating between the levels; both in expressing the 
local needs to the central authorities and in designing how national requirements shall be 
handled locally. Planning professions and sector are elements in an institutional perspective, 
in which norms, history and organization are important parts. Such organizations may develop 
self-interest in the up keep or development of its field because they represent sector interests, 
traditional organizations, professional careers and jobs.43 The Highway Agency (HA) comes 
in this study out as the “winner” in the sense thatis organization has achieved its goals, 
while the strong visions and goals of creating a more environmentally sustainable transport 
system in cities lost.  
 
Politics  
The third group of forces is attached to local politics and party politics. Politics cover the 
formal decision making in the city council, but also the wider governance processes involving 
from time to time with different intensity stakeholders and the public. Public engagement 
tends to rise when projects are implemented. Politics therefore represent the much wider 
networking and social life than a more limited focus on land use and transport planning 
decisions would reveal. 
 
Party politics, which is the most important institution and group of actors in the political 
system in Norway and Denmark, are also organized along party lines in the municipalities. 
They decide to a large extent the local priorities of tasks and resources. An example that will 
be outlined below is how the task of improving the public transport had to be put at rest, in 
order not to interfere with the task of getting road investment money from the government 
(see ch. 4.5.2). The political parties have an important function to mobilize local support and 
participation for national policies, they thereby create integration between the local and 
central level, and give legitimacy for the national po itics implemented locally.44 In England 
and USA, as will be seen in the case studies, this dimension – Politics – had a different 
function.  
 
Party political programs did not come out as important in the cases looked into in this study, 
but the liberalist ideology and how the local politicians have transformed it into local 
strategies seems very important in the explanation of local actions. It may be argued that this 
is part of the pressure on the “Scandinavian welfar” model in which the unitary state 
(enhetsstaten) is the tradition, towards more market solutions and federal models with local 
self-rule. In the cases addressed in this study, a continual power game between the national 
level and local level seems to be ongoing, albeit with different strengths and effects. In some 
cases there is active cooperation between the national and the city level, while in others the 
city acts more like an autonomous authority.  
 
                                                
42 Well-known from transport planning, but spatial planners also have fixed doctrines they try to implement 
regardless of local context.  
43 Torgersen, Ulf (1994): Profesjoner og offentlig sektor. Oslo: Tano 
44 Mydske, P. K. (ed.) (2006): Skandinaviske regioner – plass for politikk? Bergen: Fagbokforlaget  
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Analytical model 
Territory, sector and politics can be looked at as complementary and overlapping dimensions. 
Successful national interventions on the local level require local support, both politically and 
through the sectors. The territory is the arena where the intended and unintended effects of the 
interventions will be felt. The politicians and political parties meet the reactions from the 
public directly and they have to be accountable for the policies and interventions in local 
elections. Politicians and planners in the sectors may or may not have a strong local 
foundation, and they may or may not try to influenc the interventions to “fit” the local 
circumstances and territory. The politicians seeking reelection, must be very attuned to the 
common feeling among people and their experiences in their daily lives.  
 
The relationship between the three forces territory/geography, sector and politics can be 
described as theoretical and empirical connections. They may constitute an analytical model 
to map the strength of each of these forces and the relation between them. They have both 
formative and constructive effects, as well as conflicting effects, and hence they may both be 
complimentary and in opposition to each other.  
 
Institutions are the “rules” and organizations the “players”. The rules can be changed from 
above as intended changes, but they are also formed and eveloped from the bottom through 
daily practice. Informal institutions play an important part, but a part which is difficult to 
reveal.  
 
The relationship between the three groups of forces, regardless of whether one sees them as 
conflicting forces or constructive forces, will affect both how far and in what direction the 
development will go towards stronger or weaker institutions, with democracy and with the 
integration on the local level. 
 
2.2.7 Double talk and fuzzy planning. 
 
Many of the key notions associated with spatial planning are essentially ‘fuzzy’ in their 
nature. For example, while almost everyone accepts ‘sustainability’ as an important goal of 
planning, the actions of the actors involved can make the achieved ‘sustainability’ minimal, or 
even counterproductive. Decision-makers may delegate implementation of policies with 
insufficient powers to ensure that the desired outcome, i.e. non-implementation of an adopted 
policy can be achieved. The planners have then been d f ated by a lack of clarity in their 
basic concepts and doctrines.45 Such situations and defeats are common in planning.  
 
Brunsson talks of such situations where goals and actions are widely apart as hypocrisy and 
double talk46. Decisions can be seen as a special type of talk th t indicates a will to act and 
choice of action. A decision is in traditional theory taken to be indicative of a corresponding 
action that will occur in the future, or at least the decision is assumed to increase the 
probability of such action. The following is an example of how organizations talk: “The 
                                                
45 Roo, Gert de. and Porter, Geoff. (2007): Fuzzy planning: The role of actors in a Fuzzy Governance 
Environment. England: Ashgate 
46 Brunsson, N. (1989) “The organization of Hypocrisy: talk, decisions and actions in organisations.” 
Chichester, John Wiley & Sons. and Brunsson, N. (2007) “The consequences of decision-making.” Oxford 
University Press.  
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intensity of car traffic within the city of Stockholm has long been a controversial issue. Traffic 
increased in Stockholm during the 1990s but city officials could refer to the decision they 
made at the beginning of the decade to reduce traffic by 30 percent in fifteen years.” 
(Brunsson 2007:111) Traffic was allowed to grow without interference from politicians since 
the politicians had expressed their intention “in pri ciple” to reduce traffic. To talk is one 
thing, to decide is a second, and to act is yet a third. It is possible to act without making a 
decision or talk about it, and it is possible to talk and decide without acting on it. The example 
demonstrates that it is possible to act contrary to what has been said or decided. The result is 
hypocrisy which means “the assumption or postulation of (moral) standards to which one’s 
own behavior does not conform.” Hypocrisy is tied to actors: individuals or organizations, and 
is a kind of inconsistency within an actor. It is common to talk of implementation problems 
when the organization does not execute the visions stated or the decisions made, but 
hypocrisy is not necessarily a problem, sometimes it can be a solution according to Brunsson. 
However, this raises ethical questions about politicians’ accountability, which I will come 
back to in chapters 9 and 10.  
 
Hypocrisy is a response to a world in which values, ideas, or people are in conflict, the fuzzy 
and contradictory world that planners are confronted with daily. There are conflicts or 
tensions between ideology (reduced car transport) and practice (traffic generating projects). 
Modern organizations are squeezed between ideology and practice. Success in one dimension 
often decreases the success in another. Hypocrisy is a way of handling conflicts by reflecting 
them in inconsistencies among talk, decisions, and actions. The decision to decrease traffic in 
Stockholm is the decisive precondition for the traffic to keep growing. The decision to 
decrease traffic in Stockholm made it easier to gain acceptance for the fact that it was actually 
increasing; it weakened the arguments of those who opp sed the increasing traffic – 
eventually.  
 
Municipalities are subject to strongly conflicting demands. Moreover, it is integral to them 
that they are able to deal with conflicts that cannot be dealt with elsewhere, and that they are 
structured to facilitate this task. For local and central governments that must handle 
controversial issues, it is according to Brunsson often easier to act contrary to the ways in 
which they talk, and wise to talk contrary to the ways in which they act – double talk.  
 
The political organization is characterized of a large variety of ideas, needs, demands and try 
to meet the values and inconsistent expectations of different groups in society.  
The surroundings are characterized by constant change. 
 
Political organizations have three characteristics: 
• Talk (speech, understanding, social interest, development of ideas, values)  
• Decisions, often ambiguous  
• Products – ideologies, e.g. a prestige building as a product sold to gather more support 
and supporters 
 
Brunsson uses the term hypocrisy about the double talk one finds when plans and decisions 
are separated from action. For example: promote sustainable development and more public 
transport use, but reduce the subsidies to PT next day. 
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2.3 Methodology  
 
Methodology is concerned with the form of knowledge on  assesses to be valid related to the 
research question. In other words, methodology is guidelines on how the research s all, ought 
to and can be performed to make the research results acceptabl  as valid knowledge. A 
method consists of rules and techniques on how to collect, adapt, analyze and present 
empirical evidence. Rationality is not only logical, nalytical rationality, but rationality is also 
based on experience with aspects tied to the context and subjects intuition (Lysgård 2000).   
 
2.3.1 Theory based search for data? 
 
As soon as the historian E H Carr found the main data sources he started to write, usually not 
the introduction, but anywhere, and thereafter reading and writing took place simultaneously  
Clausen (1986:56). My working method has been similar and I have used the historians’ 
cyclic methodology starting with a more or less well d fined research question, which was 
refined through the research process:  
 
Search for data  > analyses  > build hypothesis  > back to the empirical > revise hypothesis > 
search for data >>> and so on in a cyclic research p ocess. 
 
The following figure attempts to illustrate this cyclic process.  
 
Figure 2-7  The cyclic research process  
 
In addition to the main stream in this cyclic process one should according to Kleven look for 
the “unexpected”, the little “extra” which made that the situation never became as expected 
because mechanisms interacted. These comments are based on his own experiences on such a 
research process (Kleven 1990 translated by author):  
 
1. Repeated shifts between empirical data and theoretical reflection 
2. With increasing understanding the theoretical perspective has shifted and with that the 
direction of the study 
3. Research questions, which at the outset made up a driving force became less 
interesting and were replaced. Several thoughts may rise as what about intentional acts 
and non-intentional acts, what about feelings, were diff rent sorts of rationalities are 
involved. 
 
 Research question                 Search for data  
 
 
Revise hypothesis   Interpret/build hypothesis 
 
  More data 
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4. At a particular point the alternation between the search for understanding and the 
search for possible explanations must close. The hermeneutical circle must be 
transformed to a linear description, which is very difficult.  
5. The unbalance or time-difference between the collection of data and the reflection on 
the data raises a validity question. Is the “final” reflection based on the most relevant 
or interesting data? 
 
 
2.3.2 Critical Realism as philosophical basis 
 
The research approach has been inspired by the philosophy of Critical Realism (CR), strongly 
associated with the works of Roy Bhaskar. CR acknowledge that the world consists of objects 
that possess emergent powers in virtue of their relations to other objects, and that these 
relations can form structures and exercise powers in the form of mechanisms, that may not be 
perceived by us as related to empirically observable effects. Mechanisms are then understood 
as structures that exercise powers and have real eff cts, although there may not be any 
immediately observable connection between mechanisms and their effects. Science should be 
understood as an ongoing process in which scientists improve the concepts they use to 
understand the mechanisms that they study. It should not, be about the identification of a 
coincidence between a postulated independent variable and dependent variable. 
 
CR prescribes a social scientific method which seek to identify the mechanisms producing 
social events, and makes the observation that it is also highly plausible that a mechanism will 
exist but either a) go unactivated, b) be activated, but not perceived, or c) be activated, but 
counteracted by other mechanisms, which results in i  having unpredictable effects.47 
 
The Critical Realist approach places emphasis on the mechanisms that produce events and on 
the structures that support and underpin those mechanisms. The major importance is set not 
on the empirical level of the observable events, but on what produces events, i.e. on their 
causes. This approach draws attention to the crucial fa tor that not all reality is perceived 
through empirical procedures, and the mechanisms we are looking for are in general not 
evident from observation. Reality is more than what our senses perceive. According to 
Critical Realism the reality is layered in three levels or domains: the mpirical – containing 
our experiences of the world, the actual – containing the events, part of which we never get to 
experience, and the r al – containing the causal mechanisms we want to identify. Below is a 
figure showing the relationship between the concrete and the abstract. 
 
                                                
47 Based on Wikipedia: Critical Realism.  
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Figure 2-8 Structures, mechanisms and events, Danermark 2001, after Sayer (1992:117)  
 
The three different domains spring out of the belief that objects possess emergent powers, i.e. 
capacities within the objects which exist whether exercised or not. At the lowest level called 
structure in the figure are the causal forces and te encies, which may or may not lead to 
observable events. That is because causal forces may neutralize, prevent or reinforce a causal 
tendency, thereby both produce or prevent empirical events.  
 
Bhaskar draws a distinct border line between the more basic strata of the natural world and 
the more complex strata of the social world, a discus ion that leads to the Transformational 
Model of Social Activity: “Society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the 
continually produced outcome of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is, conscious 
production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, that is 
society. One could refer to the former as the duality of structure, and the latter as the duality 
of praxis”.48  
 
                                                
48 Bhaskar cited in Askildsen, T.C. (2002): Driving Forces in Goods Transport Development. Dr Polit. thesis, 
Department of Sociology and Human Geography, Univers ty of Oslo.  
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This Transformational Model of social activity is often drawn as in the following figure:  
 
Figure 2-9 The CR Transformational model of social activity, after Bhaskar 1989.  
Source: Næss, P. (2004): “Planlægning, prædiktion og videnskab teori”. In Christensen, J. (ed.) Vidensgrundlag 
for handlen, pp. 151-186. Aalborg Universitetsforlag 
 
Societal structures can be understood as framework conditions that through mechanisms 
guide and direct actions and shape ev nts. Structures and agency/actors exist in a reciprocal 
relationship, but with an important time-lag: We ar s humans born into societies already 
characterized by a number of structures (economic, legal, cultural as well as spatial/physical). 
Through our actions we may reproduce, modify or even replace some structures, but we do 
not as individuals create the structures from scratch when we awake in the morning – they are 
already there, enabling some actions and putting costraints on other activities.  
 
In this study I try to trace the mechanisms having caused the events, and through that also 
throw light on the structures framing and directing the mechanisms. Moving from the 
concrete empirical events to the domains of the actual and the real is done by abstract thought 
processes opening up for different interpretations, but always with the aim of creating holistic 
explanations.  
 
2.3.3 A stream of events 
 
History of land use and transport planning 
The recent history of land use and transport planning in the cities is looked into covering a 
perspective of twenty years. It is therefore a study of what has happened after the Brundtland 
report was published in 1987, but some paths were followed further back in history. Cities are 
fast changing many places, from core cities hierarchically positioned in the geography 
(Christaller) to sprawling polycentric urban fields, a change both facilitated by the car and 
driven by the car. The ideologies of new liberalism and new public management have forced 
changes in, and are changing contemporary planning; some call this a shift from Government 
to Governance.  
 
The driving forces that produce changes in land use and transportation at the local level are 
many. In this study we look at a stream of events over time. The events are those representing 
or leading to distinct changes in land use and/or transportation planning, policy and on the 
ground. At one level we describe the events and their rol  among the total stream of events 
forming the land use and transport in the local community. At another level we look below 
the surface and ask how initiatives were conceived and how they were applied, we are 
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especially interested in the three elements that can be conceptualized as mechanisms, 
relationships and agencies.  
 
In a city there are over time certain events, which make a profound change, like the building 
of the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao. On a smaller scale building a big multi-storey car park 
changes the supply of parking over night, which in a market leads to lower parking prices and 
greater demand for parking. Some of the incremental events sum up over time to become 
important, while other events make a substantial impact straight away, like location of a 
superstore.  
 
A model can be used to illustrate and explain complex situations as this illustration of the city 
in a stream of forces. It is a tool to systemize, make clear and explain the complex reality. 
Simplicity can be very valuable for oversight and understanding, for how this and that are 
joined together. But simplicity is also the weakness of the model, the difference between the 
model and reality tends to increase the more complex, dynamic and conflicting the real world 
becomes.  
 
2.3.3.1 Path dependence 
In this project we use two different models for exploring and understanding the city viewed as 
a stream of events. The first model is how Thomas P Hughes49 used path dependence to 
explain changes in socio-technical systems. Hughes defined the model with these concepts:  
 
System builders goal driven entrepreneurs who form, develop and try to manage the 
development and expansion of the system.  
Phases of Development  time periods, each recognized by special tasks and problems to 
be solved. 
Bottlenecks  technological, institutional and organizational problems occurring in a system, 
which must be solved before the system can develop further. 
Momentum is the inertia or self-weight of the system, which makes it difficult to change 
track. This has relevance for the competition with ot er systems.  
                                                
49 Hughes Thomas P, (2000): Rescuing Prometheus Vintage Books. 
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Veto-points decision points in a planning process where different interest groups or 
stakeholders can block, delay or change the actual plans or proposals. 
 
It is not possible to recreate history, as it was. A true as possible story is the aim. Path 
dependence is used to explain the relatively stable, long lasting political and institutional 
patterns that can be observed – but also changes and breakdown in these patterns. Path 
dependence – self-reinforcing forces or learning – can be a helpful tool to explain change in 
complex socio-technical systems as city land use and tr sport planning is.  
 
2.3.3.2 The Garbage Can model 
The Garbage Can model as developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) can be used to 
describe flows and events in planning and decision-making processes. The model can be 
looked at as the meeting of four streams (after Olsen 1994):  
 
• A stream of decision opportunities. Situations were the organization shall take action 
on a problem and make choices regarding organization or contents of policies. 
• A stream of problems. All kind of problems crop up in processes. They may be 
created internally in the organization or may be coming from the outside. 
• A stream of solutions. The solutions may be answers to a problem, but solions can 
also be the source of problems. Until solutions are proposed, one often may have 
unclear ideas about the problem. The solutions may be new techniques, standardized 
solutions i.e. from traffic models, increased budget or employing new people.  
• A stream of participants. These participants bring interests, knowledge, energy, 
contacts and both problems and solutions.  
 
This model breaks the conditions set for Banfield’s rational planning model. The Garbage 
Can model sees decisions as the more or less continge  meeting of these four streams of 
participants, decision opportunities, problems and solutions. There are two processes, which 
are particularly important for the output: 
 
• The process of activation, which concerns who will be activated and how they will be 
organized. It is a process that lead to who mayand will  be coupled to what decision 
opportunities.  
• The process of defining, which decides which problems and which solutions are 
defined into decision processes and how important the participants regard the 
decisions made.  
 
The organizational structure often decides how the four streams are coupled together and 
thereby it influences the decision outcome. If the coupling of the streams is based on 
structural and administrative set ups, then to a large extent it is clear which actors solve which 
problems. If four flows flow together with no restric ions on who participates and what 
problems taken up, the decision process will be more uncertain and contingent.  
 
The Garbage Can model is an empirical model that many regard as suitable to study decision 
processes with many goals, unclear means – ends relationships, and unstable and unclear 
patterns of influence and participation. With the sift towards more market solutions and 
increasingly more participants in LU&T planning, I see this model as very helpful in 
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describing and understanding the course of events in each city. Combined with the philosophy 
of Critical Realism outlined above it will be used to explain the mechanisms that cause the 
events.  
 
2.3.4 Power  
 
Robert Dahl in his classic book Who Governs? Democracy and power in an American City 
studies how the city of New Haven (164 000 inhabitants) was governed over a period of 250 
years (Dahl 1961). For the study he asked the question:  
In a political system where nearly all adults may vote but where knowledge, 
wealth, social position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally 
distributed, who actually governs? 
 
Dahl formulated this view of power “  power is a relation among social actors in which one 
social actor A, can get another social actor B, to do something that B would not otherwise 
have done”  
 
The ideals about democracy lead to: ”the relationships between leaders and sub leaders will 
be clothed in the rituals and ceremonies of ”democratic” control, according to which the 
leaders are ”representatives” of a broader community.” (page 102). Dahl also points out the 
importance of feelings and tacit knowledge (page 307) ”Surrounded by uncertainty, the 
politician himself necessarily imputes a structure and meaning to the situation that goes 
beyond empirical evidence and scientific modes of analysis. What the politician imputes to 
the situation depends, in sum, not only on the information at his disposal but also his inner 
predispositions (optimism or pessimism, negotiation or toughness, caution or boldness, etc).” 
The pillars of democracy (albeit far from the ideal) are, according to Dahl:  
1) the physical, economic and social conditions,  
2) the laws and  
3) the customs, the customs or traditions often is the dividing difference between 
democracy and not.  
 
He also ends up with a question: An elite no longer rules New Haven, but the disapperance 
of the elite rule has not led to the emergence of rule by the people. Who, then, rules in a 
pluralist democracy? (Page 86) 
 
Weber’s view of power (1971:88):  
• Legal command as in the bureaucracy. Through a system of rules and norms, 
legitimate power can be exercised. 
• Traditional command. The exercise of power is legitima e in the belief that the 
authority that is exercised is holy. 
• Charismatic command. The authority lies in the belief that the person wielding power 
has special gifts.  
 
Lukes (1974) includes both individual and structural aspects of power when draws three 
dimensions of power: The first dimension is “power as force over”. The second dimension of 
power is the hidden power in structures, etc. that prevent certain views to be expressed, as 
power to set the agenda. The third dimension of power is the powerlessness caused by 
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interests not being articulated  “  by influencing, shaping, determining (men’s) very wants and 
thereby secure compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires” (1974:23)  
 
Haugaard is in an interesting article reflecting over the seven ways of creating power.50 He 
discusses among others Giddens’ structuration concept: “While it is true that the reproduction 
of structure presupposes structuration by actor A, it also presupposes the recognition of that 
action as ordered, or meaningful, by an actor B (structuration is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the reproduction of social structure).”  This second act Haugaard calls 
confirming-structuring, a concept he prefers to restructuring. “This process of structuring and 
restructuring is central in the working of democracy: the losers in an election “are willing to 
confirm-structure the structuration practices of the victors so, in a sense, they consent to their 
own defeat”.  
 
Flyvbjerg claims that to understand power one must widen Lukes’ perspective beyond 
structures to ask questions on relations. One must look at power as something more than 
possession of power, one must be concerned with how power is wielded (Flyvbjerg 1991: 
105-106)51: “Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one 
holds on to or allows to slip away…… power is exercis d rather than possessed ……power is 
not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with, it 
is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society.” 
 
This weight on strategy – the dynamic and the execution of power – leads to studies of 
processes in which How-questions are the important. Foucault according to Flyvbjerg wants 
to expand studies of power from the structural question  of who, what, where and why, to also 
include the question about How (Flyvbjerg 1992:107)52: “If   I grant a certain privileged 
position to the question of ‘how’ it is not because I would wish to eliminate the questions of 
‘what’ and ‘why’. Rather it is that I wish to   know if it is legitimate to imagine a power which 
unites in itself a what, a why and a how”. The traditional view on power as represented by 
Dahl and Weber, was that power was held, but later power became something that was 
exercised through strategy and struggle. Power therefore is concerned with the r lation 
between actors, but it is also attached to context and a specific time. 
 
Bent Flyvbjerg develops a set of methodological guidelines for a ‘phronetic social science’ 
(2001) based on the old Greek intellectual virtues epi teme, techne and phronesis. These can 
according to Flyvbjerg be characterized as:  
 
Episteme  Scientific knowledge. Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based on 
general analytical rationality. The original concept is known today from the terms 
‘epistemology’ and ‘epistemic’.  
Techne Craft/art. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward production. 
Based on practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious goal. The original 
concept appears today in terms such as ‘technique’, ‘technical’, and ‘technology’. 
                                                
50 Haugaard, M. (2003): "Reflecting on Seven Ways of Creating Power." European Journal of Social Theory, 
Vol. 6, pp. 87-113 
51 Cited from Flyvbjerg 1991 where he refer to Foucault (1980): The history of sexuality  
52 Cited from Flyvbjerg 1991 where he refers to Foucault (1982): The Subject and Power  
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Phronesis  Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, 
context-dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original 
concept has no analogous contemporary term.  
 
Phronesis (prudence) is a sense of the ethically practical rather than a kind of science. 
Flyvbjerg combines this concept with the consideration of power and poses four phronesis 
questions:  
1. Where are we going with democracy? 
2. Who gains and who loses by which mechanisms of power? 
3. Is it desirable? 
4. What should be done?  
 
These four questions are the overriding questions guiding this case study. In this study both 
the structural side and the dynamic side will be usd in the study of the four cities.  
 
2.3.5 Agencies and actors 
 
An understanding of the role and approach of the many agencies involved in the urban policy 
process will greatly aid effective policy development and implementation. Such 
understanding will also be concerned with issues of leadership and coordination in the policy 
process (Hambleton 1995:216).  
 
Following Giddens: “structural power relations provide the context, but agency is vital in 
having the potential to continually transform this context through a process of structuration” 
(cited from Vigar 2002:23). Structuration theory aims to avoid extremes of structural or agent 
determinism. The balancing of agency and structure is ferred to as the duality of structure: 
social structures make social action possible, and at the same time that social action creates 
those very structures. Agency, as Giddens calls it, is human ction. To be human is to be an 
agent, although not all agents are human beings. Agents' k owledge of their society informs 
their actions, which reproduce social structures, which in turn enforce and maintain the 
dynamics of action. For Giddens, structures are rul s and resources (sets of transformation 
relations) organized as properties of social system. Rules are patterns people may follow in 
social life. Resources relate to what is created by human action; they are not given by nature 
(Wikipedia on Anthony Giddens, accessed June 2008). 
 
The theory of structuration distinguishes between discursive and practical knowledge, 
recognizes actors as having knowledge that is reflexive and situated, and that habitual use 
becomes institutionalized. A social system can be understood by its structure, and interaction. 
Rules and resources available to and governing agents co stitute structure. Authoritative 
resources control persons, whereas allocative resources control material objects.  
 
For the purposes of this study I adopt the same view as Vigar on structuration theory: “a
useful way of thinking about embedded rules and societal structures within which 
stakeholders (among them LU&T planners) operate, and subsequently how this limits their 
action. At the same time we should be aware that active agency may transform this structural 
context” (Vigar 2002:23)  
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Individuals play often a decisive role in change, but it is very difficult to reveal their true 
influence as this statement tells: “Sociological institutionalism does not explicitly allow for 
one crucial dimension of power: That of the power, will and capabilities of individuals and 
the values and ethics they bring given policy dilemmas.” (Mule, 1999, p 149, in Vigar, 2002, 
page 216) “It is certainly true that alternative explanations for many processes described in 
this book could lie in the whim, capabilities and will of powerful individuals.”  
 
In a study of the location of out of town shopping centres Holsen showed that the developers 
used varied approaches to promote their cases:  
1) informal (closed politics to secure support and “kill” alternatives) until carefully timed 
formal case handling start,  
2) timing also important in relation to what otherwise attracts attention (other cases with 
conflicts, celebrations and holidays, before the summer recess, etc.)  
3) choice of process and type of plan (confer the practice in Kristiansand, ch. 4.9) (Holsen 
1993:12) 
 
Lastly, on agency a comment on public choice theory, which is often according to Wikipedia 
referred to when discussing how individual political decision-making results in policy that 
conflicts with the overall desires of the general public. For example, many special interest and 
pork barrel projects are not the desire of the overall democracy. However, it makes sense for 
politicians to support these projects. It may benefit them psychologically as they feel powerful 
and important. It can also benefit them financially s it may open the door to future wealth as 
lobbyists (after they retire). The project may be of interest to the politician's local 
constituency, increasing district votes or campaign co tributions. The politician pays little or 
no cost to gain these benefits, as they are spending public tax money. Special interest 
lobbyists are also behaving rationally. They can gai  overnment favors worth millions or 
billions for relatively small investments. They face a risk of losing out to their competitors if 
they don't seek these favors. Everyone involved has rational incentives to do exactly what 
they're doing, even though the desire of the general constituency is opposite. (Wikipedia: 
Public choice theory) Although this was written with a perspective on the USA, it may be 
useful to think in terms of public choice theory when agency on the city level is analyzed.  
 
2.3.6 The market turn, does it make long-term planning less important?  
 
Globalization and increased economic competition together with fundamental changes in the 
geographical production and consumption structure, has put cities in a new competitive 
situation. (Amin and Thrift, 1994, Castells 1996) Globalization and internationalization has of 
course been with us for centuries, but the information technology and especially the Internet 
has brought faster change and greater complexity. The terms Glocal – that the global 
economy impacts on and becomes intertwined with the local – and Raplex53 – rapid change in 
complex systems – can be said to describe the world after the millennium. Castells (1996) has 
in his books on the information age and network society coined the concept “the space of 
flows” as a contrast to the traditional “the spaces of places”. Cities are conceptualized as 
“processes” and as nodes or hubs in globalizing networks. London for example has now 
                                                
53 Raplex was used in the introduction by Bo Elling ad Karl Georg Høyer, in Elling, Bo. (ed) De store Nordiske 
Transportprosjekter. Transportinfrastruktur. Miljø og Regional Udvikling. NordREFO rapport 1996:4. 
Stockholm: NordREFO  
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become the centre in a polycentric system of some 30-40 cities within a 160 km radius from 
Central London, South East England.54 Other examples of how the global networks impact 
are the successful participation in the world economy n oil drilling technology in 
Kristiansand, and the moving out of concern headquarters from Norwich. The implications of 
the space of flows are twofold, firstly it makes it difficult to delimit the area for this study of 
land use and transport to medium sized cities, and secondly it makes it more complicated to 
assess to what extent “global” flows are associated with the physical development at regional 
and city scale.  
 
This competitive situation is met with a turn to city branding and marketing to make the city 
more competitive and to attract inward investment, mployment and people. The new 
competitive situation has also supported cooperation between business and authorities on a 
wider scale, with the effect that decisions are transferred from the formal democracy to the 
market, which puts more emphasis on the exchange valu of place than the use value (Logan 
and Molotch 1987). There is a serious danger that citizens will lose influence that the 
Governance relations gain and is it likely that LU&T gradually will become marginalized by 
this public private cooperation and partnerships?  
 
The LU&T planning context in the cities varies with: population structure and growth, 
migration, business structure and economic growth, land use and building land availability, 
transport infrastructure and city economic viability. These contexts are probably important 
factors in each city’s development. The history andtra ition with regards to the relationship 
with central authorities (centre-periphery dimensio) and local attitudes (demanding, begging, 
suffering) may influence the course of events greatly (the prime example in Norway is the 
mayor in Kristiansand who went out in the press and nounced that the city did not want the 
headquarter of the dirty oil business, which went to the city neighbor Stavanger). Party 
political majority in the city council may influence LU&T planning in many ways. This will 
particularly be the case when a majority is constant over many years. Kristiansand is the only 
major city in Norway where Labour (Arbeiderpartiet) never was in position55. It has been 
ruled by a centre-right coalition for decades with the labour party more or less supporting the 
regime. Another example of long-time rule is Norwich where the Labour had the majority in 
the city council for seventy years. These questions have been used to guide the collection of 
data in each city and when analyzing the events and the mechanisms causing the events. 
 
                                                
54 Hall Peter, and Kathy Pain (2006) The polycentric metropolis 
55 Sandvik, Pål Thonstad, (1999): Kristiansands historie 1945-1999. Kristiansand: Sparebanken Pluss  
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3 Case study approach and research design 
 
3.1 Case study methodology 
 
3.1.1 Foucault and Critical Realism 
 
The case study approach is inspired by the reconstruction of Foucault’s research and method 
done by Bent Flyvbjerg in volume one of his thesis from 1991: Rationalitet og magt. Det 
konkretes videnskab, and by Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen in Diskursive analysestrategier. 
Foucault never asks why or what to the statements, o ly how. Statements are positive events 
that through speech bring existence. This existence has four aspects: object, subject, network 
of events and strategy. The statements are always statements in a discourse. The discourse 
analysis field is “the collection of all actual statements (spoken and written) in their historic 
spread and their specific momentary value. The discourse is the final and factually delimited 
corpus of the spoken sequences that was formulated.”  The discourse analysis is concerned 
with circling this corpus. It is a question about constructing the archive of a discourse, which 
in the end regulates what has been said and not said in  society. Only through the description 
of the archive of a discourse is it possible to see th  discursive formation and transformation 
(Andersen 1999, translated by author).  
 
Archaeology is the science of this archive (Andersen 1999:47). When the archive is formed, 
one can ask about the discourse formations. There ar  four discourse formations, or four 
collections of rules for the generation of statements:  
 
The forming of objects 
The forming of subjects 
The forming of statements 
The forming of strategies 
 
Archaeology as method implies registration and mapping of events a d practices, description 
of what they consist of and how they are put together. With focus on single and contingent 
events instead of causal connections, one tries to describe regularities, differences, 
transformations and other events that have been more or less important elements in the 
development and the formation of the practices and discourses studied. Confrontations, 
dominance and power struggles are important events to be recorded, since these are central 
elements in the further analysis of practice’s histor cal birth. Archaeology focuses on how a 
discourse looks in a historical cross-section (event) a d is oriented towards description and 
explanation of what the practice consists of and how it is put together. 
 
Genealogy is a further development of the archaeology method by attempting to understand 
the historical and political importance of practices, and is trying to reveal the power relations 
that lie behind the start and growth of the practice studied. “Genealogy  is to identify 
accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false 
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appraisals, and the faulty calculations that give birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us  ”56 
 
Genealogy is concerned with probing the discourses and practices by showing the power 
relations they were generated by, and also the cracks in the terrain within which strategies, 
institutions and practices are formed. It is concered with the dissolution of the obvious with 
the help of history. The genealogical strategy tries to open the discursive field through the 
tracing of practices’ historical and political influences and is focused on revealing the power 
relations behind the origin and growth of the practices studied.  
 
The concepts of strategy and power-relations are according to Flyvbjerg central in the study 
of power. Strategies are concerned with 3 points:  
• First, ends-means rationality, what means are necessary to achieve what goals. 
• Second, how to act under the presumption of how the o r will act, and what to 
believe about the other parts believing what I willdo. 
• Third, procedures to remove the opponent’s weapons and force him to give up (see 
also 2.4.4). 
 
In sum a strategy is according to Flyvbjerg the totality of means used to implement power and 
to keep power (Flyvbjerg, Vol. I, 1991:113, with reference to Foucault). Foucault has two 
different strategies for analysis, the archaeological and the genealogical. Together the two 
strategies have been an inspiration and framework for the analysis strategy for the case studies 
of the four cities. The relationship between them can be illustrated thus (Andersen 1999:63): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1  The archaeology analysis strategy, after N Åkerstrøm Andersen 1999. 
 
This represents an understanding of history as a vast amount of contingent events without 
purpose, overriding principles or built in stability. There are parallels to the Garbage Can 
model and the main model of analyzing the history as a stream of events in this picture of 
Foucault’s two main strategies.  
 
                                                
56 Foucault 1984, p 81. Here cited from Lysgård 2000.  
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Critical Realism places contrary to Foucault emphasis on causality and hence the why 
question, as discussed in chapter 2.4.2. The why question refers to the belief in Critical 
Realism that objects possess emergent powers in virtue of their relations to other objects, and 
that these relations can form structures and exercise powers in the form of mechanisms. 
Asking why questions are helps to reveal these mechanisms.  
 
The figure above combining the genealogy with the in depth focused archaeology has been an 
inspiration for the longitudinal time series study combined with cross section studies of 
particular events performed in this thesis. Contrary to Foucault I have put a lot of emphasis on 
causal explanations and the motives behind mechanisms causing events. There are structural 
conditions that give some actors greater propensity to act than others, and some contexts make 
certain behavior and practice more likely than others.  
 
3.1.2 Case Study research 
 
Yin’s very popular book on case study research has been the manual for this study 57. One of 
the first issues in the book is a comparison of different research approaches, as shown in the 
table below:  
 
 
Strategy  Form of research 
question 
Requires control over 
behavioral events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment  How, why Yes Yes 
Survey  Who, what, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes/No 
History  How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
 
 
A case study has advantages when a “how” or “why” question is being asked about 
contemporary set of events over which the investigation has little or no control. It therefore 
was fitting well with my theme of studying the effects of land us and transport planning in 
cities. Yin sees a case study as a comprehensive research strategy, defined as: A Case Study is 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
 
Because phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable in real-life situations, Yin 
add a second part to the definition: The Case Study inquiry a) copes with many more variables 
than data points, b) relies on multiple sources of evidence, c) benefits from prior theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis. 
 
The case study is particularly suitable when believing that the contextual conditions are highly 
pertinent to your phenomenon of study (Yin 1994:13). This also fits with Flyvbjerg’s 
insistence that daily practices and cases only can be understood in their relevant context 
                                                
57 Yin Robert K, 1994 Case Study Research. Design and methods Sage London 
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(Flyvbjerg 1991). Based on Aristotle’s’ three intellectual virtues episteme, techne and 
phronesis as starting point he argues that progressive phronesis research is the way forward 
for the study of man and society. Phronesis (prudence, ethics, morals) research should imply 
the analysis of values and interests in practices in their contexts. The emphasis on context also 
fits with the philosophy of Critical Realism as outlined above.  
 
Five components of research design are especially important: 
1. a study’s questions 
2. its propositions, if any 
3. its unit(s) of analysis 
4. the logic linking the data to the propositions, and 
5. the criteria for interpreting the findings 
 
The five components of research designs force the res archer to begin constructing a 
preliminary theory related to the topic of study. This role of theory development, prior to the 
conduct of any data collection, is one point of diference between case studies and related 
methods. In this sense the complete research design mbodies a “theory” or a “blueprint” of 
what is being studied. The complete research design will then provide strong guidance in 
determining what data to collect and the strategies for analyzing the data. The theory 
development prior to the collection of any case data is an essential step in doing case studies. 
The appropriately developed theory is the level at which generalization of the case study 
results will occur, called “analytical generalization” as opposed to statistical generalization. 
Multiple cases should be considered like multiple experiments and the method of 
generalization is “analytical generalization” in whic  a previously developed theory is used as 
a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin 1994:28-32).  
 
The research design can be seen as a “quasi-experiment” where the aim is, informed by 
theory, to single out and delineate phenomena in way where interrelations between variables 
can be given sufficient control by the researcher. The study’s research question was presented 
in chapter 1. Chapter 2 outlines several theories that were used in the studies of the four cities 
guiding the search for and analysis of data. These av  formed the propositions or hypotheses 
used in the confrontation of data and theory in the cyclic research process outlined above.  
 
The unit of analysis is related to the fundamental problem of defining the case. Simply, this 
thesis is about environmentally sustainable transport in cities. A model of “the city” is shown 
in figure 2.4, which is the main unit of analysis. This model more specifically can be divided 
into city structure with land use and activities, transport structure and interconnections, and 
management system called “development control” in the figure. The transport system makes 
the activities possible, and hence it is not only ph sical structure but also how the activities in 
buildings interconnect. The main unit of analysis i therefore in the research divided into 
several subunits.  
 
This work has had the following statement as a guideline: an exploratory case study should be 
preceded with statements about a) what is to be explored, b) the purpose of the exploration, c) 
the criteria by which the exploration will be judged successful (Yin 1994:28).  
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Case protocol 
For each of the cities a case protocol was formed. In the beginning it functioned as a register 
documenting the work. After some time the protocol to k on a wider role when the work on 
the case descriptions started. It became, I can see in hindsight, a process of interaction 
between the writing of the case description and the protocol, a process I think was very 
helpful in producing this result.  
 
3.1.3 Research method 
 
In this thesis the focus is on land use and transport planning in cities, with the aim to 
understand how this instrument has been used and can be used to facilitate policy goals. The 
city is seen as an object situated in a stream of forces that change the city over time. These 
forces are both external, working on the city, and internal forces responding to external forces.  
 
The research method is first to delimit the city and the land use planning policy in the city 
through finding the land use and transport events that has had important effects on the city 
development. Secondly an in depth exploration into each event is done to find the 
mechanisms that has caused that event. After the events are investigated the external forces 
are looked into to explore the vertical relationship  from the global via the national to the 
local level, and how these relations are connected to the horizontal forces and spatial 
dimension on the city level.  
 
The research process was in practice a cyclic process with finding and analyzing data, back to 
the data for more information, then analyzing data and back to the data again, and so on as 
described in chapter 2.3.1. This cyclic process shifting between data analysis and drawing 
inferences from the data is similar to what can be called the methodology in historic 
research58.  
 
3.1.4 Reliability and validity 
 
How the city has changed over time will be described ased on a list of important events in a 
land use and transport perspective. The description w ll for example note that the highway 
was built contrary to the Sustainability Plan for the city. How can that be explained? One 
explanation can be that the description was wrong, the highway will support the development 
of a more sustainable city. Another explanation can be that the Sustainability Plan was only 
made to appease the central government.  
 
Thus, both description and explanation raise question  of reliability and validity. The data and 
methods used may strengthen reliability. Validity will mainly be judged by the extent to 
which the story, the connections and causes describd are plausible or “truthful”. According 
to Yin the possibility of case study research lies in analytical generalization, i.e. generalizing 
in relation to a theoretical universe aiming at expanding theories. The validity test or the 
study’s “truthfulness” will therefore be how well this research explains the particular 
outcomes. 
 
                                                
58 Clausen, H.P. (1998): Hvad er Historie?    
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Even if the knowledge produced by the research is valid, it need not be reliable. Yin 
(1994:33) using the traditional social science concepts of trustworthiness, credibility, 
confirmability and data dependability, discriminates between four tests of research designs: 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. These tests should be 
used in case study tactic and the different phases of the research.  
 
As Stone points out in Atlanta the tacit understanding and knowledge were the important glue 
that held the governing coalition together (Stone 1989). Events create expectations among 
those participating in causing the event. There is a mutual understanding and trust from past 
events, which can be drawn upon at future situations. To identify governing coalitions in the 
cities and how tacit knowledge is used are a major research task in the project, which again 
raises reliability and validity questions.  
 
3.1.5 Evaluation of Land Use and Transport policy   
 
According to Salet and Gualini (2001) plans can be evaluated along three dimensions:  
• Institutional context 
• Planning strategies and tools 
• Best practice  
 
Hambleton claims that a good evaluation should satisfy the three E’s of evaluation: 
Effectiveness, Equity and Efficiency. An evaluation should permit the program to be improved 
in these three dimensions, however the policy-makers d fine them. The evaluation must meet 
minimum criteria of political acceptability, i.e. if the evaluation is not credible it will fail 
(Hambleton and Thomas, 1995:92). 
 
• Effectiveness: the extent to which the objectives ar  met by a given program. For the 
evaluation to be able to assess the extent to which a program achieves its ends, the 
policy objectives must be well understood, but also ccepted as legitimate by the 
constituents affected.  
• Equity: is defined situationally, it is not synonymous with equality. Equity in program 
outcome may call for inequality in distribution of resources, conflict about how equity 
is to be defined is inevitable.  
• Efficiency: this criterion refers to the costs (monetary or otherwise) of the means used 
to attain the intended end: can the same effect be a tained at lower monetary, social 
and environmental costs? 
 
A distinction between programmatic a tivity and impact must be drawn if an evaluation is to 
promote the three Es. All interventions have specific outputs: number of people trained, 
buildings rehabilitated, and so on. If however the trainees find no jobs, the rehabilitated 
buildings no buyers, etc. these activities may have zero or even negative outcomes. The 
evaluation of Land Use and Transport policy should look at: 
• Strategic proficiency 
• Innovation capacity 
• Consensus building 
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The conflict between economic growth and sustainable transport, how is it treated? Admitted, 
ignored – analyzed, prioritized? To what extent does marketing overshadow the real content? 
In Kristiansand the city council executive had a very positive evaluation of the Sustainable 
City project, the need to paint a picture of success was great and the strategic positioning 
towards the MoE another concern. In Aalborg several prizes have been bestowed on the 
LU&T planning, clearly with different strategic aims.  
 
Questions to be asked are: What are the effects of LU&T planning? How do the plans impact 
in the decision-making process? Are the plans impleented, fully, partly or not at all? How 
and to what extent did LU&T planning lead to events and did it influence other events? 
Conformance between LU&T plan and result? Performance of the LU&T plan as decision 
support, actual use and decisions according to or cntrary to plan? 
 
Planning as have to, ought to, want to or nice to have? Planning as adaptation to the course of 
development or instrumental to guide and change devlopment? To what degree was the 
instrumental use active or passive? Is it possible to have high ambitions on car traffic 
reduction, and outlining strong measures to achieve this reduction, but never implementing 
the aims and measures? In a conformance perspective it may seem that a plan has been used 
instrumentally in achieving the result, but in fact the use was clearly an adaptation to what 
would have happened in any case.  
 
Before and After studies 
 
Before evaluation asks the question how the plan’s strategies and proposed actions 
would be effective according to the aims of the plan.  
After evaluation asks the question about how effective the plan’s strategies and 
proposed actions actually turned out to be, seen in relation to the aims of the plan and 
judged from the development experienced after the plan was adopted.  
Plans are produced to promote development and control the actual development gradually 
emerging as small steps at a time. Plans may have a very long life (eg the planning ordinance 
from 1907 is still the guideline for the planning office when applying development control in 
my home area!). 
 
Evaluations of public projects are often done by organizations close to the project makers, 
which raises validity and reliability questions of how the evaluation is used, who paid for the 
evaluation and who is to gain and lose?  
 
3.1.6 Theoretical perspectives and relevant research questions 
 
Three core questions guide the study. First, what is understood by environmentally 
sustainable transport development? Reduction of emissions from cars can be done in several 
ways, such as better technology, different types of fuel, etc. These are not dealt with here. In 
this study we concentrate on the how land use and tr sport planning can contribute to less 
travel, shorter travel distances and shift from cars to other modes. The prime interest is the 
outcome: how can the environmentally sustainable transport development goals be reached? 
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Secondly, what is understood by local land use and transport planning? I defined in the 
beginning planning as what planners do. In Norway the planning system requires the 
municipalities to produce a Kommuneplan, which is a general plan for the development of the 
municipality and a specific land use plan. The Kommuneplan is meant to be a strategic plan 
for the guidance of development and the content of local plans for parts of the municipal 
territory or specific themes like road structure. R guleringsplan is the vehicle that decides the 
design, location and rules determining which buildings/structures to be permitted. There is an 
important judicial difference between the legal statuses of these two plan types. The 
Kommuneplan defines future land use, a definition that can be changed by the city council 
without having to pay compensation. A Reguleringsplan both defines land use and puts rights 
and obligations on the land, which has to be compensat d if the Reguleringsplan is changed. 
The planners’ prime tasks are those associated with making this planning system work, as 
producing background documents for politicians’ decisions, plans, permits and planning 
guidance. As the New Public Management has spread as n ideology, the municipalities are 
producing fewer plans than before, a fact that has c nged their role from content producers 
to more and more control of procedures59. 
 
New modes of planning are surfacing in the form of strategies, visions, partnership and other 
measures as the guiding principle for municipal or local planning. The changes facing 
statutory land use planning are not only emerging through institutional measures, but also via 
basic changes in practice and a move towards non-statutory initiatives. This shift from an 
administrative regulatory practice to a more negotiative one has been described by Healey 
(1997): “In many of Europe’s planning systems, the formal mchinery for articulating 
strategies has become discredited and formal systems have ceased to be the key arenas and 
procedures for spatial strategy-making. This new impulse towards strategic planning has 
however taken place rather informally, beyond the formal arenas provided by the planning 
system itself”. Such processes are ongoing in all the four case cities, probably with different 
shape and speed according to the local traditions and needs. The broad definition of planning 
is meant to cover all the activities that form the land use and transport system.  
 
Thirdly, what type of knowledge to be dealt with? One may distinguish between two levels of 
knowledge. The first being what type of research questions to be asked, and the second being 
what theoretical discourses the research is part of. The Norwegian sociologist Ragnvald 
Kalleberg60 distinguishes three types of basic research questions:  
• Probing questions – that ascertain, establish, show something (konstaterende)  
• Evaluative questions – that judge, assess, evaluate a ph nomena (vurderende) 
• Constructive questions – that focus on the normative and what things ought to 
or should become (konstruktive) 
 
The probing research questions relate to what a phenomenon is, and how it has become what 
it is and why it is like that. The evaluative questions relate to what the phenomena is in 
relation to what it should/ought to be, hence the evaluative questions also have normative 
dimensions. The constructive questions ask howa phenomena/situation can and should be 
changed, thus revealing the researchers normative position.  
                                                
59 Private firms produced 70% of the plans according to The national accounts review, 2007.  
60 Kalleberg, R. (1996): ”Forskningsopplegget og samfunnsforskningens dobbeltdialog.” I: Holter, H. Og R. 
Kalleberg (red.): Kvalitative metoder i samfunnsforskningen. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
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In my context this becomes: A) How are land use and transport considerations maintained? B) 
What limitations and possibilities for land use and transport exist? and C) What can be done 
with land use and transport planning to better achieve the environmentally sustainable 
transport development goals set? In this project knowledge has been developed in relation to 
all three types of research questions. This implies questions of how today’s planning systems 
function, how to utilize the systems better and what le rning can be drawn from cross city 
(country) comparison, and what changes should be made to make the systems more effective.  
 
This project is part of three different, but closely related theoretical discourses. They are 
sustainable development and planning, planning theory and implementation theory. The 
discourse on sustainable development and planning ecompasses among other questions on 
relations between physical characteristics of urban land use and mode of transport use and the 
associated amount of transport. The question of sprawl or concentration related to urban 
design is one important dimension. The discourse on pla ning theory deals with questions on 
the various forms of planning, which ranged in the 1960s from Banfield’s rational or synoptic 
model on one side to Lindblom’s incrementalism. Later this discourse turned towards 
communicative and participatory planning models, which have dominated planning theory 
discussions the latest decades. More specific questions are how and under what conditions 
land use and transport planning is a suitable tool for reaching specific goals regarding 
localization, land use and transport modes. Implementation theory in this context refers to 
theories shedding light on conditions for implementing strategies to reduce the fossil fuel 
consumption and GHG emissions from cars in cities. A focus on the implication of different 
types of barriers, structural, actor-related and socio-cultural, is embedded in this.  
 
This study is related to the theoretical discourses in three different ways. First, the theoretical 
perspective gives the study the necessary basis for asking the fruitful, more detailed research 
questions based on the theoretical and empirical knowledge developed in earlier research. 
This is helpful for the identification of and raising of new critical research questions. Second, 
the attachment to several theoretical discourses gives basis for looking at complex problems 
from different angles. Lastly it is an ambition that the study will produce knowledge that 
contributes to both the theoretical and practical worlds.  
 
3.2 Comparison across cities and countries 
 
3.2.1 Six themes to be explored 
 
The spatial planning system in most countries is an important part of the national government. 
Most have their own planning law with instruments and organization to match. At the local 
authority level (in Norway municipalities) the territorial dimension of the law comes into 
effect, both as guiding and monitoring building, development control and strategic planning 
for the local administrations territory. At this level the individual property owner, neighbors 
to building land and the public at large becomes part of the planning process. 
 
To cope with these complex relations both horizontally and vertically, between levels, sectors 
and layers I will look at six issues or areas in each city, to be used for cross comparison and 
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analysis. Focus will be on how differences in contexts and in the organization of land use and 
transport planning impact on planning and how the plans function as strategic instruments. 
These six areas are (after Beatley and van der Brink, 2003):  
• The importance of a broad, national, guiding, spatial framework (guiding lower level, 
providing mechanisms for catalyzing and rallying political and popular support) 
• Integration between levels, sectors and layers of planning. 
• The role of the rational planning model and planning doctrine (eg the Dutch ‘Green 
Heart’).  
• Tools for engaging citizens and the public. 
• Partnerships, collaboration, cross border cooperation and mechanisms. 
• Harnessing the power of the market place: new market ori nted tools. 
 
3.2.2 Methods of comparison 
 
Knut Kjellstadli61 has in a book on methodology built on John Stuart Mill and the concepts 
Method of Agreement and Method of Difference. In the Method of Agreement one asks what is 
equal despite being unequal in size, scope, location, tradition, etc. and in the Method of 
Difference one asks what is unequal despite being equal in size, scope, location, tradition, etc 
 
I have used these methods of comparison in this study. What is compared is decisive in 
finding the factors of explanation. In Kristiansand for example most things were the same in 
the 1980s and 1990s except for:  
1. Change of leadership (new mayor, new city director, new technical director) 
2. The municipality role was strengthened in the planning act 
3. Ideology changes, the new liberal ideas and sustainable development 
4. The Highway Agency finds new roles, and toll road financing spreads 
In the comparison everything is not compared, but description is done in a way where all the 
factors we believe are important when a phenomenon shall be explained are included. Good 
results and “research economy” can be secured by concentrating on one main object and 
compare with other objects only on the factors we think are important to test. (Kjellstadli 
1999:268) An important issue to be aware of is thate comparison is done on indicators and 
event at different times.  
 
Bergene argues that traditional approaches to comparative methodology are not compatible 
with the ontology of critical realism.62 Especially the notion of causality and their reliance on 
inductive inferences are criticized and a combination of intensive and extensive research 
designs is proposed. In this study causality is understood as a generative and contextual 
concept and therefore adheres to the critical realism ontology. The methodology presented by 
Mill is useful to identify possible causal connections, both positive and negative, and then 
investigate causality by identifying plausible causes and the mechanisms that have worked to 
produce the events.  
 
                                                
61 Kjellstadli Knut, 1999. “Fortida er ikke hva den var” Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 
62 Bergene, Ann Cecilie, Towards a critical realist comparative methodology. Journal of Critical Realism 6(1) 
2007, 5-27.  
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”A theory is the language that allows us to move from observation to observation and make 
sense of similarities and differences” (Rudestam & Newton 1992:6). This definition of a 
theory is well suited to my comparative project. The task then becomes to form the 
“language” or “description” or “theory” in a way that makes it possible to move from 
observation to observation to reveal likenesses and differences. Examples from the four cities 
of this thinking are shown in the following box.  
 
Likeness / Unlikeness Comment on differences 
Size of population Norwich urban area population larger than the other cities 
Regional impact on city Davis develops independent of the Sacramento region  
Legislation: planning acts Similar planning legislation in all four cities: an overall strategic plan for
the territory, and a detailed plan for controlling development  
Organization of planning Referendum in Davis. The rol  of the state.  
Role of national state US federal: Davis  
University city All four cities are university cities, but UCD/Davis special because of 
separate jurisdiction outside city area and being the major (sole) 
employer. 
Municipal territory Norwich has no building area reserves within the district, expansion in 
other districts. Davis expands by acquiring land, UCD separate 
jurisdiction. Both Kristiansand and Aalborg have big land reserves that 
can be used for building.  
Growth  Aalborg has far slower growth than the three others. 
Territory  Ample building land, except Norwich cannot expand within municipal 
territory. 
Bike use Norwich has low bike use and poor network  
Self-rule  The room for autonomous action varies considerably between the four 
cities.  
Urban expansion  All three cities drive urban sprawl, except Davis. 
Area/density  Only Norwich has density above 3000 persons/ha. 
Plan/development control 
and management.  
US litigation/individual rights secured in law. Only in Davis can citizens 
test council/plans in courts.   
Referendum  Davis is the only city using referendum 
Subsidiarity  Davis is the only city that can decide LU&T without intervention from 
above (county, region, state) 
 
3.2.3 Case study of four cities 
 
This study is part of a multiple case study limited o medium sized cities: urban areas between 
50-300.000 inhabitants. The focus is on person transport and the effects of the instrument or 
tool: land use and transportation planning, programs and policy.  
 
The key indicators are:  
1. trend in land use and density, person kilometer traveled, consumption of fossil 
resources, emissions 
2. mode share (car, PT, walk, cycle)  
3. urban land use and transportation policy: aims, measures, outputs and outcomes. 
 
In the following the “level of sustainability/unsustainability” or the best practices among 
comparable cities are assessed: 
• Share of walking, cycling and public transport usage. 
• Infrastructure supporting these three modes of travel. 
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• Land use policies that increase densification (dwellings/ha) and limit urban sprawl 
• Social cohesion and accessibility in the area: Public Transport at a level of service that 
gives a minimum standard of access to the city centre63 for all.  
• Policies that 
a) support car sharing, car pooling, etc. 
b) promote walking and cycling 
c) use parking as an instrument to reduce the use of cars 
• Gaps between policy aims and actual development 
 
Lack of integration of land use and transport policy a ross levels and layers is often a major 
problem (Beatley 2003). Planning and implementing of such policies are dependent on several 
actors and agencies cooperating, for example the planning office, the road engineers, 
consultants and highway authorities. “Each of these has vested interests, ideas of how things 
are done and indeed a knowledge of institutions and processes, which may be used to set up 
barriers to all policies that do not suit their interests”. (Bijker et al. 1987, cited from 
Tengström 1999:23) Planning and Action has been a theme in the planning debate for 
decades. A conformance view treats the effectiveness of plans or strategies as goals 
achievement. The Dutch school on the other hand says th t the performance of the plan is 
important, not the result. Plans have effect during the planning process, and plans can perform 
well without influencing actions (see Alexander and Faludi 1988).  
 
In this case study I try to use both the conformance and the performance view, when 
analyzing land use and transport planning. The output of land use and transport policy is the 
decisions on visions and goals and the strategy to reach these goals. This may be called formal 
policies, and are of secondary interest in this study. The outcome of land use and transport 
policies are decisions on budgets and instruments to be used to implement the policy. This 
may be called Realpolitik, and are of prime interest in this study (Flyvbjerg 1998).  
                                                
63 Accessibility to other parts of the city should ideally also be above a minimum standard, but that seem utopian 
in most cities due to the costs of providing public transport at low demand spatially distributed  
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4 Kristiansand 
The case study of Kristiansand, the first of the four cities studied, is described in this chapter. 
The study itself started with the present situation looking at the major land use and transport 
trends and asking several questions of what events, processes and plans have led up this 
situation and trends. A timeline through the planning history was thus created and the paths 
of events could be followed through time. Each important event on the path has been analyzed 
and set in perspective. The result of this study is contained in the metaphor “A tale of two 
cities”. One of the city tales is how Kristiansand presents itself as a sustainable city with all 
the right goals and visions. The other tale is about the sprawling “engine” in the region, 
increasingly car dependent and also called “the climate villain”. The gaps between the 
planned city and the regional change, between the aims of reducing the car traffic (growth) 
and increasing the use of public transport, walking and cycling, between emissions from 
transport as CO2, etc. and aims and international commitments are increasing fast. The 
causes behind these two tales are complex and deep,including fragmented institutions and 
not accountable politicians. Extensive use of the principle of subsidiarity may be one way to 
go to redress the situation.  
 
Below follows first the setting, then data on land use and transport followed by a description 
and analysis of the story of events. In the last section of this chapter the findings from the case 
study of Kristiansand are discussed and lessons are drawn.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 
The city of Kristiansand, the fifth largest in Norway, is a municipality on the southern coast of 
Norway. Some key figures are:  
 
Kristiansand located in Vest-Agder County, Norway 
Area: 276 km2  
Population: 76 000 (2005) 
Admin. centre: Kristiansand Kvadraturen 
 
 Year Kristiansand 
Municipality 
Vest-Agder 
County 
Norway 
Population per 01.01 2004 75 280 160 127 4 577 457 
Pop. change last 10 years  7 417 11 537 252 642 
Pop. change last 10 years %  10.9 7.8 5.8 
Population per km2 2004 290 24 15 
Population share within urban area 2003 96 79 78 
Cars per 1000 inhabitants 2006 390   
Table  4-1 Basic data Kristiansand, Vest-Agder, Norway  
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Figure 4-1 Map showing the location of Kristiansand  
 
 
4.1.1 Contemporary issues - Kristiansand in the new millennium  
 
Some of the important drivers and issues that probably will be of great importance for land 
use and transport change in Kristiansand are:  
Very strong economic growth (the companies: Xtrata, Elkem Solar, Aker Kværner 
MH, National Oilwell are some of the major drivers) 
Major highway investment through city NOK 1.5 billion completed, 4.5 billion 
planned. 
Toll road financing 1992 -2006. New package 2007-2022 planned. 
Cross-border pilot projects Knutepunkt Sørland and ATP project. 
Kommuneplan 2005  
National Transport Plan 2010-2019 
Controversy: Kommunedelplan E39 from the city centre towards west. Grassroots 
action started 2004. Major public opposition to “High Bridge” alternative, the public 
wants E39 in a tunnel bypassing the city centre. Tunnel finally decided by Government 
in 2006. 
 
Kristiansand has also serious lasting challenges as women’s access to jobs, high medication 
usage and scoring low on several life quality indicators. The challenges put aside, 
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Kristiansand was bursting of confidence at the start of the new millennium as the following 
box shows64.  
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Research question and case study aim 
 
The aim of this case study of land use and transport planning in Kristiansand is to describe 
and understand how the city has developed up to the present, with a focus on land use and 
transport. It is further an aim to try to explain the interests and outcomes – the power relations 
– that have gained from that particular development and what interests have been loosing. I 
want to produce mpirical and practically relevant knowledge through this study. The 
empirical research will explore both governmental and political processes of the state and the 
policy-making contexts of planning practice. The focus of the research is land use and 
transport development, with an aim to understand and explain how land use and transport 
planning and policy has been used to change developm nt towards environmentally 
sustainable transport (as part of sustainable development), and what has hindered and what 
has promoted such change. 
 
Through the knowledge production and discussions I have also an aim to contribute to the 
theoretical knowledge production within the field of land use and transport planning in 
medium sized urban areas.  
 
There is the duality between land use and transport. Land use structure influences transport 
behavior, which again influence structure. This study of environmentally sustainable transport 
focuses on one key questions and three sub-questions:  
 
How can land use and transport planning be used to create / increase environmentally 
sustainable transport in cites, what are the barriers for sustainable transport development 
and what promotes such development? 
• How was the connection and interaction between landuse and transport in the 
cities? What effect did planning and policy exert on the choice of transport mode? 
Was the development caused by a deliberate policy and was it sustainable, and in 
case how and why? 
• How could the observed land use and transport development be explained? What 
were the factors facilitating cycling, walking and public transport; and what were 
the factors inhibiting more sustainable transport development?  
• What if any, are the lessons from the case cities for other medium sized cities in 
Europe? 
                                                
64 Fædrelandsvennen, 100705, Start is the elite football club, Quart a music festival, Idol-Jorunn won a TV 
competition and Fiskebrygga is the Fish market.  
Kristiansand is on the map!  
The city sparkles, struts of self-confidence. There are talks of a southern gold 
age down south with hope of gold for Start, Quart-success, Idol-Jorunn, prize 
rewarded super-beach, blooming businesses and Mediterranean atmosphere on 
Fiskebrygga.  
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4.2 History and situation  
 
4.2.1 The planning legacy in Kristiansand and the status 2005 
 
Kristiansand carries a proud legacy of being in the for front in Norway on land use and 
transport planning for decades. After 1985 things changed, planning lost status and market 
rule became the leading ideology, still Kristiansand got the City Planning Prize in 2002. For 
seven years 1993-2000 the city was appointed Sustainable City. Even if several good results 
and learning were achieved, it failed to reach the main goal to reduce car traffic and shift 
travel to public transport. Contrary to the objectives for the Sustainable City, a massive 
highway project through the city was planned, decidd and implementation started during this 
seven-year period. 
 
Congestion on the main trunk road through the city and the lack of investment in road 
capacity made road financing the prime political task. The expansion of the highway network 
is heavily dependent upon the amount of local toll road financing. It has become a finance-led 
instead of demand-led transport planning. Land use planning and development has become a 
consequence of the road plan. When the transport system has been decided, the municipal 
land use plan has been adjusted accordingly. The expansion of the highway system is done to 
cater for car growth and avoid future congestion. Such a massive highway investment as in 
Kristiansand will both reduce travel time for cars (at least in a short term perspective) and 
generate new traffic. This again contributes to reduction in the use of public transport, cycling 
and walking, and more dispersed housing settlements and increased commuting. The paradox 
is that the BusMetro project, which is aiming at reducing car transport, is developed at the 
same time. 
 
Why all these paradoxes? One reason is the way land use and transport are organized. The 
municipality has a monopoly in land use planning of the area of the municipality, accordingly 
the Highway Agency must propose highway plans that t e City Council accept. However, the 
municipality has few active or positive instruments to develop the land use according to the 
plan. The second reason being the way highways and public transport are financed. Public 
transport is the responsibility of and financed by the county. The county has to prioritize its 
funds between secondary schools, culture and public transport, and further between rural or 
urban buses. Private operators run the bus services on contract. Highways on the other hand 
are planned and built by the Highway Agency that gets it funds by decisions in the 
Parliament. The Highway Agency is organized like a concern, with the Highway Director on 
top of the bureaucracy and regions and districts underneath. It answers directly to the Ministry 
of Transport. Lastly, it is also leading the work with the National Transport Plan, which is 
both a strategic plan and a program for allocation of funds.  
 
The situation in 2005 can be characterized by: 
• Hardly any integration of land use and transport planning. 
• Huge investments in highway expansion. 
• Increasing distance between city centre and the locati n of new employment and 
housing. 
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• Commuting increases rapidly. 
• VKT increases and also the emissions of CO2, etc.  
 
There is a lack of discussion on the following important issues: 
• Increased road capacity > increased traffic > congestion > increased road capacity and 
so on 
• Sector politics instead of integrated, comprehensive, holistic policy 
• Increasing gap between sustainability goals and transport development 
• Travel Demand Management. The need to control car traffic growth (“New realism”).  
• New forms of governance. Public participation in planning.  
 
In short, the “Sustainable City” Kristiansand has never been further away from a sustainable 
transport system than in 2005. Neither have more money been used to increase car travel in 
the city. The city population has never had higher standard of living. Car dependency and 
mobility increases every year. The threat of global w rming and depletion of natural resources 
is part of the local discourse, but far away from having more than symbolic influence on the 
land use and transport decisions made in the City Council.  
 
 
4.2.2 Planning history is important – a timeline  
 
The past plays an important role for the understanding of the present environment and the 
planning discourse. Major road investments have to a large extent formed the urban structure 
in Kristiansand. History and earlier planning lives both in the minds as tacit knowledge, and 
as plans and built structures.  
 
Why have these events been picked out as important, and which events are left out? Those 
land use and transport events that led to marked and long-time consequences have been 
picked out, based upon a thorough knowledge of the dev lopment in Kristiansand. It should 
be noted that in this listing the smaller projects are not mentioned, although they often may 
have substantial influence both symbolically and materi lly (Tinghuset is such an example). 
Some of the most important plans and projects, which ave had considerable and permanent 
impact, are listed below. They are fundamental to the understanding of land use and transport 
planning in Kristiansand:  
 
The story line “The car has come to stay” is the commonly accepted and taken for granted 
premise for land use and transport in Kristiansand. The tradition and history of land use and 
transport planning in the city has been one of Predict and Provide, which made Kristiansand 
famous for solving the after the war housing crisis. The mechanism used was to control both 
the demand for housing and the supply of land for building. Since then the control of land for 
building through ownership has been abandoned and the role the Highway Agency has 
changed. Planning of land use and transport and the impl mentation of road transport plans 
are placed in different organizations causing a gap between the two. The gap between 
government funds for road building and the local demand for road capacity has increased over 
many years. Queues have thus become a major political problem. A vast majority in the city 
council voted in 1996 for a city “Toll ring”, many against their principles and political 
program. The funds collected financed E18 into the centre of the city.  
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TIMELINE THROUGH KRISTIANSAND LU&T HISTORY 
Hendelser  Year Events  
Bru nummer 2 over Otra debattert i Bystyret 1948 City ouncil discuss 2nd crossing of river Otra   
Regionplan (Høvåg - Høllen) 1955/63 Plan for urban region 
Varoddbrua  1956 Varodd bridge opened 
Generalplan  1969 The famous General Plan 
Sentrumsplanen  1978 Plan for city centre 
Generalplan  1978 General plan review 
Vestervegbrua  1980 Vesterveg bridge opened 
Sørlandssenteret  1986 Sørlandssenteret Shopping Mall & Business Park 
Kommunevalg:Baneheia, Byfjorden, Bom 1987 Local election about Tolls, Green, Fjord  
VA Sykehus 1989 New County hospital  
ADH (HIA) 1990 New localization of regional university 
TP 10 1989-1991 Transport Plan for 10 largest cities 
Kommuneplan  1990 General plan review 
Jubileum  Kristiansand 350 år  1991 Jubilee  Kristiansand 350 years old  
Krigskolen nedlagt 1991 Military Academy closed 
Forsøksordning Kollektivtransporten 1991-1994 Public transport demonstration projects 
Miljøhandlingsplanen 1992 Action plan for Environment 
Varoddbrua 1992 Second Varodd bridge opened 
Miljøby  1993-2000 Sustainable City 
Odderøya 1995 Odderøya military camp abandoned 
HiA til Gimlemoen 1997 University college to Gimlemoen 
Kommuneplan  1995 General plan review 
E18 planlegging  1992-1999 E18 plan and Toll Ring 
Kommuneplan  2000 General plan review 
BusMetro 2003 BusMetro opened September 2003 
ATP forsøket 2004 LU&T pilot project organization 
E39 og Bompenger 2002-2006 E39 plan and Toll collection 
Kommuneplan  2005 General plan review 
 
 
 
In 2007 the City Council has adopted a “new” toll scheme to finance the motorway from the 
city centre and further west. The increased funding thus available strengthen the Predict and 
Provide tradition, and indeed will make any alternative transport strategy as “rush-hour 
pricing” irrelevant for many years65 unless the law is changed. Interesting enough congesting 
charging or “rush-hour pricing” has in the autumn of 2007 become a key political issue in 
several cities after the Minister of Transport raised the question as part of a carrot and stick 
strategy.  
 
                                                
65 Under the present law, road pricing is prohibited until the toll road collection has ceased (Vegtrafikkloven §7) 
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4.2.3 Land use structure and plans 
 
Kristiansand was one of the first cities in Norway to make a Generalplan in 1969. The plan 
laid down the future physical structure of the city and allocated land to cater for an increase in 
the number of inhabitants from less than 50 000 to 100 000 inhabitants in the year 2000. This 
huge, planned city expansion with industrial areas, dwelling areas, hierarchy of centers, and 
so on, could well be confined within the municipality borders. A tremendous surplus of land 
for building was allocated, and still the areas rese ved in the Generalplan provide ample land 
for city expansion. The subsequent strategic spatial plans66 have contracted and expanded the 
amount of land to be built upon according to the mood and projections at the time they were 
made. In none of these plans is the commuting across the town border discussed; even though 
this car based commuting has a profound impact upon the development of the whole region. 
The economic growth, agglomeration and clustering of ec nomic activity in Kristiansand is 
the major driving force or the “engine” for the regional development.  
 
There has been a continued expansion of the urban are  for a long time period. The speed of 
the outward expansion has fluctuated with the economy and the population growth. There has 
also been stand still for some years and then a jump when a new area of land for building has 
been opened up. The development in Kristiansand has induced growth in housing demand in 
the neighboring municipalities mainly along E18/E39.  
 
4.2.4 Transport structure  
When Varoddbrua was finished in 1956 the main structu e of the road network was fixed. The 
trunk road (E18 and E39) is the main artery through the city and most other main roads 
branch out from this. The only major change of plans happened in the early eighties when it 
was decided that E18 should follow the present alignment instead of a tunnel underneath 
Kongsgård. There has been discussions on building a by pass for the city centre as KrF-linja, 
a line named after a political party, but all such attempts have been in vain. There have been 
two important changes in road planning during the last thirty years, which also have impacted 
on Kristiansand:  
• Tunnel technology revolution opens for new opportunities, formerly unthinkable.  
• The environment concern for greener cities has involved landscape architects in road 
planning. 
 
In Kristiansand these two changes led to sinking the road down in the ground and reusing the 
land on top for recreation, etc. and extensive tunnels and grade separated junctions below 
ground inside Baneheia67.  
 
4.2.5 Many prizes 
 
In Kristiansand some of the most prominent Norwegian pl nners have worked, and many 
years ago the city got a reputation of being in the for front, a reputation it has kept. Already in 
1967, in a country still with a housing shortage aft r the second World War, the major 
                                                
66 Generalplan 1978, Kommuneplan 1990, Kommuneplan 1995, Kommuneplan 2000 and Kommuneplan 2005.  
67 Baneheia is the “sacred” natural area close to the centre.  
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newspaper gave the city the title national house-building champion (Norgesmester). Some of 
the prizes are shown in the list. Notice that the Ministry of the Environment has given the last 
two:  
• Aftenposten 1967 Norwegian Champion in Planning 
• Sofus prisen 1983 The National Cycling Town 
• Bygg for fremtiden 1984 Housing for the Future68 
• MoE 1996 The best of environment planning 
• MoE 2002 Prize for the best environmental city 
 
4.2.6 The virtuous city with the best intentions.  
 
A figure69 from 1994 show how Kristiansand intended to quit Ad-hoc or Incremental 
planning and use Comprehensive or Holistic planning to turn towards sustainable 
development. The intention of doing the things the best possible way to achieve good results 
for the city is clearly expressed. Although formulated slightly differently it resembles the 
approach in the Sentrumsplan 1978, but the politicians rejected the philosophy of plan-led 
development.  
 
Holistic planning Rather than Bit by Bit planning 
Concentrated city development and 
densification 
Rather than Further city sprawl, increasing land 
consumption & increasing travel demand  
Public transport and walking / bicycle 
transport 
Rather than Sole planning for the car 
Living and attractive city centre and 
 sub-centers 
Rather than Shopping malls along the highway 
Living neighborhoods and local areas 
with daily activities and services in 
walking distance 
Rather than Contingent distribution of services and 
activities based on car transport 
Parks and shoreline for recreation Rather than Barriers between housing and sea shore 
The precautionary principle Rather than Repairing damages after  
Figure 4-2 Kristiansand statement of “How to do it”1994 
 
The stated Kristiansand policy aims falls clearly in the left column of the table, and the 
implemented results of that policy just as clearly on the right hand side as we will see in this 
study.  
 
4.3 The trend: More cars and less sustainability? 
The Kristiansand urban region is expanding, the length of journey to work is increasing and 
so is the use of the private car. The political attitudes seem to have become more 
environmentally friendly. Plans and program aiming at sustainability and better environment 
are prolific. True to say, there have been huge invstments in repairing former sins (sewage 
treatment plants and deep-sea discharge of waste hav substantially improved the quality of 
the both river- and seawater). But still, the car is used more than ever and in comparison the 
                                                
68 The first full scale exhibition of a housing estate, prizes for individual houses only.  
69 Kristiansand Miljøbyprogrammet (sak B 201/94) 
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road investment is far greater than before. In thissection we look at some important changes 
in population and transport. 
 
4.3.1 The population concentrates in the big cities in Norway 
 
The net migration within Norway is shown in the figure below. The general picture is that 
people move from the periphery towards the centre, or from the north and west to the big city 
regions, and to Oslo in particular. The big city regions are therefore growing fast. This growth 
is further strengthened by a net migration from abro d, with most of the immigrants settling 
according to the same pattern in the big city regions.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Net migration in Norway 2006. 
 
 
There is a strong concentration of the population in Norway into the big city regions as the 
table below show. In the big city regions the population grew with 10% between 1995 and 
2005, while the population in the rural areas decreased with 4%. Within the big city regions 
there are both an outward expansion and a re-migration into the city centers. These trends will 
be discussed for Kristiansand below.  
 
Table  4-2 Regional population change 1995 – 2005, numbers. 
 1995 2005 % change 
Big city regions 2 278 000 2 512 000 +10.3 
Town regions 1 103 000 1 154 000 +4.7 
Village regions 323 000 323 000 +0.1 
Rural areas 645 000 617 000 -4.4 
Norway 4 348 000 4 606 000 5.9 
Source: SSB 
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4.3.1.1 The Kristiansand area population changes 
First, a table showing population change in Kristians nd compared to the county and country:  
 
Table  4-3 Population and area, change 2000 – 2008, numbers & %. 
 Population 2008 Area 2008 Change 2000-2008 % 
 Total On built 
area 
Total  
Area 
sq km 
Built 
area 
sq km 
Built area 
share of total 
area % 
Total 
pop  
 
Pop on 
built 
area 
Built  
area 
Norway 4 737 200 3 722 786 323 802 2333.73 0.72 1.06 1.10 1.04 
Vest-Agder 165 944 131 661 7 276 85.01 1.17 1.06 1.10 1.08 
Kristiansand 78 919 75 852 277 39.06 14.08 1.09 1.09 1.08 
 
 
The total population in Norway in 2006 was as the table above shows 4.6 million and out of 
this population 3.6 million lived in built up areas. While the population changed with 0.73 
percent from 2005 to 2006, the population living in built areas rose with 1.34 percent and the 
extent of the built areas rose with 2 percent. The population on the built area grows far faster 
than the total population reflecting the general urbanizing trend. The figures for the county of 
Vest-Agder are fairly similar to those for the country as a whole, except the built area grew 
slightly faster.  
 
4.3.1.2 Kristiansand and Oslo compared  
The population development in Kristiansand resembles that of the Oslo area, but on a smaller 
scale. Akershus the surrounding county of Oslo has grown steadily and far above the national 
average the last fifty years. Oslo’s inner city population was halved from 1950 to 1980, from 
about 300 000 inhabitants to 150 000. This reduction was compensated by the growth in the 
outer city. From 1990 onwards the inner city population of Oslo has grown fast, in line with 
re-concentration in city centers experienced in many cities both in Norway and abroad.  
 
Table  4-4 Oslo and Akershus population in thousand 1950 – 2000. 
Population, 
thousands 
Oslo Inner 
city 
Oslo Outer 
city 
Oslo pop 
total 
Akershus 
pop total 
Oslo Akershus 
pop total 
1950 310 124 434 182 616 
1960 253 223 476 234 710 
1970 201 277 478 322 800 
1980 153 299 452 369 821 
1990 136 326 462 418 880 
2000 153 360 513 476 989 
2007 158 390 548 509 1057 
 
In Kristiansand a similar development to that of Oslo has occurred with a long period of 
decline in central areas, and outward expansion and increase in population in the outer areas. 
In the mid eighties the movement back into the city entre started in Kristiansand as in Oslo, 
see below for further discussion on the city center Kvadraturen.  
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4.3.1.3 The changes in the urbanized area and urban density. 
The built area70 in Kristiansand increased from 35.61 km2 in 2000 to 39.06 km2 in 2008. This 
is an increase of eight percent. At the same time the population on the built area increased by 
nine percent, hence Kristiansand became slightly denser from 2000 to 2008. The number of 
inhabitants within the built up area of the city was in 2008: 1942 persons/km2.  
 
Below figures for Kristiansand and Vest-Agder County are shown. First, a figure showing 
change in population on the built up area and second a figure showing the change in the built 
up area. Both figures show a steady and fairly parallel change, both in population and in the 
built up area, the last eight years.  
 
 
Population on built area Kristiansand and Vest-
Agder 2000-2008
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
Kristiansand Vest-Agder
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
Figure 4-4 Kristiansand and Vest-Agder. Population and Built area 2000 – 2008  
 
The Kristiansand area of influence71 as engine in the local development has spread into the 
neighboring county Aust-Agder. This area of influenc  has been coined Agderbyen, a fairly 
narrow spatial structure along the trunk road, which will be discussed below. The change in 
the population on the built up area in Kristiansand  Agderbyen is shown next:  
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Figure 4-5 Kristiansand & Agderbyen. Number of inhabit nts on Built area 2000 – 2007  
                                                
70 Built area is in this document used as the term settlement (tettsted), a circumscribed area of buildings, parks, 
etc. with at least 50 houses not further than 200 m apart.  
71 The area of influence can be defined in different ways, e.g. travel to work area, hierarchy of centres, gional 
identity, etc. Agderbyen was coined as metaphor to c eate a common feeling of identity across county borders. 
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The yearly change 2000 – 2008 in the number of inhabitants per square km in Kristiansand 
and Agderbyen is shown in the next figure. It shows that the urban density in Kristiansand has 
been fairly constant just below 2000 per square km and in Agderbyen 1500 persons per square 
km.  
 
The increase in built up area from 2005 to 2008 was for Kristiansand 2.14 square km (0.7 sq 
km per year) and for Vest-Agder 5.69 square km (2.9sq km per year). This is a far higher 
yearly growth in the Kristiansand built up area than before (0.4 sq km per year 2000-2007), 
which may indicate that the urban expansion is accelerating.  
 
 
Kristiansand and Vest-Agder. Population 
per square km, 2000-2008.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
20
00
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Square
 km
Kristiansand Vest-Agder
 
Figure 4-6 Change in density, Kristiansand and Vest-Agder, persons per square km.  
 
The density in Kristiansand has not been increasing the last decade, although that has been a 
goal for the municipality. The population in Kristiansand grows far faster than in the county, 
which has been the case for many years. This fact confirms for many persons the idea of 
Kristiansand as the “engine” in development.  
 
4.3.1.4 Kvadraturen  
The downtown or central business district in Kristiansand is called Kvadraturen and shown on 
the map below. The renaissance town plan from the sev nteen’s century has given the center 
it’s nickname and consists of 54 quadrants. 
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Figure 4-7 Map of Kristiansand center, Kvadraturen.  
 
 
Around 15 000 people were living in Kvadraturen just after the second world war, which was 
reduced to around 4000 in the seventies. In the last twenty years the Kvadraturen population 
has grown steadily due the building of new flats for sale. From 1995 to 2007 the population in 
Kvadraturen grew by 19% while only 13% for the city as shown in the next table. 
 
Table  4-5 Kristiansand and Kvadraturen, population time series. 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 Growth 
1995-2007 
Kvadraturen  4782 5227 5510 5669 5671 19 % 
Kristiansand  68 609 72 395 76 066 76 917 77 840 13 % 
Source: www.Kristiansand.kommune.no, accessed February 2008. 
 
The population growth in Kvadraturen far outstrips the growth in the neighboring central 
zones Grim and Lund the last decade. However, the growth in the Kvadraturen was far below 
the relative growth in the outer areas of Kristiansand. In numbers the outer areas got 57 % of 
the population growth 1995 – 2005 (4236 out of 7457). These areas are located more than ten 
km from the city centre. It is therefore probable that the average trip distance increased in this 
period.  
 
There are three areas planned for major urban development in the city centre of Kristiansand 
which belong to the built up area zone Kvadraturen, these are Odderøya, Tangen and the 
railway station area called “NSB tomta”. In the stati tics they will show up as increase in the 
population on the built up area of Kvadraturen. Theplanned developments on these three 
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areas are of very high density and thus they will increase the average density in the 
Kvadraturen zone. Another such development or “transformation” area is “Nybyen” which is 
part regeneration, part reclaimed road area and part green area. When the developments on 
these four areas are finished the brown-field areas within the Kvadraturen zone is completely 
built up within the present limits for development, only regeneration of the existing buildings 
remain.  
 
4.3.2 What are the outlooks towards 2025? 
 
The population forecast made by Statistics Norway for Kristiansand shows a population of 
more than 91 000 in 2025, an increase in population of just below twenty thousand in twenty 
years and a yearly growth about 1.1 %, see the tablbelow. What amount of building land 
will the population growth and the associated busine s growth demand over the next 20 
years? This demand is difficult to foresee because the uncertainty is great, an example of this 
uncertainty is discussed in chapter 4.12. In table 4-6 below the built up area in Kristiansand 
and the number of persons living on the same area are shown for a period of years. The 
statistics shown in the table is not directly comparable before and after the year 2000 and 
therefore only illustrative for the long-term development in density. Over the last three years 
2005 to 2008 both population and urban expansion have been faster than before. There was an 
increase in the built area of 2.1 km2 in the three-year period from 2005 to 2008 (0.7 km2 per 
year). It may be that this faster growth will continue. However, in the forecast below we have 
chosen a conservative estimate for the urban expansion, far below the marginal growth as at 
present.  
 
In the next table a forecast for 2025 and an estimate of the density is shown. The forecast is 
based on a future yearly growth in the built up area of 1.5 %. The built area will then 
accordingly become 50 km2 in 2025. We assume that the 2025 population will as forecasted 
by the National Statistics, become 91 482 persons and 96% will be living in the built area.  
 
Table  4-6 Kristiansand, population and built up are  1990 -  2008, and forecast 2025 
 1990 1999 2000 2005 2008 Forecast 
202572  
Built up area 25.9 km2 28.9 km2 35.6 km2 36.9 km2 39.1 km2 50 km2 
Population on same area  53 414 60 350 69 323 72 672 75 852 88 00073 
Inhabitants per km2 2063 2088 1960 1968 1942 1760 
Source: SSB. Forecast by author.  
 
To keep the density at 1968 persons per km2 as in 2005, the built up area must not increase by 
more than about 10 km2 in the twenty years up to 2025, which is lower than the present 
trends. The forecast shows that the number of people per square km will be further reduced to 
1760 persons/km2. This rough forecast indicates that Kristiansand may face a great challenge 
in stopping the decline in density and it will be ncessary to manage land use far more 
effectively in the future than so far.  
 
                                                
72 Trend exploration made by the author.  
73 SSB Population forecast for the total municipality multiplied by 0,96, the rest 4% live outside the built area.  
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4.3.3 Commuting creates a new “urban” region – Agderbyen  
 
4.3.3.1 Commuting trends  
Commuting, one may note, is a two way process: If one changes job from own municipality 
and starts commuting to a new job in the next, one also starts another process. Someone fills 
the old job, and this new employee may commute from another municipality. Thus changing 
job or changing house may start complex processes of changes. 
 
14 300 persons commuted between the municipalities of Agder in 1990. In 2000 the number 
of commuters had risen to 23 905. For the ten-year p riod the number of commuters increased 
with 67 %. The trunk road E39/E18 passes through seven municipalities between Mandal and 
Arendal, nicknamed “Agderbyen”. The major growth in commuting has been along this 
stretch of road. In 2000 the commuting between these s ven municipalities was 10 390 
persons. This number of commuters represents some 15 000 car journeys per working day 
(9000 average annual daily traffic). The change in mployment and commuting in Agderbyen 
from 2000 to 2005 is shown in the following table:  
 
Table  4-7 Agderbyen and Kristiansand, commuting from esidence 2000 and 2005. 
 2000 2005 2000-2005 2000-2005 
Place of residence Commuting 
from residence 
Commuting from 
residence 
Change 
numbers 
2005 as 
% of 2000 
1001 Kristiansand 1405 1822 417 130 % 
Agderby commuting 12 648 14 061 1 413 111 %
Agderby employment 75 018 77 910 2 892 104 % 
 
Employment in Agderbyen increased by four per cent from 2000 to 2005, while the number 
of commuters increased by eleven per cent in the same period. In other words, the number of 
commuters increased nearly three times more than the increase in the number of jobs from 
2000 to 2005. This is an indication that the complex criss-cross interaction between the 
municipalities in Agderbyen keep increasing and making the population more and more car 
dependent.  
 
4.3.3.2 Agderbyen – an emerging region 
Agderbyen resembles a ”pearls on a string” settlements dotted along the major trunk road, 120 
km long and less than 10 km wide. Agderbyen is the term used for  “working and living 
region” a concept close to the English concept Travel to Work Area. It crosses the border 
between two counties, and this makes it a concept, which has been politically “impossible” to 
use locally, because of the scare for merging the two counties into one. The Government, 
however, has used the concept of Agderbyen actively to promote moving out offices from 
Oslo74.  
 
The Agder Region has 30 municipalities, out of which seven form Agderbyen. The population 
changes from 2001 to 2002 are shown in the following table:  
 
 
 
                                                
74 Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority (Post- og Teletilsynet) to Lillesand. 
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Table  4-8 Population change in Agderbyen in relation to Agder and Norway. 
 Population 
2001 
Birth 
surplus 
Net in-
migration 
Population 
increase 
Population  
2002 
Growth 
Agderbyen 167 527 562 820 1 382 168 909 0.8 % 
Rest 23 municipalities 92 065 68 -247 -179 91 886 -0.3 % 
AGDER 259 592 630 573 1 203 260 795 0.50 % 
Norway     4 524 000 0.45 % 
 
Agderbyen had a population growth of 0.8% while the rest of Agder decreased by 0.3%. This 
pattern mainly caused by migration, goes many years b ck. The population increases far 
above the national average in Agderbyen, while the rest of Agder is stagnating. This fast 
growing population in the Kristiansand region will probably also use the car for work 
journeys, as it in practice is the fastest mode avail ble.  
 
4.3.4 Travel studies and modal split 
 
A traffic study in 1949 gave the cycling traffic to and from the city centre. The number of 
bike riders passing the three entry points was 13 316 cyclists. Oddernesbrua was not built at 
that time and the thirteen thousand cyclists in 1949 is comparable to less than three thousand 
in 1980. The bicycle traffic to and from Kvadraturen was reduced by three quarters in these 
30 years. The 1980 mode split of the traffic to andfrom the city centre in Kristiansand 
”Kvadraturen” is shown in the table below (based on c unts)75. About 57 000 persons 
traveled to and from Kvadraturen an average day. Two thirds traveled by car and one quarter 
by bus, the remaining nine percent walked or cycled. 
 
Table  4-9 Kristiansand, Kvadraturen, mode split 1980. 
Kristiansand Mode split  
No. trips & %  
24 hours 0800 - 0900 1500 - 1600 
Car 76 200          67% 4 400          57% 5 400       59% 
PublicTransport 27 000          24% 2 300          30% 2 900          32% 
Walking 6 000          6% 630          8% 530      6% 
Cycling 3 900          3% 370          5% 260      3% 
Total 113 700         100% 7 700         100% 9 090         100% 
 
The travel survey 2005 Main results for Agderbyen 
The first comprehensive travel survey76 covering the Kristiansand area and the eight other 
municipalities gives data for 2005.77 There are only small variations between the 
municipalities, but large variations between sex and ge/income. The main results were:  
 
The total number of trips was 537 354.  
Each person in Agderbyen performed on average 3.58 trips per day.  
The total daily travel time was on average 68 minutes.  
Total daily traveling distance was on average 35 km.  
On average each trip took 19 minutes and was 9.9 km long. 
 
                                                
75 Kårikstad, I. B. & A. Langeland. Modellstudie over sykkeltrafikk i Kristiansand. Nordisk Embedsmannskomité 
for Transportspørsmål, 1981 
76 Meland, Solveig. 2007 RVU Hovedresultater for Agderbyen. SINTEF STF50 A070227 VEDLEGG 
77 The report covers nine municipalities in Agderbyen.  
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The household78 based national travel surveys show that mobility in Kristiansand increases. In 
1998 the number of trips per day, all modes included, was 3.34 trips/person & day. There are 
variations between those with high and low income, between age groups and men and 
women. Women for example did 3.62 trips/ person & day while men 3.53 trips/ person & day. 
The opposite is the case for travel distance. The average distance for women was 30.19 km 
per day while the men traveled longer with an averag  distance of 40.30 km per day. On 
average each citizen in Agderbyen did 1.97 trips as car driver per day in 2005. In 2001 this 
number was 1.91 and in 1997/1998 much lower at 1.68. Among the municipalities Songdalen 
was on top with 2.65 car trips and the lowest was Kri tiansand with 1.77 trips as car driver 
daily.  
 
4.3.4.1 Mode split or the share of trips per mode 
The mode split for Kristiansand shown in the next table is based on the 2005 travel survey 
with “other modes” excluded, and adjusted to hundred p rcent:  
 
Table  4-10 Kristiansand, mode split, share of the number of trips per mode, %. 
Kristiansand Mode split 2005 adjusted 
Car 69 
Public Transport 5 
Walking 20 
Cycling 6 
 
Mode split figures are used in several contexts and for ifferent purposes. There is often no 
documentation available that shows how these figures a  calculated or what statistics have 
been used. Also there might be lack of clarity as to whether the basis is cross-section data or 
time series data, and it may not be stated if it is the number of trips or transport data with 
length of trip included, which is presented. In thenext table mode split data from reports and 
documents produced locally are shown and may therefore differ from the travel survey data.79 
The data in the table below is based upon several sources and compiled by the author: 
 
Table  4-11 Kristiansand, mode split time series from Kristiansand project reports 
Source:  TP10 SC SC NTP Krs 
Kristiansand 1985 1990 1992 1998 2000 
Car 45 69 65 63 70 
Public Transport 19 10 9 10 20 
Walk 18 11 13 13 3 
Bike 18 11 13 14 7 
Source: Collected by author from many sources TP10 report, Sustainable City documents, National Transport 
Plan, etc. 
 
The mode split in the two Sustainable City (SC) columns show an increase in public transport 
and cycling, and a reduction in car share to 63%, which is 6% down from 1990. This picture 
fits well with the aims for the Sustainable City project, but hardly with reality. Two years later 
the National Transport Plan, Kristiansand City Report, shows completely different numbers 
                                                
78 An average Norwegian household consisted of 2.2 persons 2007. Vest-Agder County had 2.4. The lowest 
number of persons per household had Oslo:1.9, and the highest Sogn og Fjordane: 2.5.  
79 The data are from the Transport Plan Kristiansand (TP10), the Sustainable City (SC) project and the National 
Transport Plan Kristiansand City Report (NTP Krs). I assume that trips to the city centre (vaguely defined) are 
the basis for these calculations. 
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for the year 2000. The increase for public transport to 20% for the year 2000 in the NTP 
Kristiansand column is probably wrong, because the total number of bus passengers in 
Kristiansand has varied slightly around 8,5 million per year from mid nineties to 2005. The 
total number of trips has increased in this period, the public transport share should therefore 
fall. The national travel survey 2001 had some extra data for Kristiansand, and extra 
interviews were done for Agderbyen in the 2005 survey. The next table is probably the most 
reliable time series of modal split for Kristiansand 1985 - 2005. 
 
Table  4-12 Kristiansand, mode split time series baed mainly on RVU 
Kristiansand Mode split % 1985 1992 1998 2001 2005  
Car 57 67 68 67 69 
PublicTransport 12 6 7 7 5 
Walking 20 19 19 20 20 
Cycling 9 7 6 5 6 
Source: Vibe, Nils et. al. 2005. Persontransport i norske byområder. TØI report 761/2005 & Meland, Solveig. 
2007. RVU 2005 – Hovedresultater for Agderbyen. SINTEF. Also from many sources TP10 report, Sustainable 
City documents, National Transport Plan, etc.  
 
In the table above there is reasonable consistency from 1985 to 2005. The most noticeable in 
the table is the change from 1985 to 1992 when the public transport share was halved, which 
is probably due to different definitions in the statistics for these years. From 1992 and 
onwards there seem to be a steady and slow growth in the car share, the walking share is 
constant while the public transport and cycling share fluctuates around a low level.  
 
The two last tables illustrate that modal split is very dependent upon what has been measured 
or calculated, and that “strategic misrepresentation” may occur. The travel surveys (data are 
usually collected by telephone) are representative for the area where those interviewed live. 
Other surveys can be based on cross section data from different sources and calculated as to 
and from the city centre or across the “inner ring”. Some surveys use cut-off for very short 
trips, e.g. below 300 meters, others don’t. In the Norwegian national travel survey it seems 
that more walk trips have been included in 2001 and 2005, than the years before.80  
 
In the next table the mode split in Kristiansand for motorized transport only, is presented. The 
resulting matrix shows that 93% of the trips were done with the car and 7% with public 
transport. This indicates that public transport mode probably mainly caters for “captive” 
users, those without access to a car, and that the car mode has become so embedded that a 
modal shift will be very difficult to obtain.  
 
 
Table  4-13 Kristiansand, mode split time series motorized transport only 
Kristiansand Mode split % 1985 1992 1998 2001 2005 
Car  83 92 91 91 93 
Public transport 17 8 9 9 7 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
                                                
80 In the national survey interviews all walk trips outside the house regardless of length are included.  
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4.3.5 The travel pattern is becoming more complex.  
 
The car traffic has grown for many years. On the trunk road E18 Varoddbrua, which give a 
good indication of traffic in Kristiansand, the average traffic81 was 34 699 in 2005. The traffic 
has been growing with more than three percent per year the last decade as shown in the table:  
 
Table  4-14  E18 Varoddbrua in Kristiansand, traffic growth, annual average daily traffic   
E18 Varoddbrua 1995 2000 2005 
Yearly traffic  25 486 29 679 34 699 
Yearly growth over 5 years  3.1% pa 3.2% pa 
 
This growth has many causes among them a growing population, increase in the number of 
car trips per day and the changes in location and activity patterns. Especially important are the 
changes in origin and destination location to follow how the traffic pattern changes. In 
Kristiansand there has been a strong growth in the number of jobs outside the city centre. 
Sørlandsparken and the “oil service industry” in Korsvik are two of the largest new job 
locations. The shopping mall in Sørlandsparken is another large traffic generator.82 Both of 
these locations have been developed to cater for the car, without any thought of public 
transport at the start of the development. Looking at the traffic pattern, some main points are:  
 
Traffic to/from Kvadraturen (CBD) stagnates 
Traffic bypassing Kvadraturen grows, 60% increase on Oddernesbrua 1980-1999 
Traffic east of and west of Kvadraturen increased with a third 1985-1999 
Traffic on the municipal borders doubled in the period 1980-1999 
 
In the western world the car is used more than ever, w ll documented in several reports.83 Still 
the countries in Western Europe have for many years followed a trajectory in car ownership 
and usage seemingly parallel to and some twenty years after the USA. Without saying that 
this is good or bad development, it represents a challenge if such a growth will continue. The 
car is a central driving force in the suburbanisation in the Kristiansand region and other major 
city areas in Norway, in Europe and indeed in the USA84. The problems the steady increasing 
car usage produce are well known and related to: congestion, environment, energy, safety, 
finance and equity. 85  
 
4.3.6 Public transport in Kristiansand 
 
Public transport in Kristiansand is mainly bus transport. The length of the average trip is 11 
km, bus occupancy is 12.6 and the average inhabitant uses the bus for about 90 trips per year. 
The following table shows some key figures:  
 
 
 
                                                
81 AADT average annual daily traffic in USA, ÅDT in Norway 
82 The Center director complained in the news that “The Kristiansand Climate Plan will kill the Sørlandspark 
because of proposed restriction on the car” NRK web220908.  
83 EU Commission “Time to decide” 2001 
84 Pucher John & Christian Lefevre, 1996, “The Urban Transport Crisis.” MacMillan. 
85 Banister David, et al 2000 “European Transport Policy and Sustainable Mobility”  Spon Press, London. 
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Table  4-15 Kristiansand, public transport, key figures 2005 & 2006   
Kristiansand  2005 2006 
Number of bus trips per person&year 88 91 
Length of bus-trip km 11 11 
Bus kilometers total – veh. km 5 857 082 6 076 443 
Total number of trips. Number 6 693 808 6 999 447 
Passenger km traveled - pkm 73 784 020 76 532 415 
 
Public transport statistics on the municipal level has been poor. The following table from has 
been compiled from different sources. Note that the figures for Kristiansand include some of 
the neighboring municipalities because the bus routes also serve parts of these municipalities.  
 
Table  4-16 Kristiansand area, public transport economy data, 2000   
 2000 Per inhabitant 
Ticket revenue NOK 1000 79 930 800 
Public contribution NOK 1000 60 300 534 
Total costs   NOK 1000 134 020 1341 
Public contribution % 45 %  
Passengers 1000 8 750 88 
Passenger km 1000 70 600 707 
Bus km 1000 7 859 79 
Source: Vibe Nils, Engebregtsen Øystein, Fearnley Nils, 2005. Persontransport i norske byområder. 
Utviklingstrekk, drivkrefter og rammebetingelser. TØI rapport 761:2005. 
 
The public transport patronage went down to reach a low level of 8 311 000 trips in 2001. 
Thereafter the number of passengers has increased to r ach close to 9 million in 2007. Further 
discussion of the role of public transport in Kristiansand will be presented under the section 
on the BusMetro below.  
 
4.3.7   Green house gases emissions  
 
Road traffic emitted 145 000 tons of green house gas s86 in Kristiansand measured as CO2 
equivalents, nearly half of total emissions of 276 000 tons in the municipality in 2006. The 
CO2 emissions from road were bigger than ever before
87. The increase from 1991 was 27.3% 
and far above the national goal. In the next figure the relative amounts of emissions per head 
from the main sources are shown. The total climate g s emissions measured as CO2 
equivalents were 3.6 tons per head in Kristiansand and from land transport only 2.0 tons per 
head in 200688. The amount from road traffic was 1.885 tons per person and represented 53% 
of the total green house gas emissions in the city. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
86 CO2 CH4, N2O  
87 http://www.ssb.no/emner/01/04/10/klimagassr/  
88 In comparison CO2 emissions per head was in Stavanger 2.2 tons total/1.4 tons transport, and in Sandnes 3.5 
tons total/1.9 tons transport. 
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Figure 4-8 Kristiansand 2006, climate gas emissions, 2006, CO2 equivalents percent.  
 
A rough calculation has been done to estimate the amount of CO2 emissions from private car 
use in Kristiansand: Every day there were in 2005 about 240 000 trips or journeys, and for the 
whole year it was 85 million trips in Kristiansand with a total distance traveled about 850 
million km. The distance traveled by car was about 420 million km causing CO2 emissions 
that can be estimated to 80 000 tons in the year 2005 from car transport in Kristiansand (based 
on an average CO2 emission per car of 200 g/km)
89. This gives an average amount of 
emissions of one ton per person from local car transport in Kristiansand (in addition there are 
the emissions from the long journeys). The figure below shows CO2 emissions of about  
140 000 tons from road transport in Kristiansand. This include both transit traffic and goods 
vehicles, hence the rough estimate give a fair estimate of the CO2 emissions from private car 
use in Kristiansand.  
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Figure 4-9 Climate gas emissions from road transport, K istiansand, 1991-2006  
 
 
The change in emissions from both light and heavy vehicles, measured as CO2 equivalents, 
are shown in the next figure. To bring the emission back to the 1990 level, the emissions 
from road traffic should be reduced by about 25 000tons.  
                                                
89 The estimate gives only an indication of the CO2 emissions, the average distance 9,9km includes all modes and 
overestimate emissions, emissions per car is probably lower than 200g/km and the average distance traveled with 
cars are longer than the figure used.  
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Climate emissions from transport, Kristiansand, 
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Figure 4-10  Emissions from road transport in Kristiansand, CO2  equivalents, 1000 tons.  
 
4.4 After the Brundtland report 
 
4.4.1 The car has come to stay? 
 
The 1978 plan for the city centre, Sentrumsplanen, was a very modern and radical plan. Not 
because of the traffic plan shown below, but because of the intention to reduce car use and the 
associated parking proposal in the plan.  
 
Figure 4-11 The Traffic plan for Kvadraturen in Kristiansand from Sentrumsplanen 1978.  
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Both the Generalplan 1969 and the Sentrumsplan 1978 discussed the future growth in the 
number of cars and the consequences for the city centre. The next figure show the impact of 
parking in five year intervals superimposed on Kvadraturen and a “parking-roof”. It said that 
the city centre Kvadraturen would be “run over” by the car if it unrestricted car use was 
facilitated. It therefore proposed an upper limit to how much traffic the centre could sustain90 
and the necessary tools to manage the development, partly through the parking policy and 
partly through land use planning and policy. In hindsight the plan is an excellent example of 
integrated land use and transport planning, at the tim  unique in Norway91.  
 
The following figure from Sentrumsplanen shows to the right the space required for parking 
after 5, 10, …25 years superimposed on a map of Kvadraturen, while the drawing on the left 
shows the maximum level of cars Kvadraturen can cope with. When the number of jobs 
(arbeidsplasser) increases over time (tid), demand for traffic capacity will increase above the 
limit for Kvadraturen and then private cars (privatbiler) have to give way to buses (busser) 
and goods vehicles (varelev. kjøretøy).  
 
Figure 4-12 The upper limit to traffic capacity in Kvadraturen.  
 
 
The city development committee approved the plan unanimously, but the technical director 
went against it and the City Council followed the director’s advice. Sentrumsplanen became 
therefore like many plans a guiding instrument, instead of a sharp tool in a plan-led system. 
The City Council chose to continue with a management philosophy of incrementalism and 
relying on ad hoc solutions. The reasoning put forward in the Sentrumsplan was to discuss 
how the transport demand should be solved, and how to achieve balance between the car, 
public transport, walking and cycling modes, disappeared by the council decision. Traffic 
congestion on the trunk road got all the attention and the ”predict and provide” ideology 
became the obvious answer that soon got a hegemonic p sition in the debate. However when 
predicted demand led to increasing congestion, the provide part of the ideology did not 
provide more capacity. The state was responsible for financing the trunk road and the 
                                                
90 In accordance with the Buchanan report. 
91 The author came to Kristiansand after the Sentrumsplanen was published. It was Per G Gløersen og Arne
Schanke who wrote it.  
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frustration among local politicians increased with the increasing gap between traffic growth 
and capacity. This misfit between demand and supply soon became a critical problem: we’re 
not getting a “fair” share of the road funding. P. O. Johnsen who through the eighties was 
mayor, was an active fighter for more road money, but in vain. ”Especially with a prime 
minister from own party, it is frustrating not to get a break-through for our demand for road 
funding.” he said later92.  
 
Kristiansand received in 1983 the Sofus-prize as the leading cycle city in Norway. This was a 
reward for systematic planning, developing and facilit ting for cycling over ten years. During 
the eighties the money for the cycle network program disappeared and Kristiansand lost 
gradually the position as the leading cycling city. 
 
Kristiansand had from the creation of the political ounty council (“fylkeskommunen”) in 
1975 a very strained relationship with the county: Vest-Agder fylkeskommune. That was one 
of the causes of often-negative reactions from the city to public transport proposals from the 
county. The county is the public transport authority and a key to achieve more public 
transport and in the development of a balanced transport system. This animosity may also be 
part of the reason that neither Sentrumsplanen nor Transportplanen93 was implemented by the 
city. Both of these plans had increased public transport and an integrated transport system as 
their aim. When the county then increased the number of bus passengers with 30% 1990-
1994, a unique success, the city refused to contribute to keep the success going.  
 
4.4.2 The 350 years Jubilee and the start of a new era  
 
Kristiansand was 350 years old in 1991, founded by King Christian IV in 1641. The Jubilee 
was a mechanism that released funds from many sources. It was the last of the twelve years as 
mayor for P O Johnsen. It was a big day when King Harald of Norway and Queen Margrethe 
of Denmark met in Kristiansand, a city their forefather King Christian IV founded. 
 
The team Johnsen and Johnsen94 who had worked well together for years, mobilized all forces 
to present Kristiansand in the best possible way for the jubilee in 1991. All the old plans were 
looked into to find out what could be realized. The radical propositions of an extensive 
pedestrian area and a car free market place in the Sentrumsplanen, formerly not politically 
acceptable, were implemented. In summary, many of the earlier very controversial cases got a 
break-through caused by the jubilee. Or is the explanation that the jubilee was used as 
leverage for implementation? Either explanation, the jubilee created a feeling of pride among 
people and reinforced the place-identity with the city and the centre, making it very difficult 
to go back and give the car more space.  
 
4.4.3 The new men and woman. 
 
The new female mayor replaced the very popular old mayor in 1992, a daunting task many 
thought. But, in a short time her first name became known to all and cherished. There were a 
                                                
92 Intervju med P O Johnsen , 1998 
93 TP10 was transport plans in the 10 largest Norwegian c ties, 1991.  
94 Former teknisk rådmann Yngvar Johnsen 
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lot of other changes about the same time. In the municipality the town clerk, the technical 
director and other leaders were new and so the Highway Director. The Highway Director is 
employed by the national Highway Agency (HA) and came new to the area, contrary to the 
municipality leaders all recruited from within. “I wanted to know what the problems were, so 
first thing I went around and talked to people in key positions” said the Highway Director 95 
“the problem over-shading all other problems was to get the trunk road E18 built.” 
Congestion on E18 east of the city centre had for yea s been a story in the press and 
positioning the city politicians as not delivering, even if they were not responsible for the 
national trunk road. Part of this was also a legacy in Kristiansand for successful land use and 
transport planning, a reputation badly flawed by the daily congestion. This reputation was 
deteriorating further when more and more houses were built towards the east96 and congestion 
grew with the same pace.  
4.4.4 The land use planning concept and design model  
 
The design concept underlying the planning in Kristiansand for housing, for shopping and for 
business is based on the car as the main transport mode. From the main road a distributor road 
is drawn into an area as a cul-de-sac. Around the road the buildings are arranged with the 
highest density around the local shopping centre for that area. Several very well designed 
housing estates with separated systems for driving and walking-cycling have been built in 
Kristiansand (Tinnheia, Slettheia, Hånes, etc.)97. The housing estates were usually designed 
with concentrated parking for multi-storey housing and parking on each site with single 
detached housing.98 The retail and business park Sørlandsparken, which is the major growth 
centre in the region, was developed around a single main road into the area and individual 
sites with access from roads branching of the from the main road.  
 
Figure 4-13 The plan for the  Sørlandspark.  
 
                                                
95 Interview Andreas Setsaa 
96 The majority of the 500-600 houses built per year.  
97 Slettheia was for many years a model for good housing estate design in Norway.  
98 Detached housing outside the centre is required to have 2,25 parking spaces per dwelling.  
 
 83 
 
The individual building sites are developed as the figure below. A building is placed at one 
side of the site and the rest is used for parking. There is hardly any provision for walking or 
cycling between the individual sites. 
 
Figure 4-14 Design concept used extensively in Kristian and.  
 
 
At the turn of the millennium, this design model is still alive as shown in the picture below:  
 
 
Figure 4-15 Design concept used at Telenor building in Kristiansand.  
 
Central place theory99 was the conceptual basis for planning a hierarchy of centers in 
Kristiansand. This concept, which implies that there a e thresholds for goods and services (the 
minimum volume of business necessary for an establihment to be commercially viable), was 
used to outline a hierarchy of centers from CBD on top, via two major centers on the next 
level, via the housing estate centers on the level below and the neighborhood shop at the 
bottom.100 This centre structure has not been successful, such bl eprint thinking and the 
individual location of each centre did not fit with t e structural changes in retail or the 
services as post, public offices, etc. Still the planners keep this concept alive and Strømme 
centre on level two is being developed although the big shopping magnet Sørlandsparken is 
only a short distance away.  
                                                
99 Developed by Christaller to describe the size and distribution of settlements.  
100 On top of the hierarchy Kvadraturen, then Vågsbygd o  Strømme, then Hånes, Tinnheia, Slettheia, Voie, etc. 
and at last the local shops. 
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The former City Director101 pointed out that it was not sustainable that those living in Hånes 
had to drive far into the area to access the shopping centre (which never became a success) 
instead of putting the shops at the entrance of the area so that people could pick up groceries 
on their way home. Some twenty years later the market forces has turned the design model 
used for Hånes upside down. The centre never became what was intended in the plan and 
commercial activity has developed at the access point t  the area. At the near by Sørlandspark 
the commercial interests are transforming part of the area by connecting buildings and 
creating indoor shopping streets, contrary to the design model. But on other parts the park the 
single plot design model as shown in figure 4-16, is st ll used.  
 
What is the alternative to such a development design model?  
How should centers and sub-centers be designed, planned and created? Firstly I think that 
individual transport with the car will dominate in many years to come. The question then is 
how to harness the use of the car and create a balanced transport system both within the 
areas/estates/parks and for access. The land use plan should not allow a vast parking area in 
front of a building without other access than the road itself for people walking (if you don’t 
drive we don’t need you as a customer seems to be the idea). Instead access with cars should 
be from a service road on the back and parking on gr und limited. The single use road should 
be abandoned and the multi-use street recreated.  
 
The land use planning philosophy and the design model should be scraped. The alternative 
philosophy is to create cities that are both livable and sustainable. Jane Jacobs criticized urban 
renewal, zoning and told us how to plan cites, and others like Engwicht talk of “Reclaiming 
the streets”.102 The garden city inspired suburbs of Oslo has been m t with similar criticism: 
“The suburbs of Oslo are the true face of the class society. The plan is very poor.”103 The 
New Urbanism charter and ideology points towards the same need to break with the car 
ideology in city planning and propose a new urban pl ning doctrine (see ch. 7).  
 
4.5 The E18 plan and implementation 
 
4.5.1 The traffic problem 
 
In the early 1990s only a few years after the Brundtla  report Our Common Future was 
published, one might think that the environment wasthe prime political challenge in 
Kristiansand, but my interviews showed that the main planning problem was and had been 
during the last 15 years to solve the capacity and congestion problems on the main trunk road, 
the E18. How should E18 be built and when? With the then state road program, E18 would 
not be built until 20-30 years had passed by, and meanwhile the traffic growth continued. This 
threat of increasing capacity problems was overruling all other planning problems. 
 
                                                
101 Interview Erling Valvik  
102 Jane Jacobs (1961) “The Death and Life of the Great American City” advocated mixed-use. Engwicht, D. 
(1993) “Reclaiming the streets”. 
103 Jan Carlsen, Klassekampen 050508  
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The planning process for the E18 trunk road started early 1992 with talks between the mayor 
and the county Highway Agency (HA) director, both new in their positions. The HA director 
continued the talks with other major stakeholders who confirmed the goal of getting the E18 
built as soon as possible. Then the E18 planning process was designed, from start to the 
finish, and the end result was the finished road. The HA director’s story104 goes like this:  
“When I started as road director I came from another place with clean sheets. People came to 
me and gave me advice and I went around and talked to people to get an understanding of the 
situation. It soon became clear that there was a lot of frustration of not being able to get the 
main road system solved. To me the problem had two separate parts: 
• I had to get understanding and support in Vegdirektoratet105 both for the seriousness 
of the situation and the need for Road Tolls, and  
• Road Tolls had to be accepted by the City ouncil, and the necessary plans had to be 
accepted ending up with a Reguleringsplan for E18, so that we could build the road.”  
 
The whole process was then designed, with ample tim put in for talks and getting support 
from people both locally and centrally. “We took the key actors in Vegdirektoratet down here
so that they could inform on the latest road building techniques and experiences from other 
places. This was a very good learning process which went both ways!” said the HA director. 
 
The start was a period of deliberations and a seminar106, with all the important stakeholders 
taking part. In this seminar agreement on the end goal was reached, and support for the timing 
and the means to be used was secured. The question of using tolls to finance the road was at 
the time only five years after the “green election” in 1987 a very delicate issue, which easily 
could jeopardize the project.  
 
4.5.2 The E18 problem and solution. 
 
The E18 planning problem was the lack of capacity on E18 through the central parts of the 
city. This had not found a solution mainly because of the lack of Government funding, even 
though one had tried hard to find a solution for a decade.  
 
 
Figure 4-16 Kristiansand, the trunk roads through the central part of the municipality.  
                                                
104 Interview Andreas Setsaa  
105 Vegdirektoratet is the central office of the National Highway Agency 
106 At Refsnes hotel, Byglandsfjord.  
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The major problem in Kristiansand in 1992 was fourfld as the Highway Director put:  
 
1. Kristiansand had to decide on a plan for E18 through a very sensitive area, which also 
decided the costs. 
2. The Highway Agency (HA) had to accept that congestion on E18 in Kristiansand was 
a problem deserving national funding. 
3. The City Council had to accept the finance plan, including the continuous toll road 
financing (the toll amount to be collected, the price per passing and the number of 
years during which toll was to be collected)  
4. The Highway Agency had to approve both the road plan and finance plan (state grant, 
municipal grant and local toll road). 
 
This 2 by 2 planning problem is shown in the following four-quadrant figure:  
 
  Authority  
  Local Central 
Plan 
 
I  Approve design and 
decide plan  
II Accept the plan Decide 
priority for funding 
 
Road plan 
financed by tolls 
 
Finance 
 
III  City Council decide 
to apply for toll financing 
IV HA approve toll package 
for decision in Parliament  
 
The solution of the E18 planning problem had to address all this four issues and create a 
common agreement on how to solve the problem. There ar  complicated relationships 
between the four quadrants, requiring both horizontal and vertical coordination on both the 
local and central level involving actors in several organizations that may or may not pull in 
the same direction to promote the case, but could also r ise barriers to it.  
 
It was the HA after these four major problems were solved who recommend the road project 
and the Toll Road Package for the Ministry of Transport and the Parliament. After very 
skilled planning, the process ended successfully and the motorway into the city centre was 
completed in 2004. The whole process took only twelve years and about a billion NOK (125 
million Euro) was spent. The process went smoothly, apart from more than a year’s delay, 
when an alternative junction107 was forced into the process. “That was the biggest problem in 
other wise a very effective planning process” as the county HA director put it.  
 
Throughout the process the HA director kept in close contact with the mayor and a small 
group of politicians advising on the process. To solve the E18 problem overshadowed all 
other projects, even the Sustainable City project that run at the same time. All of the 
interviewed had E18 as one of the major tasks, but none of my informants mentioned the 
Sustainable City directly as one of the most important land use and transport issues for the 
city. Indirectly several mentioned the Sustainable City through land use policy, densification, 
public transport, etc. To understand the lack of importance the SC had, the old saying “Follow 
the money” can be used. E18 costs 700 million NOK to build, while the Sustainable City used 
10-15 million. “Garnish” the road director called rebuilding Dronningens gate “we used some 
millions to make the street nice, it gave us a lot of good will.”  
 
                                                
107 KrF’s ”Julegave til Kristiansand”, Fædrelandsvenne 1996 
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“Lommerusk” – the term for petty cash – was used by the conservative group leader108 to 
describe the Sustainable City project in Kristiansand “The MoE gives us lommerusk, at the 
same time the Ministry of Transport cuts severely in the public transport grant! We, the city 
and the county, have to put up a lot of money to foll w up their ideas. That is not interesting!” 
Thus the Sustainable City never caught on as the vision for the future among the actors or 
players with power, who were dealing with the big issues in Kristiansand.  
 
4.5.3 Evaluation of the E18 process  
 
Pre 1992 case history 
The legacy was: a) Land use planning “top in class”, b) Transport financing “impossible” to 
get the normal way, c) Varoddbrua opened 1992 proved that tolls were an effective way to 
finance roads, d) The 1987 local election “No to Toll Ring” showed a strong green shift.  
 
Easy or difficult (wicked) problem field? 
Difficult problem because the Toll Ring was rejected in 1987 elections, but also supported by 
the E18 Varoddbrua success. 
 
Problem definition as the difference between Facts and Expectation 
Fact:  Queues on main roads, public grievance, business expectations. Common talk. Media.  
Expectation:  New road will increase capacity. Opinion among national-government agencies 
in Oslo: the congestion problems in Kristiansand small, hence the need for more capacity and 
funds is low. 
 
What ideas and direction did these facts and expectations lead to? 
Planning results:  Concrete result was toll financed new E18 after bottom-up process led by 
the HA. The politicians took an active role as “municipality developers”. 
Understanding of power:  Experience told that to succeed it was necessary: a) to fight locally, 
within HA, towards MoT and Parliament, b) that a broad consensus in Kristiansand was 
necessary, and c) closed politics in the initial phase of the big project would help.  
 
Plan process and implementing 
Important incentives and benefits: Success gives many winners:  
• Huge time savings for car users. 
• Inward investment gives jobs. 
• Building gives jobs and profits. 
• Deserved “just” allocation of money 
• Both politicians and planners are considered “clever” and gain increased “status” 
 
Counter factual discussion: Was the E18 project a success only in conditions with queues and 
planning for the car? Is it conceivable with a more balanced transport system including car, 
bike, walk and priority to public transport? What in case would have been the necessary 
conditions? If for example the E18 aim had been the new road plus 20% public transport 
increase and completion of the BikeWalk net? At the time it was formally impossible, but so 
was the Bergen toll system a few years earlier. Perhaps wishful thinking, but I believe that a 
                                                
108 Interview Harald Furre  
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more innovative E18 process might have succeeded. For years transport policy was led by 
tactical considerations without an overall strategy for the region. When the strategic level is 
lacking the tactic becomes of little value. If the Agder region had had a strategy for the trunk 
road through the whole region, then a more active instead of reactive tactic could have been 
used. Why not more flexible, creative and innovative processes and solutions? Playing on 
existing power relations as shown in the 4-quadrant table solved the E18 problems. The risk 
of failure for the main objective was too large to include other objectives as a greater share 
should go to PT and BW. 
 
4.6 The Sustainable City. 
 
4.6.1 Introduction  
 
During the 1990s and parallel to the E18 process another land use and transport planning 
process took place. The Sustainable City Kristiansand came as a result of the great success 
with the municipal environmental planning project (MIK). The MoE wanted to continue and 
broaden that experience and asked cities to apply to become a Sustainable City. 
Kristiansand109 was after sending an application in the autumn 1992 appointed by the 
Ministry of the Environment (MoE) in Norway to Sustainable City (SC) together with 
Fredrikstad, Bergen, Tromsø and Gamle Oslo110. ”The aim for the Sustainable City 
experiment is to direct the development in a more environment friendly direction where the 
long-term perspective is to produce models for a sustainable town development.” It was six 
priority areas for Sustainable City:  
1. Land use and transport planning 
2. City centre development 
3. City dwellings and densification 
4. Green structure, nature and recreation 
5. Waste and recycling 
6. Urban design and cultural heritage 
 
As mentioned before Kristiansand with about 75 000 inhabitants has a fifty-year-old 
reputation of being a “front-runner” in city plannig. Both politicians and planners were 
therefore very positive to become a “Sustainable City.” Also the MoE was keen to get 
Kristiansand as part of the program, due to its reputation and record. Hence, the outlook 
towards success was soon established. Indeed, the MoE appointed Kristiansand The best of 
environment planning in Norway already in 1996. The development concept model for 
Kristiansand is shown in figure 4-11.  
 
With the goals set out in the application, the seven-y ar project could outline the process and 
design the use of the means and instruments to achieve these goals. Instead of a plan process 
involving the city population, it became a process in which the focus was put on 
communication between the MoE/the central project task force and the Sustainable Cities in 
                                                
109 See K H Olsen 1994:220 about the application and appointment of the SC 
110 National program for the Sustainable Cities can be found on  
http://odin.dep.no/md/norsk/dok/andre_dok/rapporter/022005-990517/dok-bn.html  
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seminars and meetings. Information was spread to the public through leaflets, articles and 
media stunts.111 The controversial goal of shifting people from cars to public transport was to 
a limited extent addressed. In Kristiansand the emphasis was put on changing people’s 
attitudes and actions (?) through information and appe ling morally to make people do the 
right things. Several smaller projects were run like “Don’t pollute! Use the bus”, “Don’t 
throw waste around”, “Stop idle running”, and “Drive without studded tires”.  
 
The five Sustainable Cities set different goals. However, for the priority area - Land use and 
transport planning – all five including Kristiansand, should reduce car usage and CO2 
emissions by increasing the use of public transport. This public transport effort did not 
succeed. The MoE which also was the project maker, has funded expert evaluations of the 
SC-program and also carried out its own evaluation. “The most important result of the SC-
program was to exemplify how difficult it is to obtain a more sustainable development in a 
city”  was one comment112. The full-scale experiment was closed in September 2000 with 
meager results. 
 
4.6.2 Public transport share 1985, 1992 and 1998 
 
In the following figure the traffic change in four of the Sustainable Cities and Stavanger are 
compared113. The national travel surveys have a low confidence lev l when broken down on 
individual cities, but are the best data there is. In all the five cities the public transport share 
fell from 1985 to 1998. In Kristiansand there was already in 1993 a 30% increase in public 
transport usage due to another experiment ”Kristianand package 1”. However, this patronage 
was lost thereafter and in 1998 the figure shows a public transport share of 10% for the 
Kristiansand region.  
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Table  4-17 Public transport in five cities, 1985, 1992, 1998 
 
 
                                                
111 The signing of the Fredrikstad declaration (inspired by the Aalborg project?) was one such stunt. Who has 
heard of it later?  
112 Strand et al evaluation of the SC project   
113 Data is a collection made by Civitas from the national travel surveys, and supplemented with data from 
Stavanger, not part of the SC project. 
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4.6.3 Kristiansand and the Sustainable City project 
 
Background and organization 
The MoE described the Sustainable City experiment in several reports. In the main report it is 
stated: “The main challenge is to change the course away from the car driven expansion of 
the urban areas.” With this as the basic perspective, six tasks were defined. For each task a 
professional task force was set up to guide and advice the towns in their planning and 
implementation of projects. The process was a Top Down exercise with the task force as the 
obvious authority. However, in one of the evaluation reports114 the process has been said to be 
Bottom Up. The planning process and the organisation of the work was designed to get close 
co-operation between the central and local government, meetings were held regularly and 
series of yearly national conferences. The design of the experiment seems rather Top Down. 
 
The goals of the Sustainable City experiment 
The idea behind Sustainable City Kristiansand (and the four other cities) was both to develop 
a comprehensive approach for planning and administration, and models on how sustainable 
cities could be developed. The government clearly aimed at initiating comprehensive planning 
for sustainability in the cities, and indeed as an experience from this work, models to be used 
as examples for other cities should result. The government also gave the cities full 
responsibility for a successful result: “the municipal ties are to be the driving force and 
integrating the work towards sustainability in their own planning and administration.”  
 
Means to develop Public Transport 
The transport committee in the Parliament initiated 1990 a broad government exercise115 in 
improving public transport as part of the Norwegian government’s follow-up of the 
Brundtland report. The counties applied for grants to the Ministry of Transport to run public 
transport projects. For Kristiansand a series of prjects were designed as a comprehensive 
package to improve public transport, “Kristiansand package I”. This was very successful and 
the number of passengers increased with 30% from 1990 to 1994, a unique result.  
 
Hence, when Kristiansand became a Sustainable City, the county wanted to follow up this 
success with a new comprehensive package “Kristiansand package II”. However, the Ministry 
of the Environment rejected to finance “Kristiansand package II” and the same was the case 
with MoT. Locally, it was not possible to get influential persons like the local Member of 
Parliament, to lobby the government for a grant for “Kristiansand package II”. The reason for 
this was that funding of roads was the top priority and the only one. “Nothing should interfere 
with the E18 process. Nothing!”116. In sum the county and the SC Kristiansand put together 
the plans for an improved public transport system, but were unable to implement the 
comprehensive plan or package. 
 
 
                                                
114 The Ministry of the Environment, 2000 Areal- og transportplanlegging. Erfaringer og anbefalinger fra 
Miljøbyprogrammet. Oslo 
115 Forsøksordningen for bedre kollektivtransport 
116 Interview Kjell Abildsnes  
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Figure 4-17 Kristiansand Sustainable City, development concept model.  
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Results? 
After the first few years, negative comments about the Sustainable City Kristiansand started 
to crop up in the press. People seemed to have lost faith in the project. Even though the 
leaflets and information spread the sustainable city gospel, people didn’t notice any change. 
Public transport was not improved, the bike lanes wre still poorly maintained and the 
crossings complicated and unsafe. Car usage increased and public transport patronage fell 
during the seven years the project lasted.  
 
The Ministry of Environment main evaluation report described the results:  
• It will take a long time to change the course towards more sustainability. 
• Key projects make the future vision more clear. 
• Sustainable development is in the cities more embedded both politically and 
administratively. 
• A new policy for local community development was tried out. 
• City Centre development was improved 
 
Specifically for Kristiansand is mentioned: 
• Co-operation between central government, the roads authority, the county and 
Kristiansand was formalized (Kristiansand package II, Areal og Buss) 
• City expansion was curbed and densification promoted. 
• The market place117 has been changed from parking place to “the city living room”.  
 
The MoE questionnaire 
The basis for the Ministry’s evaluation was a questionnaire asking about the Sustainable City 
project, which were sent to all five towns in the exp riment. The questions were: 
1. The most positive results? 
2. Changes in the cities’ way of organizing the work? 
3. Has the SC changed economic priorities? 
4. What was difficult to implement and why? 
5. Future SC work? 
6. Demands to county and central authorities? 
7. The most important experiences? 
One may guess the answers! Of course the SC experiment was a grand success in all the five 
cities, even with similar results as Sustainable City Kristiansand. Here we only look at the 
land use and transport planning and the cities answers may reflect successes on the other 
tasks, however it may be that the cities in their answers also had other and hidden intentions. 
The City Council Executive in the Sustainable City Kristiansand had the following answer to 
the above questions: 
1. Greater insights and willingness. 
2. The Environment committee was removed, and formal co-operation to improve PT 
established. 
3. More funds to SC projects. 
4. No reduction in car usage. Lack of funds to PT has mpered the work. Land use 
management difficult. 
5. Develop a sustainable land use policy in the long term. 
                                                
117 This was finished for the city jubilee in 1991, long before the SC experiment started, but still used to sell the 
SC project! 
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6. Consistent and adequate PT funding. 
7. A very good example of co-operation between local and central government. 
 
The answer to questions 1 and 2 is a good example of using the language rhetorically. Greater 
insight and willingness was according to the Executive obtained, but how much were attitudes 
changed and what were the starting point for change, zero? Many will disagree that the 
removal of the Environment committee was a positive result. This committee was established 
in 1988 as part of the environmental project and became an active voice for sustainable 
development, to the annoyance of the establishment. The answer, which passed through the 
city political executive, was very positive. How can that be explained? My suggestions are:  
• The city wants to be polite towards the people who took part in the seven-year project, 
and signal that the city is interested to take partin future experiments hopefully with 
some extra money. 
• The politicians and administration tend to present the positive side of things, and 
forget about the failures. It may also be the case that the picture the politicians had of 
the Sustainable City Kristiansand basically was very positive, even though the results 
were meager. 
• Neither the politicians and nor the administration want to be associated with failure 
under any circumstances. That may influence the electorate and also question the 
competence of the politicians running the city affairs. 
• The politicians and the administration do have a comm n interest in always being 
successful. The same goes for the Department of the Environment. This may have 
influenced the questioning, the answers and the presentation of the answers? 
• Lastly, representative democracy has a strong preferenc  for avoiding conflicts and 
maintaining consensus positions118. A sustainable city development will threaten the 
existing consensus and may therefore be marginalized, as it became in Kristiansand. 
 
4.6.4 Prize for the best environmental city 
 
The Minister of the Environment Borge Brende, honored Kristiansand when he gave the 
Mayor Bjorg Wallevik, “Prize for the best environmental city” (Byplanprisen) for the year 
2002.  
 
“Kristiansand gets the prize for it’s long-term effort of city development in a sustainability 
perspective. I hope this prize will inspire the cities to put even more emphasis on the 
environment. Kristiansand is the example of the best practice; I hope other cities can learn 
from Kristiansand. It is good foresight to improve th  environment in the cities.” said the 
minister and continued “ Kristiansand has worked systematically with a long time horizon to 
develop the city with overall structure, improved public transport and cycling network, 
attractive city space and green structure, cleaner river and waterfront, and good accessibility 
for all. Kristiansand has great breadth in its environmental approach, which spans from the 
cultural heritage to waste recycling and energy. The local authority is sitting in the drivers’ 
seat for this work and has been active in promoting co-operation with Government, county, 
industry and the population. Hardly any other city in Norway has such a breadth in the work 
to develop a good city environment as Kristiansand.” 
                                                
118 Rydin Yvonne 1995 Sustainable development and the role of Land Use Planning Area 369-377 
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What did the Minister highlight?  
1. Time perspective: long-term effort of city development in a sustainability perspective.  
2. Kristiansand is the example of the best practice.  
3. Comprehensive, integrated planning, Kristiansand has worked systematically with a 
long time horizon:  
• to develop the city with overall structure,  
• improved public transport and cycling network,  
• attractive city space and green structure,  
• cleaner river and waterfront,  
• good accessibility for all.  
Management and Governance: The local authority is sitt ng in the drivers’ seat for this work:  
has been active in promoting co-operation with Government, county, industry and the 
population. Broad approach: Kristiansand has great breadth in its environmental approach, 
which spans from the cultural heritage to waste recycling and energy. Hardly any other city 
in Norway has such a breadth in the work to develop a good city environment as 
Kristiansand. Put in another words, one may look to Kristiansand to learn about:  
Sustainable city development 
Integrated planning 
Good governance 
Practical approach 
Media, some politicians and many people were somewhat surprised of this prize. The 
Sustainable City did not improve public transport services, instead it disregarded the unique 
public transport success the county had created with the consequence that public transport 
patronage fell during the project. The cycling network was not improved or extended contrary 
to what the Minister said. One may wonder where the information for the speech came from?  
 
A gap between words and reality? 
The gap between the Sustainable City propaganda and people’s daily experiences was topped 
when the city got the City Planning Prize from the Minister of Environment. The Sustainable 
City became a concept of something different than what was experienced in Kristiansand, a 
proof of wrong policies, and a “hypocrite” in the eyes of many. Kristiansand had launched the 
biggest road-building scheme ever in the nineties, f nanced by road tolls. The motorway takes 
the car directly to the city centre through an underground grade separated junction. The traffic 
capacity established may provide for free car usage for several decades. Neither the parking 
policy nor the statutory parking requirements for new buildings were changed. Hardly a 
sustainable development, many will say. An evaluation of the effectiveness in achieving the 
stated objectives of the transport part of the SC project, found on the contrary that the 
objectives of shifting people from cars to PT were not reached. In fact the SC project did 
hardly affect person’s choice of mode in a positive way, rather all indicators show that car use 
and car dependency increased and PT patronage fell.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Sustainable City is less environment friendly. 
Good wishes and 100 million NOK was used – but the car usage has not 
decreased in the five Sustainable Cities: Tromsø, Bergen, Fredrikstad, 
Kristiansand and Gamle Oslo. 
      ”It is of no use to promote public transport when the roads in the 
cities are expanded and improved,” says project leader Kjell Spigseth.      
Plan  1/2000 
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4.7 Assessment of the major events in the nineties 
 
The two major events in the nineties were the designat on as Sustainable City (SC) from 1993 
to 2000, a period of seven years, and the E18 project transforming the old two-lane road into a 
four-lane urban motorway financed mainly by a toll r ad ring around the city centre.  
 
These two events the E18 and the Sustainable City, are analyzed using the model in the 
figure119, starting with structure, then process, resources and measures.  
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Figure 4-18 Model for analysis  
 
 
The E18 and the Sustainable City projects are systematically compared below120:  
 
The E18 case can be called a “Stakeholder” project, meaning that combinations of 
stakeholders both public and private were central in the process. The SC case can from one 
angle be called a “Government” project, meaning that it was implementing national policy at 
the local level, using the hierarchical formal authority system for decision-making. From 
another angle the benevolent Government used information to persuade the municipality to 
become more sustainable. It was never a question of management by force, but under both 
perspectives the Sustainable City idea and project was implemented in the city without regard 
for the local context and citizens.  
Goals  
The E18 had one simple aim, to build a new highway. A set of objectives underpin this aim; 
some of them very difficult to achieve, in particular the toll financing and decision on the 
alignment and road design. The stakeholders agreed upon the aims of the E18 project, which 
was important in later decision process. After the City Council made the final decision on the 
                                                
119 LOKTRA report 3 Mer effektive institusjoner og bedr  planlegging. 
120 ANNEX I to chapter 4 show a one page comparison. 
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Toll Road Package and highway alignment, the process transferred to “product planning”. 
The aims of the SC project were as ambiguous as the concept sustainable development itself. 
The targets set by the MoE were to develop a SC-model, to create jobs and to improve 
children’s environment. The SC should also shift people from cars to PT. The SC project did 
not manage to focus on selected objectives, but proceeded with ambiguous targets. A more 
focused process with clearly identified targets might have led to more tangible results, 
especially with regards to the aim of influencing peo le’s choice of mode of transport i.e. a 
move from car use to public transport.  
Structure  
The formal structure following the planning act was used as the instrument to achieve the two 
aims: Decisions in the City Council on Reguleringsplan E18, and Toll road finance package. 
The E18 project had two main actors, the Highway Agency and Kristiansand municipality. 
The HA is organized in a vertical structure under the Ministry of Transport while the 
municipality has a City Council with elected representatives on top. The cooperation and 
partnership created in the E18 case made it possible to overcome the barriers inherent in the 
structure. The SC on the other hand did not manage to create such partnerships. A Top down 
approach initiated by MoE with national secretariat and six supporting groups, with local 
steering and project groups (note that the SC project did not use the permanent committees in 
the local authority) was the way the project was organized. The aim of increasing public 
transport use was abandoned due to two reasons:  
 a) Animosity between municipality and county,  
 b) The possibility of a negative effect on ability to raise funds for building roads   
The SC created its own steering group and project group instead of using the formal structure, 
this probably hampered the progress and ultimately th  effectiveness of the project. 
Process  
The E18 project started with a closed process with selected stakeholders until consensus were 
reached, thereafter the statutory process was used.It was first a learning and confidence 
building process among selected key actors. The SC process was very much a Top Down 
process, unable to create any broad confidence in the project. SC used professional 
information people to disseminate information and create awareness about the project, it’s 
meetings and conferences. The process and information strategy took place outside the 
established planning processes in the municipality, making the SC project exclusive and 
alienating some planners as well as many members of the public.  
Resources  
Both projects had ample of resources for the planning process. Resources for the E18 
planning were available in Highway Agency and Kristiansand municipality administration. If 
the E18 project had been successful, then the toll system would generate significant income 
(100 million NOK every year for a decade paid by road users) for building infrastructure in 
the region. Ample resources for planning (seminars and meetings in places unusual for most 
public planners) were available for the Sustainable City project too, but the SC project was 
not embedded in daily processes nor structure. SC can be read as “predict and prevent” 
project, the car growth that was predicted should be prevented by shift to public transport. 
Such a shift would represent a huge challenge to the ci y as a “growth machine” and the 
interests behind growth.121 The SC project would yearly require substantial public money to 
make public transport an attractive alternative to the car. Public transport would have to be 
                                                
121 The “car system” represent substantial economic interests in Kristiansand, from the newspaper who has 
considerable income from advertising to the real estat  business and the planning and building of car sale 
premises in the Sørlandspark.  
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subsidized from taxpayers by money allocated through the county. Thus one of the projects 
had clear direct benefits for the local community, while the other would require the same 
community to commit to additional expenditure for years to obtain long-term benefits.  
Measures  
The E18 project is an excellent example of successful coordination of interests and creating 
consensus about a common goal. The main measures used were cooperation and learning. 
Consensus was built among key stakeholders through a learning process and cooperation 
across levels, layers and sectors. The result was an unwritten “contract” between the 
stakeholders built on trust, agreeing on the goals and “tying” each member in for the duration 
of the project. The aims of the SC project should be achieved through holistic planning, and 
integrate local authority, the state and private inrests across sectors and tasks (note the 
county is not mentioned!). The priority tasks were among several others public transport and 
BW, plus integrated land use and transport planning. The SC project attempted to change both 
the course of action and the rules of the game through “good examples” and the “right” moral 
attitude. 
Results  
The E18 project is an example of achieving the goalset within the time frame and funds 
available. The SC project did not achieve the goals set: “The MoE has evaluated what the 
sustainable cities among them Kristiansand, have done and not done to prepare for future 
environmentally friendly transport solutions. Stripped of professional and ministerial 
language the conclusion was: Nothing, which has any effect on the traffic development.”122  
 
Comments  
The Toll road system has an important economic growth effect locally (jobs from the 
collection of tolls and building the road; and reduced travel times generate growth) plus the 
land use opportunities opening up because of the proj cts (both at junctions and further away 
due to reduced travel times). The successful E18 story arted in 1992 when new actors came 
on stage. Before that the E18 project had been unsucce sful for years. Incentives were aligned 
and the result positive for all: zero congestion gives faster travel, direct jobs for a few, 
increased income for firms, increased taxes due to higher incomes, etc.  
 
The Sustainable City has left two important results in Kristiansand. Firstly, Kristiansand got 
the MoE prize for champion city planning. This gives the city important symbolic value, 
which has a positive marketing effect and supports city branding. Secondly the BusMetro was 
established and embedded with politicians and administrators. The lack of progress in mode 
shift from cars to public transport, show that it is necessary to implement an integrated policy 
with both push and pull factors, across all levels to achieve such a shift. The measures to 
achieve the SC goals would be negative for many politicians, planners and the public. Shift 
from car to public transport will necessarily mean that many will have to change mode at a 
cost, and short-term benefits must be forsaken. At the urn of the millennium then, there are 
two paths, the successful ‘The Road Building Path’ and the unsuccessful ‘The Planning 
Path’. How did these two paths fare the first few years into the new millennium? This is the 
question we will answer next.  
 
                                                
122 VA Chief transport executive K Abildsnes, interview Fædrelandsvennen 18th February 1999 
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4.8 After the millennium, still on an unsustainable path? 
 
The Road Building Path was still very strong in Kristiansand into the new millennium. E18 is 
finished from the city centre and some five kilometers towards the east. There a major new 
road works starts, 50 km of E18 is being built and road tolls pay for the investment123. Plans 
for the continuation of the trunk road the E39 towards the west and the toll road package for 
financing E39 passed through the decision system (se below).  
 
The Planning Path was blurred, uncertainties seemed great and it was difficult to predict 
future development. The Sustainable City left several ideas like the BusMetro, the ATP 
project and more emphasis on sustainable development in the Kommuneplan 2005. “Go to 
Kristiansand and learn,” said the Minister of Environment when he gave Kristiansand the 
prize as city planning champion. The discourse on sustainability and the story line sustainable 
transport development was strengthened through the Sustainable City project and of course 
further strengthened by the general debate on climate change. This does not mean that this 
story line had obtained a hegemony role, far from it. The “car world” occupied with better, 
bigger and safer cars, petrol prices, congestion, and l ck of money for road building, etc. was 
still by far the strongest influence in the common discourse. It was taken for granted in 
Kristiansand that the car is here stay. The most important LU&T events and issues the first 
few years of the new millennium, which will be treat d in turn below, have been:  
• Campaign for “Gratis buss” 
• BusMetro 
• ATP project 
• Kommuneplan 2005 
• E39  
Bridge or Tunnel 
Toll Road Package with new geography /localization and formal structure  
Innsigelse (Objection)  
• Planning practice and parking policy (P-house undereath Market Square) 
 
4.8.1 Campaign for ”Gratis Buss” 
 
4.8.1.1 Zero fare or “Gratis buss”  
Fædrelandsvennen started a very successful campaign romoting “Gratis Buss” (zero-fare 
bus) before the coming elections to the Parliament (Storting) in August 2001. Many local 
politicians jumped on the bandwagon and proclaimed th y wanted “Gratis Buss”. The story 
continues through autumn and winter with politicians playing lip service and passing the 
responsibility buck about. In May 2002 the campaign was closed, no one had agreed to 
shoulder the costs. The timeline for the first “Gratis Buss” campaign was:  
• September 2001: County Council Executive supports ”Gratis Buss” in Kristiansand 
• September 2001: The mayor Wallevik gets support from f ur MPs on a national pilot 
project ”Gratis Buss”  
                                                
123 A public private partnership (in Norway called OPS) finance, build and maintain the road on a 25 years 
contract. 
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• October 2001: Gratis Buss will cost 100-150 million NOK, while present subsidy is 36 
million.  
• November 2001: The Conservative Party did not put Gra is Buss in the budget 
(Labour Party offered NOK 300 000) 
• December 2001: The Government will support the citis, and public trasnsport124 
• February 2001: VAFK; VA Kollektivtrafikk and Bussen Trafikkselskap say no: Free 
bus makes no sense!  
• April 2002: The Minister of Transport T Skogsholm, V, in the Parliament125: 
”Everybody want ”Gratis buss”, and it will be difficult to defend that we support 
Kristiansand and not the others. We can’t discriminate.” She also wanted the 
municipalities to commit themselves to allocate more f their own funds to public 
transport before the Government would increase suchfunding.  
• Mai 2002: City Council Executive rejects the Labour proposal  
 
Hasselt  
Fædrelandsvennen was very much inspired by the city of Hasselt in Belgium, when they 
started the campaign for “Gratis Buss”126. Hasselt is about the same size as Kristiansand as 
shown in the table.  
 
Table  4-18 Kristiansand and Hasselt, PT key figures 2001 
 Hasselt 2001 
68 000 inhabitants  
(200 000 within region) 
Kristiansand 2001 
75 000 inhabitants  
(110 000 within region) 
Passengers PT 3.2 mill 8.1 mill 
PT costs 32 mill NOK 90 mill NOK 
 
The Hasselt model is an example of integrated transport planning in a city where public 
transport and BW is a city responsibility. In Hasselt a 4-lane road was redesigned to a 2-lane 
road, the former road space was transformed into a green b lt with BW path. The city 
reduced the number of parking spaces and raised the parking fee! The cost of ”Free Public 
Transport” was fairly low due to the very low level of public transport users (one third of 
Kristiansand). 
 
The local discussion in Kristiansand focused singularly on the public transport fare element of 
the Hasselt initiative when in reality it was a well integrated transport policy where 
restrictions on car use were implemented together with improvements for vulnerable road 
users and free public transport services. Parking in the city centre was reduced and the four-
lane ring road was reduced to a two-lane road. It was a carrot and stick policy measure, which 
was very successful. 
 
4.8.1.2 The “Gratis Buss” campaign process 
The prime minister candidate Jens Stoltenberg was: turned on by the idea of “Gratis 
Buss”.127 “Interesting thought” he says. A few days later on August 15th Fædrelandsvennen 
presents a full page headed Broad Political Excitement for “Gratis Buss” with pictures and 
                                                
124 St meld nr 23 (2001-2002) Bedre miljø i byer og tettsteder 
125 Presenting St meld nr 26 (2001-2002) Bedre kollektivtransport 
126 Fædrelandsvennen 11 August 2001 
127 Fædrelandsvennen, 110801 
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comments from political parties. “If we can be a demonstration city for this, it is unbelievably 
exciting. I am not at all against “Gratis Buss”, on the contrary. I have earlier expressed that 
the municipality is not receiving the money for public transport, and therefore it is not our 
responsibility. But if we can get money from the state and become a demonstration city, I 
support it fully.” says the mayor Bjørg Wallevik. Together with the leader of Agderrådet Jan 
Helland-Olsen she is going to push the case right to the top nationally. There was political 
consensus about “Gratis Buss” in Kristiansand (Frp excepted). 
 
Note that the mayor says:  
1. That the PT is not the responsibility of the city 
2. She will go to the “top” (Central Government) and ask for money for public transport, 
without an offer of a local contribution  
3. That the County mayor, who is responsible for PT, is not engaged with (Agderrådet is 
a “club” to ease cooperation between the two Agder counties and produce common 
goals) 
 
On September first the County Council Executive supports the idea, and four MPs support the 
idea of a Government demonstration project. After th  September election things are back to 
normal. During the budget discussion in the Parliament, the Labour party put in a tiny  
300 000 NOK (estimated cost 100-150 million) while th Conservatives opted not to make a 
contribution. In December the Government proclaims a new and active policy to support PT. 
Then on February 1st those responsible for PT: Vest-Agder County; Vest-Agder 
Kollektivtrafikk and Bussen Trafikkselskap say no: Free bus makes no sense! 
 
In April the Government White Paper128 on public transport was presented by the Minister of 
Transport, T Skogsholm, V, and she comments on the initiative in Kristiansand: “Everybody 
wants “Gratis Buss” and it will be difficult to defend that we only support Kristiansand and no 
one else.” She adds that the cities must commit money in their budgets at local level before 
they will get state grants. 
 
LAST STOP FOR ”GRATIS BUSS”  one could read in Fædrelandsvennen 16 May 2002. 
The City Council killed all hopes for “Gratis Buss” yesterday. Ap put in a last effort to keep 
the election promise, but the majority Høyre, Kristelig Folkepart and Venstre crushed the 
dream. ”The election promise was a bluff from Høyre, Kristelig Folkepart og Venstre. They 
have led the voters behind the light.” exclaims a disappointed and upset Mette Gundersen, 
Ap. ”We have met the wall. We realize that we are not get ing any way with the Government 
on this issue. It would only be a symbolic propositi n.”  says Tore Austad, H (the Government 
consisted of: Høyre, Kristelig Folkeparti and Venstre).  
 
4.8.1.3 Epilogue, “Gratis Buss” is dead, but won’t stay down.  
The newspaper however, does not let the issue die. Ever so often some form of “Gratis Buss” 
crops up in commentaries and articles, although modified to be half price or substantially 
reduced public transport fares. At the 2007 election the mayor candidate for the labor party 
relaunched “Gratis Buss”, but this time around it didn’t catch much attention.  
 
                                                
128 St. meld. nr. 26 (2001-2002) Bedre kollektivtransport  
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‘Fædrelandsvennen’ has kept the discussion on public transport fares alive over many years. 
The problem is that local politicians only participate in stunts and no political party assumes 
responsibility; i.e. ’Our policy on public transport fares is “ Gratis Buss”. The way public 
transport is organized and financed makes it easy for politicians to avoid taking responsibility 
and making a stand on the subject129. There are many research reports on the importance of 
the different elements like price, comfort, reliability, frequency and travel time, seating 
availability, etc with regards to transport choices. Common in these reports are that price is 
not enough to shift people from cars to buses. The few experiments also show that “Gratis 
buss” attract mainly cyclists and walkers, and only few drivers.  
 
4.8.2 BusMetro in Kristiansand. 
 
Curitiba in Brazil (population 2 mill) gave during the Sustainable City project birth to the 
BusMetro idea for Kristiansand130. The MoT launched a new grant131 in spring 2000. The 
BusMetro started on August 18th 2003 and was officially opened by the Minister of Transport 
in September. It became an instant success with headlin s like 18% growth.  
 
The BusMetro is a 8 km linear bus route through the city centre with high frequency, real time 
info and high quality bus stops, etc. The intention is to develop the land around the major 
stops as high-density mixed-use interchanges. The objective of course is to develop the 
BusMetro as an alternative to the car. It remains to be seen to what extent the BusMetro will 
attain such goals. New route structure has been established with a lot better frequency 
(doubling on some routes) paid for by Government “reward money”. The four parties should 
participate with the following amounts: 
 
Table  4-19 Kristiansand, BusMetro share of costs 
Investor Million NOK 
Ministry of Transport 2.25 
Kristiansand municipality 1.25 
Vest-Agder County 1.30 
Highway Agency 1.20 
Sum  6.00 
 
In fact the costs of the project became 11.46 million NOK. In addition 41 million NOK was 
invested in infrastructure, new stops, etc. The “real-time” system alone cost 10 million.  
The “great success” of the BusMetro and the rapid growth mostly refer to the initial months of 
the project in 2003. The data on the “before” situat on was fairly unreliable and probably 
inflated the growth figures.  
The table below show that the BusMetro has had substantially higher growth than the 
Kristiansand region and far higher than for the county (fylke).  
 
                                                
129 Research on this issue, see Kråkenes and Oland 
130 The idea goes back to the report A eal og buss, en byvisjon 1991. ”Hensikten er å utvikle arealbruk som er 
mindre transportgenererende” s. 7 
131 MoT spring 2000 ”Støtteordningen for forsøksvirksomhet i KT” 
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BusMetroen show rapid growth first two years
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Figure 4-19 Kristiansand, BusMetro passenger growth  2003 – 2005 
Notice that the y-axis use comma, hence 1,02 mean 1.02 in US-English language.  
 
The differences are less from 2004 to 2005 than for the year before. This may be caused by 
the initial positive effects at the start of the project has been leveling out; indicating that 
further growth will only be generated by further improvements in the services. Public 
transport in the Kristiansand region has since 1997 varied around 8,5 million trips per year. In 
2005 the number of passengers was only 2% higher than in 1997. The BusMetro may have 
changed this path and possibly started an upward tren ?  
 
There is very little indication that the BussMetro has attracted substantial numbers of former 
car users. The car traffic on the trunk road E18 Varoddbrua increased with 3% per year in the 
period 2000 – 2005.  
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Figure 4-20 Kristiansand and VA county, public transport passenger growth  1997 – 2005 
 
From an evaluation132 of the BusMetro it seems clear that most of the public transport users 
have the bus as sole mode: ”It is still such that 70% of bus users did not have car as an 
alternative, and a further 25% were in households where someone else used the car. This 
means that the vast majority of the bus users, usedthe bus because the alternative was 
lacking. Among the relatively few who could use the bus but didn’t, it was the different 
positive sides with public transport and the negative sides of car use like parking difficulties, 
costs and queues, that were mentioned.  
 
                                                
132 Gunnar Stavrum, (2004)  Evaluering av bussmetroen. Kristiansand: GS Analyse. 
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4.8.2.1 Assessment of the BusMetro success 
The BusMetro has had a very good start, the foundation for basic infrastructure is in place 
(dilemmas are also there, it takes 10 min extra to travel by UiA, which is a choice of route 
where some passengers gain and some lose), but the improvements must continue to keep up 
with the competition from the cars. In the list of tasks below it is especially important to 
prioritize those that reduce the door-to-door travel time for the bus passengers. 
• Bus priority (lanes, signals etc) 
• Frequency, buses every 10 minutes.  
• Ticket price.  
• Comfort on the bus.  
• High quality stops. 
• Real time information has to be available at all stop  not only on the city centre 
terminals.  
 
The traffic growth confirms that increased frequency generates more traffic, and together with 
a more efficient route structure and the effect of marketing a ”new” product, the very 
successful start of the BusMetro can be explained. The goals for 2008 are 20% increase in 
traffic on the BusMetro and 10% for PT generally in the city. These aims will be hard to meet 
unless more money is put into PT services.  
 
4.8.2.2 Conclusion on BusMetro 
The BusMetro has been very successful in improving the image of public transport in 
Kristiansand, and the basic infrastructure for a modern public transport system has been 
established in the city centre. The BusMetro process is also an excellent example of how 
institutional barriers can be overcome and how goals c n be achieved.  
 
The cooperation of the partners (The Highway Agency, the bus company Bussen, Vest-Agder 
County, Kristiansand city) who produced the BusMetro system is arguably the project’s 
greatest success. There are many examples also in Kristiansand that projects requiring input 
from many organizations fail. Without the Ministry of Transport grant it could not have been 
realized, but that should not hide the fact that the local actors in Kristiansand managed to 
integrate public transport services and investments within the transport and land use planning 
and policy making. The BusMetro has been integrated in land use structure plan for 
Kristiansand. What remains to be seen is to what extent the administration and politicians will 
follow up the ideas and aims of the BusMetro project in the coming land use planning. This 
successful cooperation was continued in the ATP project from 2004, see below. The major 
question, however, how to shift people from cars to buses, is not answered.  
 
The BusMetro has not managed to attract many persons who formerly used the car, the major 
traffic growth on the buses has probably been new traffic generated by the improved bus 
services. More than 3.2 million passengers used the BusMetro in 2007, which is about 250 
000 more passengers than in 2004 and up 2% from 2006. The numbers in the following table 
show a growth on the BusMetro lines on 1% the second full year of service, 5% the third year 
and 2% the forth year. To reach the goal of 20% increase in the number of passengers 
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between 2004 and 2008, another 250 000 passengers is needed in addition to the present 
numbers.133  
 
Table  4-20 BusMetro traffic 2004 and onwards, number of passengers 
Line 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
M1/01 703 910 742 443 812 324 880 998 908 502 
M2/04 1 260 359 1 282 479 1 348 287 1 279 341 1 201 205 
M3-M4/07 1 032 832 1 016 252 1 035 237 1 083 961 1 051 054 
BusMetro total 2 997 101 3 041 174 3 195 848 3 244 300 3 160 791 
Growth per year  1.01 1.05 1.02 0.97 
Source: Vest-Agder Kollektivtrafikk, Inge Os.  
 
Further increase in patronage depends on an improvement of the relative attributes of public 
transport compared with the competing modes, which are walking and cycling on short 
distances and the car for all distances. The price of travel is important, but not enough to 
attract people from cars. However, people in general find the price of using the bus too high, 
this is especially the case for families traveling to ether, as a stream of letters over years to 
the media show. The BusMetro must probably offer fares at about half the present level 
before people in general will consider it as a viable alternative (This is in line with the 
campaign for “Gratis Buss” the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen has run since 2001). Model 
calculations show that the “optimal public transport fa e” in Kristiansand should be 38% 
lower (TØI 1998).   
 
There is little reason to believe that the BusMetro will accomplish a major shift in mode 
choice without an integrated land use and transport policy (bus priority, congestion charging, 
parking costs, etc.) in which restrictive measures on car use are adopted in addition to high 
frequency and substantially lower fares. The present policies with substantial increase in road 
capacity (E18 and E39) will generate more and faster car traffic and people will travel further, 
making mode shift increasingly difficult. Thus the BusMetro is very good for all those 
presently traveling by public transport along its line (more than three million passengers per 
year), but will probably have little effect on modal split.  
 
What should be done? 
There is no doubt that the car offers superior travel qualities to the bus. Public transport is not 
an option for the vast majority of trips. Most public transport users don’t have the alternative 
to use the car. How then can a policy to shift peopl  from cars to the BusMetro in 
Kristiansand – be achieved – given that the aim is still there? A gradual implementation of a 
strategy could be to start with selective, substantially reduced fares i.e. student-card costing 
200 NOK per month; combined with improved services. This will probably be necessary to 
make buses attract passengers and change the present growth in car use. This will cost 
substantial amounts of money (“Gratis Buss” has been estimated to cost some 130 million 
NOK per year). In addition the image of public transport as a product in the market place 
must be lifted many steps to be able to compete with the car. Thirdly the door-to-door travel 
time for public transport users must be continually improved through bus priority schemes 
both on congested roads within the city and on the main access roads E18 and E39. It is 
probably also necessary to use parking measures such a  higher prices, no long time parking, 
                                                
133 Even if the yearly growth is far below the goals set, the administration keep selling “the great success”, for 
example in the application for “reward” money for 2008, page 8: The BusMetro has been and still is a success. 
Has had strong growth the whole period.  
 
 105 
removal of parking places at workplaces, and so on to achieve the City Council’s goals. Road 
pricing is legally134 not an option in Kristiansand until the toll system is abandoned about 
2025. The City Council rejected in 1999 road pricing as an alternative in Kristiansand, and 
even if some politicians talk of “Stockholm Congestion Charging”135 the major political 
parties’ program offer no such option.  
 
4.8.3 The ATP project 
 
The Government wanted to test alternative models of how land use and transport should be 
organized at the local level. An application from the public authorities responsible for the 
transport system in the Kristiansand region to become a pilot for administrative reform was 
sent to MoT late 2002. Excerpts from the application follow below 136. The overall aim of the 
four-year land use and transport planning project (Areal og Transport Prosjekt - ATP) was 
better integration of land use and transport policies across municipality and county borders.  
 
The cooperation agreement about land use and transport planning in the Kristiansand region 
has the following partners: Birkenes kommune, Songdalen kommune, Søgne kommune, 
Lillesand kommune, Vennesla kommune, Kristiansand kommune, Vest-Agder 
fylkeskommune, Aust-Agder fylkeskommune. The ATP committee has 17 members with 
voting rights, plus 1 observer from the Highway Agency regional office, with no voting rights 
 
4.8.4 ATP vision, goals and objectives 
 
Here follows a translation of the vision, goals and objectives from the “Final application to 
Ministry of Transport” to obtain the ATP-project:  
Vision 
Coordinated local management of the complete land use and transport policy in the region. 
Freedom to dispose all transport resources in the region according to the overall local priority, 
regardless of source of finance and type of road. 
Main aim 
To meet the region’s transport challenges related to among others the environment and 
accessibility in a more comprehensive and effective way.  
Sub goals 
1. To improve the coordinated land use and transport policy in the region. 
2. To improve public resource utilization across the leve s of authorities. 
3. To increase opportunities for local prioritizing. 
4. To increase the number of people choosing environmentally friendly transport modes. 
5. To improve transport services across borders between municipalities and counties for 
the benefit of the regions inhabitants. 
6. Develop the Kristiansand region as a transport node in both national and international 
contexts. 
                                                
134 Vegtrafikklovens §7a Vegprising was not yet effected by January 2008. Tolls and congestion charging ca not 
be combined on same area.  
135 Stockholm had a test on congestion charging for eight months in 2006, the traffic was reduced with about 
25%. The project restarted in 2007 on a permanent basis.  
136 Translated from document “Final application to Ministry of Transport” draft version dated 1.10.02. 
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Objectives  
The document is hereafter divided into themes with main challenges and objectives outlined 
under each. Only the objectives are cited here:  
• Reduce traffic growth and support the use of enviromentally friendly transport modes 
by a better-coordinated land use and transport policy. 
• Attain a more comprehensive and effective use of resources across the levels of 
authorities, to improve responses to the challenges of nvironmental sustainability and 
improve accessibility. Also to correct bias in priorities caused by regulation of finance 
or organization. 
• Improve the competitive position of public transport in the area relative to cars. 
• Improve accessibility for all user groups. 
• Increase environmentally friendly transport by coordinated strategy and instruments 
based on the greatest potential according to mode, and utilization of the interplay 
between modes. 
• Increase resources available for public transport services by raising support from new 
partners and by making supply of public transport more effective. Develop the 
services through the provision of infrastructure and improvements in accessibility and 
thereby contribute to a reduction in further demand for resources to cover running 
costs, contribute to growth in passengers and thereby increased traffic revenue.  
• The last objective was quantified 
o Reduce traffic growth in relation to population growth during the period 
o At least 25%   increase in the number of ordinary bus-passengers (outside 
school transports),  to increase the mode split for non-motorized travel from 12 
to 15%  
o At least 40%  increase in the number of bike journeys 
 
4.8.4.1 Assessment of the ATP strategies  
The ATP project will develop the strategy on the following themes: 
• Coordinated land use and transport policy 
• BusMetro project 
• Land use plan for the Kristiansand region  
• Improved competitive situation between car and bus 
• Access for all groups of users 
• Integrated strategy for increased use of environmentally friendly transport  
• Develop the public transport in the region  
• Coordinated strategies for other environment actions 
 
A discussion follows in the Application on how realistic these objectives were. The objectiv s 
are realistic the Application claims, if “the effects are considered for a longer time period 
than the 4 year demonstration project”. It is therefore impossible for this project to fail. It is a 
guaranteed success, if not during the project period, then sometimes in the future. The ATP 
also looks like a copy of the Sustainable City project. All the actors have a common strong 
interest in success, and therefore of course it will become a success. There is no stated interest 
in exploring the benefits from the project, nor learning from possible mistakes. The language 
used in the application is close to the rhetorical language in Government white papers, which 
 
 107 
can be advantageous137. The distinction between the roles of politicians d planners is 
blurred, which raises serious questions regarding accountability.  
 
Land use plan for the Kristiansand region (consensus or conflict?) 
Kristiansand promised a lot and set the aims high in t e ATP application, but probably so 
high that they seem like wishful thinking. An example is the following objective where 
increased revenue is envisaged: Making the public transport supply more effective and 
develop the services through the provision of infrastructure and improvements in accessibility 
to contribute to a reduction in extra demand for resources to running costs / contribute to 
growth in passengers and thereby increased traffic revenue. The provision of infrastructure 
and better accessibility shall achieve two things. Firstly reduce the need for subsidies and 
secondly contribute to increased revenue, may seem lik  wishful thinking without realistic 
knowledge about public transport? 
 
The last objective Coordinated strategies for other environment actions will with the present 
political attitudes be hard to fulfill, and even if it is met it will scarcely have any effect in 
relation to the climate challenge. This is because the shift from cars to public transport must 
be very large before it has more than a marginal chnge in the CO2 emissions from transport 
in Kristiansand. 
 
4.8.4.2 Evaluation of the ATP project 
A consultancy did a ”halfway” evaluation138 of the ATP project. The evaluation method used 
was a questionnaire to all participants and in-depth interviews with key individuals. The 
consultants stated that there are many positive outputs from the ATP project so far:  Regional 
thinking and coordination is more evident.  There is more flexibility . Increased resources 
(reward-grant).  Improved focus. More dialog. Better coordination. Better efficiency. ”Most of 
the participants believe that they will achieve the objectives to increase environmentally 
friendly transport and reduce the growth in car traffic in the region.” 
 
The negative sides:  
1. Democratic deficit 
2. Wrong combination of measures 
3. Too much administration, meetings and bureaucracy 
4. Unclear responsibilities and roles 
5. Skewed representation in the ATP committee 
6. Conflict about organizing bus services 
7. Unclear framework regarding organization, money and timescale 
8. Some were critical to MoT and the project 
9. Miscellaneous 
The evaluation presents on the positive side the participants’ answers like better coordination, 
better effectiveness, etc. Most of these are relativ  issues depending upon their view of the 
situation before project start and not assessments of project outputs. If there was a lack of or 
no coordination, effectiveness, focus, regional thinking, etc. before, any element of these 
                                                
137 Strand, A. and Moen, B. Areal- og transportplanlegging – verken samordnet ell r bærekraftig. In Fiskaa, H. 
and Skjeggedal, T. (eds.): Planlegging og bærekraftig utvikling. Tapir Akademisk Forlag.  
138 Jomar Lygre Langeland NORCONSULT 2006 Midtveis evaluering av ATP-prosjektet i 
Kristiansandsregionen. Notat – mai 2006. 
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issues present after will be an improvement. Thus the project suits the MoT’s need to produce 
political arguments, rather than finding the pro’s and con’s with the organization model 
tested. The consultant does not necessarily think tat the majority of the interviewees are right 
in their belief regarding the achievement of the goal on reduced car traffic. “We believe that 
the combination of measures must be more comprehensive and also include more restrictive 
instruments for car use, if one wants to reduce the growth in car traffic in the region.” This 
“common knowledge” has either not been understood or more likely deliberately been set 
aside for political reasons. Thus one can hardly expect substantial results from the ATP 
project. The list of negative barriers supports thiexpectation. 
 
One of the key instruments to make people travel more by bus is to increase frequency and 
reduce travel time with buses. The ATP committee has only advisory capacity on bus 
economy. ”We (the County) could not risk increasing extra costs of running the public 
transport services, that meant that we had to cut back services when the project was 
finished.”139 The political and administrative vested interest to keep the status quo is strong, 
as the MoT must (?) know. How then, can one explain that the MoT introduces such projects 
as the ATP project without measures to circumvent such interests? It seems that there is no 
analysis of the background for the Ministry’s wish to start this and the other demonstration 
projects.  
 
From my interviews it became clear that the politicians also had other motives for the ATP 
project, to position Kristiansand for the expected r form of counties and municipalities. The 
ATP territory could well become the new Kristiansand municipality either the end result will 
become a two-tier reform or a three-tier reform.  
 
An unexpected consequence came when the ATP committee was used by the HA to discuss 
the E39 and the new toll road agreement. This changed the E39 process quite a lot (see ch. 
4.13). 
                                                
139 Interview Transport planning director Leif Storsve  
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4.8.5 Practice: public transport, parking and personnel problems. 
 
4.8.5.1 Parking, Public Transport and “Sjøboder”.  
 
Parking policy is usually seen by planners as a supplementary measure to reduce car traffic. 
Already in the Sentrumsplan 1978 there was a discussion on the statutory parking requirement 
for new buildings. The figure shows that the total number of places in Kvadraturen would 
increase to nearly 5,000 places in 1995 following the statutory requirement, despite the 
identified target within the plan to reduce the number of parking spaces in the streets from 
2200 to 1100. Thirty years later this discussion is repeated in Kristiansand. The planners 
advocate reduced parking in the centre while the political majority has the opposite view.  
 
Figure 4-21 Parking in Kvadraturen, the effect of the requirements according to §69.  
 
 
Parking policy is also a very sensitive subject. The municipal politicians “exploded” when 
Abildsnes140 proposed to increase the road toll collection time and use the municipal parking 
income to strengthen public transport with the purpose to reduce car traffic. Several 
politicians opposed his proposal strongly: “The Chief transport planning executive’s solution 
is to kick the ball to Kristiansand, when the county has too little money to solve the statutory 
county tasks. It is rude! To use income from parking o  public transport is completely wrong! 
I agree with the conservative party (Høyre) that we have to use that income on our own 
statutory tasks.” says Kittelsen, the labour party group leader, to the paper the next day.  
 
A week later Abildsnes answers the municipal politicians: “The MoE has evaluated what the 
sustainable cities among them Kristiansand, have done and not done to prepare for future 
environmentally friendly transport solutions. Stripped of professional and ministerial 
language the conclusion was: Nothing, which has any effect on the traffic development. In 
Byutredningen141 in which the city took part, we even want to increas  public transport with 
50% the next ten years. We have calculated that this will require 30 million NOK yearly in 
                                                
140 Chief transport planning executive VAFK, interviewd by Fædrelandsvennen 18th February 1999 
141 Byutredningen was the city transport plan produced for the NTP process 
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increased public transport subsidy to the bus companies that will transport 4 million more 
passengers than today. If the politicians are not willing to discuss how this money can be 
provided there is no point in setting targets of improved public transport.” Alv Holmlid142 SV 
stated “Everybody speaks warmly about improved PT services, but at the same time they 
deliberately go against all measures which could lead to that goal. Vest-Agder County does 
more for public transport than most counties, it is up to Kristiansand now.” 
 
This was at the time when the public started to see that the SC project would not deliver. The 
condescending attitude many city politicians had to the County was suddenly spelt out in the 
media. Underneath the discussion lies the experience of the very successful public transport 
project 1990-1994, which the politicians didn’t want to prolong, both because improved 
public transport costs money and because grants for road building might be threatened (see ch 
4.6.3).  
 
Let us jump six years to 2005 and the city’s problems with more than 800 “sjøboder” 
(originally a small hut on the shore for boats and fishing gear, but turned into expensive sea 
side chalets) in a legal controversy. In itself a case not related to parking policy, but H and 
KrF carried the “Sjøbod” motion in the City Council, 32 for 21 against, with the help of Frp. 
Interestingly the majority was gained by linking the decision to a deal on dropping proposed 
restrictions on curbside parking, clearly completely unrelated to the issue voted over. The 
parking restrictions had been proposed and adopted by the ATP committee to be sanctioned 
by the city. The deal shows that the majority in the City Council did not want to put further 
restrictions on car use, and also a lenient attitude in the “Sjøbod” case.  
 
The reactions came promptly:  
• “This is beneath the dignity of the City Council. H, KrF and Frp hide the way they run 
politics, both for the opposition and the voters.” Said Mette Gundersen, Ap143  
• The County Mayor Thore Westermoen claims that Kristiansand challenges important 
parts of the big cooperation on land use and transport plan (ATP): “Here the reduction 
in car traffic and effort on public transport are part of the objectives. We will have 
great challenges in cooperation with the politics that suddenly now appear. To mix the 
inter-municipal cooperation of bus promotion, parking and environmental politics in 
the city centre together with the “Sjøbod” case seems strange and unwise.”144  
• The environment director Øystein Holvik stated that t e City Council adopted a policy 
that is directly opposed to the aims in the ATP-cooperation the very same City 
Council adopted earlier.  
• Torbjørn Urfjell, SV, thought that the situation was grave: “The BusMetro and strong 
effort on public transport is in danger. We receive “reward money” for the PT effort 
on condition of growth in bus passengers and reduction in car traffic. Now we are 
walking in the opposite direction. Much of what we have built and Kristiansand 
receives praise for, can be torn down in a short time.” 
 
“Cars Before Buses” was the headline Fædrelandsvennen145 used to sum up the City Council 
decision. The compromise decision on “Sjøbod” will lead to profound changes in the 
                                                
142 Fædrelandsvennen 250299 
143 Mette Gundersen, group leader Ap, Fædrelandsvennen 22.09.2005 
144 Fædrelandsvennen 24.09.2005 
145 Fædrelandsvennen 24.09.2005 
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transport strategy and policy in Kristiansand. The consequences of these changes are 
pinpointed in the following Before and After comparison:  
Without restrictions on car traffic 
Before, arguments on restrictive measures to curb car traffic.  
Now, it is decided that restrictions on cars shall not be implemented (H & Frp has had this 
line all the time, but supported the intention of in time to do something.) 
Road projects first priority 
• Before, arguments to give priority to PT and vulnerable road users.  
• Now, it is decided that important and necessary road projects must go before effort on 
vulnerable road users and PT.  
Unlimited parking supply 
• Before, arguments to stop using “minimum” parking requirements for the number of 
parking spaces demanded for new buildings and introduce “maximum”.  
• Now, it is decided that “minimum” requirements shall continue to be the rule. Free car 
usage is thus still the rule in the “Sustainable City” Kristiansand. 
More cars into the City Centre 
• Before, arguments that the city environmental capacity should steer parking policy and 
that the number of long-time parking spaces and kerb spaces should be reduced in 
Kvadraturen and along the BusMetro lines.  
• Now, it is decided to provide for both kerb parking and long-time parking.  
 
4.8.5.2 The Plan and Building office had management problems 
The planning office leadership was completely renewed in 2004. Through several years an 
increasing frustration had spread in political circles. Several well-published cases of 
unauthorized development permits, mistakes and lack of development control was the basis 
for this frustration. More than 300 “Sjøbod” cases had to be looked into to find out how to 
make these “legal”. The editor commented thus146: “A picture is revealed of the Plan and 
Building office as a place for anarchy, taking the law into ones own hands, lack of judgment 
and let it slide policy.“ About a month later the three leaders of the Plan and Building office 
were replaced. The technical director finished his term in 2006, completely replacing the 
management of the Plan and Building administration. 
 
The lack of trust in the Plan and Building office which had grown over several years must 
have had serious implications, but the politicians responsible for organizing, resources and 
manning the office never came out to explain or defend the planners. Reduced legitimacy 
must have been one impact, another was that the “Sjøbod” case led to long-time consequences 
for the parking policy and it probably also had implications in the E39 case (see below). It 
would have been far more difficult for the E39 project leader to campaign in the press if the 
Plan and Building office had been operating with normal legitimacy. 
 
Kommuneplanen (arealdelen) is the comprehensive plan for the municipality territory and 
should be used to control and guide development (see figure ch 2). A Plan and Building office 
without legitimacy has limited chances to function properly. Is it possible that the effects of 
the malfunctioning planning office were negative for the public interests in general, lowered 
the public interests in developments and benefited th  private interests? 
                                                
146 Fædrelandsvennen 11th September 2004 
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4.8.5.3 Market Square P-House 
When the conflict between the City and the HA about Tall Bridge or Tunnel was at its most 
intense; parking and reduced car traffic reached th headlines again (see ch 4.13). The City 
wanted to get state “reward money” to improve public transport with the sole purpose of 
reducing car traffic. If successful there would be no need to build more roads to prevent future 
congestion, since car traffic would be reduced. There would be no need or demand for 1,000 
new parking spaces in a multi-storey car park under th  city square, according to this logic. 
Some thought otherwise, because just before Christmas 2004 one could read on the front 
page147: 
1,000 Parking-places under the Market Square 
The Chamber of Commerce sped up plans to build 1,000 parking-places underneath the 
Market Square.148 The Parking-house will be finished in 2011. The timing of this presentation 
was carefully selected to coincide with the Christmas shopping time, when everybody 
experiences traffic chaos and congestion. More importantly the presentation also came just 
before the last City Council meeting prior to the Christmas recess, the Council passed a 
motion proposed by H to clarify the consequences of parking below the Market Square. It was 
now up the administration to follow up this motion a d how they would do it. Below we will 
discuss the possible implications of this decision.  
 
The lead story in Fædrelandsvennen 21.01.2005 was about the city centre, Kvadraturen . “If 
the city wants to be trustworthy in environmental issues, one can’t on one side work to reduce 
traffic in the city centre, and on the other side facilitate the opposite. It is a paradox to invest 
millions in the BusMetro to make people choose the bus instead of the car, and at the same 
time launch a “gigantic parking house”. The city is in addition expanding the road network 
for free car use, and applying to the MoT for “reward money” to reduce car traffic!” This is 
the first voice saying this with some strength in public. Most rational arguments would claim 
that to aim to reduce car traffic whilst at the same time aiming to increase car traffic is absurd, 
but not so in Kristiansand. The politicians had no pr blem doing just that, the leader of the 
development committee Lund, H, claimed that there was no contradiction between the City 
Climate plan and 1000 extra parking places149: ”No contradiction in that. We have to do 
something with “matpakkekjørerne” (people driving sole to work). They are the problem. 
That people come to the city to shop, must never be seen as a problem”.  
 
The day after Fædrelandsvennen put the charge in th mini-leader: Make up your mind! It 
will generate even more traffic. Shouldn’t the elect d councilors find out what they want 
with the city soon?   
 
However, it is possible to succeed politically with a paradoxical policy. Two years later an 
advert150 in the press notified that a public private partnership would start detailed planning 
and developing a funding package for the Market Square P-House. This was possibly the start 
                                                
147 Fædrelandsvennen 19.12.2006 
148 The troika Hans Otto Lund, leader of the city development committee, leader of the Chamber Fred Bjerke and 
Sigurd Tvedt, Kvadraturforeningen present old plans in new wrapping. The consultants Rambøl Unico shall use 
expertise from Kristiansand, Trondheim and Copenhagen. 
149 Fævennen 19.12.06 
150 Fædrelandsvennen 20.05.2007 
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of a new regime coalition establishing pre-emptive power to succeed in realizing the 1000 
parking places?  
 
4.8.6 Strategic land use planning (Kommuneplan 2005) 
 
I have used the term strategic land use planning for the process of producing the strategic 
municipal plan (kommuneplan). The latest one produce  in Kristiansand is Kommuneplan 
2005. Strategy and strategic plan entered public planning in Norway in the eighties with the 
New Public Management ideology. Strategy is often used as an outline of the necessary steps 
to reach a vision or aim, based on certain premises. To attain the aim of environmentally 
sustainable transport in Kristiansand, nearly all pl ns produced since 1990 have set 
restrictions on car use as a premise. The plans also concentrate on visions and aims with 
hardly any discussion on how to get there. Time and again history shows that this premise is 
not acceptable to the majority in the City Council, but new plans are produced with the same 
premises. Instead it could be a focal point in a str tegy on how to come to terms with the 
challenge that car use without restrictions poses for ustainable development in Kristiansand 
and especially for Kvadraturen. However, Kommuneplan 2005 follows the traditional pattern 
by emphasizing the vision and aims, whilst paying less attention to how to get there. Most 
indicators of the development in Kristiansand show that the trend is on an unsustainable path, 
contrary to the visions, aims and goals adopted in pla after plan, nonetheless it does not 
consider the important question151: How to prevent that we end up where we don’t want to be? 
 
The process before the decision on Kommuneplan 2005was very broad and innovative. The 
planner in charge organized cooperation with the commercial sector and put a lot of emphasis 
on public participation in the process by engaging politicians and people from all walks of 
life, for example in many meetings. “We had 60-70 ’culture-workers’ in meeting” said the 
planner152 “The former Kommuneplan was much more sector orientat d”. The planning 
process showed that Kristiansand should put more emphasis on the following: 
1. Role in the regional development 
2. Growth and value added 
3. Living conditions and quality of life 
4. Sustainable development 
 
The planner’s intentions were to make Kommuneplan 2005 a more strategic document that 
would be an instrument to guide/steer development. All he “correct” land use and transport 
goals are in the plan, but the conflict between the sustainable development goals and car 
growth, investment in transport infrastructure and sprawl is not addressed. The territorial part 
of the plan (Arealdelen) from the former plan (Kommuneplan 2000) was kept with minor 
changes. “Land use was not a great issue, since the r serves are large.”153 In fact the land use 
plan has only undergone very small changes in the three last plans.  
 
Sustainable development is one the main goals of the plan. “We will hand over the city to the 
next generation in a better ecological, economic and social condition than when we started,” 
is one statement. One of the objectives is to create “Sustainable city structure and Sustainable 
                                                
151 Confer the book by Ottar Brox ”Dit vi ikke vil” 
152 Intervju med Grethe Sjøholt 12. november 2004  
153 Intervju med Grethe Sjøholt 12. november 2004 
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transport system”. Among the instruments to reach this objective is “Strengthen 
Comprehensive Planning” (Helhetlig planlegging styrkes). This is the very same wording as 
was used in 1994 (Sustainable City program) without m ch effect.  
 
Possibly the most important vision/aim in the plan is “Kristiansand as an engine to develop a 
major city (Storby)”.154 This is in line with the ideology of cities competing in the global 
market. The Cultiva foundation’s big effort on the t me “culture as business” was followed 
up in the plan. Another aspect of this vision is city branding, city promotion and city 
marketing, which have grown a lot in ten years.  
 
Kristiansand has questioned the need for such a plan as the Kommuneplan. Agderforskning 
state in a report155 that only few politicians say that they use the plan. Among the leaders 
responsible for important sectors in the plan one fi d some who say they use it a lot and the 
same is also the case among those who took part in p oducing the plan. The territorial part of 
the plan (Arealdelen) has little detail and with large reserves of building land, it is probably of 
little use to guide future location of activity. In addition to land allocated for building there are 
huge areas within the municipality borders set aside as green areas (LNF- områder). These 
areas can be changed into land for building by a decision in the City Council and judging 
from the interviews many looked at these as reserve areas for building.  
 
The land development program for housing and commercial sites has been the key instrument 
to steer development in Kristiansand. The latest program states that the municipality role has 
changed from being an active actor within the propety and development market to a role of 
facilitator.156 This change of role is in line with the new liberal ideology and has led to 
“market rule”. Still the aim in the Kommuneplan 2005 is to facilitate for a varied supply of 
housing/building sites to obtain a “buyers market”. The population growth in 2005 was 851 
persons, an increase about 25% higher than expected in he programs. The program outlines 
the problems causing the gap between the number of houses being built and the increase in 
house prices on one side and the aims in the municipality plans on the other: 
a) Integrated planning is challenging,  
b) Provide the necessary social and technical infrastructure (schools, roads, water, etc.)  
c) Private ownership of land, and lastly  
d) The role of the municipality as facilitator hardly has any effect on the 
implementation of the program.  
 
It seems to be the case that the population growth continues to increase far more than the 
estimate in Kommuneplan 2005. The demand for housing in Kristiansand will then outstrip 
supply and cause prices to rise fast the next years (location and type of housing will decide the 
price increase for different type of dwellings). Another effect of the too low supply of housing 
in Kristiansand is that commuting will increase, contrary to the sustainable development aims 
in the Kommuneplan 2005.  
 
                                                
154 Incidentally very similar to the Aalborg strategy, see ch 5.  
155 Hans Kjetil Lysgård, Jørn Cruickshank, Jens Kristian Fosse. Evaluering av Kommuneplan for Kristiansand 
2000-2011. Agderforskning Prosjektrapport nr. 16/2003 
 
156 Forslag til Utbyggingsprogram 2007-2010. Del av Rådmannens Handlingsprogram (Dok. 4) 
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The Development Program has ensured that “there is a substantial supply of commercial 
building sites available in Kristiansand”157. However, the ownership and management of the 
municipality land for commercial development has been transferred to a limited company 
KNAS158 and thereby further reduced the role of the municipality’s land use and transport 
planning according to the planning act. KNAS has contrary to the Development Program 
declared that there is a lack of available commercial building sites. In 2008 the “substantial 
supply” from 2005 has been turned into “screaming lack of suitable sites” and the solution is 
to use the green areas.159 This apparent change in the assessment of building land reserves 
may have several causes like change of chairman, strong growth and increasing demand for 
land for businesses, and probably as will be discussed below a new proactive municipality in 
development (ch. 4.15.2).  
 
4.8.7 E39 plan and the new Toll Road collection 
 
A major conflict about road planning broke out in spring 2004. The Highway Agency 
presented the new plan alternatives for E39 and a new package for Toll Road collection to 
finance the trunk road. The conflict was about aesthetics and environment, and the grass roots 
rallied against the proposed Tall Bridge alternative.  
 
4.8.7.1 Bridge or tunnel? 
The project price (2004) for the total road length E39 Gartnerløkka-Søgne was estimated at 
300 million euro for the recommended Tall bridge alt rnative. The Tall Bridge was estimated 
at 190 million euro and Tunnel at 230 million euro. The difference between Bridge and 
Tunnel was 40 million euro. (E39 Gartnerløkka-Søgne 2.5 billion NOK, høybro 1540 mill, 
lavbro 1620 mill, tunnel 1865 mill.)  
 
The HA sent the proposal for E39 and the next Toll R ad Package to the municipality in the 
spring 2004. Kristiansand City Council has the authori y to decide the plan for E39. The toll 
road agreement has to be decided by the Parliament, but only after a City Council decision 
asking for tolls to be raised in the municipality. Both road plans and tolls are difficult political 
issues, but the HA was fairly confident that both would pass through since the ATP 
committee had been informed all along. The leader of the labour party pronounced early on 
that the Tall Bridge was chosen because of the lower costs, something he would later regret. 
The bridge proposal meant putting a new bridge beside an old, which for years had been an 
aesthetic eyesore for people in Kristiansand. Sigbjørn Sødal160, professor at UiA, wrote a 
report and several articles in the media picking the HA documentation to pieces. More than 
any it was he who caused the majority for the Tall Bridge to change for Tunnel, but he had 
good helpers. In a short time the grass roots had organized themselves and formed the Action 
FOR Tunnel. From May 2004 onwards one could not open a newspaper without the question 
                                                
157 Utbyggingsprogram 2007-2010, page 32.  
158 KNAS – Kristiansand Næringsselskap AS. 
159 KNAS board chairman, Bjarne Ugland (former deputy mayor) to Fædrelandsvennen 25.02.08  
160 S Sødal did a very competent job showing that the HA traffic analysis was faulty, and hence that the 
recommendations very made on a poor basis. He is also the nephew of the then deputy mayor H Sødal, KrFwho 
had fought the HA and lost twice before in 1975 and1995 about the same trunk road (interview Harald Sø al). 
In 1975 tall bridge won with 39 against 38, and in 1995 “The KrF alternative cost us an extra year” according to 
an interview with A Setsaa, HA director.  
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Tall Bridge or Tunnel being discussed, here follow some selected cuts from 
Fædrelandsvennen, the major local newspaper:  
 
This is the future low bridge. Manipulated photos showing the low bridge alternative 
(rejected earlier) together with an interview with the HA project leader S Berg-Thomassen: 
“The advantages of the tunnel melts away, and the arguments for using 300 million extra are 
now so much poorer.”161 Two months later another manipulated photo: “This is how the 
future could become” was followed by an interview with Berg-Thomassen who claimed that 
the tunnel and bridge alternatives were equally good with regards to traffic162. This statement 
is wrong according to the HA report in which a consultant states163: “There is no doubt that 
the tunnel alternative has advantages for traffic.” Instead of being the objective planner the 
project leader clearly was now fighting to win regardless of whether he had to be flexible with 
the truth.  
 
The bridge – tunnel controversy split the city and the technical director called in impartial 
expertise. On November 6th one could read that professor Kåre Petter Hagen, professor Arvid 
Strand and professor Tore Knudsen were engaged to evaluate the comments from the public 
hearing. “We as experts shall judge this without bindings, but understand that the HA has 
broad experience behind their judgments” say SINTEF researcher Tore Knudsen164. Life goes 
on and the debate in the press continues with strength. 
 
The headline165 “Laughing at the HA Tall Bridge Plan”  was accompanied with a picture of 
Dag Vige and Harald Sødal. They were not insignificant nobodies, both group leaders in the 
City Council (V & KrF) and had for years been prominent in the debate about the 
environment. Nationally Bondevik’s second Cabinet ruled, and both V and KrF had places in 
it, which of course is very important when the case would reach the Parliament (Stortinget).  
 
In January 2005 the case becomes very tense because most cards will be shown in a few days. 
On January 7th Fædrelandsvennen informs that the HA rejects Tunnel and calls for 
Innsigelse166. “The HA notifies Innsigelse to the Tunnel alternative because of large extra 
social costs.” The politicians are in uproar. Both the timing of the Innsigelse, the day before 
the expert group report would be public and the reason given “large additional social costs” is 
peculiar. The extra costs are only about 10% of the w ole project, calculated from drawings 
with a fairly wide range of uncertainty.  
 
It also seems that the HA wishes to draw attention away from the devastating report from the 
experts. Piercing critic of the Highway Agency is the headline. Deficient. Unbalanced. 
Worthy of criticisms. Flawed are words used in the expert report167. This is the decisive 
document that opens up for the technical director to go against the HA proposal and advice 
the City Council to choose the tunnel. But still the different political parties are split, 
especially the Labour party where the leader was loyal to the agreement in the ATP 
                                                
161 Fædrelandsvennen 04.09.2004 
162 Fædrelandsvennen 03.11.2004 
163 B Martens, RAMBØLL Dated 05. May 2004 
164 Fædrelandsvennen 06.11.2004 
165 Fædrelandsvennen 12.11.2004 
166 Innsigelse or Objection means that the City Council can no longer make the final decision in the case, it has to 
be decided by the MoE. 
167 Fædrelandsvennen, 080107.  
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committee. An article on January 13th “Åsså drider vi i Vesterveien”168 by Terje Næss, a 
prominent Labour councilor, opposes the party leader nd to a large extent legitimates the 
tunnel alternative within the party (the leader later changed his position169). 
 
On 18th January the paper shows on the front page a picture of the action group celebrating 
the tunnel. A preliminary count shows that there is a majority for tunnel in the City Council. 
On the same day the editorial in the paper comments the expert group report. “A devastating 
expert judgment. The HA has in the best case produced a very poor document – in the worst 
case – manipulated both the basis for the calculations and comparison.” This is an extremely 
serious accusation against the HA and the project leader, which in most cases would lead to 
reactions. Except for a short answer170 where the HA claimed that they had done good work, 
the accusations were not repudiated. The project leader who had actively used the paper 
nearly every day, was suddenly quiet. Instead the HA delivers the Innsigelse and starts an 
unnecessary (see below) prolonging of the decision pr cess for a year and a half, with 
substantial costs to the society.  
 
The Innsigelse process then goes on and there are no news until the change of Government in 
the autumn. The outgoing Minister of Environment Knut Arild Hareide (KrF) says a 
resounding Yes to the Tunnel171. ”Here the environment issues weigh so heavy that my choice 
would be clear. This is a very important case for the whole city. With the road in the tunnel, 
one gets the opportunity to develop a completely new and lively area.” A very strong 
statement from the departing minister, showing thate Innsigelse from the HA both was 
unnecessary and a waste of public money. Mayor Skisland commented the Minister’s 
statement: “We have such a strong opinion behind us that we won’t accept defeat in this case. 
In the worst case we are willing to take a new round o  the complete toll road package. 
Because we cannot accept to use a huge amount of toll money on a solution we don’t want.” 
This signal that the City Council would reject the ”bompengepakke” if the bridge alternative 
was chosen, was never understood by the HA. That is the joker in this power game, giving the 
local democracy the power to prevent toll financing a d thus push the new E39 far into the 
future.  
 
But the HA did not accept defeat. In the following months the Minister of Transport 
Naversete, Sp, several times supported the HA with statements in the press172, while the 
Minister of Environment Bjørnøy, SV, avoided to comment. Even if the case from an 
environmental point of view seemed clear, the HA was fighting for its recommendation and 
the MoT supported the HA (and the ATP project they financed).  
 
Twice the case was in the Parliament during question time. This is an opportunity for the 
politicians to put pressure on the Government, which used such a long time to come to a 
decision, and to show that the Tunnel was the only acceptable solution. (Svar på spørsmål nr. 
928 om bro eller tunnel på E39 i Kristiansand, and Svar på spørsmål nr. 367 om E39 i 
                                                
168 A paraphrase on the title of a loved local song. 
169 Interview with Bjarne Ugland: ”I came to the understanding that the HA proposition was wrong.” 
170 Fædrelandsvennen 18.01.2005. HA answers the expert criticism without discussing the different points, only 
reiterate that they have done a good job. Signed Arne Birkeland and Stig Berg-Thomassen.  
171 Fædrelandsvennen 12.10.2005 
172 Sp, which is a small party in the city, had the mayor in neighbouring Sogndalen municipality, who fought 
against the tunnel. He actively “pressed” his Minister, Sp. 
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Kristiansand) The Minister of Transport supported to the very endthe Highway Agency 
choice of the cheapest solution that disregarded aesthetics. It was a stand against the local 
community and against a better environment. At that time it was fairly certain that the 
majority in the City Council could not accept a local development plan (reguleringsplan) for 
the Tall Bridge and as a consequence the Toll-package would fall to pieces. The Highway 
Agency would not manage to solve the trunk road problem and congestion would keep 
growing. The Government had then only one solution: t  adopt the plan itself, a legal 
opportunity hardly ever used. The power structure in the road sector is so strong that the HA 
could go against the City Council decision, but also against the environment profile the “Red-
Green” Government liked to show. That happened in a case where according to the news173: 
The Highway Agency has in the best case produced a v ry poor document – in the worst case 
– manipulated both the basis for the calculations and comparison. 
 
About INNSIGELSE  
The current guidelines the summer 2005 was from 1988, but proposed new guidelines were 
looked into by Vegdirektoratet174. The day before the devastating report from the expert group 
was published, the Highway Agency announces that it will formally object (submit an 
Innsigelse) to the tunnel alternative because “of the additional social costs associated with the 
tunnel alternative”. This raises several questions: 
Timing   
It may look like that HA tries to kill/reduce the eff ct of the mayor’s change of standpoint and 
the expert group report. It can also be seen as pressu  on the officials in the municipality 
when they are about to write the proposition to the politicians, and indeed on the city council. 
The warning of an objection could and should have be n sent many months earlier. According 
to the HA own guidelines Innsigelse shall be submitted as early as possible and the reason for 
the objection shall be given. Instead of January 6th 2005 the HA should have done that already 
in April 2004 if it had followed the statutes.  
Formal criteria  
Formal objections to a plan must be substantiated. 20% higher costs of the tunnel alternative 
compared to the lowest are based on calculations frm plan drawings and standard costs for 
tunnels, bridges, etc. It is a comparison of a short section of the complete plan. If the costs for 
the two alternatives are calculated for the whole plan (kommunedelplanen) then the cost 
difference is about 10%. The uncertainty of such cost estimates is probably greater than 20%. 
The basis for the objection “additional social costs” refers to additional costs not included in 
the cost benefit analysis. But many external benefits not quantified are positive for the tunnel 
alternative: less noise, less visual intrusion, less dust and particles, controlled emissions and 
most of all release of valuable land for development. Probably most important for the public 
was the aesthetic side, where the Tunnel is far superior. The magnitude of these external 
benefits can be discussed, but all of them supported th  tunnel alternative. Arbitration.  
Fylkesmannen who has a statutory position to arbitrate when Innsigelse has been given, 
recommended to the MoE that the objection was rejected. An interesting legal question is if 
she could have rejected the objection on formal grounds because it is plainly wrong regarding 
“social costs” since the calculated costs are mainly construction costs.175 Innsigelse can be 
                                                
173 Fædrelandsvennen 18.01.2005  
174 Vegdirektoratet NA_Rundskriv nr. 88/29 Punkt 5 Grunnlag for innsigelser overfor kommunen (gamle men 
fortsatt gjeldende retningslinjer ifg Tord Thorshov 17.06.05) 
175 The objection should possibly also be rejected on the ground that the HA interferes with political allocation 
and is politically lobbying for another allocation f public money than the elected politicians have deci ed?  
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promoted when the land use is not compatible to the National Guidelines for coordinated land 
use and transport planning (RPR SAT rundskriv T-2/2003). In this case the Tunnel is opening 
up for city development and land use according to the principles in the Guidelines, while the 
Tall Bridge alternative was a “rural motorway” pushed through a city centre. The objection 
should according to good planning principles have be n against the Bridge not the Tunnel.  
Power rule. 
One may on different grounds raise the question if the HA Innsigelse adhered to the legal 
framework or if it violated it. However there is noway to try the legality of the objection itself 
or the process followed by the objector. It is a closed process where established power 
relations and traditions have weight. The project lader needs only to use the trust of his 
superiors to make an objection. In this case the obj ction was presented in the newspaper as a 
warning and the HA was then committed to follow up the warning. It would be very difficult 
for the project leader’s superiors to prevent the obj ction being sent following the warning. 
This then also opens for the HA to use Innsigelse to pursue the agency’s own vested interests 
or as it seem in the E39 case a personal vendetta from the project leader.  
 
4.8.7.2 Toll levies from 2008 and onwards 
The MoE rejected the Innsigelse in May 2006 and the Tunnel was chosen. The decision on the 
new level of levies in the Toll Ring in Kristiansand came a year later.  
 
 
 
The Toll Road package would be funded by approximately 15% Government grant and 85% 
user payment.176 The increasing uses of toll financing break with the principle of having a 
national road system as a “common good” free for all to use and paid for by tax money. Toll 
funding is by definition and statutes money collected for building particular roads. The 
legislation has been opened up for different prices at different times and to use the funds also 
on public transport infrastructure, bike lanes and safety projects.  
 
Recently there has been a renewed debate on Rush hor pricing. As it is, the congestion 
charging act prevents rush hour pricing in areas with toll funding. A combined funding and 
                                                                                                                                              
 
176 The first model for the later packages was the Bergen package, which was originally divided in three: 1/3 
Government grant, 1/3 ordinary Trunk road programme and 1/3 user payment. 
Toll increase from 2008 
The politicians in the City Council have decided that the maximum cost to pass the tolls should be 6000 
NOK per year. Single passing will cost 20 NOK and season ticket 10 NOK. In 2006 the yearly pass 
cost 1500 NOK.  
Compulsory  
The toll resistance was massive. A petition on Internet collected several thousand names and a go-slow 
action created troubles in traffic. But the politicians have repeatedly said that they feel compelled to 
accept an increase in toll charges. The majority has expressed that there are no alternatives to finance 
the roads. The Government finances 15 - 20 percent of costs, the rest must be financed locally by toll 
charging.  
Fear of chaos 
Per Sigurd Sørensen, Mayor, has earlier said that he felt powerless in the case. – We are trapped in this 
system if we want more road building in Kristiansand. The alternative is to say NO, but then we will 
not get a new road and we manage the city into traffic chaos, said Sørensen when the toll road debate 
took place.  
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congestion-charging package therefore needs new legislation to be possible. The planning and 
funding system is gradually growing more and more complicated and the accountability of the 
actors therefore decreases.  
 
The decision-making authority of both toll funding and congestion charging should be 
devolved to the local level to prevent this decline i  accountability. That will make it possible 
to create a balanced and integrated transport system in which all modes are included, but only 
if the elected local councilors decide so. 
 
4.8.8 Important factors deciding project outcome?  
 
How important are the different factors as explanation for goals achievement and lack of 
such? To answer this question I have assessed the differ nt projects against different 
explanations as contributing to the projects’ success or failure. The assessments were graded 
in High, Medium and Low. In reality it is not possible to divide up a process into individual 
factors, because they are ingrained with each other, so that the matrix and grading must be 
used with care. 
 
Events and plan 
processes 
Fragmentation 
levels / sector 
Inconsistent 
national 
goals 
Municipal 
self-rule 
Growth 
goal    
land use 
Growth 
goal 
transport 
Double 
talk / 
Hypocrisy 
E18 HIGH LOW MEDIUM  LOW HIGH MEDIUM  
Sustainable City LOW HIGH LOW MEDIUM  HIGH HIGH 
“Gratis buss” LOW HIGH MEDIUM  LOW MEDIUM  HIGH 
BusMetro LOW HIGH LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
E39 HIGH LOW MEDIUM  LOW HIGH MEDIUM  
ATP HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW LOW MEDIUM  
Kommuneplan05 LOW LOW LOW HIGH HIGH MEDIUM  
Practice  MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW 
Score  3 HIGH 4 HIGH 2 HIGH 2 HIGH 5 HIGH 3 HIGH 
Table  4-21 Matrix grading the importance of different indicators  
 
Fragmentation on several levels and between sectors had high importance in the successes of 
the two road building cases because the process was teered around barriers to be promoted as 
pure sector projects. Double talk or rhetoric was not prevalent in the process because the car 
growth goal was taken for granted. The Sustainable City, “Gratis Buss” and BusMetro 
projects were all hampered by the inconsistent natio l goals. That opened up for the different 
actors to use double talk and play on the ambiguous g als with the result that some interests 
lost and other interests won.  
 
The ATP project has inherent weaknesses caused by the fragmentation, the inconsistent goals 
and municipal self-rule, which probably will make it very difficult for the project to reach its 
goals. The most important learning from the exercis is that behind the successful projects 
there were skilful actors that used the framework t maximize advantages and avoid 
hindrances. A different framework aimed at supporting overriding goals should therefore 
anticipate how the different actors would play and take precautions and use incentives to 
achieve the set goals.  
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4.9 Analysis and discussion  
 
In this section the land use and transport development in Kristiansand is discussed to answer 
the research question of what has promoted and whathas hindered a shift towards a more 
sustainable trajectory. I start with the models used for the analysis and discussion, then 
turning to highlight the important forces and mechanisms that caused the results to become 
what they became. The picture coming out is local politicians and planners in each separate 
case maximizing their ends within the fragmented natio l framework or the fragmented 
institutions that existed. With the new liberalism and the market turn away from planning, it 
seems that the city has adapted to change more readily than the state fraught with inertia. 
Two decades after the Brundtland report, Kristiansand is more car dependent and more 
unsustainable, contrary to all the nice goals and itentions expressed.  
 
4.9.1 The good intentions 
 
Looking back at the LU&T policy and development in Kristiansand the last ten – twenty 
years it is striking, given the extent of the good intentions, that so few of the aims and goals 
have been achieved. The list of plans and decisions adopting goals aiming at a sustainable 
future is long: 
• TP10 Kristiansand 
• Miljøvernplanen 
• The Sustainable City program 
• Kommuneplanen 2000 
• Miljøhandlingsplanen 
• Klimaplanen 
• BusMetro plan 
• ATP program 
• Kommuneplanen 2005 
 
This path of plans and projects aiming at sustainable development, which has a long history in 
the city, is called The Planning Path. The report Our Common Future (Brundtland report 
1987) reinvigorated this path and the concept of sustainable development crept into the policy 
documents. Indeed Kristiansand became “Sustainable City” in 1993, only six years after the 
report was published. Twenty years later concepts and the storylines containing words like 
“sustainable – development – environment – transport - land use” have become embedded in 
the municipal strategy plan (Kommuneplan 2005). But, nice aims are one thing, reality is 
another.  
 
Kristiansand - the Climate Villain was a headline177 a few years after the city received the 
prize as best in Norway in City Planning. The emission  from transport were high and 
increasing in Kristiansand, which was called “the most car dependent urban area in 
Norway”178. The path leading to this increasingly car dependent area I have called The Road 
Building Path. These two paths, which have been followed over two decades, have changed 
                                                
177 Fædrelandsvennen 08.03.2006 
178 Lindseth Gard & Carlo Aall. 2004 Kommuner og klima. En vanskelig kombinasjon. E  spørreundersøkelse 
om klima- og energiplanlegging i norske kommuner og fylkeskommuner. Universitetet i Oslo. Prosus rap 4/04 
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position relative to each other. In the seventies The Planning Path ruled, the plan-led system 
designed the land use and transport network as an integrated plan. The last decade The Road 
Building Path has taken over and the car-led planning system is leading the development on 
an unsustainable trajectory. In the following we will discuss some of the causes behind this.  
 
4.9.2 Introduction to the discussion  
 
The case history is presented as two paths or trajec ori s with changing players, opportunities 
and constraints. The paths have a history, which stll impacts on the course of events through 
tacit knowledge carried forward and therefore it islikely that the future (post case history) 
also will be influenced by former experiences. Some of that tacit knowledge was revealed 
through observation and interviews, but much stayed hid en. The changes over time were 
analyzed by using North’s definitions about institutions (the rules of the game) and 
organizations (the players), SEE CH. 2.2.3 179. This interaction between institutions and 
agency is seen as a game, which Giddens called the duality of structure and agency or 
structuration. This play between actors and the institutional structure was for each of the 
individual cases analyzed using the framework outlined below.  
 
Frame for analysis, the question – How was the interaction between structure and agency? 
The events on the path and the mechanisms working together to produce the events are 
analyzed through asking the question: How did the institutional structure interact with agency 
to produce each particular event. Or in the words of North: How did the players (individuals 
and organizations) and the rules of the game (the institutions) interact with what result?  
 
The conceptual model for the analysis of the interaction on the local level has three realms or 
dimensions: sector, politics and territory as outlined in ch. 2.2.7.  
 
Horizontal and vertical connection  
The land use and transport planning and policy impacts on the public in their daily life in the 
local area, or what can be called the horizontal or spatial level. The reciprocal horizontal 
interaction between the three dimensions is an important part of the model. The agencies on 
the local level have different vertical connections between the municipal level and the 
regional and central level, some of these are close, hierarchical and permanent (planner 
employed in the Highway Agency), others loose and changing (e.g. the City Mayor to 
Minister of Transport). The vertical interaction is mainly taking place through the s ctor in 
the Government hierarchy, as between local planners and the Ministry of Environment. There 
are also some vertical interactions between the local party politicians with central level 
representatives of the same party or when local politicians lobby the central politicians on a 
special issue.  
 
Overlapping roles  
Some of the political decision makers enter into many different roles. They may be 
spokesman for the city, or the city council, for their political party, but also they may take part 
in land use and transport planning working groups side by side by professional planners 
discussing planning details. What I am getting at is that the former more distinct roles and 
separations between elected and employed, between politicians and bureaucrats have become 
                                                
179 Douglass North, 1990.  
 
 123 
less distinct and blurred. These “blurred” roles are further complicated by their private 
connections, which in a small city like Kristiansand may be of great importance to understand 
what’s going on.  
Let me take an example: politician P who is a building constructor, is married to a 
local journalist, he is member of the city development committee and sits in the 
working group for roadplan X, were the consultant and the public planner both belong 
to the same club as P and all three go hunting together. P’s family ties, his property 
and business interests, his professional association partners, etc. of course all influence 
on P’s forming of standpoint in particular cases and is not a problem. What may be a 
problem is if the consultant is selected because of his friendship with P and because he 
has the “right” attitudes.  
 
Lack of transparency, hidden interests, etc. may influe ce the public debate and political 
decisions to a larger extent than prescribed by democratic theory. It is possible that this type 
of networks and ties plays a more important role in a small city than in a larger city with 
several competing such networks. Very few persons have over a long time period been very 
influential in the land use and transport planning a d outcome in Kristiansand, which is 
important when one tries to understand what has happened. 
 
Power and powerlessness – Why did actors behave as they did?  
The how questions above explain how the event came about, but not the forces or power 
behind causing the event. To assess power relationships and who gains and who loses from 
that particular outcome, the following question about power180 and powerlessness was asked 
of the Kristiansand case: What interests benefited from the produced results and by the failed 
attempts?  
 
The reciprocal interactions between these three dimnsions are important in the power play. 
Those who within the national framework set the political agenda at the local level have the 
most important strategic position. It is not possible to attain this position without a direct and 
indirect interaction with a resourceful local business life (Lyngstad 1997). Stone introduced 
the concept “ruling coalition: the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private 
interests function together to make and carry out governing decisions”. (Stone 1989:179)  
 
This definition has three elements: 
• Mechanism that make the actors interact 
• Capacity to implement decisions 
• Actors that are able to implement plans and projects  
 
Stone remarks: ”It need no more than a set of indivduals who are accustomed to cooperating, 
who are confident that they can rely on one another, and who believe that it is proper to 
maintain these relationships.” (Stone 89:180) In the E18 case such a group was formed and 
the plan process was designed with the aim of securing a majority in the city council. A 
process to obtain ”pre-emptive power” which is a term that points to: “power as a capacity to 
occupy, hold, and make use of strategic position” (Stone 1988:83, after Lyngstad 1997:31) 
The stakeholder planning as I have called the E18 case, resembles the ruling coalition in 
Stone’s terminology.  
                                                
180 Power is here defined as the ability to produce int nded results and prevent unwanted outcomes.  
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4.9.3 The road building path.  
 
The E18 project is the success story of the nineties regarding goal achievements. The path 
continued with the E39 process, which ended as intended, but with some hindrances during 
the process. Congestion and car queues create general discontent, strong business 
dissatisfaction, and a feeling of being let down by central authorities among the local 
politicians. The media keep the discontent alive, pr ach the ubiquitous car’s excellence and 
remind of the underlying threat of more congestion hat might be damaging for business 
growth. The way the E18 process was designed in order to secure achievement of goals 
demonstrates a deep understanding of power. 
 
The E18 case started by the Highway Agency Director explored among key stakeholders the 
questions “what are your problems and what can I do for you?” The queues on the E18 and 
the lack of government funding overshadowed all other problems. It was a complicated 
problem, a 2 by 2 problem involving many local and central decision takers (see the E18 case 
above).  
 
The next step was that the director set up a learning process involving the main central and 
local decision takers and stakeholders. Through this process the most important local 
politicians were taken through a group process that strongly tied the group together about 
aims and necessary decisions. The local task was to get the majority in the city council to both 
accept the E18 alignment and design and that tolls were necessary to finance E18. Road tolls 
are very sensitive issues that easily can create a voc l public opposition. Only a few years 
before the three major parties had lost 18 councilors n the municipal election, which was akin 
to a local political massacre. If another toll oppositi n arose in the E18 case, the proposed 
solution to the 2 by 2 problem would fall. The politicians therefore had to sell the E18 
package to the public, a task requiring skilful political leadership. Thus the interaction 
between Politics and Territory in the model became the key to solve the E18 problem, as 
indicated.  
 
The outcome from the E18 process was a new road finnced by the toll collection. The road 
represents in the short time an increase in welfare for most people in Kristiansand due to 
shorter travel times that increase the space/time opportunities. In the long time the road might 
be filled with cars and the situation turn back to square one. The politicians benefited from 
satisfied voters and positive feedback from busines. The planners got professional reputation 
for being clever. The business community benefited from reduced congestion and shorter 
travel times, and generally a better business climate. Some businesses have also direct income 
from delivering work, goods and services to the road-building project. The losers are the few 
without access to a car and future generations who will bear the consequences of increased 
CO2 and sprawl.  
 
What was the incentive structure? 
The planners were successful at their work if E18 was built, hence the incentives were strong 
to get the project accepted and financed. The opposite (not building the road) would be 
professionally unsatisfactory. The politicians had strong pressure on their shoulders to deliver 
a solution to the decade old problem of not being able to prevent the growing queues. The 
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pressure from business was also strong and therefor many politicians would try hard to get 
the E18 built. A failure to do so would mainly hurt their vanity, unless the unlikely case 
occurred that the voters turned against them. Busines  in general benefits from better roads for 
freight transport, for travel during work and travel to and from work. Lastly, the benefits for 
the automobile sector – all the businesses who would earn from increased car traffic from the 
car sales, the filling stations, etc. to the media who would get more car adverts – may not be 
directly important for each one, but in sum large benefits from road building would accrue. 
The power in the E18 case rests with all those who benefit from the new road. The Highway 
Agency had a lot to gain and to lose if a failure occurred and the politicians in power likewise. 
The public had the power to stop the project, but not power to realize it. 
 
Could the end result have been different? 
The E18 case was not a clear run, but succeeded because the planning process was carefully 
designed to avoid barriers. The major barrier was the increase in public burden put on car 
owners, which was against the principles of the majority in the city council. There was also 
wide resentment among the public to pay tolls for a road the state should finance, not the local 
road users. Unless an “environment-tunnel” had been d signed for the E18 through an area 
with many buildings close to the road, the council could have rejected the plan. The E18 
planning could therefore easily have been a failure.  
 
The later E39 process could have been stopped because of the new structure created by the 
ATP project and the lack of understanding of the real power relations. The political 
compromise in the ATP committee on E39 fell because the chosen alternative was 
environmentally poor and that the city council had decisive power over the toll ring decision. 
In the end the result of the E39 case became a democratic solution, but it also a resulted in 
strengthening the “car society”. The fragmentized institutions governed the handling of the 
planning and decision-making process. The incentives w re guiding the actors’ actions and 
negotiations leading to agreements/compromises, but it also opened for both the setting of 
hindrances for a project and the possibilities of st pping it. Lastly, part of the E18 legacy is 
also that the Highway Agency has got increased status nd position in the local transport 
planning.  
 
The ATP project enlarged the scope and the number of decision makers (many “heavy” 
political decision makers) and both Vest-Agder County and the Highway agency got a 
completely different position than in the former bilateral relationship with the municipality. 
The role of the Highway Agency, the politicians and the planners were changed. Prestige is 
important in such groups as the ATP, all partners mu t get something to avoid creating a 
loser. Hence the allocation of the “cake” was different from before the ATP. The Vest-Agder 
County and the small municipalities were strengthened at the cost of the majority of people 
who live in Kristiansand municipality. The appointed members of the committee were not 
answerable to anyone and not directly accountable. Th  ATP project contributed to increased 
fragmentation and therefore a more complex system, with less transparency and less 
democracy as a result.  
 
Barriers. 
The E18/E39 processes were a game about getting investment money from the road program 
through decisions in the Parliament. This game becam   success story because key players 
knew the game, were able to create a forceful coaliti n and designed a planning process that 
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avoided the major obstacles to reach the goal. The first barrier for the E18 process was that, 
even if the expected result “new road capacity” wasin high general demand, the history 
showed futile attempts of financing the road. The environment wave after the Brundtland 
report was not helpful, but a serious hindrance that could obstruct the project. Another 
obstacle was high demand for money from the Governmnt for hospitals, schools, etc. The 
history showed that Kristiansand/Vest-Agder had few supporters in Oslo that would increase 
the chance of obtaining Government funding. The last b rrier was that a majority in the local 
election had rejected financing new roads by a toll ring only few years before.  
 
The E39 planning process was the continuation of the E18 process, but the former key players 
were gone and a new organization had been established (t e ATP). These changes changed 
both the power relations and procedures, most of all bringing many new players into the game 
on a new arena. The participants’ access to the decision situations was important for the 
outcome.181 The HA was very active in the media, and had direct ac ess to politicians and 
planners both locally and in Oslo by the central Highway Agency. The formal structure giving 
actors uneven access to the decision process represented a formidable barrier to the 
environmentally best local alternative.  
 
4.9.4 The planning path.  
 
The Sustainable City was at the outset not a widely felt planning problem in Kristiansand. It 
became a planning process because the Ministry of Environment accepted an application from 
the city to become a sustainable city. Thus it was an idea and project created in the vertical 
dimension of the Sector in the model. An idea carried forward on the euphoria f success 
from the environment project having gone on for four years182. This was a few years after the 
report Our common future, Brundtland was the prime minister in Norway and the 
environment wave was high. The Sustainable City project started with set goals and 
objectives without much thought for the impact it mght have in the local context and what the 
public wanted.  
 
The Sustainable City process was a process trying to make people change behavior through 
information and propaganda, with hardly any room for communication. The public and media 
became alienated to the project. The outcome became only an output of reports and with the 
words of the city council executive: “The most important result was that greater insight and 
willingness was obtained”. If in the case that the Sustainable City had succeeded to achieve 
the goals, the outcome would be negative for many people. Increased travel time and costs 
caused by the shift to public transport, would have  strong impact on people’s daily life. The 
benefits would be marginally less CO2 emissions and an unclear improvement of public 
transport. It is also a paradox that if 10-20 percent of the car users shifted to other modes, 
congestion on the main roads in Kristiansand would disappear. The time savings for the 
remaining car users would hence be great! 
 
                                                
181 The MoE minister Hareide and the Mayor Skisland both represent KrF, the following MoE minister Bjørnøy 
from SV, was weak and without strong local partners, the MoT minister Navarsete and Mayor Grindland in 
Songdalen both belong to Sp, representing a rural road building ideology.  
182 MIK (miljøvern i kommunene) was a project in hundre  municipalities to make environment issues a central 
municipal task and obligation, and a great success in Kristiansand under the local leader Holvik.  
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What was the incentive structure? 
Planners and Ministry of Environment employees did what they considered was 
professionally and morally the right thing to do, namely to use land use and transport planning 
to contribute to save the planet. The vertical communication within the sector was therefore 
very good. However, on the central level conflicts arose because the sustainable development 
idea and specifically to reduce the use of cars and shift to public transport, threatened the core 
self-image and long traditions in the Ministry of Transport and the road sector. On the local 
level the same type of conflicts was present. Firstly, the politicians had to be aware of the 
public opinion about the car. Restrictions on the us of the car, which many people had used a 
lot of their income to buy, could easily mean loss f voters. Secondly, to improve public 
transport without extra money from central authorities entailed to cut down on other public 
services like schools, old folks homes, etc. There was also animosity against the Sustainable 
City project from the technical administration in the municipality, who formerly had been in 
charge of such projects. The Sustainable City project spread the sustainable development 
“gospel” to the public, apparently expecting that they would change behavior because it was 
morally right. Even if the public agreed and wanted to shift to public transport the 
disincentive of an inadequate bus service made such a shift in practice very time consuming 
for many. On top of it an improved public transport system seemed far away.  
 
 
Could the end result have been different? 
With such a negative incentive structure it is not likely the Sustainable City could have 
succeeded in achieving its goals. The result could probably have been better by another 
planning process. This was especially so concerning public transport. The county had 
launched the most successful public transport demonstration project in Norway, which was 
not prolonged even if it fitted well with the aims of the Sustainable City project. With a 
different handling of the public transport issue another result could probably have been 
obtained. The same is the case for cycling since the city had a proud legacy for building cycle 
paths. The third issue is the municipality’s own car use, where demonstration projects could 
have tested alternative fuels and the mode shift policy. As it turned out in the end it didn’t 
even produce small incremental results that later could be used for further development of the 
Sustainable City. The only lasting result was the city planning price and the idea of the 
BusMetro, which might have come without the Sustainable City project since the Curitiba 
model had been imported to Norway years before.  
 
Barriers. 
The main barrier for the Sustainable City project was the lack of connection to peoples’ local 
transport and daily life, the struggle to get their time budgets together at a reasonable price. 
Broad cooperation and public participation is necessary to create a Sustainable City, hence 
Bottom-up processes are required. The Sustainable City project was an example of elite 
thinking and a Top-down exercise. It was at outset doomed to fail because the Ministry of 
Environment did not manage to include active participation and cooperation from the 
Ministry of Transport and its’ agency the Highway Agency. Another barrier on the central 
level was the lack of real political backing of the project. The enormous interests of the oil 
industry in Norway and the “automobility system” were not confronted, and as long as the 
Sustainable City project did not challenge these int rests it could go on. It tried to implement 
ambiguous aims at the local level with strong symbolic but little real political backing, and 
few forceful measures and instruments. On the local level the main barrier for the Sustainable 
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City project was that it represented a threat that could damage the implementation of the E18 
project. Also the long-standing conflicts and opposite interests between the County and 
Municipality represented barriers to the project. Lastly, the local public needs, attitudes and 
problems were not taken serious in the Sustainable City project.  
 
Tentative conclusions on the two paths 
Looking back on the case history, the dynamic and contingent change in land use and 
transport planning opportunities and challenges is possibly most striking. The words of Agnes 
Heller fit this impression: The modern world is continually changing, it’s a conglomerate of 
different lifestyles, systems and subsystems.183 The future seems more uncertain and less 
predictable than twenty years ago, making public land use and transport planning more of a 
game than an instrument for governing future development. The common impression from the 
two paths when looking back over the last years was th t the actors played on the institutional 
structure and the attached incentive system. Only winners were apparently produced in the 
short term (E18 was built and the SC got a prize), the losers in the long term might be future 
generations and the climate.  
 
The planning practice was not comprehensive, integra d and holistic, but incremental and ad-
hoc. The Norwegian planning legislation is based on the rational or synoptic planning model 
although modified by the mixed-scanning model.184  The land use and transport planning 
processes and decision-making should ideally not deviate far from this model. However, the 
plan- and decision-making processes looked into in Kristiansand appear incrementalistic of 
nature and resemble more the Garbage Can model sinc more or less contingent combinations 
of problems, local solutions and actors often were decisive for the results.185  
 
Another important observation is that issues may suddenly appear seemingly from nowhere. 
“Gratis buss” was a hot issue during the election campaign in 2001, after three-four years of 
oblivion, the issue resurfaced in 2005, but this time it became a lame duck. Similarly the 
parking issue suddenly appeared out of the blue in a completely unrelated case about building 
cottages on the seashore, and resulted in lasting implications for the future parking policy. 
These are both examples of tacit knowledge and skills among the political actors participating 
in a continuing political process.  
 
The analysis of the decision-making, output and consequences of the cases discussed above 
seeks to assess the path dependence and connections to other issues both before and after the 
formal planning process. There are for example indications that the election in 1987 in which 
the three big parties lost 18 councilors had lasting effects on the policies of these parties. 
Whether it had any effect on the actual outcome of the policies is debatable, but that the 
election defeat had repercussions for more than ten years is clear. The assessments of these 
cases delve with two difficult questions. How and at what time period after the plan should 
the plan be evaluated for goal achievement? The second question is How to measure a plan’s 
                                                
183 Agnes Heller cited in “Ett möte mellan Agnes Heller och nordisk social forskning”Rapport från Nordisk 
Forskarkurs, Nordplan den 12-23 maj 1986. Nordiska nstitutet för samhällsplanering, KR 1986:3. 
184 Amitai Etzioni in his Mixed-Scanning model (in Faludi 1973) argued for a holistic overview to be taken and 
then that the important problems should get priority and leave the minor problems to be solved ad-hoc. R lf 
Jensen in his article “ Fjern- og Nær-analyse” (Jensen 1986) follows this conceptual model, an article that has 
had great influence on planning in Norway.  
185 The garbage can model developed by March and Olsen, may be viewed as a stream of problems, solutions, 
participants and choices, cf. chapter 2.3.3.2. 
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results when the development without the plan is unknown? Using the timeline and setting the 
individual cases in a historic perspective we have identified two paths. The path dependence 
shows that there is no final answer to the first question. Politicians (and planners) are human 
beings representing interests, and they are continually trying to achieve as much as possible 
for these interests, which means that the outcomes of planning decisions are modified and 
changed over time. Evaluation of goal achievement must bear this in mind and make as true 
as possible an evaluation at that particular time it is done. The second question was answered 
by the counterfactual discussion in each individual case. A general conclusion can be that the 
storyline “The car has come to stay” has a hegemonic position, meaning that it is self-evident 
to cater for the car and base future plans on it. Another way to put it is to use the Dutch 
concept planning doctrine, which is used about a phenomenon when assumptions are accepted 
or considered implicitly given (people have cars, hence all flats must have parking).186 The 
car has accordingly become an important instrument in local development and the quest for 
growth.  
 
The Kristiansand experience is a lack of monitoring and learning  
The Sustainable City project reports do not show where and why it went wrong. It is therefore 
unclear what lessons to be drawn because of this lack of learning. Machiavelli was one of the 
first who wrote about history; ”where instructive mistakes get an equal place as instructive 
examples” (Eriksen, 2006:197). If it had been recognized that several mistakes were made, 
among them how to achieve the goal of shifting people from cars to buses, both the BusMetro 
and the ATP project could have got a better start. Bu  it seems that there are strong barriers to 
recognizing and learning from mistakes in the system. The lack of an unbiased monitoring 
and evaluation system underpins this conclusion.  
 
The BusMetro was a project where ”price was not one of the instruments”187 and where bus-
priority was not actively used. Without such important measures what can be achieved is 
limited.188 Vest-Agder County had the knowledge necessary to create a successful BusMetro 
project also in terms of attracting passengers from cars. But such an experiment would 
demand new money or different priority of the existing funds for public transport services. 
Because both of these options were unrealistic, a BusMetro project with an Achilles-heel was 
launched. However, the basic physical public transport infrastructure has been substantially 
improved and it is still possible to improve the BusMetro further. In my opinion the BusMetro 
in Kristiansand could have been vastly better if the Ministry of Transport had learnt from the 
Sustainable City project and used the knowledge from public transport research.  
 
Another lack of learning is shown by the ATP project, which seeks to find common land use 
and transport solutions across municipality and county borders by consensus. From my 
interviews it is clear that leading Kristiansand politicians see it as the first step in an eventual 
enlarging of the municipality territory. It is clearly a project, which is part of the larger 
ongoing discussions on reorganizing local government in Norway. Many claim that land use 
and transport decisions should be taken at the functional regional level delimited by the travel 
to work area (TWA)189. In Norway one could think that the present municipality planning 
                                                
186 Van der Valk & Faludi (1994) 
187 Interview County Transport Director Leif Storsve 
188 With 5% growth per year for the BusMetro the public transport share in 2015 will only be 7% up from 5%
presuming that car use increase with 3% per year as t present.  
189 In Norway called ABS regioner or Arbeid Bo- og Service regioner  
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powers (the planning act), the financing of public transport services and the authority for 
roads (except national trunk roads) were placed at a level above the municipality. “That is 
unthinkable!” was the answer from a prominent politician when asked if the ATP project 
should get such powers. It seems that the expected local government reform will face 
substantial opposition and change little of the present power structure. 
 
The consensus model in the ATP avoids a superior power. But the conflicting interests are 
still there. Where to locate new development? What part of the territory comes first and last? 
How to prioritize between the centre and the periphery? The questions are many and unsolved 
in the ATP project. Vest-Agder County did not let the public transport money into the ATP 
project, because “we couldn’t risk that they started public transport services that didn’t have a 
long term viability. We would be left with a poor image and the bill.”190 Another problematic 
area came up in the E39 case. The deputy mayor got a lot of negative comments in the papers 
because he had together with the neighboring municipal ties agreed that the E39 Tall Bridge 
should be chosen. The reason for this was an agreement in the ATP committee for spreading 
the toll funds more widely. In Kristiansand people could not accept that the neighboring 
municipalities were pressing for the environmentally worst solution for the city. Thus the 
ATP project seems full of internal conflicts, which it is in a weak position to handle. One aim 
is to reduce travel distances by increasing the density in built up areas, which would mean 
reduced expansion in some municipalities and concentration of building in Kristiansand. 
Another major land use and transport issue is where jobs will be located in the future, which 
is decided by the owners of companies. Often the municipalities compete to attract new jobs 
and offer attractive sites. The future outcome from the ATP project, which is not constructed 
to handle conflicts, will probably show that such very difficult but necessary decisions, were 
put aside, and only the consensus issues were dealt with.  
 
Monitoring is lacking. 
We showed in chapter 4.3 that modal split data is very dependent upon what has been 
measured or calculated, and that “strategic misrepresentation” may occur. There are also 
examples of deliberate use of skewed information to obtain advantages, as did happen in the 
E39 case: “A devastating expert judgment. The Highway Agency has in the best case 
produced a very poor document – in the worst case – manipulated both the basis for the 
calculations and comparison.” 191 (see ch. 4.13 ) There is clearly a need to have an institution 
outside land use and transport planning organizations that could supply reliable data on 
planning issues like commuting, Origin-Destination data, modal split and so on. Statistics 
Norway does provide some of these data already and coul  be such an institution. Another 
way to solve the problem of “strategic misrepresentation”, bias, inaccuracy or deliberate lying 
to favor the “right” solution could be “to change the rules of the power play that governs 
forecasting and project development”192.  
 
What is the legacy of the two paths? 
It is very difficult to separate these two paths from the external forces of internationalization 
and globalization that have had direct effect on Kristiansand through the rapid growth in 
businesses competing globally. Neoliberal ideas affect the public policy through the New 
Public Management ideas put into practice. The local political elite both acts and reacts on 
                                                
190 Interview County Transport Director Leif Storsve 
191 Fædrelandsvennen, 080105, the editorial comment the exp rt group report. 
192 Priemus et al (2008) page 138. 
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these complex forces. In development cases the municipality has taken a more autonomous 
role that reduces the state’s local influence. Of the three main factors in the model: land use, 
transport and development control (see ch 2.x), land use planning has become market-led and 
private interests have grown stronger. Sustainable dev lopment is not in vogue and the 
discussion on mode shift is resting or dead. Transport planning and implementation has 
become finance-led and development control has becom  a passive instrument to get statutory 
formalities correct.  
 
The comprehensive planning in the municipality (Kommuneplan) is the public strategic 
spatial planning instrument. The strategic plans have been “rolled forward” after five years, 
which shorten the real time horizon of the plans sice the politicians know that they regularly 
can change the land use in the plans if necessary. The ATP project has lifted the focus to 
cover a far larger territory, however the inherent weakness with different borders and 
fragmented institutions will probably make the project another without much impact in the 
real world. Fragmentation of institutions increases the democratic deficit, which was further 
widened by the local politicians in their land use development practice. 
 
4.9.5 Power relations 
 
The evidence on the ground 
The “Realpolitik” can be read as evidence on the ground. The “sand and mortar” used to build 
houses, industry, offices, chalets and transport infrastructure are transforming the physical 
structure of the Kristiansand region. It is a change facilitated and promoted by the car as the 
major (sole) means of motorized transport.  
 
The amount of money having gone and are going into road capacity, parking, housing, 
industry and business offices, etc. is huge. This has as we have outlined above led to increased 
car use and changing travel patterns, and trends point towards a challenging future for 
Kristiansand. So far there is little reason to believe that the City Council’s visions and aims of 
an environmentally friendly transport system are anythi g but symbolic statements. There are 
hardly any signs of public policy being used to strive for a more environmentally sustainable 
future for Kristiansand. Land use and transport planning has to an increasing degree supported 
a market led development based on car transport as the main mode of transport for both 
persons and freight. This is caused by a deliberate policy of dismantling the public sector and 
transferring tasks to the market, both in Kristiansand City Council and nationally193. The 
expected increase in future wealth will probably together with the present land use and 
transport planning policy lead to increased demand for car travel (and plane for long trips). 
Kristiansand urban region will continue to gradually expand into Agderbyen, and make 
people more and more dependent upon the car.  
 
The changes one can observe in land use and transport practice are not only emerging through 
institutional changes, but also via basic changes in practice, and a move towards non-statutory 
initiatives. This is a shift from an administrative regulatory practice (public planning) to a 
more “negotiative” one (market rule). In Kristiansad cooperative agreements and coalitions 
are found, such as Agderrådet and Jernbane Forum Sør both formally established by the 
                                                
193 For international experiences, see for example: Næss, Petter "Nyliberalisme i byplanlægningen", in 
Lundquist, A. (ed.) (2008): Dansk nyliberalisme. København: Frydenlund Forlag 
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counties. Other organizations are more ad hoc as the E18-coalition, and again others as 
Stamveg Aksjonen are cooperation between business and politicians, partly 
supported/financed by public agencies. Project organizations vary from the major consortium 
that has a planning, building and maintenance ontract on E18 worth several billion NOK, to 
small projects. One such project-organization is the committee that plans and builds the new 
concert hall, Kilden. That is a project costing well over one billion NOK financed by public 
money and without public insight to proceedings anddecisions.  
 
This plethora of organizations is characterized by unclear accountability, appointed decision 
makers and lack of transparency. The participants are often appointed by business 
associations and (former) politicians appointed by elected politicians. Such organizations have 
grown rapidly in numbers and complicate the public government and management system. 
That makes it difficult especially for the public to get an overview and insight, and the 
fragmentation reduces accountability. Since members are appointed or self recruited, they are 
not accountable to any one. Elected politicians have to meet the voters every four years and 
account for their decisions, and in private companies board members are accountable to 
owners. In quangos and similar organizations there is not accountability, only trust between 
appointed and appointee. Information can be presentd i  the form most suitable and timed to 
reap most advantage. The democratic rights are lowered and it opens for undemocratic 
lobbyism, corporative solutions and in the end the possibility and opportunity for corruption.  
 
The power play 
The Gimlemoen army camp in Kristiansand was proposed closed in the early nineteen 
nineties. The Defense College was to move to Oslo. Str ng local opposition ensued: research 
to prove them wrong on a social cost basis, mobilizat on politically and generally plus 
network-discussions. The network activity demanded that someone took the lead194 to focus 
on strategies a) how to keep the present activity, b) how to maximize the local benefits of a 
closure.  
 
Some fifteen years later the story of Gimlemoen wasthu  presented in an article by key local 
players195: “When Kristiansand lost Defence College (Krigsskolen), everybody agreed196 that 
Gimlemoen had to be the new campus for HiA. Again with the Minister of Education 
Gudmund Hernes (Ap), deputy minister Randi Øverland (Ap from Kristiansand) and Member 
of Parliament Aud Blattmann (Ap from Kristiansand) as important actors in Oslo”. The 
former editor of Fædrelandsvennen soon reputed the ar icle for re-writing history, and among 
other things stressed that the Defense Minister had pressed the city to take over the camp197. 
The statement “everybody agreed” is probably a judgment made in hindsight following a few 
consultations among the ruling elite. After an investment of 700 million NOK in the 
university campus; and the status of full university being reached, the statement became 
“true”. However, from land use and transport perspectiv  another location would have been 
preferential. If the Campus had continued to be localized in the Centre, less car use could 
entail, writes Petter Næss in a book. Different land uses and localizations in Kristiansand are 
                                                
194 The leader should have authority, trust, broad network and knowledge about government (the processes 
between the ministries, who sit in what positions, who may and can influence outcome, etc.) 
195 Fædrelandsvennen, 241107, by Bjørg Wallevik, Jan Oddvar Skisland and Harald Furre 
196 every body should here read a handful of people that could carry the local opinion and resist alternative views 
on localisation. 
197 Fædrelandsvennen, 261107, Finn Holmer-Hoven 
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compared in a sustainable development and energy pespective: “It is likely that more 
students will travel with car to Gimlemoen than to the city centre.”198 But when the case 
arose, there was not any room for assessing such altern tives, as the synoptic planning model 
requires. The risk of losing a potentially high compensation for the defense closure and gain 
an inward investment was present. At the national level there where two opposing interests: 
The Minister of Defense pressed hard to get rid of the army camp at a highest possible price 
and the Minister of Education did not want to invest in a campus in Kristiansand at all. In 
Kristiansand the old hospital had been turned into a city centre campus with a site for 
expansion reserved across the river, after years with difficult planning. Kristiansand was 
therefore not willing just to buy the Gimlemoen army camp, it wanted much more and 
succeeded. The Minister of Education was convinced (forced?) to take over the camp and turn 
it into the future university campus at a cost to the State of 700 million NOK plus, and 
without the municipality having to buy the land from the Defense Minister, a good deal for 
the municipality. In this bargaining process there was no room for alternative proposals, 
which easily could have jeopardized the local strategy. The land use and transport planning 
goals of a sustainable future had to give way for the growth goals.  
 
A similar game was the aborted attempts to continue the great public transport success in 
Kristiansand in the early nineties “Kristiansand package I”. It was unique among all the 
projects in Norway, leading to a thirty per cent increase in patronage. If Vest-Agder continued 
with projects that made public transport better andmore competitive, the result could be 
achieving the aims of reduced car traffic growth. However, that could imply that the 
prognosis for the future car traffic growth had to be lowered. The cost-benefit ratio for the 
E18 project would be lower and the E18 project would be far more difficult to promote in 
Oslo. There was a strong risk that someone in the Highway Agency in Oslo could look at the 
E18 plans and push it far down on the list of priority. After many years of fighting for 
investment money from the State to the E18, the ruling elite in Kristiansand could not risk any 
outside interference with the E18 project. Even if the Sustainable City had reduction of car 
traffic, shift to public transport and an increase in the public transport modal share as some of 
its main objectives, the successful public transport roject had to be less successful. 
“Kristiansand package II” which was the successor never came to much and after a few years 
the number of public transport users had fallen back to the 1990 level.  
 
Political power in practice 
The parties H and KrF have been ruling Kristiansand municipality for the last 30 years, 
depending from time to time on other parties. They are in their rhetoric as positive to the 
environment as any other party, but when there are propositions to put restrictions on car use, 
they vote against, as this decision199 shows: “Kristiansand municipality will actively 
contribute to a development of positive measures that reduce people’s transport needs. Road 
pricing, restrictive measures with the help of the toll ring, plus parking restrictions are not 
relevant measures to reduce personal car traffic in Kristiansand.” 
 
In the “Sjøbod” case the two parties made a deal with Frp on transport and parking policy, 
which means that “Kristiansand - the Climate Villain” will continue on an environmentally, 
unsustainable trajectory. The decision on parking requirement for new buildings goes straight 
into the core of the development control framework, which guides daily practice. It will have 
                                                
198 Petter Næss, Fysisk planlegging og arealbruk. Tano Aschehoug, 1997 page 169. 
199 City Council decision March 17th 1999 
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strong implications lasting a long time and making a future shift in policy far less effective. It 
is a policy aiming at a more unsustainable transport development in Kristiansand.  
 
“Gratis Buss” got very strong support from all political parties before the 2001 elections, 
except from Frp200. But after the election was over, the interest disappeared and the 
proposition was finally buried in the City Council in May. ”We have met the wall. We realize 
that we are not getting any way with the Government on this issue. It would only be a 
symbolic proposition,” said Tore Austad, H. But the voters that listened to the politicians a 
few months earlier heard that they would fight for “G atis Buss”. The politicians knew very 
well during election time that it was a proposal costing a lot of money, and that no party was 
willing to support only one city with national-government money. Some will call this 
symbolic politics and others will say that the voters were cheated. The political majority did 
neither in the Sustainable City case nor for the BusMetro want to use municipal money for 
public transport services. They knew that public transport was heavily dependent on public 
funds to provide the existing services. They also knew that the same parties in position 
nationally (as they were up to 2005) did not want to use more funds on public transport. In 
fact they knew that without extra municipal funding t was impossible to improve public 
transport services in the city, but still they talked warmly about shifting people from cars to 
buses. Some will call these double standards. The E18 case shows that the chance of securing 
money for road building was of outmost importance and nothing was to interfere with that 
option.  
 
Major projects 
In order to understand major projects the interesting parts are: the pre-planning stage, the 
agenda setting stage, the design of the project path including when it should be informal and 
closed, and when formal and open. Major projects are never “planned”. By that I mean that 
the major projects seldom or never are discussed in the strategic land use and transport 
planning processes (kommuneplan). The reasons are: 
 
• Someone wants to build something possibly controversial and keeps it secret to avoid 
public discussion (examples: Tinghuset 1974, Stadion 2005, Concert Hall 2004, 
Swimming pool 2003, P-house Market Square 2004) 
• Learning process on strategy and tactics to get projects through (with NPM and 
quangos being formed, it is likely that a process of learning has taken place during the 
last 10-15 years  
• Something unexpected happens, and good leadership can turn the event into a positive 
event (closure of Gimlemoen Army Camp and the creation of the University Campus 
for HiA is a good example) 
 
Plans can support outcome, and will then be used in the egotiations as in the Gimlemoen 
case. If a plan had prevented the new land use, it would have been a non-issue in the 
negotiations between the State who wanted to leave with low costs and the Municipality who 
wanted maximum compensation for the loss of jobs, income, etc.  
 
 
                                                
200 The Frp code was a favourite topic in 2006, possibly it is so simple that Frp contrary to other political parties, 
say which things they are against? 
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Governance and public private partnerships 
By making a public-private partnership agreement, a inter-municipal company or a similar 
construction one can avoid the usual democratic rules for the public rights to insight in 
documents, etc. These constructions are common where “a ruling coalition” wants to 
implement projects, (see Lyngstad 2004) and it looks like several projects in Kristiansand can 
be placed in such a category. (e.g. Tangen, Concert Hall Kilden, Football Arena, 
Swimmingpool.) The coming(?) Market Square P-House may fall into this category. It is 
common that public private partnerships withdraw from public insight. Democratic control is 
supposed to be taken care of by the very few politicians involved.  
 
Market Square P-House close to implementation? 
The Chamber of Commerce proposed as we have seen above to build 1000 parking-places 
underneath the Market Square. There are about 8500 parking spaces in Kvadraturen, about 
40% of which under public control. At present the public parking garages have only 50% 
capacity utilization. Demand for another 1000 places will therefore be low and the parking 
garage must probably be subsidized from the general pa king revenue for some years. But the 
location will have advantages for some shops compared to others. The main shopping street in 
the centre Markens is about one km long. It starts at the “castle” and e ds where it meets the 
sea. It was the first pedestrian street in Norway established 1972 and has no competitors as 
“the street” in Kristiansand. It is the property and shop owners in Markens who put pressure 
on the politicians to build more parking close to the street.201 The emerging strategy 
(Mintzberg 1994) that seem to govern the Market Square P-House process, may have grown 
naturally, but looks like being very candid both regarding timing and instruments 
(reguleringsplan). Two years after the proposal of building 1000 parking places under the 
Market Square came, an advert202 in the press notifies that a public private partnership will 
start detailed planning and developing a funding package for the Market Square P-House. The 
choice of reguleringsplan as the planning instrument and the public private partnership has 
several important consequences:  
• One prevents that the Market Square P-House is evaluated in the strategic plan process 
(kommuneplan), hence it will not be discussed if public transport alternatively could 
cater for the transport demand as the National Guidelines require203. 
• One avoids discussing in public if there is a need for an extra 1000 parking places in 
Kvadraturen. 
• The public private partnership and the funding package can be used to prevent public 
insight into the planning. 
• The Market Square P-House project will probably be presented as a complete package 
where the municipality in a formal contract is tied up economically for many years. 
The City Council will be given the choice: Take it or leave it!  
 
 
                                                
201 There is already a 5-6 storey P-house in one end of the street at “the Castle” and another 100 meters away in 
Henrik Wergelands gate. A third is 100 meters away in Skippergata and a fourth 50 meters away in 
Lillemarkens. A fifth parking garage is 50 meters away in Gyldenløves gate. Parko is 120 meters away in 
Dronningens gate, plus ample on street parking in most of the nine streets crossing the Markens street. Th re are 
in addition several parking garages (some 400 places?) along Markens not open to the public.  
202 Fædrelandsvennen 20.05.2007 Annonse: Igangsetting av reguleringsarbeid med sikte på Reguleringsplan for 
Rådhuskvarteret og Øvre Torv. Pluss Parkeringsanlegg under Øvre Torv og forhandlinger om utbyggingsavtale.  
203 Rikspolitiske retningslinjer for samordnet Areal og Transport Planlegging.  
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A “Ruling coalition” and “pre-emptive power” 
My hypothesis is that there has been a learning process the last 10-15 years in Kristiansand, 
where a small group of politicians and administrators have learnt how to get controversial 
projects through the democratic system as winners. A “ruling coalition” - a set of individuals 
who are accustomed to cooperating, who are confident that they can rely on one another, and 
who believe that it is proper to maintain these relationships – get together to realize a certain 
project. One may say according to Stone (1989) that a strategy emerges in which:  
The planning system is used by a “ruling coalition” to win, to get controversial 
projects through, which otherwise might had lost in a comprehensive planning 
process.  
 
It is legitimate for political parties and interest groups to fight for their projects. But it raises 
questions about how planning law and practice functio  in relation to the representative 
democracy. It is firstly questions about accountability and legitimacy that are being raised. 
What is worrying is the fact that the integrated planning on the macro level is sidestepped. By 
going straight for a reguleringsplan as is the case for Market Square P-House, one can turn a 
controversial project into “closed door politics”204 and outside the scrutiny from the press and 
public. Serious questions on democracy can be raised concerning accountability, transparency 
and insight into such processes. The lack of transprency and accountability opens up the 
possibility and opportunity for undemocratic pressure, lobbyism and also for corruption. It 
opens up for using the information and agenda setting privilege to present the case in the most 
favorable light (spin) and to avoid mentioning risk and negative consequences. Also a 
systematic work to build support in secrecy for a project can be undertaken. Selective 
information and “leakages” to the press is often part of the information and marketing strategy 
for projects. It may happen that building plots are transferred or sold at bargain prices to 
support the realization of the project, before the project has been known and influencing the 
market value of the land. The local plan (reguleringsplan) can also be used strategically to 
support the project.  
 
4.9.6 Klosterman205 tested on Kristiansand  
 
The experience from several national projects like the City Environment Campaign and 
transport planning in the big cities (TP10) had shown the MoE that a change from “sector” 
planning towards the ideal of integrated land use and transport planning was necessary to shift 
the course towards sustainability. The Sustainable City project was a result of that 
experience206. The E18 planning was initiated by the Highway Agency director and used as a 
tool to achieve the physical goal of more road capaity by gathering the support of key 
stakeholders and prevent opposition. The analysis of Kristiansand shows several paradoxes: 
• Gap between goals and results 
• The “right” goals and doing the “right” things led nowhere 
• The car mode was the winner 
• From TP10 to Sustainable City – a remarkable lack of learning 
                                                
204 C P Snow, 1962. Vitenskap og statsstyre. Cappelens upopulære skrifter. See also The two cultures by the 
same author.  
205 Klosterman Richard E, 1985 Arguments for and against planning Town Planning Review, Vol 56, No 1, pp. 
5-20, 1985.  
206 Interview with Kjell Spigseth, project leader Sustainable Cities.  
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Looking at these paradoxes we ask how the E18 and Sustainable City cases fit with 
Klosterman’s four main arguments for planning:  
• Promote the collective interests of society. 
• Counteract externalities. 
• Contribute to better information about long-term consequences. 
• Contribute to fair distribution of goods. 
 
Promote the collective interests of society. 
The trunk road E18 is essential for the well functioning of such a car dependent country as 
Norway, hence it serves the capitalist system and does not challenge the present economic 
distribution. The E18 problem was that as a public good, it had no priority for funding. It was 
the geographical area/region that fell out of the funding program. This became more felt over 
time as car traffic grew and smaller and smaller funds became available from the national 
government. However, the E18 solution was user financing by tolls, and therefore it became a 
market driven solution and “quasi” common good. In the short-term the E18 will improve 
accessibility for the car-owning majority and worsen the situation for those with little or no 
access to the car. 
 
The Sustainable City was an attempt to change present policy to benefit future generations. 
The Sustainable City goals are collective goals aiming at creating a better and healthier 
environment, and this fits thus exactly with the ned for planning Klosterman identified. 
However, the climate challenge had little real political support through the nineties in 
Kristiansand, nor in the Norwegian Parliament, other an as symbolic goals.  
 
Counteract externalities caused by market failure 
The market cannot deal with social costs and benefits not reflected in market prices or 
revenues. The externalities of car use (accidents, missions, sprawl, etc) make it a prime 
target for land use and transport planning according to Klosterman. Planners should address 
the shortcomings of the political system by fully rep esenting the public interest. E18 is a 
public good, which had no priority for funding until mid nineties. It was the quasi-market 
solution – toll ring around Kristiansand Centre – that released the new building. However, the 
externalities were not addressed and the consequences of the E18 planning and 
implementation are more accidents, more emissions and so on. These externalities will 
increase in the years to come. The social costs carried by the sufferers of accidents, emissions, 
noise, etc from the road and traffic is not compensated. The planners did not voice the 
interests of the sufferers, they only pushed the imple entation of the new road scheme. Why 
then have comprehensive or holistic public planning207 when the planners are not fully 
representing the public interest? 
 
The Sustainable City directly addressed the externalities of car use (accidents, emissions, 
sprawl, etc) and aimed at shifting persons from cars to public transport. This also matches the 
argument for planning. Some local planners worked har  to make the Sustainable City a 
success, but never addressed the shortcomings of the political system. At the national level 
MoE still carried on with the Sustainable City project even after it became clear that the MoT 
would not support the project strongly. On the loca level the old animosity from the 
                                                
207 I am not including project planning to build a road, etc. here.  
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municipality (both politicians and planners) towards the county seriously damaged the 
opportunity to continue the great success with increased public transport use. Within 
Kristiansand municipality the internal grievances btween the environment section and the 
technical department probably reduced the effectiveness of the Sustainable City project.  
 
Contribute to better information about long-term consequences. 
Klosterman argues that information of the long-term ffects of location decisions is needed to 
make adequately informed decisions. Planners possess unique professional expertise and 
instrumental rationality. In the E18 case, which went through a thorough environmental 
assessment (EIA), the long-term issues were virtually non-existent. Even if the Highway 
Agency by statute should evaluate if public transport alternatively could solve the planning 
problem "the need to build more road capacity”, this was not done. The E18 case is an 
example on how the planning system can be used to produce an intended result, but not an 
example on how information on the long-term effects of the project “enlightened” the 
decision makers or the public (possibly the concentration on the near future suited the 
politicians best?). Only the information that supported the E18 development was presented. 
There was no information about the effects of the new road capacity on traffic generation, the 
increase in the travel to work area and sprawl. Neither was the negative effects the new road 
would have on other modes public transport, cycling a d walking informed about, nor the 
increase it would cause in local and global emissions. The Sustainable City project was again 
very much concerned with long-term issues as the slogan “think globally, act locally” 
underlines. 
 
Contribute to fair distribution of goods. 
It is very likely that the distribution of costs and benefits from the E18 project is socially 
skewed as it is in most cities (more traffic injuries, more NOx related illnesses, etc. in the low 
income areas than in high income areas). The E18 project increases car use and adds to the 
long-term problems with oil resource depletion, climate change and so on. This inter-
generational redistribution is an example of the present car users in Kristiansand reap the 
benefits and ignore the global consequences. The Sustainable City on the other side focused 
within transportation on a modal shift towards bike, walk and public transport, and by that a 
redistribution of social costs and benefits. The Sustainable City project was an attempt to 
redistribute and change present policy to benefit future generations, and as such it provided a 
major challenge to the present partly car driven economic system.  
 
Summing up Klosterman and Kristiansand.  
Compared with the four Klosterman arguments, the E18 case shows a complex picture not 
readily fitting in with the arguments. Even if the planning framework and institutions in 
Norway to a high degree supports and follows his arguments, they did not function as 
intended with the E18 case in Kristiansand. Instead of providing a healthy and pleasant 
environment, the planning system facilitated and supported individual car use, which 
(marginally) threaten the global climate. Instead of reducing, diminishing and compensating 
the externalities of car use, the E18 planning has increased these. Instead of a planning that 
informed about the long-term consequences and proposed mitigating measures and 
alternatives, the long-term effects were played down and largely ignored. Instead of planning 
finding solutions, by which costs and benefits were distributed in a socially acceptable 
manner, the E18 planning only catered for what has been called “the automobility society” 
(Urry 2002). In short the E18 planning shows that even with the best intentions and a 
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“correct” planning system, the output from this planning caused the gap between 
environmentally sustainable transport and our unsustainable practice to increase. 
 
The Sustainable City on the other hand fitted well ith Klosterman’s arguments for planning, 
but it became a process with little impact. When interviewees were confronted with the lack 
of results and poor performance of the Sustainable City project the answers were firstly 
denial: the Sustainable City was a success, look at what we have achieved (clean river, sandy 
city beach, the Nupen park). OK, there are still some problems with public transport, but that 
is a county not a city responsibility. In the long-term the Sustainable City is necessary, but 
meanwhile we have to solve the congestion problem. The MoE embarked on the Sustainable 
City project without any baseline to evaluate the project against, neither did the MoE demand 
Before studies to be done in the five Sustainable City cities. One may wonder why the 
Ministry did not want to produce as much knowledge about the Sustainable City project as 
possible? My answer is that the politicians (and planners) are freer without too much 
knowledge and can then paint a nicer picture than ws actually the case. There are of course 
also planners at all levels that may find that little actual knowledge of a project may be an 
advantage.  
 
This lack of knowledge opens for biased and skewed information, which may be used to 
support projects like the Sustainable City and present it in a favorable light. The aid from 
communication advisers may further create a glorified picture of a case. The arguments for 
planning do not see planning as a struggle between different groups where the gain of one 
group is the loss of another. The power to make the E18 project a success was present, but not 
the power to make the Sustainable City achieve evensome partial goals. The Government 
could have made the Sustainable City achieve better than it did. Why the Government did not 
support the Sustainable City stronger, we will explore further.  
 
The ‘market versus government’ debate in planning has juxtaposed these as to opposing 
forces, but the reality is not so clear cut and more messy. Instead of describing a theoretical 
ideal as Klosterman did, another more fruitful approach could be to look at planning and 
development in a transaction cost perspective. I don’t believe that it is possible to turn the 
ideological shift towards market rule, hence for land use and transport planning it is important 
to safeguard what only planning can do. Integrated land use and transport planning may be 
necessary to make the turn towards environmentally sustainable transport development. 
Buitelaar for example claims that transaction costs economics is a more pragmatic approach 
that can be used to compare realistic alternative institutional arrangements208.  
 
4.9.7  Planning as an instrument in capitalistic production 
 
Scott and Roweis209 see planning as an instrument to increase capitalist c production. What 
seemingly was motivated in social and human objectiv s or reasons, was really motivated 
from the interests of increased and more effective production of goods and services. City 
planning was introduced when the negative effects of production (inner city squalor in the 
middle and late eighteen hundred) became so great that hey threatened to undermine 
                                                
208 Buitelaar, Edwin. (2007): The cost of land use decisions. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.  
209 Scott, A.J. and Roweis, S.T.(1977): “Urban planning theory and practice: a reappraisal.” Environment and 
Planning A. Vol.9, pp. 1097-1119. 
 
 140 
production. They also show by examples that planning has had limited effects and often create 
consequences that lead to more planning. The recent upsurge in city planning looking at cities 
as “engines in development” may be such an example.210 
 
In an evaluation of transport planning in the ten biggest cities in Norway (TP10), the Scott 
and Roweis arguments were contrasted: “TP10 does not distinguish from the characteristics 
Scott and Roweis give planning in general. It is still the same actors in TP10, who has not 
been able to produce plans with different values than earlier transport planning. If we put in 
environment where Scott and Roweis focus on underprivileged classes, then the same can be 
said about the TP10 process. TP10 can be judged as a maneuver where “noble” goals and a 
somewhat greater concern for the environment are used to maintain the road sector’s 
traditional production system.”211  
 
This is similar to the Kristiansand case, which shows how the ”noble” goals of the Sustainable 
City with a strong focus on improving the environment and to facilitate change away from a 
car dependent city development, was used to maintain the road sector’s traditional production 
system. In addition it strengthened the role of the road sector in the municipal planning and 
thus shifted power from the elected representatives at the local level to employed road 
planners at the regional/state level. The land use and transport development generated from 
the implementation of these plans embed the car as the main mode and further increase the car 
dependency in the Kristiansand region for the next d cades. As Scott and Roweis pointed out 
the demand for more planning is created. Politicians interested in positions and planners 
interested in seeing physical results as new roads, flock to car transport production system and 
the present (car) planning ideology. To change the course of development, it is necessary to 
change the complete social system, according to Scott and Roweis. In the light of 
Kristiansand’s attempt to change the course towards environmentally sustainable transport 
one may ask if sustainable development at all is possible.  
 
4.9.8 The plan law, national framework and the Ministry’s role 
 
The Ministry of Environment (MoE) administer the Norwegian Planning and Building Act 
(pbl) and should see to that the law is applied according to the law maker’s wishes. The 
Parliament has repeatedly stated “the pbl and the municipal strategic planning 
(Kommuneplan, with its two parts: social and land use) must actively be used to secure a 
sustainable development”212. To find out what happen in practice the Auditor General213 has 
evaluated the present planning practice and assessed: To what extent is the municipal 
planning system used so that the aim of sustainable dev lopment can be achieved? The report 
shows that municipalities in general are not producing and reviewing the Kommuneplan so 
that a comprehensive and long-term land use is secured. The social part of Kommuneplan is 
not used as an instrument in land use planning. It is also a challenge for many municipalities 
                                                
210 ”The Big Cities as engines in development” is the new slogan in 2003 (St.meld.nr. 46 (2002-2003) 
Storbymeldingen) 
211 Synnøve Lyssand Larsen and Per Gunnar Røe, Fra idealmodell til virkelighet. NIBR  
212 St.meld nr. 31 (1992-1993) Den regional planlegginen og arealpolitikken, St.meld nr. 29 (1996-97) Regional 
planlegging og arealpolitikk, St.meld nr. 23 (2000-2001) Om bedre miljø i byer og tettsteder.  
213 Office of the Auditor General Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av bærekraftig arealplanlegging og 
arealdisponering I Norge. Dokument nr. 3:11 (2006-2007) 
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to see the social and economic planning in the context of land use planning. The evaluation 
also shows that private interests and ad hoc plans increasingly dominate the municipal land 
use planning214.  
 
The land use development in cities does not contribute to sustainable development, because 
prudent land use has to a limited extent been promoted so that the aims can be achieved, and 
pollution and climate gas emissions have increased. On municipal land use planning the 
evaluation states: 
• Many municipalities do not produce comprehensive land use plans and also produce 
local land use plans contradicting national aims. 
• Plans are decided and dispensations are given in conflict with the municipal 
comprehensive plan. 
• Illegal building continues. 
• MoE has the overall responsibility for making the municipalities able to fulfil their 
tasks. The municipalities have a large need for knowledge. 
• National framework must be clarified and simpler guidelines used for regional and 
local administration.  
• Innsigelse (objection) to plans and the appeal of decisions should be used more. 
 
The audit points to serious shortcomings in the Ministry’s and the Government’s management 
of the planning act, which fits well with the result  from Kristiansand: the land use and 
transport policy is faulty on coordination and integration at all levels, there is a lack of 
monitoring and hence knowledge, the national effort on sustainable land use planning and 
allocation has been weak, and short term unsustainable development has priority.  
 
Another study of open space in the four big cities in Norway shows that the steering of land 
use planning on the municipality level serves the developers’ interests. The common interests 
are not adequately taken care of by the municipalites and the Guidelines for children’s rights 
are violated. The study215 of open space in 27 new housing projects in Trondheim, Bergen, 
Stavanger and Kristiansand show that only three wer “good”. The main faults were bad/non-
existing connections with the surrounding city, dark nd too small playgrounds, and poor 
design and placing of the open space areas. The evaluators concludes with a normative 
advice: “The municipality being in charge should if it wants to reach the goals of good 
housing and good housing estates, set in actions to safeguard good open space in cities.” 
This is another example of the market turn in cities, happening because of the elected building 
committees are putting private interests in front of common interests. The building boom216 in 
Norwegian cities the recent years has according to the study created “dorm-cities within the 
city” with poor connections and open spaces with poor “sun and light conditions”. It is like 
reading about the big cities in the 1880s. The municipality role as watchdog of development 
and using development control to safeguard good open s ace in cities has been set aside to the 
role of facilitating development.  
 
                                                
214 72% private local plans( reguleringsplaner) 
215 Guttu, Jon  & Lene Schmidt (2007): Uterom i den tette byen. Eksempler fra nye byboligprosjekter. NIBR 
216 The upsurge in the building small flats in the city entres of all the biggest cities in Norway Kristiansand 
included, has partly been driven by creative financing (subprime loans) and pushing the true costs to he young 
buyers into the future.  
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Conclusion 
Both these national studies fit well with the findigs of this case study of Kristiansand. The 
lack of an effective national policy on sustainable development and hence institutions not 
designed to achieve sustainable development, has opened up for the cities to pursue a growth 
policy. With liberal/right local authority majority as Kristiansand has had for decades, then 
the development control instrument will hardly ever b  used to prevent a project. Even to put 
an “extra cost” on a private development to secure “good open space” is as the above study 
reveals, not done.  
 
There is also learning from the development control p actice. One is the way Kristiansand 
uses “diminutive” local plans for a building site (r guleringsplan Kasernen) within the 
adopted local plan (Murbyplanen), another is the use of Innsigelse (objection). In both these 
issues there seems to be a self-reinforcing or positive feedback process in the political system. 
The use of “diminutive” local plans has been effective in getting controversial development 
projects through, and when the municipality gets away ith such a practice without objections 
from other authorities this practice is reinforced. Innsigelse is an instrument to be used to 
safeguard national or common interests as expressed in national guidelines, in the local 
planning. The local practice of this instrument is al o a learning process on how to use it 
according to the objectives pursued. If the instrument is used in a haphazard way over the 
years, the self-reinforcing effects will be that the instrument will continue to be used 
haphazardly when the national framework allows this to happen. The Auditor proposes that 
Innsigelse to plans and the appeal of decisions should be used more, an advice that follows 
the synoptic perspective, not reflecting of the causes why the innsigelse is used in a haphazard 
way. 
 
These two learning processes point at both the lack of a consistent national framework and the 
need for subsidiarity. The municipality pursues a growth policy that is contrary to the 
municipality’s own aims for sustainable development a d indeed the national aims of 
sustainable development. Furthermore it is against the spirit of the planning act and against 
the national guidelines. Why is there not a more consistent national framework and why is it 
not applied consistently? Which interests prevent tha ? Are our dependence on the car to 
perform our daily chores, and the oil industry and our dependency on the oil exports perhaps 
the strongest hindrances to an effective sustainable development policy?  
 
One perspective on local democracy, local politics and politicians sees local politicians as 
rational actors within a framework of institutions created by the national state. How would 
such a politician act if he asks himself: How to maximize benefits for my city in a fragmented 
world? Firstly the problem of providing surplus of housing and the complaints from business 
that the municipality hamper developments, lead to a more flexible use of development 
control. With a liberal/right majority the municipality tends to use land use planning to secure 
ample supply of building land. Transport infrastrucure – roads – is seen as a utility not as an 
instrument to balance land use. Pieces are then falli g together: the Sustainable City fails 
because of very few local benefits at least in the s ort-term, while the E18 toll road wins 
because of great local benefits. Public transport is a “county responsibility” and the county 
can hence be used as a scapegoat, which fits in with history. Agreement on visions and goals 
can be strategic because disagreement will be political ncorrect and damaging to the 
politician’s career. The performance of actors willbe differentiated according to agendas and 
space and time. Structure defines frames, but players do act differently with different results. 
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The society should not (cannot) rely on clever politicians managing to beat the system, 
therefore the system must change, i.e. institutions and structure must change. How to change 
institutions and structure? I point to the principle of subsidiarity and a national framework 
with incentives to make the actors work to obtain the national goals. That will be a 
tremendous improvement in accountability and transprency, but won’t solve all land use and 
transport issues in a democracy because the voters may elect/choose to stay unsustainable, 
and still the power interests will try to influence processes within the framework and 
influence local solutions.  
 
4.9.9 The lost opportunities 
 
The opportunities are “lost” in the meaning that alternatives ought to have been discussed 
when the plans for the area was decided, especially the formal detailed local plan 
(reguleringsplan). As mentioned above the Kommuneplan has changed from being 
instrumental to more and more descriptive of the future, and accordingly the instrumental side 
has vanished. The local plan (reguleringsplan) was formerly the instrument that decided the 
design of a development. This instrument has been further sharpened so that the City Council 
can decide when a development can be implemented over time and set requirements for 
implementation. However, on the other side the Cityouncil practice has over the years been 
influenced by the ideas of deregulation and privatizing. Some years back the municipality 
made most local plans (reguleringsplan) itself. That has changed to most such plans being 
made by private firms these days. The incremental or d hoc decision-making the City 
Council practices, make planning lose credibility and predictability. One could expect that 
sustainable development as an issue would be mention d in the local plans, but one can hardly 
find traces of that. Some would say that it is a lost opportunity not to reduce the amount of 
land for development by transferring it to land notfor development (LNF område). Judging 
from my interviews such a transformation would be thought “unthinkable” or “absurd” and is 
accordingly not included as a “lost opportunity”. More difficult is the tradition of using the 
planning legislation to support a “bit for bit” planning. In order to get a project decided 
contrary to the existing comprehensive plan, a new plan (reguleringsplan) is made for one 
particular site. “Murbyplanen” covers the area destroyed by the fire in 1892 and was intended 
to protect the city that rose after the fire. The plan was worked out with extensive 
consultations and aimed to protect this valuable heritage. Recently a developer wanted to 
develop a property (Kasernen) contrary to the plan. The municipality creatively facilitated 
that, not by changing the plan, but by making a newplan for that particular property. A 
peculiar way to plan one may say, it is contrary to the planning act that wants to see things in 
a context, the very raison d’etre for planning. Still the Council adopted the “diminutive” plan.  
 
How far this disintegration of the former land use and transport planning and decision system 
has come can be discussed. In an editorial the presnt City Council attitudes and decision-
making practice on local plans (reguleringsplan) was thus described: “The elected councilors 
have several times earlier shown that existing local pl n statutory requirements 
(reguleringsplanbestemmelser) are not in any way are holy when the will to do something else 
is strong enough. The last example came a week ago. When the majority decided to expand 
Kasernen, the existing statutory requirements were of no hindrance.”217 The pattern emerging 
from investigating land use and transport planning in Kristiansand is that both planning 
                                                
217 Fædrelandsvennen, editorial 01 02 08.  
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practice and the instruments Kommuneplan and Reguleringsplan have been continually 
changing and adapting to outside forces. Kristiansand has lost the leading edge on housing, on 
walking and on cycling, on shoreline preservation, and on integrated land use and transport 
planning. The gap between the goals and the policy utcome on the ground has become large 
and is increasing, to mention a few examples: traffic ccidents, building of cottages along the 
coastline, the CO2 emissions and climate challenge, local emissions from cars (NOx, particles, 
etc.), traffic noise and the role of public transport.  
 
All these represent long standing and remaining planning challenges. By looking back on the 
causes for these failures we pose the question if the opportunities for another policy were 
there at the time and if another trajectory could have been created in Kristiansand? In the 
following list of cases, instruments for car reduction should (according to the sustainability 
goals adopted) have been discussed, but they were not:  
 
Car free Gimlemoen University campus 
Car free city developments, Kvadraturen, Tangen, Odderøya 
Car free Concert Hall 
Sustainable municipal travel 
Work trips and trips during the day 
Politicians and employees lead the way 
Parking at public buildings 
Bike Walking policy, a question of priority 
Public Transport policy, it costs 
Mobility management, car sharing and alternative fuels 
 
It was possible for the planners in all these cases to suggest different ways to solve the tasks, 
but such alternative ideas were never proposed (again  practice far from the normative 
synoptic model for planning).  
 
Car free Gimlemoen University campus? 
An example of an alternative design for the Gimlemon Campus could have been a Car Free 
Campus. It was taken for granted that the new Univers ty campus should have cars as the 
main mode for students and teachers. It was therefor  designed with about 700 parking 
spaces. Land value only for these places amount to 35 million NOK in the present market. 
Once they are established, it is far more difficult to remove them only because the 
Municipality and University are aiming for some sustainable goals. If on the other hand the 
“Sustainable City” Kristiansand had made clear before the architectural competition that the 
aim was a Car Free Campus, it would have been realized as such. But no such signals came, 
even through this was a very hot issue in the professional discussions at that time. Imagine 
how proud our descendents might be if “Kristiansand made UiA at Gimlemoen a Car Free 
Campus already in 2000”. 
 
Car free city developments: Kvadraturen, Tangen, Odderøya? 
Kristiansand City Centre is undergoing very rapid growth, both within the existing 54 blocks 
and adjacent brown-fields and regeneration areas. Thi  development could have been steered 
in detail by using the planning law instruments local plan statutory requirements 
(reguleringsplanbestemmelser). In addition the municipality owned directly or indirectly 
(through the public port) the land for much of these developments. However the City Council 
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did not want to use such traditional instruments and set a framework for the coming 
developments. Instead it transferred ownership to limited companies and let different public 
private partnerships develop the areas, which removd the developments from public insight 
and the politicians from being directly responsible. The City Council could take a laid-back 
position and claim that it was in charge.218  
 
Car free Concert Hall 
Another example where it still (early 2008) is not too late to change course towards more 
environmentally friendly transport, is the Concert Hall Kilden, which is being planned. Three 
different (concert) halls with seating for about 2000 persons will be built. The audience 
together with performers and the necessary staff will be the maximum number of persons 
using the building at the same time. It will have 400 parking places at a cost of 50-60 million 
NOK to cater for this demand. The location of Kilden is close to Kvadraturen and can thus be 
served without parking spaces for the public, as mot other such buildings in cities do. The 
planning authorities/politicians could have limited the number of parking places to the 
number needed for it to function, as the parking guidelines have no provision for such special 
buildings, but the City Council sustainable development aims were not influencing the 
decision to approve the building plan. The threatening Climate Change causing the aims set, 
seem to bear no influence on the planners and decision makers in practice.219  
 
Sustainable municipal travel? 
Sustainable municipal travel is here used in the meaning that the politicians and the 
employees behave according to the principles of sustainable travel in their municipal role. 
When the politicians set aims and make rules for the public without going in front as good 
examples, it can hardly be expected that the public follow these rules voluntarily. Most policy 
successes have used both the whip and the carrot. An example in Kristiansand is the parking 
office that markets itself as environmentally friendly and “We are here for you” meaning that 
it eases the traffic. When the parking company SUV with two people then drive around in 
Kvadraturen on a Sunday morning, the image the company tries to build is tarred. One could 
for example expect that elected politicians who set th  aims follow these in their political 
practice, and shift from the car to public transport and walking and cycling. The Sustainable 
City Kristiansand could have demanded that all employees walk and cycle for short trips and 
provided electric cars for all long trips during work. Ideas like these are ridiculed or met with 
silence because they affect individual lifestyles and economy, but if politicians want to be 
trusted by the public, they should either lower the goals they set or show as leaders that they 
live as they preach. 
 
Bike and Walking policy, a question of priority 
The experiences in Kristiansand from the seventies show that a bike and walking network 
could be developed within the existing budgets. Thecosts of developing a balanced transport 
system in Kristiansand could therefore continuously have been covered within the total yearly 
budgets over the years. In the eighties investment in the bike and walking network was 
gradually reduced. The main cause of this was the lack of money for investment in roads or 
under-investment in relation to the demand. Together with unclear responsibilities of who 
should cover the costs for cycle paths along different types of roads and also different 
                                                
218 The questions of accountability and increasing distrust in politicians seem to be of little concern.  
219 A similar discussion has been going on in Copenhagen about parking at the Opera. Ironically the opponents 
of parking at the Copenhagen Opera, use the Opera in Oslo as a good example of very limited parking! 
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budgets, the cycling effort stopped. The opportunities were there to continue cooperation 
between the different authorities and finance the city bike and walking network as part of a 
comprehensive package, but the sector politicians did not prioritize that.  
 
Public Transport policy, it costs 
Public transport has for years had a prominent place in the political rhetoric, but not in 
practical politics. Even if the municipality was adamant not to use money on public transport 
the room for alternative solutions was not explored or utilized, in particular with regards to 
the case for using transport planning (parking and ccess for the different modes) to support 
land use planning instead of only providing for thecar.  
 
Mobility management, car sharing and alternative fuls 
Although the municipality has had some limited demonstration projects on alternative fuels, 
car sharing (kameratkjøring) and cycling, these efforts have never been part of a broad policy. 
The potential of an integrated land use and transport policy developed in cooperation with the 
public and business community has not been tested out.  
 
Summing up the discussion on ”the lost opportunities”. 
What I have called “lost opportunities” are ideas discussed in the planning literature for years 
and being tested out several places. The puzzling th is that even if delegates have been 
abroad and seen successful schemes, such schemes are not p oposed in Kristiansand. This is 
in stark contrast to the legacy of planning in the city with updated planners like Erik Lorange 
and Yngvar Johnsen trying out new ideas. What has happened to the planners’ innovative and 
entrepreneurial skills? The new opera in Oslo has opened without parking, while in 
Kristiansand it is not even proposed by the planners that the concert hall Kilden should be 
built without parking for the public, which they should be obliged to propose according to the 
Kommuneplan. Nor do the political parties flagging sustainable development discuss such a 
proposal. All the cases discussed under the heading lost opportunities would in a “normal” 
planning process have been alternatives, but not in Kristiansand? Why? One explanation is 
that politicians wanting the market to rule have sidelined the planners and planning by 
dividing both tasks and personnel (e.g. KNAS see ch. 4.8.6). Planners then are kept busy with 
statutory control of plan and building permits.  
 
4.9.10 Future challenges and tasks? 
 
The Road Building Path continues with the objective to solve the RV456, which has serious 
congestion problems and is the main road for one third of the city population. The city is 
vulnerable if something happens to this road, the tim loss and costs will be high and far-
reaching. The road is therefore high priority in the city, county and the ATP committee. 
However, the RV456 can hardly be said to be in a natio l interest, so why should central 
authorities finance it?  
 
On all the key land use and transport indicators the gap has increased between the goals and 
the results on the ground. The politicians soon abolished the densification process started in 
the Sustainable City project, because the general effect of the policy was that the house prices 
increased and made it more difficult for young peopl  to enter the market. Even the famous 
BusMetro has not managed to attract people from cars to any noticeable extent. Non-
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motorized transport plays a less important role than ten years ago and the future for public 
transport, cycling and walking seem to a be declining role. The city’s expansion outwards 
continues and the same is the case for commuting.  
 
The land use change and the building in Kvadraturen is u precedented. The population has 
increased by 19% to nearly 6000 in twelve years and will increase further when the many 
hundred flats planned come on the market. However, with the increase in square meters of 
floor space there is an “automatic” increase in the number of parking spaces. Several thousand 
new parking places are planned/proposed (Kilden 400, Torvet 1000, Tangen 1500, NSB-
tomta 1500, Odderøya 1000 and from regeneration 1500?). This increase in the number of 
parking spaces from the present about 8500 places will of course increase the car traffic to 
and from the city centre, but there are no adopted lans showing how the city centre will cope 
with this increase. Kvadraturen has only three access points, of which public transport uses 
two. In these two junctions with heavy traffic there will be an increasing need to prioritize 
public transport, otherwise the public transport system will either collapse or the running-
costs will skyrocket. The third point on transport in Kvadraturen is that the present national 
roads (Vestre Strandgate and Dronningens gate) probably will be downgraded to county 
roads.220 Hence, the municipality and possibly the county will be sole responsible to finance 
the solution of the increased traffic demand in Kvadraturen. The consequences of the present 
shortsighted market liberalist land use and transport policy will gradually show up as 
congestion and hit all citizens. The property owners and developers reap the huge profits and 
the politicians responsible are not accountable221. 
 
Lack of knowledge seems to be an advantage judged by the case history. It then becomes 
possible to present preferred alternatives, achievem nts and proposals in a very favorable light 
(inflated increase in cycling and bus patronage, BusMetro success, ATP success). “Strategic 
misrepresentation” as in the applications for reward money has advantages towards ministries 
where “Lip service pays” (Strand and Moen, 2000).  
 
Summing up:  
• More complex governance structures increases the democratic deficit. 
• More Public Private Partnerships where the role of public planners becomes a provider 
for “getting projects funded and built”.  
• Land use and transport planning is becoming more market led and governed by the 
money available for projects, causing the planning act rules and the planning code of 
conduct to be more flexibly adapted.  
• More accountability is necessary judged from basic democratic principles, but the 
power to change lies within higher authorities.  
 
In Norway it seems to take some years before the long awaited radical reform of the public 
sector will come. Hence, focus should be put on achieving minor changes as for example to 
shift the responsibility for public transport service and infrastructure to the Highway Agency. 
                                                
220 Høringsnotat: Forvaltningsreformen - forslag til nye oppgaver til det folkevalgte regionale nivået.  
221 The opportunity to put a levy on new buildings in Kvadraturen to pay such external costs will be increasingly 
difficult, because of the precedence the present policies are setting.  
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The responsibility for funding and building the BikeWalk net in cities should also together 
with public transport be transferred to the Highway Agency.222  
 
The challenge for land use and transport planning in Kr stiansand and in Norway is to change 
the rules of the power play that governs planning ad project development. It is not enough to 
change organizations and national guidance. The institutional structure and the incentive 
system must be changed with a focus on accountability, transparency and good governance.  
 
4.10 Main conclusions from Kristiansand.  
In this section the main conclusions from the case study of Kristiansand are summed up. It 
starts with some of the salient facts and trends. Then the main conclusions are collected under 
three themes before I draw what I think are the important lessons from Kristiansand. The 
results from the Kristiansand study are presented un er the following headings:  
• Still on an unsustainable trend 
• Land use and transport planning is undergoing great changes 
• The fragmentation of land use and transport instruments creates barriers 
• Knowledge, competence and capacity.  
• Lessons from land use and transport planning in Kristiansand.  
 
4.10.1 Still on an unsustainable trend – the facts and trends  
 
The indicators on land use and transport development ar  all negative in the sense that 
Kristiansand is becoming continually less sustainable. Chapter 4.3 gives an overview of the 
facts and trends for Kristiansand urban area, here are a few of the main indicators:  
 
• Public transport continues to increase, but the number of public transport users was 
still in 2005 lower than in 1995.223 
• The CO2 emissions from road traffic was 145 000 tons in 2006, more than ever 
before224. The increase from 1991 was 27.3% and far above the national goal.  
• The main road network (national roads) increased by 13 km and municipal roads by 
21 km between 2000 and 2006, while the bike-walking network was constant at 89 
km, which shows that this net had very low priority.225  
• The land consumption increased by 1.32 km2 or 4 % between 2005 and 2007 mainly 
due to an upsurge in new buildings of all kinds. 
• The amount of transport measured as vehicle kilometer traveled increased by 12% to 
420 million VKT in four years (3% per year).  
• The car traffic on the trunk road E18 Varoddbrua increased by more than three percent 
per year the last decade. 
 
                                                
222 The Highway Agency should of course also change name, for example to National Environmentally 
Sustainable Transport Authority.  
223 Ordinary paying passengers, school children excluded.  
224 http://www.ssb.no/emner/01/04/10/klimagassr/  
225 EV og RV has increased with 13 km to 122 km from 2000 to 2006, KV increased with 21 km to 373, while 
FV (82km) and GS have been constant (89km).  
 
 149 
Has this been an intended development? Is it a result of the land use and transport policy that 
has been practiced? Or is it so that the overarching aim is growth/employment, and that this 
development is the answer of the R alpolitik? The gap between the policy aims and policy 
results has increased during the last ten-fifteen years. It questions whether the aims for land 
use and transport policy shall be taken seriously as the instrument steering a plan-led system, 
or if the aims are only adopted for symbolic reasons. How can this development be explained? 
What has promoted and what has hindered this development?  
 
4.10.2 Land use and transport planning is sidelined? 
 
Three forces are said to be changing the context of spatial planning in Europe (Healey et al 
1997b). These forces have also impacted on land use and transport planning in Kristiansand. 
Internationalization has been changing the production relations making the city become much 
more ingrained in the global economy. Secondly, the combination of fiscal stress in the public 
sector and the leverage of new liberalism have led to new relationships between public and 
private sectors in land and property development. Lastly, the environment movement and a 
whole range of other lobby groups have forced stronger political attention on local spatial 
issues. In responding to these forces, the land use and transport planning has changed a lot the 
last decades and the change continues. The new public management ideology has had strong 
influence on how the politicians in Kristiansand have dapted and how they have changed 
land use and planning practice through use of plans, planning briefs, resources for and 
organization of planning. The environment movement rose rapidly after 1987, but it 
seemingly petered out around the millennium. Instead he road lobby took over the attention 
and even the bishop marched towards the Parliament demanding more money for roads. This 
section summarizes how the land use and transport planning in Kristiansand has responded to 
these forces.  
 
The tradition in Norway is that all powers lie in the centralized state (enhetsstaten) with the 
municipalities as local implementer of the state’s policy. However, in Norway there has been 
a strong local counter force against the centralized power in Oslo (and before 1814 
Copenhagen) expressed in the legislation as an act from 1837 (Formannskapsloven) giving 
powers to the municipality. These two forces are still alive226 and are expressed in how 
Kristiansand has been adapting to the new liberalism and the new public management ideals. 
There are two major dimensions in the municipal role:  
a) The service provider and producer, which is a continual fight to keep standards 
since demand for services outstrip service supply (eldrebølgen), and hence give 
limited freedom for political decision-making.  
b) The view of the city as an engine for development, which is no longer blueprint 
planning, but strategic maneuvering in which the politicians take and form the role as 
agents for development. Incentives become important for action and so do the 
politicians’ views on reality and effects of the global competition.  
 
The first dimension sees the municipality as an imple enter of national policy, and casts the 
politician into the role as service provider, which s strongly limited by legislation and 
national budgets and many politicians see this role as administering “cuts”. The other 
dimension sees the city as an engine in development, which fits within the autonomous role of 
                                                
226 The present discussion on local government reform in Norway is an example.  
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the municipality. Land use and transport planning ad development are central in this 
dimension, which attracts the “power-broker” and the “doer-type” of politicians. Local 
politicians are integrated in national political parties framing their stand on local issues. The 
majority of the politicians interviewed were concern d with future employment/business 
growth, how to strengthen the city in the global competition, etc. The aim of the politicians 
judging from the interviews was: what is the best I can do for the municipality within my 
framework? They had the future Knowledge society as an important perspective, and many 
pointed to the leverage the two funds Cultiva and Kompetansefondet would give the 
municipality.  
 
Following this argument land use and transport planning has become an important instrument 
in development to facilitate growth. The task of the land use and transport planning is to 
provide an ample supply of land for both business and housing development, and to improve 
the road transport infrastructure and to keep it without congestion. In addition to the general 
task of modernizing and make the city attractive, th  policy takes three directions:  
a) To acquire Government money and favors.  
b) To improve utilization of municipality’s own resources through land ownership, 
building and regulation of land use. 
c) To attract inward investment in the form of new business and public locations, the 
latter often in combination with closure of defense organizations.  
 
In the complex strategic game to support growth, obtain inward investment and develop the 
city, in which the city (politicians) participates and competes, the traditional tasks of land use 
and transport planning seem to be more and more sideline .  
 
4.10.3 The fragmentation of land use and transport planning creates 
barriers 
 
Globalization forces rapid changes both at the natio l and local levels, which open up for 
politicians and planners to adapt to new realities and react, but the legislation lags behind the 
fast changes. National funds for transport are limited and the competition (e.g. between 
schools, old folks homes, public transport subsidy, financing of infrastructure especially 
transport) force changes at the local level. Several of the issues discussed above were related 
to acquiring government money and favors: E18, E39, the Sustainable City, the ATP project 
and the BusMetro. They were at the same time also issues that would improve the daily life 
for the citizens and they could be used in city marketing like this slogan: “Settle in the 
Sustainable City Kristiansand”. Having been Sustainable City is a valuable fact tha will last 
for years, no matter what the assessment of that project. These complex relationships require 
horizontal coordination at the national and at the local level, and reciprocal vertical interaction 
between the levels to be effective. The democratic deficit is increasing with increasing 
fragmentation, but of little concern for local politic ans that act within the rules the national 
government has laid down.  
 
Inconsistent national policies and lack of coordinat on.  
At the national level there is a need for greater collaboration between ministries, and between 
ministries and agencies. Many barriers are arising from inconsistent policies on CO2 
abatement, public transport, road safety and accessibility. Ambiguous messages from the state 
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are sent out, for example about the treatment of CO2 emissions. The industry emissions in 
Kristiansand are large, used as an explanation of the label CO2 villain put on the city. Why 
then reduce car use? Or why struggle to reduce car missions when airplanes are exempted, as 
one informer asked: “I travel twice a year on holidays with plane for long distances, and in 
business 30-40 times yearly to the capital, plus other places. Why should I reduce how much I 
drive my car locally? It does not make any sense!” There are several examples of 
uncoordinated use of measures as the treatment of CO2 emissions from cars and planes, and 
these means are not used to their full potential. The national statutory guidelines for 
coordinated land use and transport from 1993 were adopted without effective measures to 
follow the effect and are much less sharp than proposed227. The delivery of integrated land use 
and transport planning will without high-level coordination rest on cities. Failures have been 
identified on the lack of implementation of environmentally sustainable transport goals, which 
were caused by the successes of the road projects. Another set of failures of transport policy 
were the attempts of mode shift and environmentally sustainable transport. Such failures are 
likely to be repeated without coordinated state instruments and more vertical guidance. CO2 
abatement takes place in Norway by a levy on fuel, th  source of the car emissions, but the 
effects of the policy on the amount of travel is not apparent and hardly noticeable as different 
from the fiscal levy put on the same fuel.  
 
Regional and local levels 
On regional and local levels a similar coordination is eeded between transport and land use. 
Moreover the transport impacts of policies on health, education and social inclusion, and the 
potential contributions of transport to those policies, need to be fully integrated into the 
overall strategy. The spatial and transport planning eed to be coordinated, which remains a 
remote objective for Kristiansand. Politicians, land use and transport planners have different 
aims, skills and knowledge, and even when policy and institutional structure are designed to 
promote interaction the lack of transparency leads to bias. Furthermore the task of integration 
has become more complex due to rapid changes, which may be used by active stakeholders to 
their own advantage.  
 
Land use and transport planning has tried to intervene with market forces even as the 
European Council of Ministers of Transport states that“Transport technology and transport 
costs have always been the key determinants of urban loc tion and form” (ECMT, 2006). 
With the growth ideology and market-led planning policy practiced in Kristiansand the later 
years, the former land use and transport policy has gr dually been abandoned.  
 
The explanation of the lack of integration and coordination, and the different policies pursued 
on national and local levels can be sought in what Brunsson calls the organization of 
hypocrisy: talk, decisions and action are the glue of society that can build compromise and 
consensus, but also be used for “log-rolling”, and strategic timing of information and actions 
(Brunsson 1989). Institutional barriers can be overcome or changed, but often these barriers 
have strong vested interests behind them and/or they are used to achieve other policy goals. 
Let me state an example of how barriers can also be used to support another policy (see ch. 
4.8). The Minister of Transport declined to support “Gratis Buss” because she couldn’t 
discriminate between cities. This was the time when t  government in a white paper 
                                                
227 Loktra 2000 page 73, Høyer 2002 page 194  
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recognized that public transport in cities needed special support. Later the same Ministry went 
on to introduce rewards to cities that wanted to support public transport, a system built on 
discrimination between the cities. The non-discrimination policy was an excuse used to “kill” 
the “Gratis Buss” proposal, not the real reason for rejecting it.  
 
4.10.4 Knowledge, competence and capacity. 
 
Planners should (must?) strive to be participatory and democratic, increase rationality and be 
open and communicative, but are they unable to do so because power rule? The research 
program LOKTRA made the following two statements on the planners’ role and 
competence228: “It must be the task of administrators and planners to make clear the 
relationship between goals and means, not conceal th  political choices that must be done.”  
and “For society to reach its ambitious aims for integrated land use and transport policy it is 
necessary to raise the professional competence considerably, both with regard to quality of 
the work, and the quantity of the skilled tasks required.”   
 
In Kristiansand we found an increasingly blurred distinction between planners and politicians. 
The municipality employs a limited number of planners, which are spread on several 
offices/organizations within the municipality. There is broad cooperation with the planners in 
the County and Highway Agency on the local level. Planners, administrators and politicians 
may use the organization to achieve the politically decided aims, the aims of each office and 
possible also the organization’s self-interest. Some planners were promoting certain goals 
with few openings for alternative ways forward. Looking at the past the planners in 
Kristiansand have had life-long tenure. Very few planners have therefore had influence on 
planning. Some politicians and some planners have hd far greater ability to implement their 
policy goals than others. With a more and more blurred distinction between planners and 
politicians, it might be a danger as LOKTRA warned that political choices are concealed. 
Another side of the politicians taking a more active part in planning is that the need for skilled 
professional competence seems to be disregarded.  
 
The dark side of planning is forecasting or the description of future problems and the wanted 
result. The planners are in charge of painting the picture of the future. It might be that the 
planners are biased in their selection of future problems and the description of these problems 
(for example that the road system will “collapse” due to future congestion). Some even talk of 
lying planners because: “Accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for getting 
projects funded and built. Indeed accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas 
biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for 
construction” (Wachs 1984, cited from Flyvbjerg 2008229) The question then becomes how to 
design checks and balances that would give planners and politicians the incentive to stop 
producing biased advice. My assessment of the planning practice in Kristiansand is that the 
former separated roles of planners and politicians are now overlapping. This role conflation is 
forcing the planners to present plan proposals, achievements and aims in a flattering light, 
another reason for bias may be that planners get personally involved in achieving a certain 
alternative. With the market turn, land use and transport planning as public planning in 
                                                
228 LOKTRA report 3, (2000) page 94 and page 14 
229 Flyvbjerg Bent, “Public Planning of mega-projects: overestimation of demand and underestimation of costs” 
in Priemus, H. et al (2008): “Decision-Making on Mega-Projects” Edward Elgar publishing  
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general, has become more strategic and short term, which has made it more difficult for public 
planners to be objective and follow the norms of the profession230.  
 
Newman and Kenworthy231 see the problem of land use and transport planning as a lack of a 
strong planning institution and advocates public participation: “The key problem seems to be 
the lack of a politically powerful and well-coordinated city planning system which could 
approve and implement the building of such transit i frastructure. The participation of the 
public is essential, particularly when the city becomes stuck in an inappropriate Western 
paradigm, as it has in cities like Bangkok.”  
 
Others like Pennington232 argue that the private market should be used more extensively to 
enhance planning: “The high information and monitoring costs that face electorates in all 
democracies and the resulting ‘rational ignorance’ of voters are likely to result in the capture 
of administrative systems by special interests and pro ucer lobbies. Where voters have little 
direct control over day-to-day performance of politicians and bureaucrats and where the 
costs of organizing large, diffuse constituencies of consumers are higher than those facing 
producer lobbies, the ‘outputs’ of the political process are unlikely to accord with the public 
interest.” He points out that planning has not been able to achieve the goals set and claims 
that green belts (as commuting) are the example of planning deficiencies: push development 
far out with high associated transport costs, private time costs and increased environmental 
pressures through emissions, land take, etc. These deficiencies are the same revealed in 
Kristiansand with outward sprawl and increasing car based commuting. There are also signs 
that special interests and producer lobbies are working closely with politicians and planners in 
land use and transport development. These trends of conflating the roles of politicians and 
planners often associated with a lack of transparency, represent a serious threat to local 
democracy. 
 
Klosterman (1985) argues that the use of public planning should be assessed by an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of planning compared to alternative ways to reach societal aims. The 
comparison of the two planning paths in Kristiansand reveals that the long-term collective 
interests have lost to the short-term demand for indiv dual car transport in the city. The 
planning system did not manage to confront the major long-term challenges of climate change 
and sustainable development. Rather than challenging the unsustainable course planning was 
used to promote such a course, and planning was at the same time used to present the picture 
of Kristiansand as a successful sustainable city. Public planning was instrumental in 
producing the car system, but did not manage to imple ent the goals of improving the 
environment or social inclusion. By pointing out serious democratic deficiencies in existing 
practice, I am not saying that an alternative model is better, only that the system should and 
must be improved if we want a more sustainable development. 
 
                                                
230 “A planner must strive to provide full, clear and accurate information on planning issues to citizens a d 
governmental decision-makers” Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, American Institute of Certified 
Planners. 
231 Newman Peter & Jeffery Kenworthy 1996 The land use-transport connection Land Use Policy, Vol. 13, No. 
1 pp. 1-22, 1996 
232 Pennington Mark, (2003): Land Use Planning: Public or Private choice? Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London June 2003. 
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4.11 Lessons from land use and transport planning in 
Kristiansand. 
 
Would the land use and transport history in Kristians nd have been different under other 
structures and other actions? The fragmented institutional structure or “the rules of the game” 
that force certain solutions and discard others, are seen as the main cause of the trajectory that 
was formed. To what extent did structure frame decisions, and what were the degrees of 
freedom for actors to make alternative decisions? How did planners’ and politicians’ actions, 
reactions and pro-actions influence the course of events? What had happened if the 
institutions had been different, and/or the actors had behaved differently? To learn from the 
past and draw lessons for the future I have reflected over these questions in order to answer: 
How should the institutions be changed to facilitate nother path of events?  
 
The reflections done to answer the above question are presented under the following 
headings:  
• Integrated land use and transport planning – the principle of subsidiarity. 
• The public transport authority.  
• Clinging to power. 
• Incentives and innovations. 
• From Government to Governance processes. 
 
Integrated land use and transport planning – the principle of subsidiarity. 
One unitary power over land use and transport has been the conceptual model in planning 
since Howard’s book233 on garden cities was published a hundred years ago. It is also fitting 
in with the principle of subsidiarity – a principle of placing decisions on the lowest competent 
level – that also has been adopted by the European Union. If Kristiansand had had complete 
powers over land use and transport planning (infrastructure development for all modes234), 
financing of infrastructure (tolls, congestion charges) and public transport services, then the 
past would probably been different, but how is unknow . What one might obtain by having 
one authority sole responsible for the land use and transport development of the city are 
several things. The city council would firstly be responsible and accountable for all land use 
and transport decisions. It would not be possible for politicians to vote for solutions they are 
against in principle and in their political programs, subsequently avoiding to take 
responsibility for the contrary decisions. Greater ccountability of councilors enhances 
democracy, an important result in itself. Secondly, the land use development had to be 
considered together with the transport development in planning and decision-making. The 
present unprecedented land use development in the city centre, which probably will create 
major traffic problems and threaten the vulnerable built heritage in Kristiansand, would 
probably not have been possible with a more accountable city council. Third, it should be 
expected that the aims of a balanced transport system where all modes are integrated, would 
have more effect. That would probably lead to more walk and bike paths, and better public 
transport services. What effect this proposition would have on parking policy is uncertain, 
since it would not include the control of parking on private property. The inertia in devolving 
                                                
233 Howard, E. (1898 reprinted 2003): TO-MORROW. A peaceful path to real reform. London: Routledge. 
234 Highway Agency would still own the trunk roads and submit plans for development of the trunk road to the 
municipality for approval as any other developer, but without mixing design and financing as of now.  
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powers from the state to the lower levels in Norway c n be explained with all the vested 
interests in maintaining status quo, which was recently confirmed by the decision of scrapping 
the regional reform and continue with the present counties in Norway.235  
 
The lesson is that integrated land use and transport lanning is not possible without 
changing the institutions and the way land use and transport planning and financing is 
organized. Environmentally sustainable transport development requires broad public 
support at the local level. The principle of subsidiarity should therefore guide the 
institutional change.  
 
The public transport authority. 
Through the years many research reports and indeed government white papers have pointed 
out the dysfunctional organization of the public transport authority in Norway. Some 
researchers even claim that it fits very well with those powers that want to increase car usage 
and at the same time not be taken to account for that development236. One solution could be to 
transfer the public transport authority from the county to the city. The present organizing with 
the county as responsible authority for public transport has, as described above, been 
cynically used in the political rhetoric to present the Kristiansand politicians as being positive 
to public transport, and blame the county as incompetent. Public transport is seen as one of 
the services the state has decentralized to the county and hence not a municipal task. 
Kristiansand as any other municipality is skeptical to take over responsibility for public 
transport in the municipality because it fears thatnot enough money to keep the service level, 
will follow from the Government. The city council would in case then have to administer and 
prioritize cuts in public transport services as it i  doing for schools, etc. It is therefore likely 
that the dysfunctional organization will last for years.  
To transfer the public transport authority to the Highway Agency could be an alternative way 
of obtaining the goal of integrating public transport with car transport. That would force the 
Highway Agency to discuss alternative transport soluti ns especially if public transport could 
reduce the car traffic demand sufficiently to postpne road building, as the statutory national 
guidelines requires. The already weakened county would l se a task and money with such an 
organization, and it may therefore not be a realistic suggestion. Public transport in 
Kristiansand will probably continue to be organized as present, and the cooperation between 
the stakeholders will decide the outcome. As long as there is no political willingness at any 
level to subsidize public transport substantially more than today, then the decline will 
continue.  
 
The lesson is that the present way of organizing and financing the road infrastructure 
and public transport service favors car transport to the detriment of the walking, 
cycling and public transport modes. It is not likely that the present organization can 
substantially improve public transport without changing some of the parameters 
governing the competition between the car and public transport modes. Public 
transport could be improved by substantially increas d funding, which must be 
“earmarked”. Another way to improve public transport is to change the organization 
of the road infrastructure system or of public transport or both, but that is not enough 
                                                
235 Minister of local authorities, M. Meltveit Kleppa, nnouncement, February 2008.  
236 Osland, O. and Kråkenes, T. (1999): Kollektivtransport og kollektive forpliktelser. Innspill til endringer i 
transportpolitikkens organisasjon i norske byområder. Rapport, Institutt for administrasjon og 
organisasjonsvitenskap, Universitetet i Bergen.  
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without increased subsidies (bus priority in traffic is taken as granted). For public 
transport to compete with the car in the medium sized cities it is necessary directly to 
prioritize the funds between these modes.  
 
Clinging to power 
The elected politicians are clinging to the power. Both the unitary land use and transport 
authority and the alternative organization of public transport discussed above, revolve around 
the devolution of powers. The pressure on government finance has forced the introduction of 
efficiency programs and cuts in public transport sevic s.237 The road investment program in 
the national transport plan proposal has been put at zero since all the funds are going into 
maintenance.238 However, this does not include the toll-financed projects. The result of this 
national transport policy is that the amount of money the Highway Agency receives continues 
to increase, while the public transport grant indirectly decided by the county, probably will be 
reduced. In Kristiansand the road system will continue to expand due to the toll financing the 
next twenty years or so, while the public transport se vices will continue to be financed by the 
users and the public subsidies channeled through the county. Public transport may get some of 
the income from tolls in the future, but hardly more than a small amount of the tolls. The 
probable effect on travel times and travel costs for car and public transport in Kristiansand 
will be a continuing and increasing advantage to the car.  
 
It is the Government and the Parliament that have the opportunity and power to change the 
organization and the funding systems in transport. Even if there has been wide professional 
agreement in transport research circles for several d cades that improvements are needed, 
nothing has been changed. The vested interests in the present system and status quo are very 
strong. The political system with MPs elected on a county basis, has made the rural and 
peripheral representatives very strong in relation to the urban spokesmen regarding the (road) 
transport policy and a neglect of urban transport has been a consequence: “A cynical attitude 
to major transport problems led to very poor solutions in the big cities.”239 This tradition of 
prioritizing the road investments to the rural areas and inter city transport is still very strong in 
Norway. Transport policy is a very sensitive political issue that can decide elections, if the 
policy is read as a concern for the petrol price and road investment. This can explain why 
Norway continues with such a dysfunctional transport system organization. With the major 
institutions within transport fixed, innovation is needed to facilitate changes.  
 
The lesson is that the “automobile policy” is very sensitive to the mood of the voters. 
Hence, governments are not risking to alter the established balance of power, because 
it might stir “things”. The fragmented institutional structure benefits politicians on all 
levels by making them unaccountable. The strategy to move towards the aim to reduce 
car traffic and shift to public transport should therefore be a) developed 
incrementally, b) developed in cooperation with the public and businesses, and c) 
specifically pointed to a certain area or type of jurney since full-scale 
implementation of the aim is unlikely. 
 
 
                                                
237 Public transport subsidies in Norway was reduced with more than one billion NOK through the efficiency 
program. (Strand & Moen, 2000:168) 
238 Forslag til NTP 2010-2019. 
239 Knutsen, S. ”Taler vegpolitikerne midt imot.” Våre Veger nr. 5, 2005. 
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Incentives and innovations. 
There have been many experiments and innovations in Kristiansand over the years as the 
Sustainable City, the public transport demonstration projects, BusMetro and the ATP project. 
The barriers to continue successes and the reasons for failures are interesting lessons. In 
general the locally initiated projects were more inve tive and successful than the national 
projects like the Sustainable City and the ongoing ATP project.  
 
The successes are a combination of local consensus, i fl ential partners at the national level 
and agreement with national policy agendas. Both the E18 and E39 cases started with bottom 
up processes in close cooperation with the central Highway Agency and were made to fit the 
national policy agenda not allowing new road projects unless the majority of finance came 
from local tolls. Both cases avoided the discourse on nvironmentally sustainable transport 
and the goal of mode shift from cars to public transport. The incentives were huge in these 
two cases. The roads open up land use opportunities and are by politicians thought to have an 
important economic growth effect locally.240 Incentives were aligned and positive for all, zero 
congestion gives faster travel, direct jobs for a few, increased income for firms, increased 
taxes due to higher incomes, etc. 
 
The Sustainable City and the ATP project were not designed to solve local problems, but 
designed to win a national project in competition with other cities. The measures to achieve 
the Sustainable City goals will be negative for many politicians, planners and the public. Shift 
from car to public transport will necessarily mean that many will have to change mode with 
negative cost, and benefits must be forsaken. The established power relations and growth 
interests together with “The car has come to stay” ideology undermined the Sustainable City, 
and they will probably make the ATP project, which s further limited by municipality 
borders, fruitless. The lessons I draw from these projects are that more could be obtained of 
results if broader participation of stakeholders had been achieved and the aims more realistic 
taking into account the local planning context and tra itions. The Sustainable City project 
discarded the unique public transport demonstration pr ject instead of integrating that into the 
project, which could have been done by the planners. The project design in both projects 
started from scratch, hardly showing any knowledge of the former experiences. Is it possible 
that MoE, which some claim has gradually been losing political support, saw these projects as 
an opportunity and the best way to keep the sustainable development discussion alive?  
 
The ATP project aims, among other objectives, “to reduce traffic growth and support the use 
of environmentally friendly transport modes by a better-coordinated land use and transport 
policy.”  This extremely ambitious objective entails less car use and more public transport by 
coordinating land use and transport policy. Translated that means that activities are to be 
located closer to each other to shorten the distance between them, which again mean that the 
distance between job and home and shops must be short r than today. In principle that entails 
a concentration of jobs and homes and shops to Kristiansand, and using the land use planning 
as an instrument to prevent new locations in the six other municipalities except for local jobs 
and homes. Unrealistic aims many will say241. Instead the ATP project should within the 
present constraints aim at creating innovative ways of using the land use and transport 
                                                
240 This is a controversial question, most transport economists disagree, see for example Engebretsen, Ø.; Lian, 
O. & Strand. S. (1998): Samferdsel og robuste bo- og arbeidsmarkedsregioner. TØI arbeidsdokument 
TR/0802/1998. Oslo: Transportøkonomisk institutt 
241 I don’t see merger of the municipalities into one large city municipality as probable for many years.  
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planning instruments to achieve public goals in a free housing market, across county and 
municipality borders.  
 
The lessons from these two top-down projects are that far more could be obtained by more 
careful project design and an incentive scheme. The incentive scheme should have made the 
projects more trustworthy and worthwhile for other stakeholders than local politicians to take 
part. Very few people are reducing their car use on m ral grounds, but their attitudes are 
central to achieve modal shifts. The first prerequisite for such a shift is that an acceptable 
alternative exists and secondly that the sacrifice and costs of not using the car bears a 
reasonable relation to what has been gained. Lastly, no one likes to be cheated. The 
consequences of the proposed/introduced measures must be seen as fair by the public, both 
regarding the allocation of costs and benefits, and also the spatial impact. With an incentive 
scheme and broader participation the Sustainable City project might have started mode shift 
demonstration projects. I believe that car reduction and mode shift strategies can only be 
implemented after broad public participation in Kristiansand because such strategies are very 
context dependent.242  
 
By incentives I mean resources that increase the probability of success so much that 
stakeholders contribute a bit extra to achieve the goals. That was not the case in the 
Sustainable City project, when the Government only ffered “peanuts” (see ch 4.5.2). But 
imagine if the Government had offered money to continue the public transport success, the 
project might then perhaps have achieved its goals? It i  likely that by identifying the obvious 
barriers for goal achievement an incentive scheme could have been designed to overcome 
these barriers. The government has ample tools to create push and pull effects in projects, and 
indeed experience in Kristiansand from such successful projects.243  
 
The lesson is that to implement national goals on the local level, it is necessary for the 
government to provide incentives that make it interesting and viable for politicians 
and people not only to take part in the project, but work hard towards implementing 
its goals (as they did in the road projects). The benefits for the city must be 
substantially greater than the disbenefits, since the local politicians’ risk lose their 
“seat”. The incentives should also be designed to create innovative solutions in each 
particular context.  
 
From Government to Governance processes. 
There is a strong shift from Government to Governance processes caused by the growth in the 
number of informal cooperative agreements and coaliti ns formed the later years. Let us take 
as an example the “Gratis buss” proposal and ask if another result might have been produced? 
If as in the E18 case a learning process had been started with both central and local 
participants getting to know each other and the problem, there might have been created 
consensus about both the importance of such a project and an agreement to test out “Gratis 
buss” in Kristiansand over a three-year period? Such “stakeholder planning” could possibly 
have released enough funds for a limited “Gratis buss” project to be realized, which could 
give valuable experience to the authorities on all three levels. The main incentive to get the 
                                                
242 Broad participation in land use and transport planning is much more likely if people get to decide issues by 
referendums or elections. The London congestion charging came as a direct election promise, and the Stockholm 
experiment was forced on the city after an election and a new government coalition.  
243 MIK was such a successful project introducing environmental policies in the local authority organization.  
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reluctant municipal politicians to support a test of “Gratis buss” would be sufficient 
Government money to run the test and also to pay for the cost of closing it if not successful. 
The later “Reward-project” has the same aims and instruments that could have been used in a 
test of “Gratis buss”, which indicates that this proposal was possible in 2001 if the Minister 
had wanted so.  
The lesson is that land use and transport planning mi ht become a “stranded whale” 
if it is not adapting to the new market liberalist world. The task is to find how land use 
and transport planning can be used to harness and bend the forces towards more 
sustainable development.  
 
Summing up. 
 
In several of the successes and failures there seemto have been very small things that could 
have been changed and altered the projects paths and results. More knowledge based and 
broader competence in project design with a focus on innovation and incentives could be 
fruitful.  
 
Stakeholder involvement is essential to develop broad policies when wide public changes in 
behavior are required. An obvious start for such an experiment could be UiA. How far in 
modal change is it possible to come by a process between students, staff, administration and 
other stakeholders? To get support and agreement abou  policy change it is necessary to 
develop the strategy in increments and take small steps. Another experiment to be pursued 
could be car share clubs and business travel plans. Such experiments raise questions of 
trustworthiness of policies and confidence in the leaders propagating the policy if they are not 
actively taking part. It is especially important tha  leaders are true role models for sustainable 
transport policies and not placed as hypocrites.   
 
There seem to be no way back, the shift towards more G vernance is likely to continue. The 
complexity will increase and by that the power relations, which open for further unsustainable 
development.  
 
The overall lesson is that there is an urgent need to make the governance processes 
more transparent and the politicians accountable. There is also a need to clarify both 
the role of land use and transport planning and of planners in such processes.  
 
Epilogue Kristtiansand case 
Complex global economies induce rapid changes at the local city level, changes that are acted 
and reacted upon with varying means and intensity. Complex games results, with new and old 
actors in different coalitions taking part under open and disclosed agendas, aims and 
expectations. The main result from the study of Kristiansand is that the state has built 
fragmented institutions that are not able to deliver an integrated land use and transport 
development in urban areas. Contrary to the goals of environmentally sustainable transport 
development the national policy has been and is a policy of building an increasingly car 
dependent society. In Kristiansand the politicians d planners have reacted on the 
fragmented institutions with skill and developed a more and more car dependent land use and 
transport system that serve the majority of the population very well, but make the 
development of the urban area increasingly unsustainable.  
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Annex I – Kristiansand case  
Short list for standard comparison of the case cities – Kristiansand 
 
 
 Kristiansand 
Background After several years with slow growth, the population has grown 1% per year last decade. 
Appointed by MoE to SUSTAINABLE CITY 1993/2000. 
Toll Roads finance major Highways E18 & E39. ATP project aims at make LU&T 
planning and financing more integrated. Bursting of confidence 2005! 
Note: BusMetro direct descendent of Sust city and TP10.  
Special LU&T 
 
 
SC goals fail. PT  and BW post less than when project started, contrary to goals 
E18 road infrastructure built – select information/effectiveness.  
E39 plan and finance by Tolls, finial decision locally 16.02.05. Contested, MoE decide 
tunnel alt. 2006. Contradiction between car culture and SC. Festival planning mask 
reality? Car commuting and sprawl increases. Job creation seen as the major task.  
Land Use 
 
LU planning has secured great reserves of building la d within municipality (>30 years). 
Big or little influence of LU on transport development. Commuting and regional LU are 
changing rapidly. Weak/fragmented steering of investm nt in infrastructure. New jobs 
needed, hence always surplus supply of land for building. 
LU&T Policy  
 
Long term security for ample land reserves to facility growth in jobs/population. 
Within this policy framework marginal shift of emphasis in policy over time 
(restrictive/not restrictive). Ample supply of land for housing building to secure affordable 
housing has been and is a keystone in Krs policy for several decades. 
Land allocation for the road system a technical issue like other utilities (water, sewage, 
electricity, etc). The main highway structure fixed since the mid-fifties with only marginal 
changes since. LU and investment in highway capacity have not been coordinated. 
Sørlandsparken – shopping: to expand or prevent enlargement? Major expansion planned 
2006. Tension between policy and planning (centre hierarchy, densification, environment, 
sea shore).  
Transport 
Financing. 
 
 
How to get money for roads? Road infrastructure. Nation l government final say 
(Stortinget). NTP planning instrument for all modes, but road investment programme most 
important. Partial funding of stretch of road, essential for each stretch to get into 
programme. Toll road financing became a necessity in he nineties. E18 & E39 pre-
emptive, consensus planning by regime coalition. “The car embedded society” 
Task: local-county support and agreement crucial. Highway Agency priority > SD support 
> Parliament Committee decision. E18 success, E39 succe s (partial highway agency 
success, tunnel instead of bridge) The price to pay for the road investment agreement with 
toll financing, was BusMetro. BusMetro was not an aim in itself, but a consequence of the 
agreement and “carrot” funding. PT services are financed by the county, and as such of 
little concern to the city. Walk/Bike infrastructure paid for by road owner, not integrated in 
policy.  
Comments 
 
 
 
Facts on the ground: Climate Villain. Commuting & Car dependence increasing. 
Decupling of planning as process (aims and symbol production) and planning as product 
(functional roadnetwork). Always good supply of land for houses and businesses, 
attractive city centre, green city, coastline, and good on culture. Legacy: Proud legacy. 
New focus globalization, ICT, KKKK-society. Implementation failure highways in the 
1980s, success in the 1990s. Findings: Krs municipal ty good at using and creating 
opportunities 1) production of symbols (miljøby, kulturby, solcelleby, oljeboringsby, 
Norges riviera, solkysten) 2) production on the ground (roads, fiskebrygga, city beach) 
Weakness: Coastline buildings contrary to aims. Car dependence increase contrary to 
aims. Decisions set cars in front of environment: (Torvet P-hus, kulturhus) accessibility & 
to avoid congestion has top priority, the functional. Questions: who wins, who lose? FIN 
INFRA: toll road ring system, vast sums of money collected, will by contract last 20 years 
more.  
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Annex II – Kristiansand case  
 
 
E18 project Sustainable City (SC) project 
Characterized by 
The E18 case can be called a “Stakeholder” project, 
meaning that a combination of stakeholders both public 
and private participated in the process. 
Characterized by  
The SC case can be called a “Government” project, 
meaning that it was implementing national policy at the 
local level, using the hierarchical formal authority 
system for decision-making.  
Goals  
The E18 had one simple goal, to build a new highway. 
Underneath this goal was a set of objectives, some f 
them very difficult to achieve as the toll financing and 
decision on road alignment and design.  
Goals  
The goals of the SC project were as ambiguous as the 
concept sustainable development itself. The aim given 
by the MoE was to develop a SC-model, create jobs 
and improve childhood environment. The SC should 
also shift people from cars to PT.  
Structure  
The formal structure following the pbl was used as the 
instrument to achieve the two aims: Decisions in the 
City Council on Reguleringsplan E18 and Toll road 
finance package.  
 
Structure  
Top down approach initiated at MoE with national 
secretariat and six groups supporting, and with local 
steering and project groups. PT success was abandoned 
because a) animosity between municipality and county, 
b) it could hinder or reduce money for road building. 
Process  
Learning and confidence building process among 
selected key actors. 
Process  
SC used professional information people to inform 
about the project, the meetings, conferences and 
progress. The process and the information strategy may 
have alienated some of the planners  and the public. 
Resources  
Resources for planning were available in Highway 
Agency and Kristiansand municipality administration. 
If the project was successful, then the toll system could 
generate 100 million NOK every year for a decade. 
Resources  
Ample resources for planning (seminars and meetings 
in places unusual for most public planners) but the SC 
project was not embedded in daily processes nor 
structure. SC can be read as “predict and prevent” 
project, the car growth that was predicted should be 
prevented by shift to PT. Such a shift would represent a 
huge challenge to the city as a “growth machine” and
the interests behind growth. 
Measures  
The main measures used were cooperation and 
learning. Consensus was built among key stakeholders 
through a learning process and cooperation across 
levels, layers and sectors. The result was an unwritten 
“contract” among the stakeholders built on trust, 
agreeing on the goals and “binding” each participant. 
Measures  
The aims of the SC project should be achieved through 
holistic planning, and integrate local authority, the state 
and private interests across sectors and tasks (note the 
county is not mentioned!). The priority tasks were 
among several others PT and BW, plus integrated land 
use and transport planning. . 
Comments  
The Toll road system has an important economic 
growth effect locally (jobs from the collection of t lls 
and building the road; and reduced travel times 
generate growth) plus the land use opportunities 
opening up because of the projects (both at junctios 
and further away due to reduced travel times). 
This successful E18 story started in 1992 when new 
actors came on stage. Before that the E18 project had 
been unsuccessful for years. Incentives are aligned a d 
positive for all, zero congestion gives faster travel, 
direct jobs for a few, increased income for firms, 
increased taxes due to higher incomes, etc. 
Comments  
SC has left two important results in Kristiansand. 
Firstly, the MoE prize for champion city planning. This 
gives the city important symbolic value, which gives a 
good marketing effect and supports city branding. 
Secondly the BusMetro was established and embedded 
with politicians and administrators.  
The measures to achieve the SC goals will be negative 
for many politicians, planners and the public. Shift 
from car to PT will necessarily mean that many will
have to change mode at a cost, and benefits must be 
forsaken.  
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5 Aalborg 
 
The City of Aalborg intends to work hard to obtain  environmentally sustainable transport 
future as this declaration shows: “We recognize the interdependence of transport, health nd 
environment and are committed to strongly promoting sustainable mobility choices.”244 
 
Aalborg is famous in planning circles, not least because of the 1994 Aalborg Charter , which 
demand that the cities that join, pledge to work fo sustainable development in cities. Around 
1800 cities worldwide have signed the Charter. Ten years after the Charter The Aalborg 
Commitments were born. But the Aalborg fame goes back longer, it was a model city in the 
NORKOLT study, it was one of the first implementing the SCAFT245 principles in existing 
areas. Already in 1979 it got a prize for the Traffic project246. In this study I only look at land 
use and transport planning and policy, which means that much of the impressive work 
Aalborg has done on the broader sustainable developm nt issues like inner city regeneration, 
energy or utilities is not included247.  
 
The study of Aalborg is firstly a description of the land use and transport situation and the 
events over time leading up to this situation. Secondly it is an analysis of these events and the 
mechanisms that has contributed to change over time. Aft r the analysis follows a discussion 
of the role of land use and transport planning and policy in the process of change and to what 
extent it has contributed to a more environmentally sustainable transport system. A reduction 
in car use and a shift to more environmentally friendly modes is seen as a necessity in the 
sustainable development debate, and indeed Aalborg has strongly committed itself to such a 
policy through its Charter, plans and programs, and i eed the Commitments. The aims and 
goals are one side, the other is how the actual development and change is going. This study 
attempts to answer if Aalborg is on a sustainable path. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction to Aalborg 
 
Aalborg is the economic, cultural and educational centre of North Jutland. Aalborg with a 
population of 162 000 inhabitants (2005) is the fourth largest city in Denmark248. A further  
65 000 people in neighboring areas form part of the daily activities in Aalborg – working, 
shopping and so on.  
 
 
                                                
244 City of Aalborg, Technical Department, 2004. Sustainable mobility. Citation from page 18. 
245 Stadsbygnad Chalmers Arbetsgruppen för Trafikksäkerhet, 1967, influenced heavily the traffic safety work in 
the Nordic countries 
246 Flyvbjerg, 1991 
247  See for example ”Sustainable utility supply in Aalborg” 2004, which sums up some of this work. 
248 Aalborg was merged with other municipalities from 2007 and population increased to 195 000 in 2008.  
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Aalborg can be characterized as two urban areas north and south of the Limfjord connected by 
a bridge and a tunnel. The city is geographically located where the distance over the Limfjord 
is shortest, and as a result the infrastructure for cr ssing the Limfjord has been placed here. 
Therefore the city has always been the ”key” to the northern part of Jutland and the 
connections onwards to Norway and Sweden.  
 
The following map shows the settlements Aalborg on the south side and Nørresundby on the 
north side of the crossing in 1948. Today they are both part of Aalborg municipality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Aalborg map from 1948 
Source: Knud Tranholm, presentation workshop UIS-AAU 14.12.06 
 
The Travel to Work Area is expanding around Aalborg making more and more people 
dependent upon the car as the means to access jobs. The County Mayor saw the education and 
re-education of the population and access to jobs as the major challenges when we are turning 
into the “knowledge society” in the coming years249. This concern of the regional 
development is shared by the city, as this statement shows250:  
 
The continuous growth in regional and interregional relations therefore has an immediate 
impact on Aalborg, and it faces the risk of becoming a future bottleneck, with adverse effects 
                                                
249 Interview county mayor Orla Hav  
250 City of Aalborg, Technical Department, 2004. Sustainable mobility. What has happened in Aalborg during 
the last 10 years? 
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on the opportunities of economic development in the region and negative environmental 
impacts as likely consequences. The annual growth in regional car traffic currently stands at 
about 3%.  
 
 
Figure 5-2 Map showing the location of Aalborg 
Source: Google maps  
 
The present situation. 
Slow growth has been the case through the last decades, which make politicians focus on 
central government for help to the “periphery”. Population growth in Aalborg has been low 
compared to the Copenhagen area. In the period 1993-2001 there was a net out migration 
from Aalborg municipality, even with a growth in jobs and the status as a University City. 
The main migration flow goes to Copenhagen, but there were also a lot of families with 
children moving to neighboring municipalities. The North Jutland and Aalborg area has been 
eligible for grants from EU over long period. 
 
Aalborg has laid out substantial areas for expansion and invested in infrastructure for housing 
and employment in the outskirts of the city. Car trffic has been increasing with three per cent 
per year, and also the trip length has increasing. The pattern of travel shows an increasing 
complex criss-cross pattern over a vast area. The 3rd Limfjord connection has been decided as 
part of a “predict and provide” ideology, but its not yet financed. The plan decision implies 
that also cross connecting roads must be built. The decision already impacts on land use 
demand, especially around intersections attractive for localization of new businesses. 
Substantial work has been done with the City Centre, the Waterfront and City Syd. Public 
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transport routes are redesigned and offer a good basic service and fare levels. Cycling as 
everywhere in Denmark is still popular and together with walking important travel modes. 
There are attempts of mobility management (car sharing, pedestrian zones, calming), but 
overall Aalborg has an adaptive not instrumental land use and transport policy.  
 
The third Limfjord crossing will be a major highway investment through the city along the 
Egholm line to the tune of DKK 3.5 billion. The alignment for the line was fixed in 2003, but 
pending a new environmental assessment after an appeal to Naturklagenævnet. Toll road 
financing was not discussed during the 3rd Limfjord connection process, but the financing of 
the highway will become an issue in the future. 
 
Denmark got new regions and new municipalities from 2007 and a lot of functions were 
shifted around. The road network was divided into tw owners: State 20% and Municipalities 
80%. The responsibility for the public transport was transferred to municipalities.  
 
Aalborg city both wants to build a new western bypass to the tune of 3.5 billion DKK and 
keep its position as a front runner towards sustainable development as manifested by the 
Aalborg Charter, which 1800 cities have joined. To plan a high class, high capacity highway 
system in the city seem for politicians not be in co flict with the adopted local goals of 
“reducing car traffic” in the Traffic & Environment Action Plan251. Building new traffic 
generating roads are also contrary to the City’s Plan and Sustainability Strategy where it is 
stated: A sustainable city development is also characterized by transport reduction, especially 
reduction in car transport252 
 
This case study of land use and transport planning i  Aalborg asks the questions: How has the 
gap between aims and output developed? Why is the gap there? Has the city managed to 
break the trend towards greater car dependence? If and how has the city managed to overcome 
the trend towards widening gap? How and to what extent has the land use and transport 
planning and policy managed to control development and steer towards the environmentally 
sustainable goals?  
                                                
251 Traffic and Environment Action Plan 1994, later reviewed 1999, 2005  
252 Aalborg Kommune. Plan & Bæredygtighed. Redegørelse. 2003 p37  
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5.1.1 Aalborg time line through history 
 
 
AALBORG  Land Use & Transport 
Lines through Time 1945 – 2007 
Year Events 
1947 City land use & traffic plan 
1956 Pedestrian street proposed 
1959 Traffic plan city centre 
1962 Pedestrian street established, first in Denmark 
1963 Review Traffic plan city centre 
1970 13 municipalities become Aalborg municipality 
1971 Traffic study 
1971 2nd Limfjord crossing opened (Tunnel) 
1972-73 General plan LU&T 
1973-79 City Centre redevelopment planning 
1975 Traffic plan. Road extension Aborted. 
1976 Parking plan 
1974 Aalborg University College opened 
1974 3rd Limfjord – Lindholm line proposed by the technical 
administration 
1974-78 NORKOLT 
1977 Aalborg project starts 
1979 A series of plan documents published 
1979 Town Planning assoc prize: Aalborg project 
1980 City council ratify Aalborg project 25-1 
1981-85 Conflicts implementation of the Aalborg project 
1984-87 New leaders 
1989 Parking regulations and charging introduced 
1987-91 Ecology, Clean City, Green City, etc. 
1990 EU/EFTA Prize The Tidiest City in Europe 
1994 Traffic & Environment Action Plan 
1994 Aalborg Charter 
1995 EU: European Planning Prize 
1999 Aalborg LU&T plan review 
1999 Traffic & Environment Action Plan 
2000  
2001 EIA 3rd Limfjord planning starts 
2003 GOV: Plan and Sustainability Strategy 
2003 New Public Transport Plan 
2003 3rd Limfjord decided by both City and County 
2004 Aalborg Commitments 
2005 Traffic & Environment Action Plan 
2005 LU&T plan for Aalborg (Kommuneplan) 
2007 “New” municipalities and regions 
  
Planning was one of the key instruments to create the new world after the Second World War 
and a “positive” concept until the new liberalism started to spread by the end of the seventies. 
This can be read in the Timeline for Aalborg. The sixties and seventies were filled with 
planning studies and well documented. Where one study finished, another took over. The city 
centre in Aalborg “Bykærnen” was more or less under continual “planning” all these years 
from the early seventies through the nineteen nineties. The Aalborg project253 started in late 
                                                
253 Bent Flyvbjerg has eminently described this period in Rationality and Power, 1998 
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1977, the plan proposals were ready in 1979, the imple entation however became fragmented 
in the eighties.  
 
The influence of the environment movement stemming from Rachel Carson’s book The Silent 
Spring to the UN Stockholm Environment conference in 1972 can be seen in the Nordic 
NORDKOLT project. Aalborg was one of eight model cities in that project. The Buchanan 
report Traffic in Towns strongly influenced the traffic planning in the sixties and seventies 
(perhaps far longer?), which can be read directly from the plans produced. The Gothenburg 
model of dividing the centre into “rooms” with no through traffic and access from the outside 
was proposed in the Aalborg project. Public participation in planning was another strong 
movement in the seventies, not least in Denmark. This mix of ideologies and forces, which 
looked so potent in the nineteen seventies seems to evaporate in the eighties, as the Aalborg 
project did. But the planners are still there going about doing their jobs. When Our Common 
Future254 was published many land use planners got a “new lif ”, certainly in the Nordic 
countries. Sustainable development led to major projects at all levels of government. In 
Aalborg with such a great planning tradition the lat r prized Traffic & Environment Action 
Plan was published in 1994, and the conference that led to the Aalborg Charter was held. 
Aalborg city, politicians and planners were suddenly famous in planning circles, a long list of 
participation in EU projects followed and in 2004 the Aalborg Commitments were signed. 
Planning for sustainable development and mobility in Aalborg had reached the top255. But 
underneath the vision and goals of sustainable mobility was a car driven development that led 
to increasing CO2 emissions, depletion of non-renewable fossil resources, less bio-diversity, 
and problems with traffic noise and accidents.  
 
This contrast between the quest for sustainable devlopment on the one side and planning and 
facilitating for the car is clearly coming out of the Aalborg Timeline. In the following chapters 
I will look into these two conflicting paths, but first an overview of statistics and data about 
the transport situation in Aalborg.  
 
5.2 History and situation  
 
5.2.1 Population  
 
Aalborg had in 2005 about 160 000 inhabitants, which is 3% of the population in Denmark. 
The growth in population over 30 years was only 6%.About 120 000 lived in the continuous 
urban area, 35 000 in villages and 8000 in rural areas within the municipality.  
 
 1976 1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 
Aalborg municipality  154 500 155 019 159 980 161 161 163 568 195 145 
Table  5-1  Population development in Aalborg 1976-2008, notice enlargement 2007  
 
The geographical distribution of the population north and south of the Limfjord is shown in 
the next table.  
                                                
254 The Brundtland report was published 1987. 
255 See the document: Sustainable mobility. What has happened in Aalborg during the last 10 years? City of 
Aalborg 2004.  
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Geographical distribution 2003 Numbers % 
North of Limfjord 37 635 23 % 
South of Limfjord 124 886 77 % 
  Total 162 521 100 % 
Table  5-2  Population distribution north and south of the Limfjord 
 
The growth prospects according to Denmark’s Statistics are shown in the next table. Only one 
per cent growth in population is expected for this period.  
 
Prognosis DS 2004 2010 Change 2004-10 
Aalborg 163 231 164 945 1 % 
Table  5-3 Expected growth in population to 2010  
 
5.2.2 Transport trends and Mode Split in Aalborg  
 
5.2.2.1 Traffic a long time ago 
On Vesterbro, one of the main streets in Aalborg, we have some traffic data256 from a long 
time ago. The car traffic growth from 1925 to 1928 was about 25% per year, while the 
number of horses went down. In 1939 a viaduct was built across the railway and then the 
number of horses had fallen to less than one hundred, an era was going towards its end. This 
was the bike heyday with 72% of the traffic volume being bikes. However, the number of cars 
had increased threefold in the 11 years from 1928, the dawn of the car-era was there. 
 
Table  5-4 Traffic data for Vesterbro 1925, 1928 and 1939 
 
5.2.2.2 NORDKOLT 
The NORDKOLT project was grounded in an agreement btween the five Nordic countries in 
1972. The project should do an “inventory and evaluation of possible future public transport 
systems fitting the Nordic type of urban areas and which consider the demands from the 
traffic development, the environment and traffic safety ”.257 The background for the project 
was the “difficulties – especially in the larger are s – to expand the traffic system mainly for 
car travel” which had shifted the focus to the need to improve public transport. The aim of the 
project was to “give a picture of the future development possibilities for all kinds of person 
transport in medium sized Nordic cities” and the time horizon was the year 2000. The project 
did 13 separate case studies, two of these in Denmark where Aalborg was one. Three future 
situations were envisaged, T1-increased car traffic, T2-constant car traffic, and T3-
substantially reduced car traffic. The T1 situation will give far more people than T3 a high 
                                                
256 Allan Christensen og Henrik Nielsen, 1977. Vesterbo Gadegennembrudet. AUC  
257 NORDKOLT Trafik i nordisk tätort. NU A1978:16, page 3. 
Vesterbro, daily number of vehicles Railcrossing 1925 Railcrossing 1928 Viaduct south 1939 
Cars 1 015 1 810 5 684 
Freight vehicles 383 699 1 632 
Horse carriages  485 433 95 
Bicycles - - 19 321 
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level of mobility. This standard however, will be “bought by more accidents, more noise and 
emissions, poorer public transport for those without access to a car, plus greater 
consumption of energy and economic resources.”        “More car traffic will demand huge 
investments in road network and parking facilities. But reduced car traffic will set strong 
demands to political steering, planning and organiztion.“ 258 Thirty years later one may say 
that the NORDKOLT project showed good foresight.  
 
The NORDKOLT project made a mode share estimate for Aalborg in 1975 and two forecasts 
for the year 2000, shown in the next table. In 1975 the non-motorized travel was 55% and car 
38%. The public transport alternative for 2000 had a non-motorized share of 58% and the car 
alternative 38%. It is interesting to see that the for cast for the Car alternative made 25 years 
earlier is not far off the real figures for the year 2000. The public transport alternative that was 
made to illustrate a more environmentally friendly path forward (produced a few years after 
the UN Environment Conference in Stockholm 1972) was in hindsight completely unrealistic.  
 
 1975 2000 PT alt 2000 Car alt 
Car 38 15 55 
PT 8 28 8 
Walk259 25 26 16 
Cycle 30 32 22 
 101 101 101 
Table  5-5  NORDKOLT mode split 1975 and two alternatives for 2000 
 
5.2.2.3 Mode share data from Aalborg 
There are several calculations and presentations of the mode split or mode share in Aalborg 
done at different times for different purposes. It has been difficult to compare the different 
mode split (MS) presentations because of differences in definitions and methods used to 
calculate the share for each mode. It varies for example if the data come from a cordon count 
around the city centre or from telephone interviews. The aim in this report is to find out if the 
trend in Aalborg is towards a greater car share and thus more unsustainable transport, or 
towards increased use of public transport, bikes and walking and reduction in car use. An 
overview of the MS presentations are shown in the next table:  
 
 1975 1993-95 2003cycleplan 1999-03 
Car 38 58 64 58 
PT 8 11 11 8 
Walk 25 14 10 18 
Cycle 30 17 15 16 
 98 100 100 100 
Table  5-6  MS data for Aalborg (number of trips)  
 
The source of the different MS presentations are:  
1975:   NORDKOLT  
1993-95 DTF 
2003 Cycleplan (Aalborg cykelstiplan 2003) 
1999-03 DTF 
                                                
258 NORDKOLT page 7. 
259 Walk and Cycle share allocated by author 
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Travel surveys done by DTF260 are shown in the next table and figure. The definitio  of short 
trips and use of “cut-off” for very short trips was changed from mid nineties till the next 
survey 1999-2003. This has made it look like that te people in Aalborg doubled their 
walking, while all other modes were reduced. The probable correct answer is that the walk 
mode was underestimated in the mid nineties. Another point is that the reduction in car use is 
contrary to the general increase in income and car ownership in the period.  
 
Table  5-7 Mode share in Aalborg 1994 and 2001 (number of trips) 
 
The EU project Transplus show mode share for Aalborg Municipality and Aalborg city centre 
(not explicitly defined) for the year 2000 as shown in the table:  
 
Year 2000 Public transport Private vehicles/MC Cycling Walking Other TOTAL 
Aalborg Centre 12 52 21 14 1 100 
Aalborg municipality 10 64 15 10 1 100 
Table  5-8 MS from Transplus 2000 
 
Comparing the DTF and Transplus data for the municipality it is the walk mode which differs 
most with 18% against 10% and then the car share with 57% against 64%. These are 
differences outside normal statistical variations. I  the next figure the author has adjusted the 
Aalborg mode share data to make the 1994 and 2001 surveys comparable.  
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Figure 5-3 Aalborg mode share development, adjusted for method variation 
 
 
The figure above does probably not give the “true” d scription of the trends. If we compare 
the change for each mode with other data, as public transport data and car ownership data as 
those shown below, I will contend that the car use probably increased between 1994 and 2001 
in Aalborg and that the walk mode probably decreased. Public transport and cycle trends are 
                                                
260  Methodology is outlined on DTF home page www.dtf.dk 
Aalborg Municipality % Public transport Private vehicles/MC Cycling Walking Other TOTAL 
1993-1995 9 63 19 9 0 100 
1999-2003 8 57 16 18 1 100 
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probably right. The change in employment patterns and the increase in the number of 
commuters support such arguments. 
 
5.2.2.4 Car ownership 
The number of zero car households went down by 3%, while the growth in the number of 
households with 1 car is 14% and in households with2 or more cars is 18%, showing that 
Aalborg is catching up with the international trends in car ownership. Still the car ownership 
in Aalborg and in Denmark is low compared with other w stern cities.  
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Figure 5-4  Car ownership development in Aalborg 
 
 1992 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Cars total      
All Denmark 1 604 053 1 679 007 1 854 060 1 915 821 2 020 129
North Jutland county 150 638 160 042 174 844 178 033 186 263
Aalborg 44 161 46 870 51 112 52 464 55 362
Table  5-9 The number of cars in Denmark  
 
The growth in the number of cars is higher for Denmark than the municipality of Aalborg, 
reflecting the fact that the economy grows faster in some areas like the Copenhagen area than 
in the peripheral region of North Jutland, where Aalborg is situated.  
 
• Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants in North Jutland  2007 = 323 
• Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants in Aalborg  2007 = 284 
 
The number of passenger cars per thousand inhabitants s generally low in Denmark 
compared to other countries, part of that is due to the relatively high number of small vans in 
Denmark (approx half a million “varebiler”). Another reason for the low number of cars per 
head is the cycling tradition, topography and an urban culture.  
 
5.2.2.5 Traffic accidents 
The number of persons injured and killed in road trffic accidents in Aalborg was reduced by 
13% between 1995 and 2003, but less than the reduction for Denmark, which was 16%.  
 
 
 172 
 1995 2000 2003 2003/1995 
DK sum 21146 19180 17688 84% 
NJ sum 2328 2156 2076 89% 
Aalborg sum 778 752 678 87% 
Table  5-10  Injured and killed in road traffic accidents 1995, 2000, 2003 
 
Aalborg has set as an aim: To reduce the number of fatalities and severe traffic injuries by 
40% in 2007 compared to 1987.  
 
5.2.3 Public Transport in Aalborg 
 
5.2.3.1 Public bus transport 
The Nordjylland Trafikselskab (NT) is the management company owned by the North Jutland 
Region and the municipalities within the region. Aalborg Omnibus Selskab was taken over by 
the city in 1976. Aalborg has to pay for the public transport within the municipality while the 
region pays for the border crossing routes. Thus the municipality must decide what share of 
the budget shall be spent on public transport, on hospitals and so on. All the bus companies 
are privately owned, and run services after licitations. This is New Public Management sat in 
system. The bus companies are paid according to a fixed hourly price, with some small bonus 
elements. The income goes to region/municipalities and is divided according to the same 
model as expenses (driving-plan hours). The board of directors of Nordjylland Trafikselskab 
was in 2005 headed by County Mayor (amtsborgermester) Orla Hav. In the board there are 11 
members, 6 from the County and 5 from the municipalit es.  
 
In 2003-2004 there was a major change in route structu e, stops and terminals for PT in 
Aalborg. Bus-priority has been introduced at 50 junctions where the “bus-pc” checks the 
arrival time, and asks for extension of green or new green, if delayed. The info system shall 
give travel info both to read and listen to. At 32 stops in 13 places a monitor show “expected” 
bus arrival. On train/bus terminals there are “real time” information about bus and train 
arrivals.  
 
Passengers  
NT lost close to 2 million passengers between 2002 and 2005 on the buses in Aalborg 
municipality, the number of passengers dropped from 17.2 mill passengers in 2002 to 15.2 
mill in 2005, a reduction of 12%. From 1997 to 2005 there has been a negative development 
every year, except for the two years 2000 and 2004.  
 
The public transport system in Aalborg underwent a major structural change in 2003/04. The 
effect of that change will be seen in the coming years. The general trend over many years is a 
decrease in traffic and politically more important  increase in deficit. The next table shows 
patronage on buses for the years 2002-2005. In these years the total number of bus passengers 
in Aalborg decreased by 2 million from 17 to 15 million per year. This decrease was as 
planned mainly on local buses. Aalborg City buses had a marked increase from 2004 to 2005, 
which may be caused by the new system starting to work.  
 
Passengers in 1000s  2002 2003 2004 2005 
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Aalborg municipality 17 205 16 685 15 120 15 262 
Local buses 2 768 2 717 1 246 526 
Aalborg city buses 14 437 13 968 13 874 14 736 
Total region 32 733 31 667 29 468 29 166 
Table  5-11  Bus passengers in Aalborg 2002-2005 
 
Looking at the North Jutland Region the number of bus passengers decreased by 12% from 
32.7 to 29.2 million passengers over these three years (the numbers for Aalborg included). 
This has of course serious consequences for the public transport economy.  
 
Public transport economy: Nordjylland Trafikselskab 
Public transport in Aalborg has had a fairly constat yearly income from passenger tickets 
around 90 million DKK, out of a total for NT of 230-240 million DKK. The yearly deficit on 
the other hand has grown the last years. In 1993 the deficit was 138 million DKK, which 
increased by 70% to 235 million DKK in 2005. From 2004 to 2005 the increase was 11%. 
The public transport structure and services have undergone major changes the last years with 
new terminals and route structure, but this does not explain the long downward trend in public 
transport patronage.  
 
Million DKK 1993 2001 2004 2005 
Expenses  365 410 460 476 
Income  225 265 293 290 
Transfer to DSB - 32 45 49 
Net income 227 231 249 241 
Deficit   138 179 211 235 
Financing deficit:          
Government - 33 13 14 
Aalborg municipality & NJ county 137 149 200 226 
Total subsidies  137 182 213 240 
Table  5-12  Nordjylland Trafikselskab, economic development 1993-2005 
 
Table 5-12 and figure 5-5 show how the public transport problem in Aalborg City and Region 
is developing. The income has stagnated or falls while costs are escalating, and the results 
negative.  
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Aalborg municipal buses 2000 - 2006, income 
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Figure 5-5  Buses in Aalborg, income, costs and result 2000-2006 
 
There is little doubt that the public transport in Aalborg increasingly has become a problem 
with a negative result below minus 50 million DKK. Still improving public transport is the 
single most acceptable measure for reducing traffic congestion, several surveys report. It is 
necessary to both reduce the fares and improve the product (travel time, frequency, comfort, 
etc) if public transport shall be able to compete with the car. These are measures that both 
reduce income and increase the costs, which again require larger subsidies. Pull measures 
such as these are by the public consistently considered to be more effective for tackling 
transport problems than push measures.261 The measures that push car drivers away from the 
cars and towards PT are higher costs (tolls, congestion charges) and restrictions on parking 
and access. Such measures are politically very controversial. The problem is not new, it goes 
a long way back as the following figure shows. What s become more problematic is the size 
of the gap between revenue and expenses (the expenses for the public transport office is the 
payment to the different providers of the bus services). 
 
Figure 5-6  Time series, passenger income and cost of bus services in Aalborg, 1998-2006 
 
                                                
261 Dominic Stead, WTPP Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, P 46 
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5.2.3.2 Local rail transport 
In 2000 it was decided to establish a local train service in the Aalborg area. The line has 6 
stations, of which 4 are located in urban and suburban areas. Lindholm Station opened in 
December 2002 and the other stations opened in December 2003. Passenger traffic on the 
local trains are shown below, notice that in the numbers for Aalborg main station are included 
regional and long distance passengers. The total number of passengers on the local line was 
about 2000 passengers per day.  
 
 2004 2005 2005/2004 
 I alt I alt I alt 
Lindholm 573 562 0.98 
AalborgVestby 371 569 1.53 
Aalborg 5747 7548 1.31 
Skalborg 164 113 0.69 
Svenstrup 556 393 0.71 
Støvring 526 403 0.77 
Total 7937 9588 1.21 
Table  5-13  Traffic on local trains in Aalborg  
 
The train frequency is half an hour, the equivalent of 20 trains parting each day, which means 
that Skalborg stop has on average 3 entering and 3 departing the train. It is costly and difficult 
to start local rail services on an old track in an urban area, where the population to a large 
extent has moved away from the track. Even with newstations it means that the walking 
distance to the stations easily becomes larger than 500-600 meters.  
 
5.2.4 Commuting distances are increasing in Denmark 
 
Statistics Denmark262 has analyzed the national travel survey and concludes that more people 
have longer distance to work. Even if the analysis is for Denmark the same trend in 
commuting seems to be the case for Aalborg (see fx Nielsen and Hovgesen 2004, 2005). In 
the ten years between 1994 and 2003 the average distance between home and work has 
increased by 15%, from 14 km in 1994 to 16 km in 2003. Close to 40% of workforce 
participants have less than 6 km to work. A gradual ch nge is happening where fewer have 
less than 12 km to work, while more and more workers have over 25 km, but still only 6.4% 
travel longer than 49 km to work, up from 4.8% in 2003, as shown in the table below.  
 
Distance  1994-1997  1998-2001  2002-03 
1-5  40.4 %  40.9 %  38.9 %  
6-11  21.4 %  20.0 %  19.4 %  
12-24  20.1 %  19.7 %  20.8 %  
25-49  13.2 %  13.7 %  14.5 %  
50-74  3.1 %  3.2 %  3.9 %  
75-99  0.8 %  1.1 %  1.1 %  
100-149 0.6 %  0.8 %  0.8 %  
150-  0.3 %  0.6 %  0.6 %  
Table  5-14 The distribution of employed after the distance between home and work 
 
                                                
262 www.dst.dk accessed October 2004 
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Even if the average distance increases the amount of transport has stagnated. That is partly 
caused by the fact that people with long journeys to work more often stay at home one or two 
days per week. Only every third person with more than 150 km journey commutes daily and 
every forth person only goes to work one day per week. Two thirds of the persons with travel 
distance between 100 and 150 km commute to work every day, while 87% of persons with 
journeys to work between 12 and 24 km commute daily. 
 
5.2.5 Large potential to shift short trips to green modes? 
 
Statistics Denmark has revealed a large potential to shift short car trips to green modes. Of all 
trips below 300 meters, 13% is with the car, 70% walking and 17% is on the bike. For trips 
around 1.5 km the walk, bike and car mode is about eq al. The share of car drivers increases 
with trip distance, while walk and cycle decrease. Cycling reaches its peak at about 1.5 km, at 
distances of 5-6 km 15% use the bike and 10% for trips 7-8km. Hardly anyone walk when the 
trip length is above 6 km. The potential to shift from cars to green modes is therefore great, 
but the amount of transport will be reduced by only a few percent. 65% of all trips are less 
than 8 km, but they represent only 15% of the amount f transport. A shift from car driving to 
bike for all journeys less than 8 km will affect 13% of the amount of transport. The CO2 
reduction of such a shift is limited, but it will also reduce congestion and increase health. It is 
also likely that the trip length will be affected since some people will choose to go to activities 
closer to home with the bike mode. These data from the national statistics is also a good 
indication for Aalborg and what effect a more successful strategy towards sustainability could 
obtain.  
 
5.3 The Aalborg land use and transport events 
Aalborg has had some of the top planners for a verylong time, which has led to some of the 
most modern and radical plans produced in Denmark. In this chapter the most important 
events that have influenced land use and transport planning and policy are outlined.  
 
5.3.1 Growth is necessary 
 
Aalborg is the regional capital of North Jutland in Denmark and situated on the north and 
south banks of the Limfjord. The city has a long history dating back one thousand years and is 
Denmark’s forth-biggest city with 162 000 inhabitants (2005), an increase of only a few 
thousands in thirty years. The city has to some extnt slowed the migration from the 
peripheral North Jutland, but there is still net migration to the capital Copenhagen.  
 
Aalborg was/is a typical industrial city with agricultural industries like slaughterhouses, 
flower mills, dairy industries, and is the home of the famous Aalborg aquavit. Along the 
Limfjord lies Aalborg port, the main hub for Greenla d connections, and a huge cement plant 
delivering worldwide. Earlier several shipbuilders and other industries were jotted along the 
shores, but most are now closed down. This leaves Aalborg with huge Brownfield areas close 
to the city centre suitable for new development. This transformation has started and one of the 
first buildings on the north shore has been offices for the technical administration in Aalborg 
municipality.  
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The plans for the layout and physical city structure have been designed for far greater growth 
than happened, and the allocation of land for expansion of the University, for housing and 
new employment estates still provide ample reserves for development. Aalborg University 
Centre was founded in 1974, and has now grown to a university with about 15 000 students. It 
has been important for the creation of new jobs in the knowledge sector, and to compensate 
for the loss in the industrial sector. The campus wa established at the outskirts of the city, 
partly to secure land for expansion and partly to use the university as an “engine” to promote 
growth in the high tech field. Today this area is st ll a major development area and important 
in the city’s development strategy.  
 
The major challenges for Aalborg are according to the County263 and City264 Mayors to create 
jobs, educate the people to make the population more c mpetitive and build the necessary 
infrastructure to give them access to the future employment market. The city pursues a growth 
strategy to attract inward investment and thus meet the hreats for Aalborg and the Region 
coming from globalization and the strong growth in Copenhagen. Politicians both in the City 
and the County/Region want more investment transferred f om Copenhagen to Aalborg. The 
same goes for other means and instruments as government offices, army camps, etc. they 
demand shift from the centre to the periphery.  
 
5.3.2 The 3rd Limfjord crossing in a growth strategy  
 
In the light of a growth strategy the 3rd Limfjord crossing can be seen as the most rational 
task, but a task not without problems. Firstly, there must in Aalborg City Council be 
agreement on one alignment, which there was in September 2003. Secondly the choice of 
highway standard must be “motorway” to fix the financial responsibility on the State. Thirdly 
it should “fit” with both the local and central sustainable plans and strategies.  
 
Aalborg is situated at the most narrow part of the Limfjord. Here are remnants of settlements 
since the birth of Christ. All this time the crossing of the fiord has been the great question, and 
it still is. Already at the opening of the second crossing in 1971, some asked265: “Where will 
the third Limfjord crossing be?” A few years later he third crossing was placed in the land 
use plans to the west of the city along the Lindholm a ignment (Nordkolt 1978:16). The 
Lindholm-line was reserved in the structure plan for Aalborg. But the alignment was not 
“fixed” for good. In 1989 the city council raised the question anew, and consultants were 
brought in. The planning process went on through the nineties. Eventually, in 2001 the 
County Mayor wanted the case settled266 and a VVM267 study was started. This was 
performed as cooperation between the Nordjylland Amt (county), Aalborg City and the 
national Highway Agency (Vejdirektoratet). In September 2003 on consecutive dates, both 
the City Council and the Amt Council, decided on the Egholm-line west of Aalborg. The 
decision in 2003 was not final due to complaints (see later), and still the Lindholm-line is 
                                                
263 Interview with Orla Hav, 2004  
264 Interview with Henning Jensen, 2007  
265 Generalplan: Aalborg 1999. Aalborg kommune 1974, page 19 
266 Interview with Svend Tøfting 
267 Vurdering af Vesentlige Virkninger for Miljøet – equivalent of EIA 
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reserved in the structure plan (this reservation is expected to be lifted in accordance with the 
new Regional Plan).  
 
Through 30 years or more the Limfjord crossing has been up for questioning, why? Firstly, it 
is a question of investment costs, can we afford it and who will pay? Secondly, it is a question 
of car mobility in cities. The first environment wave in the seventies wanted to reduce car 
usage and shift to other modes like public transport, cycling and walking. As already 
mentioned, NORDKOLT, which was a huge Nordic demonstration project aiming at 
increased public transport, had Aalborg as one of its 8 demonstration cities. In Aalborg there 
were made new traffic plans for the city centre, Bent Flyvbjerg’s famous thesis Rationality 
and Power tells the story of the implementation of these plans. Thirdly, the need for a third 
crossing of the Limfjord is interwoven with the second issue of mobility and car travel in 
cities. The predicted traffic growth indicates a need for more road capacity. But, why build 
that capacity in Aalborg city, famous for “The Aalborg Charter” and with strong goals of 
reducing car travel? Fourthly, the growth in car trffic is clearly at odds with national 
obligations of reducing the CO2 emissions. While the CO2 emissions from most other sources 
like industry, are on the decline, the emissions from transport keep increasing. 
 
5.3.3 The land use and transport planning path  
 
The four issues in land use and transport planning i  Aalborg were: 
1. Investment costs 
2. Mobility in cities 
3. Transport Demand Management 
4. Environment and cars 
 
Over the years it seems like these four questions or a mix of them, raise to the forefront of the 
discussion while at other times lie dormant. To follow the path of changes in land use and 
transport we have looked at the land use and transport planning, the plans adopted and plans 
up for revisions, and mirrored these plans with the economic, demographic and land use and 
transport changes, especially the changes in commuting across the municipality borders in the 
region. This has been supplemented with interviews of key politicians, bureaucrats, journalists 
and “opponents”268. National policy guidance and indeed the rules for financing road 
investment and both revenue and investment in public transport have a strong influence on the 
choices made and the factual changes in a city. Therefor  we have looked at both actors and 
networking in the land use and transport planning crcles in the city.  
 
Some of the most important events, which are looked at in detail in the following, are:  
• Land use and transport planning in the seventies, th  Aalborg Project  
• The Aalborg Charter 
• European projects and cooperation 
• Prizes 
• A Denmark in balance. What shall be done? 
• Vision of sustainable mobility 
• The Aalborg Commitments 
                                                
268 8 interviews performed autumn 2004 and 3 interviews winter 2007.  
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• The 3rd Limfjord crossing 
• Structure plans, Kommuneplan  
• Traffic and Environment Action Plan 1994, 1999 & 2005. 
• Road investment plan for the Aalborg area 
 
5.3.4 LU&T planning in the seventies, the Aalborg project  
 
In 1975 the planners changed their mind about the Dag Hammarskjöld Street and the City 
Council decided that the street-plan should be withdrawn. This was a major set back for the 
planning office with a long-standing reputation of being among the best in Denmark, although 
some of the planners had changed their mind. The Nordkolt project was then ongoing, radical 
and modern planning at its best. The planners who wanted to re-establish their reputation, had 
access to the newest research and knowledge when the Aalborg project started in late 1977 
(Flyvbjerg 1991:57). The Aalborg project proposals were indeed very good seen from an 
environmentally friendly transport perspective. It was based on: “  a political wish to 
prioritize the urban environment, vulnerable users, public transport, and down-prioritize car 
traffic – especially work journeys (with car) – to the extent there is conflict with other 
modes.”269.  
 
The planners on this basis then produced “a mode hierarchy” to be used in planning with the 
most important issues and those to be given priority n top270:  
1. Environment 
2. Pedestrians 
3. Cyclists  
4. Disabled drivers 
5. Business traffic 
6. Car driving shoppers  
7. Car driving visitors to offices 
8. Parking at homes 
9. Work journeys 
 
The Aalborg project met very strong opposition from many, the Aalborg Chamber of 
Commerce one of the strongest. The Chamber proposed this alternative “mode hierarchy”:  
1. Pedestrians 
2. Cars 
3. Vulnerable road users 
4. Public transport 
 
The implementation process of the Aalborg project became fragmented. In hindsight it is clear 
that use and control of the car was the major conflict line, and the Aalborg Chamber of 
Commerce’s alternative “mode hierarchy” won.  
 
 
 
                                                
269 Flyvbjerg 1991:88  
270 Norwich City introduced a similar mode hierarchy in the Local Plan 2002, twenty years later. 
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5.3.5 The Aalborg Charter 
 
The Charter of European Cities & Towns Towards Sustainability was approved by the 
participants at the European Conference on Sustainable Cities & Towns in Aalborg on 27 
May 1994. The Charter consists of three parts271:  
•  Part I: Consensus Declaration: European Cities & Towns Towards Sustainability 
•  Part II: The European Sustainable Cities & Towns Camp ign 
•  Part III: Engaging in Local Agenda 21 Processes: Local Action Plans Towards 
Sustainability 
 
Reading the Charter one gets biblical connotations, which of course become stronger with the 
Commitments. As with the Bible one wonders of the difference between what  city ought to 
do and what the city actually is doing. Another salient point is that the global ecology will not 
give redemption. The wording and contents of the 14 clauses are broad and encompassing the 
social, economic and environmental aspects of the sustainable development concept. With 
1800 cities having signed the declaration, surely the  must be on a more sustainable path?  
 
The forces pulling in an unsustainable direction are st ong and changes are opposed by many. 
An example from the text show that the Charter recognizes that the governmental system is a 
strong barrier to sustainable development, as clause I.13 tells: As democratically elected 
representatives of our local communities we are ready to take responsibility for the task of re- 
organizing our cities and towns for sustainability. The extent to which cities and towns are 
able to rise to this challenge depends upon their bing given rights to local self-governance, 
according to the principle of subsidiarity. It is essential that sufficient powers are left at the 
local level and that local authorities are given a solid financial base. The cities are ready to 
take the task, but they must be given self-governance ccording to the principle of subsidiarity 
and sufficient powers and financial base. Why does this not happen? The organizing of the 
national state is man made and continually changing, why not in a more sustainable direction? 
What are the motives for preventing cities getting self-government?  
 
5.3.6 European projects and cooperation 
 
Aalborg has also a long-time history of participation n EU projects and has been very active 
in promoting international cooperation the last ten-fifteen years or so. The Aalborg Charter 
1994 and “Ten years after” conference in 2004 are two examples. Aalborg has summed up the 
results from these projects in the report: Sustainable mobility. What has happened in Aalborg 
during the last 10 years? Growth in traffic, which has been 3% per year in the beginning of 
the new millennium, was the major challenge in several of these projects and the aims and 
objectives were drawn up accordingly:  
 
Jupiter   Encouragement of more environmentally-friendly transport methods  
QUO VADIS  Best use of variable message signs to improve the traffic flow on a road  
network for crossing the Limfjord  
Jupiter-2 Best available technology in favor of cleaner technology  
 Priority for soft transport  
                                                
271 The full texts of the Aalborg Charter follow as an nex to chapter 5. 
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ALTEReco  Strict environmental standards for transport and fuel technology  
Strict environmental measures for air quality standards  
Viking  Traffic information, advanced telematics to improve efficiency in traffic  
operations  
Vivaldi  Priority for public transport   
Car sharing and the telematics in public transport   
 
The activities under these projects were many as the following list shows. Some of the 
activities were very successful and a few not successful according to the report.  
 
• Variable message sign presenting delay information 
• Parking guidance system 
• Bicycle lanes 
• Electric vehicles 
• Car traffic restraint 
• Environmentally friendly urban transport 
• Sustainable City Logistics Solutions 
• Effective goods transport in Aalborg City.   
• Road and Traffic Monitoring 
• Information Networks 
• Traffic Management Tools and Services 
• Interoperable Road User Fee Collection 
• Implement a new public transport plan 
• Create a new centre for public transport at the new terminal 
• Implement real-time passenger information in buses at central interchange facilities 
• Implement bus priority at 20 traffic light regulated intersections 
• Integrate a new local train service into the public transport system consisting of 6 
stations, of which 4 are located in the Aalborg area 
• Introduce car sharing in the municipality 
• Introduce a Travel Information Centre 
 
Looking at the car traffic growth, the long-term decline in public transport and the growth in 
commuting one may ask what effect these projects have d? Would the increase in car usage 
have been worse without the projects? Have they resulted in more sustainable mobility in 
Aalborg and to what extent? As yet the output from these projects seems only marginal, but a 
good start for alternative thinking on city transport.  
 
Another side of these projects is that they introduce “old fashion” traffic schemes as new 
inventions. The Ministry of Transport in Great Britain published for example a series of Bus 
Demonstration Projects to inform the traffic planners on How to do it. That was thirty years 
ago, so it seems hardly a novelty when such projects are introduced in Aalborg. On the other 
hand these projects do show that there has not been a climate to introduce these schemes in 
Aalborg earlier, either because of a lack of political interest or they were alternatives the 
planners never proposed. The slow introduction of schemes for public transport may also be 
due to the car ideology being embedded to such a gre t extent that alternative modes hardly 
existed in the public minds? 
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5.3.6.1 Transplus conclusions 
The Transplus project which Aalborg participated in was not mentioned in the above report, 
but here are the results as presented on the project website: 
 
1. Integrating land use and transport planning, but also organizational structure of town 
planning and engineering. Poor monitoring. Better models needed. 
2. Door to door not prerogative for cars, but better accessibility for all modes. Creating 
attractive alternatives needed. 
3. Participation is increasingly important. Needed to gather full policy integration. 
4. Transferability of good practice into transnational etworking activities. 
5. Transferability of good practice still too episodic. Plus, more advice on accession 
countries will be necessary. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-7 Aalborg waterfront, Havnegaden ca. 2000  
Source: Knud Tranholm, presentation workshop UIS-AAU 14.12.06 
 
5.3.7 Prizes  
 
Some of the prizes awarded to Aalborg are commented on in the following. It is interesting 
that both awarder and receiver often have multiple int ntions and uses of the prize.  
 
1979 Danish Town Planning Association prize to the Aalborg project 
The official grounds for awarding the prize are that t e Aalborg project is planning at its best, 
but as Flyvbjerg writes: Together with the professional considerations, however, the 
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association, as most other “players” in the Aalborg project, also has strategic and tactical 
considerations: they wish to help commit the city government to the project.272 The strategic 
use of awards and prizes are well known from other studies.273  
 
The Municipal Architect reflected on current issues and the role of the planner in the late 
eighties274: “Earlier I was in the lead of a big ecological project, which received good 
critique. However, if I had continued talking about ecology, then I would not have been 
director today. The politicians would not have listened to me – we adjust and shift our values 
and attitudes towards what we can talk about, towards where we can have a dialogue.” 
 
In 1990 Aalborg was awarded the prize as The Tidiest City in Europe from EU and EFTA. 
Such prizes can be used internally in the administrat on as the Municipality Engineer said275: 
“There was this movement, Clean City, Green City, and in 1990 Aalborg was given the title 
The Tidiest City in Europe. It was partly the reason why traffic and environment questions 
grew     Besides people wanted a greener city. Thatwas in the late 1980s, and it was 
combined into one concept   So, when we got the priz  in November 1990 we said ‘what can 
be developed further within this perspective?’ Then it was natural to look into road traffic   
However, I cannot show a paper that says that the Clean City, Green City strategy is being 
extended with this (transport policy making and planning from an environment perspective). I 
do not think we have written that anywhere.” 
 
In 1995, the year after publishing the first Traffic and Environment Action Plan and the 
signing of the Aalborg Charter, EU gave the city the European Planning Prize for the city’s 
new approach to planning (Flyvbjerg 1998:244). 
 
In 2004 Aalborg together with Gothenburg and La Rochelle received the CIVITAS Award for 
New Mobility Culture Leadership. Aalborg got the award for aiming to increase the modal 
share of its public transport through the improvement of its image. “The city has shown clear 
leadership in the extension of the public transport network, the use of Intelligent Transport 
System and the complementary car sharing schemes.” Said Helen Holland the CIVITAS 
representative: “Public private partnerships, citizens involvement a d better design of the 
urban transport system carry the strong political support of the city’s authority. This 
integrated approach leads the way to a new mobility culture.” 
 
5.3.8 A Denmark in balance. What shall be done? 
 
Et Danmark i balance. Hvad skal gjøres? This is the title276 of the Ministry of Environment’s 
overview of the sustainability situation 2003 with advice what was needed to be done. As in 
most government’s green and white papers the wording is ambiguous. The sustainability 
strategy drawn for Denmark was without any commitments what so ever, and the word 
sustainable was hardly used in the document. If that word was removed, the document would 
                                                
272 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Rationality and Power ” 1998:77 
273 The motives for giving Kristiansand the city the 200  City planning prize in Norway is discussed in ch 4.  
274 Front page citation. Interview with Municipality Architect in Aalborg, cited from Carsten J. Hansen, 2001.  
275 Interview 29/3-2001 cited from Carsten J. Hansen, 2001.  
276 Miljøministeriet Landsplanredegørelse 2003 Et Danmrk i balance. Hvad skal gjøres? 
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become a general government white paper, which could have been produced in 1983 or in 
2007. 
 
The Sustainable development strategy from 2003 did however put the emphasis on land use 
and transport planning as the instrument to co-ordinate across levels, and dialog should be 
the instrument to give the municipalities the right ideas. It remains to be seen how effective 
planning and dialog will be to reach the Governments regional goals of “securing good and 
equal living conditions, no matter where in the country one lives.”  
 
Aalborg City followed up the national document in two reports: Plan and Sustainability 
Review277 and Plan and Sustainability Strategy278. As in the national report the perspective is 
on the global competition and how Denmark/Aalborg can meet the future challenges. 
“Videnssamfundet” or the “Knowledge Society” is the k y word, which leads to education, 
job creation, intelligence industries, etc. Land use and transport challenges are a) increased 
mobility and commuting, b) the increased traffic in the city and how the 3rd Limfjord 
connection shall be fitted into the city landscape (not to build the road is not an alternative), c) 
development around local train stops, d) both better accessibility for cars and better conditions 
for cyclists and pedestrians. These challenges are presented as if there are no contradictions or 
competition between them and the strategy follows up this “consensus feel” by presenting 
uncontroversial issues (the strategy document is nicely llustrated supporting the idyllic future 
for Aalborg). The strategic initiatives for land use and transport are: 
• New structure plan for the municipality. 
• Road investment plan for the Aalborg area. 
• Review of the Traffic and Environment Action Plan. 
• Architectural policy to be made. 
• Plan for open public spaces. 
• CO2-reduction plan to be made. 
 
The Government clearly does not want to be on the forefront for Sustainable Development 
and the city of Aalborg has to toe the line. However, the Aalborg Charter obliges and the two 
documents produced are nice and comprehensive. But are they a sustainability strategy or just 
a development strategy? Without confronting the major challenges of climate change and car 
use in Aalborg, I will guess that these two documents will soon be forgotten. Building new 
traffic generating roads like the 3rd Limfjord connection are contrary to the City’s Plan and 
Sustainability Strategy where it is stated: A sustainable city development is also characterized 
by transport reduction, especially reduction in car transport279  
 
                                                
277 Aalborg Kommune. Plan & Bæredygtighed. Redegørelse. 2003 
278 Aalborg Kommune. Plan & Bæredygtighed. Strategi. 2003 
279 Aalborg Kommune. Plan & Bæredygtighed. Redegørelse. 2003 p37 ”En bæredyktig byudvikling er også 
karakterisert ved, at transporten, særlig biltransporten, begrænses.” 
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Aalborg structure plan. 
 
Figure 5-8  Vision of the future Aalborg, copy: Plan nd Sustainability Assessment 2003 
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5.3.9 Vision of sustainable mobility 
 
Aalborg City Council has adopted the following vision for development within sustainable 
mobility in Aalborg280: 
 
• Aalborg shall be a sustainable municipality based on environmental, social and 
economic sustainability. 
• The city’s inhabitants shall actively participate in efforts to achieve sustainable 
development. 
• The City of Aalborg shall lead the way, provide the driving force and set the agenda. 
• Accessibility for the disabled and the walking-impaired shall be improved, and public 
transport shall also encompass social consideration. 
• Public transport shall be an attractive alternative to the car. 
• In the city centre, the flow of traffic shall be onthe city’s and citizen’s terms. 
• A well-developed infrastructure shall ensure a high level of accessibility and mobility. 
 
5.3.10 The Aalborg Commitments  
 
To mark the 10-year anniversary of the Aalborg Charter and continue the quest for sustainable 
development another conference was held in Aalborg. Before that conference a booklet281 
summing up the experiences with the Charter was published: Sustainable mobility. What has 
happened in Aalborg during the last 10 years? The Aalborg Commitments became the result 
of the follow up conference as this example of a commitment show:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conclusion of this conference was that: “European cities and towns working towards 
sustainability. Now ten years later, we are moving o  from Charter to Commitments”.  The 
Commitments are a signed declaration where the signatories commit their city actively to 
pursue a sustainable city development. Here is how Aalborg City describes how the 
commitments will influence the work: “Like many local governments throughout Europe, we 
in Aalborg are ambitious to maintain and actively pursue positive development towards 
sustainability, thus enhancing the quality of life and the environment. In the coming decade, 
the Aalborg Commitments will underpin all our efforts for sustainable urban development. In 
order to carry out our responsibilities to the Aalborg Commitments we strive to develop better 
mobility with a reduction in traffic. We will therefore strive to:  
 
                                                
280 Aalborg City, Sustainable Mobility, 2004:15  
281 City of Aalborg, Technical Department, 2004. Sustainable mobility. What has happened in Aalborg during 
the last 10 years? 
” We recognise the interdependence of transport, 
health and environment and are committed to 
strongly promoting sustainable mobility choices.” 
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• reduce the necessity for private motorized transport. 
• increase the share of journeys made by public transport, on foot and by bicycle. 
• promote attractive alternatives to the use of private motor vehicles. 
• develop an integrated and sustainable urban mobility plan. 
• reduce the impact of transport on the environment and public health. 
 
5.3.11 The 3rd Limfjord crossing – the planning process 
 
Both Aalborg City Council and Nordjylland County Council decided that the 3rd Limfjord 
crossing should be built as a motorway and to be located west of Aalborg, the “Egholm line”. 
The Lindholm alignment also on the west side of the city centre was thus dropped, but it still 
was reserved in the land use plan. The type of roaddecided also decides who will pay for it. 
By deciding on a motorway the amt has put the respon ibility for building the road on the 
Government. But then the Government will have to pri ritize the Limfjord crossing against 
other projects. A national cost-benefit model is used to calculate the net present value for all 
these projects, as a supplement for the decisions. It is also probable that the Government will 
look at the traffic forecasts and evaluate the possibility of increasing the capacity of the 
Limfjord tunnel. Such an evaluation may show that congestion problems around 2020 may be 
pushed out in time with minor investments on both side  of the tunnel (this was not evaluated 
when the traffic forecast was made in the early nineties). It is not unlikely that the national 
Highway Agency (Vejdirektoratet) may put the Limfjord crossing low on the list of future 
investment projects for these reasons. Furthermore, the location of the crossing may be looked 
at in a different perspective in Copenhagen than in the Nordjylland Amt. The alternative east 
of Aalborg is far cheaper than the preferred alternative in the west. Together with minor 
investment in the present system this may add up to locating a new tunnel close to the existing 
east of Aalborg and pushing the time for when the inv stment is needed to relieve congestion, 
several years out in time. 
 
However, financing of the Limfjord crossing is not calculations, but politics. By deciding on 
the west of Aalborg alternative282, the arguments, interests and weight of the municipalit es in 
the western part were supported by all the municipalities in the county. A unanimous part of 
the country has decided that they need a motorway crossing over the Limfjord west of 
Aalborg. This is a strong message to the Government and Parliament. With the “Big H-
agreement” in mind 283, already there are speculations if the so called Jutland motorway mafia 
“den Jydske motorvej mafia” may secure a new agreement when the Femer Belt crossing 
between Denmark and Germany comes to the Folketing284.  
 
When and where the third Limfjord crossing will be uilt remains to be seen, but in the mean 
time all land use decisions and building permits, must be adopted to the decided Egholm line 
west of Aalborg. As long the Egholm line is not final, then both the Egholm and Lindholm 
line will be kept secure in the land use planning. The new road has already for years 
influenced land value through the positioning of developers, especially plots with good access 
close to junctions are sought for. Aalborg municipality has also already as seen above decided 
                                                
282 The VVM has to be redone according to the decision in Naturklagenævnet in 2006. 
283 Big H was an agreement in Parliament that Jutland should be compensated with new roads if they supported 
the Great Belt investment. 
284 Jyllandsposten, September 2004  
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a road program, which strongly will influence land use and land values on the western parts of 
the city (see ch. 5.3.14). 
 
5.3.11.1  Enhedslisten appealed the 3rd Limfjord decision to Naturklagenævnet  
Enhedslisten, a left-wing political association in Aalborg, had in their appeal against the 3rd 
Limfjord connection a list of alternative tasks to s lve the future congestion problems:  
• Establishing a local rail connection from Hobro to Hjørring. 
• Bike hire 
• Express buses 
• Taxi with zone based fares 
• City logistics (also use of the rail network for distr bution at night time) 
• Existing rail bridge widened for bikes and walking 
• 40% reduction in Nordjylland Trafikselskaps fares, introduction of a Aalborg-card, 
gratis bus on Saturdays and outside rush hours 
• Parking tickets in Aalborg City Centre raised 100% 
• Establishing buslanes along 
Hobrovej/Vesterbro/Limfjordsbroen/Vesterbrogade/Østergade 
• Expanding the cycle network, and establishing free shower facilities for cyclists  
• County and  municipality start public car sharing arrangements 
 
The County rejects the complaint because the tasks re outside its area of responsibility, even 
if the objectives for the 3rd Limfjord planning process aim at a broad regional solution. 
Another reaction from the County to the complaint could have been to look at these tasks as 
comprehensive transport policy for the development of an environmentally sustainable 
transport system in Aalborg. That would have been in line with the vision, goals and 
objectives both the County and City as we have seenabove, have adopted. But such a logical 
and rational thinking would be contrary to the car interests.  
 
The 3rd Limfjord connection close to the city centre on the western side, will influence the 
development of both land use and transport strongly. It will both generate new traffic and 
attract traffic from the other two connections. The design of the road and junctions will 
increase traffic to the city centre both in magnitude and the street volumes. As such the 
proposal clearly ought to lie both within the interests and responsibilities of the County. But 
the consequences of such holistic or comprehensive thinking may have caused the 3rd
Limfjord connection to be reviewed. Questions like th following could be posed: What was 
the traffic demand for the road? How could that demand be supplied with alternative modes? 
Does the plan for increased capacity fit with the adopted policy aims, for example as 
expressed in the Aalborg Charter? It is clear that the County did not want such question  to 
be raised, because the politicians wanted to build a high-class road network in and through 
Aalborg. This would benefit the increasing number of car commuters, car users in general and 
answer to the demands from business. The growth ideology, the “predict and provide” 
ideology won, while the goals of sustainable lost in this process. Ironically, the 3rd Limfjord 
connection decision was not ratified by Naturklagenæv et because of an appeal from 
Danmarks Naturfredning. The VVM (environmental asses ment) has to be redone because of 
a conflict with habitatområde nr. 15 and with the Ramsar convention. It was not the traffic 
issues, but some birds that postponed the ratification the plan pending a new VVM.  
 
 
 189 
5.3.12 Structure plans - Kommuneplan  
 
5.3.12.1  Kommuneplan 1999 
The structure plan from 1999 state: “principles that underlie all public plans are conservation 
of the natural environment, social justice, economize with resources, avoid pollution and 
preserve biological diversity, together with the principle that the citizens shall participate in 
the planning of the future.” 
 
Housing 
The housing program for Aalborg municipality up to 2010:  
 
Inner city     2080 
Continuous urban area apart from inner city 2490 
Southern villages and rural     810 
Northern villages and rural     620 
      6000 
 
The housing program was 500 houses per year285, one third was to be built in the inner city, 
while 40% in other parts of the continuous urban area and the rest in the villages and rural 
areas of Aalborg municipality. In effect about half of the 6000 houses will be placed so far 
from the city centre that the car will be the mode that by far offers the fastest travel time.  
 
5.3.12.2 Sustainability issues in the Kommuneplan. 
Aalborg “shall govern city development so that the 3rd Limfjord connection is postponed as 
long as possible”. (In the VVM the possible effect of this policy was not mentioned.) 
 
On sustainable traffic development, the plan says: 
• The environmental impact from traffic shall be limited 
• Traffic safety shall increase 
• Landscape and city qualities shall be protected 
 
The City Council states that it “will work to reduce the growth in road traffic and develop the 
public transport and bicycle traffic.” (notice that it is the growth in traffic they will reduce, 
not reduce traffic as such) The plan has nice intentions, but few commitments, which seem 
strange when the City is the father of the Aalborg Charter. There is not much evidence that 
the Charter or the Traffic and Environment Action Plan have influenced the structure planning 
or the plan. Instead the difficult issues are avoided by passing the buck from one plan to the 
other, e.g. “this will be dealt with in the Traffic and Environment Action Plan”. There are also 
strong limitations on the wording of sentences thatcommit the City Council, as mentioned 
above on reduction in the traffic growth. Another sious point with plans that are reviewed 
every few years, is that the aims and goals are “rolled on” without any reflection on goals 
achievement. To develop the bike network has for example been a goal repeated in plan after 
plan. The politicians and indeed the planners, can the focus on the future without questioning 
the performance of the former plan process and plan. In Aalborg it is very doubtful if the land 
                                                
285 500 houses per year are few compared to Kristiansand with 75 000 inhabitants who for many years had a 
program of 600 houses yearly 
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use and transport planning and plans have had any influence what so ever to reduce car traffic. 
It may equally well be argued that the opposite is the case, that car use have increased because 
of the land use and transport planning the last ten- w ty years. The Aalborg Charter and 
Commitments may have given the City a valuable international reputation as a promoter of 
the “Sustainable City”, but the effect for the people in general is very limited, and it is not 
making any headway on the local level to contribute to the problem of solving the big issues 
like the climate challenge.  
 
5.3.12.3 New main structure ’05 
The revision of Aalborg’s land use and transport structure plan start with a statement on city-
political strategy: “The new main structure is built on a consequent city-political strategy, 
which is concerned about sustainable city development, city development from the inside and 
out, and city-quality in a wide sense. It is the Plan and Sustainability Strategy from 2003, 
which now is transferred into the City Structure Plan”.  
 
The city-political strategy has some concrete items, I will mention two here. Firstly, the ’99 
structure plan did not contain new areas for city growth. The 2005 plan give goals and 
principles for city development and time periods for areas to be used for building. Secondly, 
the housing program is reduced to 480 houses per year, down from 500 in the 1999 structure 
plan. It is difficult to foretell the wider effect of this city-political strategy, but the changes 
point towards a more short-term type of strategic planning, which is well-known from 
business. The SWOT analysis is one the instruments used. One look at Strengths and 
Weaknesses at present in the organization (municipality area?), nd then the Opportunities 
and Threats in the surroundings in the future. One consequence is that the concept sustainable 
development is narrowed from economic, social and environmental sustainability to 
environmental sustainability and thus adapted to Denmark’s national strategy. If the national 
strategy is non-committing then this will probably over time influence on Aalborg’s Charter 
and Commitments? If this in practice has any consequence for the people and development in 
Aalborg, remains to be seen.  
 
5.3.13 Traffic and Environment Action Plan 1994, 1999 & 2005. 
 
The general transport policy in the 1994 Traffic and Environment Action Plan was thus 
formulated: The transport policy in Aalborg is based on the principles of sustainability. 
Targets for reductions of the impacts of increased traffic - accidents, visual intrusion, noise 
nuisance, emissions of pollutants, energy consumption, etc. - were laid down in the 1994 
Traffic and Environment Action Plan. This plan adapted the national targets and specified 
local actions that would help meet these targets. 
 
The Traffic and Environment Action Plan was revised in 1999 and 2005, reiterating Aalborg’s 
commitment to solving the environmental problems caused by traffic. The targets of the 
earlier plans still valid are:  
• To achieve a sustainable development by balancing the need for mobility against the 
desire to minimize the environmental impact of traffic 
• To reduce energy consumption and emissions in accordance with national targets 
• To reduce the number of dwellings affected by traffic noise levels exceeding 65 dB(A) 
by 1000 before 2010 
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• To reduce the number of fatalities and severe traffic injuries by 40% in 2007 
compared to 1987 
 
The status in Aalborg Municipality’s own words after he Traffic and Environment Action 
Plan has been working twelve years, are:  
• Traffic continues to grow in Aalborg municipality. The car share of total transport 
work (vkm or pkm) increases at the expense of public transport. 
• Energy consumption and CO2-emissions increases, caused by the growth in traffic.  
• Aalborg municipality keeps under the limits for local air emissions.  
• The number of dwellings with noise above limits is expected to grow, caused by the 
growth in traffic. 
• The aims for traffic safety (killed and seriously injured) are reached.  
• The aim is to increase the number of public transport assengers, but the effect of the 
new traffic plan from 2004 has not yet materialized. 
• The present parking policy continues. 
• The road investment plan from 2004, new theme in relation to the 1999 plan (notice 
that the municipality does not mention that it is contrary to the 1999 plan, the 1994 
plan and the Charter). 
• The Waterfront, redevelopment and connections to the centre, new theme in relation to 
the 1999 plan.  
• Future projects, extension of local rail and “Sporbus”. 
• Optimization of combined trips, among others by Park&Ride, new theme in relation to 
the 1999 plan. 
 
On the major problematic issues and challenges in the listing above, the Traffic and 
Environment Action Plan has not yet provided much. Car use is still increasing about three 
percent per year and public transport passengers fell from 17 million in 2002 to 15 million per 
year in 2005. Even if the public transport system was redesigned and improved in 2003, there 
is a strong and lasting downward trend for public transport, which probably require far 
stronger support than so far, if it shall be turned. The public transport officer286 in the 
municipality was very worried that they were losing more and more youths as customers, 
because both high school and university students buy a cheap car and thus they travel cheaper 
and faster than with the bus.  
 
 
                                                
286 Interview Jan Øhlensleger, 2007  
 
 192 
 
Figure 5-9 Aalborg planned waterfront developments ca. 2000  
Source: Knud Tranholm, presentation workshop UIS-AAU 14.12.06 
 
 
5.3.14 Road investment plan for the Aalborg area  
 
In the Environment Impact Assessment (VVM) of the 3rd Limfjord connection it is stated that 
the road network must be developed to avoid congestion and therefore a road investment plan 
for the Aalborg area287 should be made. This road investment plan was finihed already in 
2004. The traffic model calculations for the 3rd Limfjord connection were used to produce the 
road investment plan. The new connection in the west (Egholm line) “must be connected with 
the necessary access roads, which are safe and prevent unnecessary great delays”. Anticipated 
future congestion is an important driver in these model calculations.  
 
The road investment program decided on in the plan had a total estimated cost of 415 million 
DKK. Are these investments in new roads necessary when the politicians time and time again 
have said that the goal is to reduce car traffic and shift people from cars to public transport, 
walking and cycling? The rational answer is no, there will not be delays or congestion, 
because the present road network has more than enough capacity. Why are the politicians still 
pushing this road plan? Is it because they don’t believ  in their own goals? Are they 
deliberately cheating the public? Do they think that t ey would like sustainable development, 
but with such a policy they will lose their jobs? Is it about a fight to keep positions in the 
short-term, and lack of long-term leadership?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
287 Vejudbyggingsplan for Aalborgområdet. 
 
 
 193 
5.4 Sustainable transport planning in Aalborg? 
This chapter sums up the experiences with land us and tr nsport planning and policy in 
Aalborg on the basis of an analysis of the situation (ch 5.2) and the major events (ch 5.3). The 
gap between the vision, aims and goals on the one side and the Realpolitik with highway 
planning as the major issue on the other side, keep increasing surprisingly enough. Some 
ideas to why this gap keeps increasing are presented. 
 
5.4.1 Land use, transport infrastructure and growth 
 
The legislation and institutions especially the organization of the road sector, and the 
organizing of the political system in three tiers, gives many actors strong incentives to 
cooperate about increased road building. 
 
Land use plans within Aalborg will push 50% of new buildings to the city outskirts and 50% 
are expected to come on brown fields on both sides of Limfjord close to the city centre. 
Depending upon density (square metre building area per hectare) and the location of jobs and 
the workers homes, it is likely that the trend towards longer work journeys will continue. 
 
Commuting across municipal borders, which has been growing strongly, will probably also 
contribute to increased amount of transport by car. L nd use decisions over a 30-40 years time 
period and slower population growth than forecast and planned for, will make this trend last 
for many years. On the other hand, Aalborg has building plot reserves, both for housing and 
employment, and may therefore be better than other citi s in attracting new firms to settle. 
 
Aalborg Charter with The Vision of a Green Aalborg is still there, but the ample supply of 
building land makes the land use instrument ineffectiv . The 3rd Limfjord crossing decision 
will on the one hand affect land ownership and attrac  development along the new alignment, 
especially close to junctions. On the other hand will the new road open up opportunities for 
extensive bus priority schemes across Nørresundby-bridge and increased cycling and walking 
in the city centre. (At present the only difference between the two road alignments apart from 
local impacts, is that parts of the future road, the Egholm line, will come further west than the 
former Lindholm line) 
 
The investigation of Aalborg leave these main impressions:  
1. Reduction of car use is not an issue actively pursued in Land Use and Transport 
planning. Even in new brown field areas close to the city center there will be full 
parking provision as a result of requirements stated in planning regulations adopted by 
the municipality. Car use shall mainly be reduced by creating competitive alternatives 
to the car, although it was a stated aim to reduce travel demand with cars.  
2. Both politicians and planners are very proud of their sustainability record, the social 
aspects like participation in projects being important. Positive actions to improve the 
bicycle net have been done. Improvement to public transport, both bus priority and 
info system is being implemented.  
3. The third Limfjord crossing has passed through the City Council with a near 
unanimous vote. It passes across Egholm with a nature conflict, and the west of the 
city with noise, esthetical and barrier problems. 
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5.4.2 The goals achievement gap 
 
Aalborg has decided that the threat of traffic congestion on the major roads around 2020, 
makes it necessary to secure land for expansion of the road network to meet this threat. 
Taking the time needed to plan and build a new road, this seems a very rational and sensible 
thing to do. Looking at the decision from a sustainable transport perspective, there are two 
issues. Firstly, the road building plan seems contrary to the aims in Aalborg’s Traffic and 
Environment Action Plan and in the Aalborg Charter. Secondly, that it is necessary to reduce 
traffic growth, and indeed the need for car transport to meet the Kyoto agreement on 
reduction of CO2 emissions. How has Aalborg handled the conflict betwe n car traffic growth 
and the need to reduce emissions and other negative consequences of car usage in the urban 
area? How has growth been traded off against the environment? To answer these questions I 
have done a synthesis of the documents in the case,the discourse in the papers and the views 
from the planning and transport officers, and some key politicians and other informants.  
 
After having performed the interviews and studied plans and documents, it seems that there is 
no integration not even an attempt of integration between the planning for highway expansion 
and the aims and planning for a more sustainable city. The structure and institutions are such 
that there is no incentive to integrate land use planning and transport policy to reach the 
sustainability objectives. Rather there are strong disincentives for politicians and planners 
against such integration. It is two separate worlds far apart:  
• Highway planning is seen as dealing with Denmark’s global competitive situation and 
it is therefore a national interest to have modern efficient transport infrastructure, 
which also is in high demand from the average car use .  
• Urban travel and sustainable transport is something cities can deal with in their 
planning as part of “the symbolic politics cities are obliged to after Rio”.  
 
Interviews support this hypothesis of the two worlds. When asked what connection is there 
between Traffic and Environment Action Plan and the plan for the 3rd Limfjord connection the 
answer is repeatedly: None! The apparent conflicting goals: car growth and sustainable 
development, are not difficult to handle for the politicians. Orla Hav the County Mayor, said 
that ”people have sacrificed a lot to attain a car” hence they deserved a decent road network 
like the 3rd Limfjord crossing, and “road pricing will come in the future”. By this addition 
about road pricing he may have thought about reducing traffic by congestion charging, or he 
may have thought on the Norwegian model of financing road building. In both cases the 
reduction of traffic is not an issue now, it was something belonging to the future. 
 
5.4.3 The role of politicians and planners 
 
The need for road building is here and now many politicians feel from their encounters with 
the public and the media. They have to act on the current issues. Besides they will be doing a 
poor job if they are not fighting to get money from the Government. It is highly regarded to 
attract to the area inward investment, jobs or Governm nt funds.  
 
To secure employment and create jobs is and will be an overriding political task, while to 
influence land use a minor one. Therefore to use land use and transport planning as an 
instrument to achieve short distance between activities, say between home and work to reduce 
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the propensity to use the car, has low political priority. More Government or State rule to 
ensure that for example the counties and the municipal ties follow up sustainable development 
goals, were rejected by all politicians interviewed. They all pointed at the general trend of 
more devolution and most important to enhance democracy by giving people a greater say. 
The principle of subsidiarity, that decisions should be taken at the lowest competent level, 
which also is EU policy, seem the best way forward. The problem as the Aalborg case show, 
is that the Government in order to keep power, make the rules such that Minister and the 
Ministry continue to have the major say. Financing of roads and public transport 
infrastructure and services have been typical examples.  
 
The 2007 regional reform in Denmark alter both these areas, which will force the municipal 
politicians to trade off better public transport wih better schools. For the 3rd Limfjord 
connection the picture we have described will be the same, the decision on type of road, 
alignment, costs and who pays, will be taken in the Folketing as a political decision. Another 
important distinction between “roads” and land use planning is that the roads sector on all 
levels is organized as a hierarchy, with e.g. Stadsingeniøren on top in Aalborg. The sector has 
resources for planning and they are in charge of the road budget, often a fairly substantial 
budget. The road planners/engineers are merited by the projects they implement and 
uncongested traffic flow. The land use planner can allocate land use and prevent certain 
activity on that land use, but are dependent on a range of stakeholders to implement the land 
use plan. This difference make the “roads sector” the strongest in the implementation phase. 
The Aalborg project, which failed in the implementation phase, shows clearly how land use 
planning lost (Flyvbjerg 1991, Vol. II). The effect of road building on development is a 
controversial issue, but is often looked upon by politicians as:  
1. a way to strengthen employment (cfr Vickerman 200x, Flyvbjerg et. al. 2003, and 
others on the growth effects of transport projects) 
2. road investments both secure employment and investment comes into the municipality 
3. the aims of sustainable development are still important, although the development in 
the short term goes the wrong way 
4. the road planners have success here and now, while the and use planners struggle with 
big long-term challenges 
 
5.5 Conclusions and Lessons  
In this last chapter I discuss the real development on he ground in Aalborg and compare it 
with the intentions and the policy pursued. What happened? Why did it happen? How can the 
course of events be explained? What is to be learned from Aalborg? 
 
5.5.1 The important events on the time line 
 
Underlying all else is a quest for inward investment to boost economic development and 
regeneration in Aalborg. The politicians can fight for a “fairer” share of public investment, 
but only facilitate private investment. In practice this has been as the fight to get the 
University many years ago, and at present the fightto get investment money for the third 
crossing of the Limfjord. To entice private investment Aalborg can offer the University and 
research facilities, skilled labor force, an attractive city with broad cultural activities and 
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building sites with good accessibility. The airport and a good transport network are seen as 
necessary to attract new businesses. The environment comes as an added attribute.  
 
• The 3rd Limfjord connection was taken as granted from the early seventies. 
• The Generalplan 1974 reserved building land for deca s. 
• The new liberalism and market rule forced the planners to rethink planning, the Traffic 
and Environment Action Plan, the Charter and sustainable cities campaign were born. 
• The interests in the environment rise and fall, while the demand for road capacity keep 
increasing. 
 
The 3rd Limfjord crossing was put into the planners sketchs already in the early seventies and 
part of the testing of networks in the traffic models, it was taken as granted. At the same time 
the population forecasts anticipated that “baby boomers” born just after the World War would 
continue to have many children. Aalborg would reach  population of 200 000 around the 
year 2000 in the Generalplan forecasts. Building lad for housing and business was allocated 
to cope with this growth. But the population growth became slow, demand for new housing 
and business sites low, and the demand for land use planners reduced. What did the planners 
do? They produced more and better quality plans for the city centre regeneration. The 
environment wave and the public participation wave supported this shift in the planners 
attention, and in Aalborg the “Bykærne” studies andthe NORDKOLT project are examples.  
 
The eighties with the New Liberalism and the New Public Management ideologies left the 
planners in obscurity, the market forces were to do the job. Until the Brundtland report came 
and created a revival among Danish land use and trasportation planners. The Aalborg 
planners with the proud planning tradition caught on early the new wave of concern for the 
global ecology. The Clean City, Green City campaign was held in 1988, which led to the 
1990 award from EU and EFTA The Tidiest City in Europe. At this time several forces 
coalesce: together with the creative planners in Aalborg and their planning, the central 
government produced “green” signals, the preparations f r the Rio ’92 meeting started and 
EU worked on its green urban paper, and not least the general public awakening and 
awareness about sustainable development was spreading.  
 
There is an interesting “wave/fashion” which rise and fall with time. The environment wave 
and with it public participation in planning had a crest in the early seventies and fell to a low 
in the early eighties when the new liberalism and the Reagan/Thatcher era took off. The 
environment wave crested anew at the Rio Conference in 1992, but the new liberalism stayed 
on, possible on different layers. Or could it be that t e seemingly very strong environmental 
discourse had been turned into a sector issue and thus made harmless? Anyway the public 
planners stayed out in their jobs all through these changes in attitudes and fashion. What did 
they do when the market should allocate land instead of planning and regulation? Tradition 
and a hundred years of plans and regulations were still there, building permits had to be given 
and proposals analyzed. Some planners went further as the municipal architect expressed in 
an interview288: “ we adjust and shift our values and attitudes towards what we can talk 
about, towards where we can have a dialogue.” The planners in Aalborg were indeed clever 
in translating sustainable development into concepts and plans relevant for the city.  
 
                                                
288 Front page citation. Interview with Municipality Architect in Aalborg, cited from Carsten J. Hansen, 2001.  
 
 197 
Innovative and creative planners make plans that are relevant for their superiors, and they are 
able to use the general mood internally in the administration as the Municipality Engineer 
said289: “   people wanted a greener city. That was in the lat -1980s, and it was combined into 
one concept   So, when we got the prize as the Tidist City in November 1990 we said ‘what 
can be developed further within this perspective?’ Then it was natural to look into road traffic   
However, I cannot show a paper that says that the Clean City, Green City strategy is being 
extended with this (transport policy making and planning from an environment perspective). I 
do not think we have written that anywhere.” This public concern for traffic and a greener city 
the planners translated into The Traffic and Environment Action Plan, which again led to the 
Aalborg Conference and the Aalborg Charter in 1994. The city planners felt and took the 
responsibility for a comprehensive and integrated land use and transport plan for Aalborg, 
without being told. The road planners in the County worried at the same time about future 
congestion because the capacity reserve on the Limfjord crossings would be “eaten up” by the 
fast traffic growth on the motorways. They therefor analyzed future traffic demand ending 
up with the need for a 3rd Limfjord crossing. These two groups were well acquainted and 
participated in each others work, although the results were going in different directions.  
 
The difficult question I have tried to answer is if the Traffic and Environment Action Plan, the 
Charter and the later the Commitments mainly exist in a discursive and symbolic world with 
little or no influence over land use and transport development in Aalborg? There is an 
increasing gap between the aims and intentions on the one side and the indicators of how 
Aalborg changes on the other side. Most indicators like car traffic growth, noise, CO2-
emissions, sprawl and commuting show that Aalborg is becoming more and more 
unsustainable and contribute to the depletion of fossil resources, reduction of bio-diversity 
and climate change through CO2-emissions. The motorway system has influenced bothh me 
and job location for people in Aalborg and North Jutland290. My belief is that this will 
continue and hence make the region more and more car dependent. It seems that the 
underlying driving forces that make the car indispensable have reached a level, which will be 
hard to break. By this I mean that when more and more persons commuting to work use more 
than 45 minutes with the car covering 50-60 km or me one way, then there are no substitute 
for the car.  
 
Policies aiming at shift of mode and reducing car use should to start with, be applied at a 
limited area, e.g. like work trips to the city centre. Even at such a limited area, there are no 
great success stories in Aalborg or anywhere291. It was not possible to create such a gradual 
introduction of an environmentally sustainable transport policy in Aalborg from 1994 and 
onwards, as the Traffic and Environment Action Plan envisaged. The City Council adopted 
the aims and has managed the implementation of the plan. Instead of a forceful 
implementation of the plan, it was left aside and reviewed every 4-5 years, rolling the 
sustainable aims and goals forward. The same City Council was much more potent and 
effective with plans and processes that supported developing the road network and reducing 
car travel times. When sometime in the future (?) the 3rd Limfjord crossing has been built and 
the 2004 Road building program implemented292, Aalborg will get a high class motorway 
system offering good capacity and high level of servic  at least for the next twenty years with 
                                                
289 Interview 29/3-2001 cited from Carsten J. Hansen, 2001.  
290 Nielsen and Hovgesen 2004   
291 The possible exception is the congestion charging schemes in London and Stockholm. 
292 See map on page 43, Plan & Bæredygtighed. Redegørelse. Aalborg kommune 2003. 
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the present 3% yearly traffic growth. It is difficult to imagine that a political party will 
promote restrictions on car use when such a network is established. Then only two options 
remain. The City Council can make public transport, cycling and walking so attractive that 
people shift voluntary (carrots like tax deduction when cycling to work, etc. is probably 
necessary). There are probably a lot of innovative soft measures that can be used to make the 
alternatives to the car extremely attractive, but they will cost! (To stem the rise in obesity in 
the population, or to reduce CO2-emissions may be motive enough for such policies) The 
second option is that “a climate of desperation” is created (Vigar, 2002). If people and indeed 
the politicians in charge feel that the threat of climate change has become unavoidable, so 
close and so strong (a feeling of desperation) that individual and collective actions are 
necessary, then change may come.293 
 
It remains a puzzle and a paradox. Aalborg seems to have everything going for it: geography, 
wealth, traditions, culture, competence, good planners and eminent plans adopted by the 
politicians. But still, the City – in 2007 – pursues policies contrary to its aims that in the long-
term might contribute to devastating global changes. 
 
5.5.2 Lesson one  
 
In Aalborg slow growth or lack of growth has been a m jor political concern for years. 
Aalborg University was created for this very reason. North Jutland has also been dedicated as 
Objective 2 Area for EU support to peripheral regions with slow growth. The city of Aalborg 
envisaged thirty years ago a population growth towards 200 000 inhabitants, but is still in 
2005 only 165 000. One side effect of this slow population growth is that the municipality has 
substantial areas allocated for development, and these areas can be used to attract firms. There 
has also been invested in the technical infrastructu e to facilitate building straight away when 
the need arise.  
 
Increased car dependence caused by the spreading of housing and workplaces has 
increasingly put a focus on road capacity and future raffic problems, the crossing of the 
Limfjord being one of these concerns.  
 
 
What is being implemented – has been implemented the last years? 
Huge road projects are what stand out as the major planning process in Aalborg the last 15 
years. The 3rd Limfjord connection has been under discussion/planning for many years. That 
discussion was finalized in September 2003 when both the City Council and the County 
Council adopted the western alternative. 
 
The decision on the 3rd Limfjord connection is securing future road capacity to avoid 
congestion, but it can also be looked at along the centre-periphery dimension. There are 
widespread political concerns on Jutland about the concentration of investment and activity in 
the Copenhagen/Øresund region and a continual political fight to attract inward investment to 
Jutland. In such a perspective the 3rd Limfjord connection will function as a project tha can 
be used as a trade off for political support in the Parliament for new projects in the 
                                                
293 As I write this a couple of months before Al Gore gets the Nobel Peace Prize, I can’t see that any of these two 
options are near in time.  
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Copenhagen region. (The precedence is the big H compro ise in the Parliament, which 
secured Jutland completion of the motorways north to south on Jutland as a compensation for 
the Great Belt Bridge.)  
 
There is not evidence that the Traffic and Environment Action Plan has achieved to attain the 
environmentally sustainable transport goals of reduc  car travel and shift to Public Transport 
and Bike and Walking. Rather the opposite is happening on Jutland with rapid development 
along the E45 motorway and increased car travel over l ng distances294. The focus on growth 
and the political task of getting inward investment to he city and region, together with the 
political game around the centre-periphery dimension are the explanations of what has been 
implemented in Aalborg. 
 
What has not been implemented? 
The aims and plans for environmentally sustainable transport have not been implemented, 
except from some marginal projects. Land use contraction is difficult because of the General 
Plan has allocated large development areas to the south east, which will increase travel 
distances when developed. Also the effect of neighboring municipalities offering cheap and 
high quality housing, pull in the same direction. Aalborg municipality owned much of the 
waterfront and could control development, but the land has been sold and control lost. 
 
Parking policy in Aalborg is less strict than advocated in the plans, and the improvement of 
Public Transport and Bike and Walking has only been marginal. There has not been 
implemented any effective means that can facilitate shift away from the car and reduce car 
travel.  
 
Counterfactual thinking could imagine that Aalborg from the early eighties concentrated all 
development to brownfields along the waterfront andother places. The city would then have 
become denser with more people living and working in the centre and thus facilitating 
reduced car use. On the other hand both people and businesses might instead of localizing 
along the waterfront have chosen to move out of the city and nothing would then be gained.  
 
Conformance between aims and results in Aalborg? 
In a goal – achievement perspective it is clear that the city of Aalborg, the mother of The 
Aalborg Charter, has adopted strong aims pointing at a more enviromentally sustainable 
transport development and indeed sustainable developm nt in general. The Traffic and 
Environment Action Plan has not been an effective instrument in Aalborg in a conformance 
view.  
 
The performance of land use and transport planning in Aalborg. 
The performance of planning depends of the definitio  of planning. If the planning only is to 
coordinate activities in space and time to adapt to and support market driven change, th n the 
land use and transport planning in Aalborg has performed well.  
 
On the other hand, if land use and transport planning also has an instrumental function in the 
city, e.g. to prevent sprawl and reduce emissions from car travel, then the Aalborg 
performance is less positive.  
                                                
294 This is well documented by Nielsen and Hovgesen, 2004. 
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The most positive performance in an instrumental view of land use and transport planning is 
the Aalborg Charter and the EU projects with sustainability aims. This is because I believe 
that if the city of Aalborg set itself high aims and reinforce these aims time and time again, 
sooner or later they may be instrumental in change. Th  other side of this argument is that the 
aims are ambiguous and relative, and as such can be pushed forward in the planning as 
symbols without ever being implemented.  
 
Politics matter 
Politics may be seen as a long stream of decisions. Some of the decisions are tiny (a straight 
forward attic conversion), some are big (building a new culture centre), some are budget 
decisions with intricate consequences and some are pl n/strategy decisions with both short- 
and long-term often unclear effects. The Traffic & Environment Plan was adopted first in 
1994. Since then the second version came in 1999 and the third version has been presented for 
the politicians and adopted 2005. “Do we have the right goals? Is the strategy in line with 
national guidelines? Are we going in the right direction” are examples of the type of questions 
politicians may ask when confronted with a new plan proposal. If not in line with the strategy, 
then they may think it doesn’t matter since the strategy will be adjusted in five years time. 
Politicians may, therefore see the decision by the City Council in September 2003 on the 3rd 
Limfjord crossing, as a simple shift in reservation of land for a western bypass (from the 
Lindholm line, which had been reserved earlier, to the Egholm line). Then it is business as 
usual. In such a light the global questions of CO2 emissions and the effects the 3
rd Limfjord 
crossing will have on traffic growth, may seem irrelevant.  
 
Politics may also be seen as having two sides. One is the ideology production for the voters 
and media, which is concerned about winning support, c nfidence and elections. The other 
side is the committee work where the elected represntatives work closely with the officials to 
find good solutions. What sort of incentives is it in he committee work? For the MP? The 
County Councilor? The City Councilor or the planner? All these three groups have strong 
incentives to give something back to their voters/party/wards/constituencies. Building 
alliances, networking and compromises are common on all three levels. Looking at the 3rd 
Limfjord crossing in such a light it is easy to see that at the city level some areas carry most of 
the negative consequences, while others benefit. This makes it a difficult case for city 
councilors. The county councilors will similarly look at what districts benefits and loses, and 
the western alignment was the obvious compromise. Common for the politicians on all the 
three levels is the thought that more money the stat  will invest in the Aalborg district, the 
“better” is the job the politicians have done. Allocation of jobs, investments and other benefits 
to Nordjylland is a major task on which politicians are judged. “We want compensation from 
Copenhagen!” was the way one politician put it.  
 
THE LESSON: The framework that guides and delimits the politicians’ and planners’ 
actions had an important role in Aalborg. A new national framework that gives the 
cities extensive self-rule over land use and transport lanning and financing appears 
to be  necessary if sustainable development is to have a chance. Such a new 
framework should also include incentive schemes that make the politicians and 
planners pursue environmentally sustainable transport development, instead of roads 
for cars. 
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5.5.3 Lesson two 
 
Traditions, and the impact of New Public Management?  
Aalborg is the capital in the one of the most peripheral regions of Denmark, although 
distances to the Copenhagen area are relatively short. But, Denmark has a tradition of a strong 
central Government, which makes politicians at the city and county level focus on how 
benefits from the Government can be obtained. One such means is to excel in planning, which 
Aalborg has done. Through this Aalborg can get in good grips with the ministries and obtain 
demonstration projects etc. This is very much the similar to the way Kristiansand has behaved 
over the years.  
 
The 3rd Limfjord decision can also be seen as part of the new governance structures 
developing. North Jutland County was the driving force in getting a final decision taken. It 
did that by creating a wide cooperation between many municipalities, the Highway Agency, 
freight associations, trade cambers, etc. which can be seen as a new governance structure on 
North Jutland.  
 
How can the EST development or lack of development be explained? 
Institutions and structure promote the car and hinder the EST development in Aalborg.  
Politicians and policy also matters. Present institutions and incentives are not adequate, hence 
new institutions/subsidiarity needs to be created. 
 
The framework must be changed so that the barriers to EST are diminished/removed. It is not 
likely that the politicians in Aalborg can push forcar reductions, unless the Government 
creates strong incentives for reduced car travel and shift to other modes. It is also unlikely that 
it is possible to curb car use in Aalborg without the far more congested capital set a good 
example. 
 
Congestion Charging is discussed for the Copenhagen rea. It will if introduced in 
Copenhagen be an example that might be seen as relevant for Aalborg, or it might not be 
relevant. The scale difference between Aalborg and Copenhagen is so large, that I can’t see 
that congestion charging will be applicable in Aalborg in the foreseeable future unless strong 
external forces as the climate challenge will be pushing such change. It is more likely that the 
Norwegian model of toll rings will be used in Aalborg to finance road investments.  
 
THE LESSON: Aalborg is on strong path to realizing a road network in the city, which 
facilitates free car use. As it is now the national po icies prevent car reduction policies 
from working. If car use in cities is to be curbed, then national policies supporting 
such reduction in car use must be in place, together with measures that support the 
soft modes.  
 
5.5.4 Lesson three 
 
The land use planning has basically been an instrument to always have a surplus of land to 
attract businesses to locate in Aalborg. The master plan of 1947 covered the whole area of the 
municipality. The plan was very influenced by American and British ideas with a major ring-
road network and good accessibility to the centre and all other areas. Creating a good 
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environment with little traffic in the dwelling areas and the centre was the other main idea. 
The building of the major road network meant demolishing a lot of buildings, some with 
historic interest, and destroying the character of the central area. However the long-range plan 
for the municipality area produced in the early seventies, expected the population and the 
demand for land to grow far faster than what happened. Thirty years later there is ample 
building land available in the outskirts of the city and in addition has the structural change 
within industry provided huge Brownfield areas along the waterfront on both sides of the 
Limfjord. In this study I have only looked at land use and transport planning and policy, 
which means that much of the impressive work Aalborg has done on the broader sustainable 
development issues like inner city regeneration, energy or utilities is not included295.  
 
The eighties saw the breakthrough of the ideas of Reagan and Thatcher, planning was “out” 
and “in” was a turn towards market solutions and away from planning, also in Denmark. In 
Aalborg no comprehensive land use and transport plan was produced until the middle of the 
nineties. The Brundtland report in 1987 came as a relief and ideological foundation for many 
traditional planners. Both at the central government l vel and the regional and city level an 
upsurge in planning documents came around 1990, which in Aalborg resulted in the Aalborg 
Charter of 1994. Aalborg has also got a lot of praise for Traffic and Environment Action Plan 
1994. The plan calls for higher density and mixed use to facilitate shorter journeys and shift of 
mode to public transport, bike and walking. However, the location of the majority of the new 
housing and new employment in Aalborg happens in the outskirts and therefore the distance 
between housing and employment increases. The increasing commuting across the 
municipality border further aggravates this. Aalborg is increasingly becoming the centre in a 
vast and expanding commuting or “travel to work” area, where the car is the only mode that 
offers acceptable travel times. Parallel to the enviro ment focus in the city planning 
department in the early nineties, the county technical staff responsible for the state road 
network started again to look at traffic growth on the major roads and especially the threat of 
future capacity problems crossing the Limfjord. The 3rd Limfjord Crossing was already fixed 
in the land use plan as the Lindholm line, but a re-examination of the plans led to the Egholm 
line was decided in September 2003. Car traffic increases that much that serious congestion 
threatens in ten/fifteen year’s time and an investmnt of 400 million Euros is deemed 
necessary. The 3rd Limfjord Crossing will further drive dispersal of homes and jobs resulting 
in increased vehicle kilometer traveled (VKT). Car dependency grows and so will green 
house gas emissions.  
 
The gap between the goals and objectives adopted by the city council and the negative 
consequences of the increased car use continue to widen. The city’s positive environmental 
policy on waste, refuse etc. can not counter weigh these negative effects. To understand the 
policy choices in Aalborg one must look at the relationship between the region, the city and 
the national authorities. The 3rd Limfjord Crossing will/may/must be financed by the 
Government and is prominent in any parliamentary bagaining about a fixed link across 
Femer Belt to Germany. The highway is also the solution to free market location and choice 
of employment opportunities in North Jutland and carry wide regional political backing. 
Goals of sustainable transport development seem to have mainly two reasons: One is the 
coordination of goals hierarchical and vertical across the national level, countries and 
                                                
295  See for example ”Sustainable utility supply in Aalborg” 2004, which sums up some of this work. 
 
 203 
municipalities, the other being the conditions to participate in new environment projects and 
obtain extra funding for projects in a municipality, starved for income.  
 
In short Aalborg has adopted all the right goals of ustainable development, and indeed 
promoted these to more than 1800 other cities. It has also land use and transport plans 
outlining the path and means to be used to reach these goals. The sustainable development 
discourse and the strategic capacity to deal with long-term sustainability issues in Aalborg 
was studied by Carsten Hansen296 who concluded “the capacity grew in the nineties, but seem 
to fade towards 2000”. During implementation it seems that some goals carry more weight 
than others, some instruments are well functioning, but others are not. The “governing 
regime” and structural forces supports market driven solutions, while the sustainable solutions 
that require action to prevent increasing car use and c r driven dispersion hardly have any 
effective instruments at hand.  
 
The strong planning tradition in Aalborg has certainly put the city in the forefront of 
sustainable development planning. There is one path of high quality and up to date planning 
that goes back to the early fifties. This path led to participation in a range of EU projects, the 
Aalborg Charter 1994 and the Commitments in 2004 being the highlight so far. The planning 
ideology underpinning this path has been the rationl/synoptic model, first described by 
Banfield. In the new millennium more weight have ben put on the symbolic part of the city 
image, on a branding and marketing effort. The effect of this is probably more weight on the 
positive image and less on how to control the policy-making process towards the city aims 
and vision.  
 
Figure 5-10  Branding Aalborg aim at making the Aalborg star shine stronger and clearer  
 
But there has also been another path that concerns the car development and how to provide 
capacity for the expected traffic growth and associated congestion problems. This path which 
was based on the “predict and provide” ideology has been concerned with the 3rd Limfjord 
crossing and the inner city car traffic and parking problem. The decision297 fixing the position 
of the third crossing in 2003, may be seen as important decision along this path.  
 
 
                                                
296 Carsten J. Hansen, 2001.  Local transport Policy and Planning. Aalborg University 
297 The VVM has to be redone according to the decision in Naturklagenævnet in 2006.  
 
 
Branding Aalborg 
Branding Aalborg står sammen med NORDJYSKE Medier bag sitet 
aalborg.dk. 
Branding Aalborg er et femårigt pro jekt, der løber fra 2005 til og med 2009, hvor Aalborgs 
uddannelsesinstitutioner, erhvervs-, turist- og kulturliv sammen med Aalborg Kommune 
arbejder fo r at få Aalborgs stjerne til at lyse stærkere og klarere.  
 
Aalborg.dk er et værktøj t il at fortælle alle de gode historier om Aalborg og til at få folk t il 
at opleve Aalborg. Vi håber, at sitet vil inspirere d ig til at benytte nogle af byens mange 
tilbud.  
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THE LESSON: The principle of subsidiarity implemented would give the City of 
Aalborg the chance to develop environmentally sustainable transport, but only if the 
majority voted for such a course. It would clarify the path from vision to aims to 
objectives and implementation. The trade off between different policies would take 
place in the open at the city level. Devolution of p wers to the city level will not 
guarantee sustainable city development, but the opportunity will be there to be taken.   
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Aalborg case – Annex I   
Short list for standard comparison of the case cities – Aalborg 
 
 
 Aalborg 
Background The Aalborg Charter 1994, pledging more sustainable city development, has reached far out, 
1800 cities have joined.  
Population growth very slow, and far behind earlier expectations. 
Strong centre-periphery issues. 
E45 & E39 finished from the German border to northern ports.  
Special LU&T 
 
 
LU&T, the correct goals, but no instruments to promote/push LU.  
E45 & 3rd Limfjord wins. 
Allocation to the Traffic and Environment Action Plan skewed, car culture the winner. 
Job creation seen as the major task.  
Land Use 
 
Reserve of land for building will last decades. Both close to the city centre redevelopment on 
both sides along the Limfjord, and in the outskirts where large growth areas are planned. 
Considerable investment in utilities for these areas, are “sunk costs” (put in ground). 
Large need for new jobs. 
LU&T Policy  
 
LU&T policy has aimed at establishing Aalborg as the growth pole and prospering regional 
centre in north Jutland. Building land reserves for at least twenty years exist and city can 
receive the location of a major company “over night”. 
Ample areas along the waterfront being released due to d cline in industries.  
3rd Limfjord corridor being fixed in 2003 after decades of discussion, controversial and 
contested. 
City Syd. Have had consequences for the shop structure in the region, by attracting shoppers 
from a large area. Development of City Nord not relevant because of this reason.  
Also shopping in the city centre versus peripheral shopping discussed.  
Transport corridors and junctions have influenced LU more than the opposite way. 3rd
Limfjord is already said to influence land-prices.  
Transport 
Financing. 
 
3rd Limfjord decision gives the county opportunity to fight for Government investment money 
as part of the national highway network system (can be contested by the state).  
Important decision to get financing as compensation for investment in Copenhagen area. The 
big H (store H ) compromise about the Great Belt connection, which led to building the 
motorways E45 and E39, might be a model for securing compensation of a Femer Belt 
decision? Very skilful political maneuver by the County mayor, while the Aalborg mayor 
opted out of the process.  
Comment  
 
Shift of planning focus from instrumental steering to goals and visions (EU projects, info 
system PT measures that is not a challenge to the car) the eighties planning’s transformation 
decade? Failure of planning: 3rd Lim in 1980s and 1990s, success 2003! LU structure from 
seventies still abundant land reserves. In addition have the waterfront land become available 
from 1980s due to close down of industry, without the city being able to plan/act on this 
straight away. To keep Centre attractive in competition with City Syd and other motorway 
hub developments a challenge.  
Findings: LU&T challenges or problems small. The C ntre-Periphery dimension important, 
how to acquire a “fair share” from GOV to NJ/Aalborg, jobs, support grants, EU funding, 
investments, research, students?  
Who wins, lose? What could have been done differently? More housing a d jobs in centre to 
prevent commuting. To return this will take decades. 3rd Lim will generate new traffic? 
Nørresundby bridge with priority to PT and B&W? MS priority list that disappeared?  
Financing Infrastructure: allocation from Government. Why plan?  Statutory. Traffic and 
Environment Action Plan driven by planners, so the EU projects.  
Democratic accountability: Medium, but fragmented. From 2007 new regions and enlarged 
Aalborg municipality may influence accountability, how remains to be seen.  
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6 Norwich 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This introductory subchapter sets the Norwich Case Study. The study is focusing on Land Use 
and Transport planning and policy as an instrument to reach the goal of sustainable urban 
transport as part of sustainable urban development. The chapter contains a short history and 
description of Norwich and the approach to the case study. It also contains a comment on the 
Buchanan Report: TRAFFIC IN TOWNS, which had profound influence on the transportation 
planning thinking in Britain, as indeed in Norwich which was one of the report’s model cities.  
 
 
6.1.1 Context  
 
The city of Norwich was the second city to London fr hundreds of years up to the 1700s. It 
was the geographical location close to the sea with a large hinterland that supported trade and 
the growth of Norwich. This legacy has left Norwich with hundreds of listed buildings of 
which Norwich Cathedral and the Castle are the most impressive.  
 
 
Figure 6-1 Map of Norwich and the south east of Engla d  
 
Norfolk has more than 830 000 inhabitants while the population in Norwich is still below  
130 000, which is only slightly more than in the 1930s. The population in Norwich urban area 
has around 230 000 inhabitants when the suburbs are included, representing roughly a third of 
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the county population. The population in the Norwich Travel to Work Area (TWA) has about 
370 000 people. 
 
In 1974 Norfolk County Council became both the Land Use & Transport and the Highway 
authority for Norfolk County including the city of Norwich. From that year Norwich was no 
longer a borough with wide powers, it became a local authority District, one of 6 Districts in 
Norfolk County. An agreement with Norwich set up a Joint Highway committee, but with the 
decisive vote for Norfolk. Some of the present day strengths and weaknesses are described in 
the box:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sustainable Futures East of England Strategy October 2005  
 
6.1.2 Traffic in the historic city 
 
The famous Buchanan Report T affic in Towns from 1963 used the city as a model in the 
chapter The Historic City Norwich. The planning principles laid down in the report, ae still 
relevant. Bellow follows some highlights on Norwich 40 years ago. 
 
The situation 
When Colin Buchanan chose the historic city of Norwich to be studied in Traffic in Towns, 
the population was about 160 000 inhabitants in the urban area. From 30 000 to 35 000 were 
employed in the old city area out of 88 000 employed in Norwich labour exchange area. 
Already in the early 1960s traffic flow and congestion were a problem: 43 000 vehicles 
entered the old city at a Friday and 49 000 at a Saturd y. In two hours in the morning 6687 
vehicles entered and 2933 left, 3500 vehicles were pa ked both on and off streets at the same 
day, an increase of 38% in two years. It was estimated that 5000 vehicles parked in 1963. 
”Congestion is sufficient to induce traffic to filter through whichever streets promise the 
shortest journey-time. Consequently the whole street n twork within the old city is at times 
used to its maximum traffic capacity.” (Buchanan 1963:116) 
 
The potentially high standard of environment was lowered by the effect of the vehicular 
traffic: The city ”---is severed by heavy cross-flows of traffic.” The environmental conditions 
deteriorate as the number of vehicles increases, this is reflected in the increase in road 
‘Norwich has the largest surviving medieval core of any city in Britain… 
The views of Ely Cathedral across the Fens evoke onf the strongest images 
of the East of England.’ 
‘The transport network is strongly radial. Although there is some provision  
for orbital road movement, the orbital rail network is poor. 
The links to London remain very important… Much of both the road and rail 
network is heavily congested and while there is a significant infrastructure 
deficit, there is a need to encourage travel by means other than the private car 
and reduce the need to travel.’ 
‘The region is commonly assumed to be affluent because it lacks major 
conurbations or post-industrial areas experiencing intense deprivation or 
poverty. It is in parts subject to growth pressures particularly around London 
and Cambridge, with implications for affordable housing, infrastructure and 
social cohesion. Yet other parts, particularly Norflk and Suffolk, face 
problems associated with remote, peripheral areas that have limited 
employment opportunities, low wages and lack access to ervices.’  
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causalities, which rose from 502 in 1957 to 644 in 1962. ”—with the present level of parking, 
every accessible piece of ground is taken up by cars. This takes place regardless of local 
amenity. Places of great interest and beauty such as the precincts of the old Cathedral and 
the Castle, Tombland and the St. Andrew’s Plain are packed with cars to the grave detriment 
to their appearance.” Industrial traffic chokes the local streets. The shortage of space is acute: 
”---the environmental capacity of much of the old city is already grossly exceeded.” 
(Buchanan 1963:118) The report gave this general recommendation for city planning, still 
valid today: “The main principle and the basis for planning is abundantly clear – if the 
environment is sacrosanct, and if no major reconstruction can be undertaken, then 
accessibility must be limited.”  
 
The future will be challenging 
A threefold increase in car traffic by 2010 was forecast, to an estimated 76 000 entering the 
old city daily. Of these 18 000 would be commuter’s cars, 22 000 shopper’s cars, 200 buses 
and 36 000 cars to industry and business. Peak hour flow was predicted to be 19 000 vehicles 
per hour, of which 75% would be commuter’s cars. Parking demand would be 18 000 long-
term spaces for commuters and 5000 spaces for shoppers.  
 
A problem of environmental management 
Buchanan listed the following steps to establish an environmental area: 
1. Numbers, types and speeds of vehicles to be kept down t  a level compatible to 
environmental standards. 
2. Circulation of essential traffic to be contrived. 
3. Streets and areas converted to pedestrian use only. 
4. All through movements prevented. 
5. Internal movements reorganized. 
 
Additional measures would be needed: 
1. Control to be exercised over change of land use with the object of reducing traffic 
generation. Certain parts to be retained for residential use,partly to restrain traffic, but 
also to maintain certain essential qualities of the old historic city. May not be in conflict 
with the function of central shopping. In fact it could well be to its advantage. 
2. Parking policy to be firmly directed towards the environmental objectives. 
3. Public service vehicles might be given preference. Buses should be smaller, quieter, 
slower-moving. 
4. The question of speed should be considered, 30 mph mig t be too great. Public opinion 
might not be prepared, but this is an example of the severity of discipline, which is likely 
to be required in the future. (Buchanan 1963:119) 
 
The recommendations the Buchanan report outlined forty years ago, both policy and measures 
are still highly relevant. It was deemed necessary with a restraint policy and Norwich needed 
measures to be able to cope with the car. It also warned that the public opinion might not be 
prepared of the severity of discipline necessary, a point highly actual to day when congestion 
charging is put on the agenda. 
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6.1.3 Which questions have I tried to answer in the Norwich case study? 
 
The use of the private car in urban areas has had both positive impacts and serious negative 
impacts. The major question in the sustainable transport development debate is how to govern 
car mobility in our cities in a way that reduces negative impacts and increases the positive 
impacts both for the present and the future population. The challenge this case study focuses 
on is how the Land Use and Transport (LU&T) planning system can be used as an instrument 
to govern mobility in medium sized cities.  
 
The questions asked are therefore:   
• What are the major changes in LU&T policy in recent years? 
• How has LU&T planning and policy influenced the development and events in the 
city over the last 10-20 years up the present?  
• How has this policy affected the spatial and traffic changes? 
• What has promoted and what has hindered the use of th  LU&T measure?  
In most western cities of less than half a million nhabitants the car is the major transport 
mode and increasingly so over the last decades. On a global scale the increase of car traffic in 
cities seem to be repeating this pattern and it is further accelerated by the strong growth in the 
urban population worldwide. The problems of car use in cities are outlined in chapter 2.1.3. 
As the European Environment Agency states the gap between the goals of a more 
environmentally sustainable transport (EST) and the harsh realities keep increasing (EEA 
2006). The methodology to explore these questions is based on a timeline of events that has 
been important in the LU&T development and change i the city. Each event is analyzed to 
find the forces behind the event. I have started with the present and worked backwards in the 
material, then forward and backwards again, as new data was discovered. The main data 
sources have been LU&T plans (documents and maps), the decisions made and the debate in 
the newspapers at that time. This material has beensupplemented with 8-10 interviews and 
talks with key persons (politicians, planners, journalist and people in grass root groups). Some 
of the events did probably happen by chance, technological change and global economic 
forces drove some and some were local, decided and implemented by public actors. If 
decisions were taken according to the LU&T planning legislation how was the conformance 
between goals and results; and how did they p rform in guiding later development and 
change? 
 
The case study of Norwich aims at answering the following four research problems:  
1. Explain the main factors resulting in LU&T change in Norwich. 
2. Explore how LU&T change was resisted, opposed, promoted. 
3. Examine the role of institutional relations in explaining processes of LU&T change 
and inertia. 
4. To use the above analysis to look for the feasibility of challenging existing patterns 
of mobility. 
 
6.1.4 A Time Line  
 
From the Master Plans in the sixties through the “anti planning Thatcher years” to the Blair 
period, Land Use and Transport planning has seen great changes in England. A major shift 
from Technocratic to Sociocratic planning ideal hasppened, but also the need to improve 
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urban governance and steering systems for long term management has emerged. It is in this 
complex and changing environment I have highlighted some of the plans and processes 
important for Norwich. The path dependence is important for many plans and decisions. The 
Time Line shows some of the important events in Norwich on the right hand side and on the 
left side events at the national level.  
 
LU&T Lines through Time in Norwich 1900/1945 – 2007  
 1900 Norwich Electrical Tramways open services 
 1935 Eastern Omnibus Company closed the tramway 
 1945 City of Norwich Plan 
Buses nationalized 1948  
 1950 Bus fares increased first time in 30 years 
Traffic in Towns published, Norwich model city 1963 University of East Anglia opened 
 1967 First pedestrian street in UK298, London street 
 1967 NATS survey of traffic 
 1969 Norwich Airport opened 
 1974 A Transportation Strategy for 1986 
 1975 A Transportation Strategy for 1990 (IRR) 
Margaret Thatcher elected 1979 Norfolk Structure Plan 1976-1991 
Buses deregulated and privatized 1987 Norwich Area Economic Study 
 1988 Norfolk Structure Plan Replacement 1981-1996 
 1991 Norwich Area Transport Strategy 
 1993 Secretaries of State stop the Inner Ring Road 
 1993 Norfolk Structure Plan 1993 
 1995 Norwich Local plan. PLANNING THE 1990’s 
 1997 NATS Norwich Area Transport Strategy 2011 
A New Deal for Transport 1998 Norfolk Structure Plan 1999 
 1999 European Sustainable City award 
Transport 2010. The 10 Year Plan 2000  
Planning Policy Guidance Note 3: Housing 2000  
RPG6: Regional Planning Guidance for East 
Anglia to 2016. 
2000 NATS Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06 
Commission for Integrated Transport. European 
best practice in delivering integrated transport 
2001 Restart on the planning of the Northern 
Distributor Road - NDR 
Planning Policy Guidance Note 13: Transport 2001  
Regional Sustainable Development Framework 
for the East of England 
2001  
East of England 2010 2001  
 2002 First Annual Progress Report LTP 2001 
 2002 City of Norwich Replacement Local Plan Draft 
 2002 Second Annual Progress Report LTP 2001 
 2003 Norwich Area Transportation Strategy (NATS) 
Review NDR launched 
 2003 Third Annual Progress Report LTP 2001 
East of England Plan   2004  
The Future of Transport-A Network for 2030 2004 Fourth Annual Progress Report LTP 2001 
Full Guidance on Local Transport Plans 2004  
 2005 St. Andrews Parking, Chapelfield development 
 2005 New Bus station opened 
 2005 Provisional Local Transport Plan 2006-2011 
 2005 Consultation LTP 2006-2011 
 2007 Norwich apply for unitary, against county wish 
                                                
298 Aalborg opened the first pedestrian street in 1961 and Markens gate in Kristiansand was pedestrianised 1971 
as one of the first in Norway, ideas travel fast. 
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The Blair Government’s first White Paper on transport: A New Deal for Transport: Better for 
Everyone represents a significant shift in Government policy and was in research circles 
named “the new realism”. From 2000 onwards “the newr alism” in transport policy was put 
into action. The main vehicle for this policy on the local level was Local Transport Plans 
(LTP) to which we will come back later. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Map of Norwich area  
Source: Google maps 
 
6.2 History and situation  
 
6.2.1 Population  
 
The box below gives some of the key data on population and employment for Norwich in 
2006. Norwich District (municipality) has 122 000 inhabitants299, the urban area (NATS) 
about 230 000 and the Travel to Work Area (TWA) 367 000. Note that number of people per 
square km is fairly high compared to the three other cities I compare (Kristiansand built up 
area has for example a density of 1952 persons per quare km compared to the Norwich figure 
of 3179).  
                                                
299 Norfolk web/population show 129 000 inhabitants, probably due to different definitions in the statistic . 
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Source: Norwich home page, accessed May 2007. 
 
Norwich District (the municipality) has hardly had ny change in population for many 
decades, it has been constant around 120 000 people. This trend may have changed the last 
few years where Norwich shows strong population growth due to in-migration. The 
surrounding area has however, experienced a strong growth in population for many years, 
especially in Broadland District. Norwich city or urban area has therefore a population of 
about 230-240 000 people, a population that is divided on three districts.  
 
6.2.1.1 European Sustainable City 1999 
European Sustainable City Award was already in 1999 given to Norwich City Council as one 
of four local authorities in Europe. An application had been sent to the European Sustainable 
Towns and Cities Campaign, which was built on three int grated pillars of Community power, 
Norwich 21, Corporate planning. The sustainable city award was given because of the 
process and work with a distinctive Local Agenda 21. There were over 100 entries from 28 
countries, including 10 from UK.  
 
6.2.2 Traffic development 
 
6.2.2.1 UK 2006 National Travel Survey 
Some data from the 2006 national travel survey in UK are noted below to have a backdrop to 
compare the data for Norwich. The national data shown are average data for the whole 
population.  
• Distance traveled per person per year was 11 500 km. 
• Average trip length 11.1 km, a yearly increase of 0.7%. 
• Average number of trips per day was 2.85, a yearly reduction of 0.4%. 
 
Population and Employment Figures 2006 
Norwich's population 
The population of the Norwich Travel to Work Area i.e. the area of Norwich in which most 
people both live and work, is 367 035 and the 1991 figure was 351 340  
121 600 people live in the Norwich City Council are, fourth most densely populated  
District in Eastern Region with 3179 people per square kilometre (8241 per square mile).  
How big is the workforce? 
The workforce of the Norwich Travel to Work Area is 169 627 people. The Norwich City 
Council area supports around 88 000 jobs  
One-third of Norfolk's working age population works within the City Council area  
Unemployment and deprivation 
Unemployment in the Norwich TWA is lower than the UK rate, 2% against 2.3% (June 
2005).  
The Index of Deprivation 2004 indicated that Norwich is the most deprived district in the 
Eastern Region relative to the numbers of people affected by deprivation. On this measure, 
Norwich is ranked 50th nationally; within the most deprived 20% of areas.  
What are average earnings in the City? 
Average earnings in Norwich are £10.44 per hour excluding overtime compared to £11.87 in 
the Eastern Region and £11.96 in UK as a whole.  
 
 213 
The proportion of the population without access to a car was 25%, down from 30% ten years 
ago. One third of the households in England have two or more cars as the next table shows, a 
number which keeps increasing. 
 
 No car One car Two or more cars 
1996 28% 44% 28% 
2006 25% 44% 32% 
Table 6-1 UK households with and without cars 
 
Of the total distance traveled more than 80% was with the car as next table shows. Car 
occupancy was 1.58 and 25% of all car trips were shorter than 3.2 km. The number of Bike 
and Walk trips fell each by 15% the last decade, while t e Bike trip distance fell by 12%, the 
Walk trip distance was constant. Bus trips in London increased by 23% since 1996 mainly 
due to the congestion charging. Outside London the number of trips with bus fell 8%. 
 
2006 Miles per person  Per cent 
Walk  201 3% 
Bike  39 1% 
Car  5693 84% 
MC  34 0% 
Bus  359 5% 
Rail  466 7% 
Total 6792 100% 
Table 6-2 UK Person travel, miles per person per mode 2006 
 
The number of commuting trips per person fell by 8%, but the average trip length rose by 6% 
and the time needed for these trips by 15%.  
 
The number of trips fell 4% 1996 – 2006, caused by a fall in shopping trips, commuting and 
people visiting friends in private houses. A decoupling of GDP and person travel in UK may 
perhaps cause this interesting fact? If so, it represents a much wanted trend brake.  
 
6.2.2.2 Congestion grows slowly 
There is a general feeling in Norwich according to the interviews that congestion is getting 
worse. The letters to the Eastern Daily Press also supports this: “the vast number of the letters 
to the paper are concerned about traffic and congestion”300. 
 
The traffic levels crossing the ring roads since 1989 shows increases on the outer ring road, 
and decreases on the inner ring road301. The journey time surveys, which were carried out in 
1989 and 2002, show that the average speed has remained unchanged at 30km/h (19mph) over 
this period. However, the journey times for orbital or cross-city routes have increased and the 
peak hour journey times have increased several places. The pattern emerging is a road 
network where the core has reached full capacity and with the increase in development 
outside the core, the traffic flows are increasingly spreading outwards and gradually more and 
more of the network reach capacity flows at peak hours. 
 
                                                
300 Interview with Shaun Lowestoft, Eastern Daily Press  
301 NATS: Norwich Northern Distributor Road. Stage 2 Environment Assessment Report. Need for the Scheme. 
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6.2.3 Commuting in Norfolk 
 
Compared with the 1991 Census all the Norfolk Districts have become less self-contained as 
commuting to work across District boundaries has increased. The following table from the 
2001 Census shows the number of persons commuting across the District boundaries to work. 
When the districts become less self-contained, it means that more and more workers have to 
travel out of the district where they live to find work. This is the general trend in areas with “a 
growth engine”. From the table Norwich stand out as growth engine in Norfolk. 53 752 
persons traveled into Norwich for work every day in 2001, and at the same ti e 14 789 
persons traveled out of Norwich for work in other districts. Norwich was the only district with 
net in commuting, all the other districts “lost” people during daytime. 
 
The number of residents finding work in her/his own district is falling, which means that the 
vehicle kilometers traveled for commuting to work increases. Between 1991 and 2001 this 
increase was up to 8%. The vehicle kilometer traveled with a car is directly proportional to the 
CO2 emissions from that car.  
 
 Resident 
population 
Workplace 
population 
Daytime 
population 
In –  
commuting 
Out -  
commuting 
Net 
commuting 
Great Yarmouth 64 808 36 192 63 416 7 465 8 857 -1 392 
King’s Lynn WN 97 398 56 356 93 557 14 789 12 255 -3 841 
North Norfolk 70 438 37 452 66 479 7 135 11 094 -3 959 
Breckland 86 783 45 299 76 470 9 537 19 850 -10 313 
Broadland 86 322 39 230 67 588 14 789 33 523 -18 734 
Norwich 89 832 92 558 128 784 53 752 14 789 38 952 
South Norfolk 79 883 39 898 67 155 13 885 26 613 -12 728 
 575 464 346 985 563 449 114 977 126 992 -12 015 
Table 6-3 Resident, workplace and daytime populations, Norfolk Districts  
 
Looking at Norfolk we see that in-commuting to the districts in Norfolk County was 115 000 
daily, which make up 230 000 trips. Similarly out-commuting to the districts in Norfolk 
County was 125 000 daily, which make up 250 000 trips. The total commuting in Norfolk was 
480 000 trips daily. It is estimated that if the trnd from 1991 to 2001 has continued, then it 
was close to 500 000 trips in 2005, which will further increase with 25 000-40 0 0 trips until 
2010. If we imagine that the length of the average trip is 12 km and 250 working days, then 
1.44 billion personkilometer is produced every year. If 90% of these trips are done in cars 
with occupation on average 1.2 persons, then the veicle km traveled for commuters in 
Norfolk is yearly: 1080 million VKT. This is a huge number of vehicle kilometers traveled 
every year and we know it is on the increase. In an environmentally sustainable transport 
perspective commuting represents an enormous challenge for Norfolk and Norwich. 
 
6.2.4 Mode split in Norwich 
 
As a follow up of the Buchanan report, a major transportation study was done in the late 
sixties. This became the basis for the structure reports produced in the mid seventies. The next 
set of data on modal split in the Norwich area is the national census in 1991. This was 
followed up in the next census from 2001.  
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The new Local Transport Plan system that was introduce  in 2000, required the local 
authority to monitor progress on key indicators, one f these was modal split. In the Norwich 
area a consultant who used telephone interviews as method did this. The number of interviews 
was just above one thousand. The figures from the telephone interviews are therefore not 
directly comparable with the more reliable census data. An overview of the modal split data 
for the work journeys is shown in the following table.  
 
Mode  1967 1991 2001 2000/01 2003/04 
Car 35 71 72 61 62 
Public Transport 23 9 12 10 10 
Walking 19 13 10 12 9 
Cycling 17 7 6 10 11 
MC 6   2 3 
Work at home -   5 5 
 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 6-4 Proportion of journeys to work by employees in the Norwich Area 
 
The sources for the data in the table are:  
1967  Home interview survey, Interim NATS report 1969 
1991  Census data  
2001  Census data, modified by author  
2000/01 NATS mode share, LTP monitoring data 
2003/04 NATS mode share, LTP monitoring data 
 
The table shows that the well-known general trends of increasing car use and reduction in soft 
modes has also been the case in Norwich up to the new millennium. The two last columns are 
data from the local transport plan (LTP) monitoring. The method used and the geographical 
area covered makes straight comparison with earlier data skewed.  
 
The long-term path in Norwich seems to be in line with the general picture in UK with 
increasing car use and more and more severe congestion. The car mode has about 70 per cent 
of all travel, while the other three modes are about 10 per cent or lower as shown in the 
following figure of work journeys 1967, 1991 and 2001.  
Figure 6-3 MS journey to work, NATS 1967, census data 1991 and 2001 
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In the next figure the development for each mode and all trips are shown. The difference 
between the census data and the local monitoring data collected after 2000 is striking. The 
decline in car use and the strong growth in bike use from 1991 to 2000/2003 is probably 
caused by the way the data was collected and does not fit readily with data from other 
sources. More data is needed to verify if there is a shift in the long-term trend, for example 
nearly doubling in the number of cyclists from 1991 to 2003, or the difference is caused by 
the methods used. There might also be that data is presented selectively to serve particular 
goals.  
 
Figure 6-4 The long-term development per mode in Norwich 
 
The next figure shows data from the monitoring of the LTP progress in Norwich. Car use has 
increased, public transport use is constant and cycling increases. The shift shown in these data 
is from walking to other modes. One explanation of this phenomenon can be that the average 
journey distance increases (which it does according to national travel surveys), which will 
exclude the walk mode for some of the trips because of the distance length. These trips are 
then either lost, or transferred to public transport, cars or bikes. It will be interesting to see 
from the coming surveys, if this is actual trend in Norwich or just variation within the margins 
of error in the survey.  
 
 
Figure 6-5 MS Norwich LTP – monitor data 
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6.2.5 Government and Governance in England. 
 
In this section the rapid and dynamic change over th  last ten years in Government and 
Governance in England is described. During the work with the Norwich Case Study I have 
had to rework my understanding several times because the changes in institutions and 
organizations have been very great over the last years and was still ongoing. And the changes 
seem not to stop! 
 
6.2.5.1 Blair’s transport policy “The New Realism”. 
New Public Management as part of the new liberalism ideology can be defined as: reform of 
public sector based on deregulation, privatization, c st reductions and better efficiency in the 
1980s, emphasis on indirect management in the nineties and the dismantling of the public 
sector from then on302. New Public Management has since put weight on partnerships and 
contracts or agreements between partners as the means of managing public sector 
involvement in development. Partnerships, both vertical and horizontal, seem to flourish. The 
public authorities no longer have “the power” but rely more and more on partnerships with 
many other stakeholders. It seems that what Patsy Healey termed “The communicative turn” 
has arrived (Healey 1997). 
 
Congestion, poor public transport, a concern for climate shift together with “no” money for 
transport infrastructure formed the debate in Britain in the early nineties. Goodwin et al 
published Transport: The New Realism in 1991 advocating the need to decouple growth in 
transport work from GDP growth (Goodwin 1991). These ideas were later followed up in the 
SACTRA report 1994. The Royal Commission on Environme tal Pollution published the 
following year the report Transport and the Environment, a very thorough and broad study 
recommending substantial changes in transport policy. The report concludes in chapter nine 
that Land Use and Transport planning is an important tool: A) because of the very long term 
effects (several decades), hence an integrated land use and transport planning is needed.  B) 
because of the dynamic short-term effects caused by the new developments at junctions and 
along corridors. “We firmly believe that taking proper account of the int ractions between 
land use and transport is crucial if essential access is to be available within the framework of 
an environmentally sustainable transport system”. (1995:159)  
 
Under the influence of New Public Management ideas a new set of procedures for LU&T 
planning was established. Vigar gives the following definition of the New Realism (Vigar 
2002:67):  
• Improvement in the scale and quality of Public Transport provision 
• Traffic calming 
• Enhanced provision for cyclists and pedestrians 
• Advanced traffic management, including route guidance, to maximize the efficiency 
of the existing network 
• Road pricing with hypothecation of revenue, to realign charging to the point of use, 
and provide capital for implementing the other elements 
                                                
302 Knutsen and Boge (2004)  
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• A greater emphasis on relationships with land use planning system as a means of 
tackling transport demand through focusing attention on the spatial relationships of 
population, economic activity and services 
• Little or no overall increase in road network capacity with much more limited road 
construction, e.g. to link residential and industrial areas, to bypass towns and villages 
or to contribute to regeneration objectives, and with a careful eye on whether such 
construction would be likely to lead to significant more traffic 
 
The Blair Government’s 1998 White Paper A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone 
followed up many of the recommendations from these r ports and brought a significant shift 
in Government policy in Britain. This document was the next ten years followed up with a lot 
of White Papers, Planning Policy Guidelines and legis ation. Some of the most important land 
use and transport policy papers from Blair’s Governme t were:  
A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone, 1998.  
Transport 2010. The 10 Year Plan, 2000. 
Planning Policy Guidance Note 3: Housing, 2000. 
Planning Policy Guidance Note 13: Transport, 2001. 
The Future of Transport-A Network for 2030,  2004. 
Full Guidance on Local Transport Plans, 2004. 
 
A selection of some of the documents and new organization from this period, which seriously 
put environment on the national agenda, are commented shortly below.  
 
The White Paper A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone (DETR 1998) did set a 
completely new course for the transport policy. This was followed by Transport 2010. The 
Ten Year Plan (DETR 2000), The Road Traffic Reduction Act and The Transport Act 2000. 
The Government also produced an updated PPG303 13 Transport and guidance on Regional 
Transport Strategies and Local Transport Plans. New partnerships were set up as the 
Commission for Integrated Transport, the Motorists’ Forum and the Road Haulage Forum. 
Partnership is a key in Blair’s policy “The New Realism”, but the partnership with the 
inhabitants of Norwich city is seriously lacking. Norfolk County Council may do what is 
thought to be best for Norfolk County, but that might not be in accordance with the interests 
of the different population groups in the urban area of Norwich. I will return to this later.  
 
The overall vision was to “safeguard the environment and to develop an integrated policy to 
tackle the problems of congestion and pollution” according to Hull, who points out two major 
strands to this policy: Firstly, major investment by central government to tackle the under-
investment in both strategic road and rail services which is vital to the country’s economic 
prosperity. Secondly, local authority action to reduce car dependency through combination of 
car restraint, improvements in the alternatives to the car such as integrated public transport 
systems and soft policies as better land use planning (Hull 2003). The ambiguity or 
contradiction between investment in the infrastructure on the one hand, and the reduction of 
car use may cause problems for local authorities in their planning. It certainly goes to the 
heart of the sustainable transport debate, and is prominent in the Norwich case study.  
 
                                                
303 Planning Policy Guidelines are used to inform on Government policies in detail.  
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The Road Traffic Reduction Act put reduced car traffic on the agenda: The Road Traffic 
Reduction Act obliges each local traffic authority to produce a report containing an 
assessment of existing levels of local road traffic and a forecast of expected growth in those 
levels. It should also contain targets for reducing the level of local road traffic in their area 
or its rate of growth. (DETR, 2000, pp 74) This act was one of the first targeting traffic 
reduction strategies. It also demanded that local authorities should produce knowledge about 
local traffic, which is long overdue since factual d ta about traffic is not as a rule collected 
and monitored. But the act does not specifically demand the collection of data on public 
transport, walking and cycling. There is also an obvi us tension between local targets set in 
discussion and partnership with local stakeholders, and the national aims in Planning Policy 
Guidances, etc. 304 
 
The Transport Act 2000 was primarily an investment program, but gave the local authority 
powers to use the LTP to introduce road-user charging and workplace levy schemes, it also 
opened up to use the revenues on transport related projects.  
 
Local Transport Plans (LTP) were introduced in 2000 as the key planning tool to adapt and 
implement the national goals at the local level. The LTP, covering a period of five years, puts 
emphasis on local collaboration, and it must be sent to the Government for approval. An 
important part of the LTP was that it was the vehicle to be used for bidding to attain 
Government funding. Major schemes over £ 5 million had to be justified both in the LTP and 
separately with own environment reports etc. The LTP system should be monitored and 
reported yearly on achievements in annual reports. The annual review of the LTP progress, 
the bidding process and meetings with Government officials are very important in developing 
and changing the LTP from year to year. In the “selling” of schemes - presentation, 
salesmanship and wrapping - do make a difference, so can key persons do. I will come back to 
this point later.  
 
The Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT) was set up as an independent organization 
to review, monitor and advice on Government policy. In a report305 the Commission asks: 
Integrating Transport Delivery – Is it Working Across Government Departments? The answer 
it gives puts Integrated Transport within an overall growth framework: “   Whilst other 
objectives will remain important to the overall objectives of any future strategic transport 
authority, congestion management and access to jobs and services should be the overriding 
objectives around which the structure of any future organization should be primarily based.”  
This statement clearly puts traffic flow and access to jobs and services as the top of the goals 
hierarchy, which is in line with other reports like the Eddington and Stern reports.306 
Congestion management should include all strategic hi hways, traffic and transport powers 
associated with:  
• Managing and maintaining the road network and keeping traffic moving (including 
traffic management, traffic signals and parking responsibilities) 
• Managing demand and reducing the need for travel (including roadspace prioritization 
and highway development control and land use planning powers) 
                                                
304 The National Transport Plan, Norway, a similar conflict is solved by the Government setting low growth 
rates, independent of local variations (P196 Forslag ti  NTP 2006-2015, Mai 2003. jfr St. meld. Nr. 24(2003-
2004)). 
305 CfIT November 2006  
306 The Eddington and Stern reports both deals with economic growth, transport and sustainability. 
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• Achieving behavioral change towards sustainable travel modes (including bus, heavy 
and light rail, cycling & walking development, school and workplace travel planning 
etc) 
• Planning, prioritizing and delivering major transport infrastructure (including both 
road and public transport projects) 
• The emerging approach to road pricing through Transport Innovation Fund (TIF). This 
inevitably requires a more unified approach in order to develop coherent citywide 
demand management and sustainable transport investment package. 
 
6.2.5.2 The regional level. 
The Government started a major reshuffle of local authority borders, functions and roles in the 
new millennium. By creating new regions, which were thought to have elected assemblies, 
powers, were to be devolved from Central Government. However, the people in the North 
East Region rejected in a referendum in 2004 to set up an elected assembly, and the future for 
elected assemblies in the regions is not clear. The gov rnment was keen for regions to play a 
wider and more democratic role in governance. Current regional government for the East of 
England, like other regions, involves Regional Assemblies, Government Offices for the 
Regions (Government Office for the East of England – GOEE – in Norfolk's case) and 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs).   
 
The English regions are large areas, for the most part, made up of several counties. Norfolk 
was part of the East Anglia region, which also included Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. In April 
2001 East Anglia merged with 3 formerly southeastern counties (Hertfordshire, Essex and 
Bedfordshire) to form the East of England Region The East of England Regional Assembly 
(EERA) is a voluntary regional chamber comprised of two thirds councilors from local 
authorities in the region and one-third from non-local authority representatives from other 
interest groups.  Its purpose is to promote the economic, social and environmental well being 
of the Region in accordance with the needs of sustainable development in the interests of all 
those who live and work in the Region through a partnership of elected representatives and 
representatives of other regional interests. The East of England Development Agency (EEDA) 
is the RDA for the East of England. 
 
Under the new Planning Act the County Council is required to provide the region with 
strategic planning policy advice on all regional and sub-regional policy matters with relation 
to the county, e.g. Norfolk. Where will Norwich city end up in this system? It remains to be 
seen if it will have its own voice or continue to be spoken for by the County?  
 
6.2.5.3 East England Region  
The East England Region is one of the largest of the English regions at just over 19 000 
square kilometers. It extends from the fringes of Lndon in the south to the North Norfolk 
coast. Nearly 5½ million people live in the region and it incorporates six counties: 
Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Norfolk and Suffolk. The unitary local 
authorities of Luton, Peterborough, Southend and Thurrock are also within the region. Note 
that Norwich is not a unitary local authority, but a District (see discussion ch. 6.3.7).  
 
There are 107 members of the East of England Regional Assembly in 2004/5 consisting of 75 
relevant authority members and 32 Community Stakehold r members. Each year, the 54 local 
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authorities within the East of England nominate onecouncilor to the Regional Assembly. 
Political parties are then invited to nominate councilors from any part of the region to ensure 
that the membership of the Regional Assembly reflects the political balance of the region. 
Finally, stakeholder organizations are invited to nominate representatives to provide a 
minimum of 30% of the overall membership of the Assembly.  
 
East England Region 
 
 
Figure 6-6 East England Region map.   
Source: East of England Spatial Strategy, www.eera.gov.uk 
 
One of the most important tasks for the region is the allocation of new housing to be built 
within the region, after the Government has allocated a specific number to the region. Draft 
Regional Planning Guidance (RPG14) recommends 72 000 houses in Norfolk by 2021. The 
Norwich area “gets” 33 000 of these new houses. Another task is to coordinate the national 
transport infrastructure planning within and through the region. Earlier the county was 
responsible both for LU&T planning, but now the regions are responsible for the Land Use 
Structure planning while the detailed transport planning is still at county level if not with an 
unitary. The Regions are also responsible for transport strategy. Regional Development 
Agencies and Regional Chambers have been appointed in each region to deal with economic 
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strategy and development priorities. Regional Transport Strategies (RTS) are being developed 
and shall provide: 
• Regional priorities for transport investment and management across all modes 
consistent with other regional objectives 
• Strategic guidance on the role and future development of railways, airports, ports and 
inland waterways in the region, for both passenger and freight, consistent with 
national policy 
• Guidance on measures to increase transport choice, including the better integration of 
rail and bus services 
• Public transport accessibility criteria for major developments 
• Regional strategic guidance and co-ordination where n cessary on other matters such 
as car parking standards and road-user charging  
 
One may raise the question of legitimacy of such organizations as an appointed not elected 
Regional Assembly, but already the Assembly has taken a stand for the region and opposed 
the Government. A Draft East of England Plan has been made, and the Assembly made the 
following decision in February 2005:  
“The East of England Regional Assembly deplores the Government’s grossly 
inadequate funding of the transport infrastructure costs associated with the additional 
478 000 houses planned for this region between 2001- 2 . Bearing in mind that the 
Assembly’s acceptance of this massive growth was conditi nal upon adequate 
government provision of the necessary infrastructure; and mindful of Lord Rooker’s 
repeated written assurances that growth will not be imposed without the associated 
infrastructure. This Assembly wishes to make clear that it now regards its 
endorsement of the draft East of England Plan as supended, pending a re-
examination of the Government’s willingness to support its own aspirations 
adequately in financial terms.” 
 
The Regional Assembly uses quite strong language, it d plores the Government’s grossly 
inadequate funding of the transport infrastructure costs associated with the additional 478 000 
houses planned for this region between 2001-2021. Such a language is perhaps only possible 
because the Assembly consists of a large number of stakeholders with loyalty to the region 
and not a political party? It also represents a more and more complex and fragmented pattern 
of governance, with new actors, arenas and networks.  
 
In any case it goes straight to the core issues in the region. On the one side is the car driven 
change in the transport geography of southeast England, which has led to massive congestion 
and a huge demand for road building. On the other sid  are the increasing deterioration of the 
environment, especially the climate, and the gap to the sustainability goals, which keep 
expanding. In the Norwich area about 30 000 new houses shall be built in the period 2001-
2021, and of course also the associated jobs and infrastructure should/ought to be provided. In 
an urban area with heavy congestion and long travel tim s an additional 30 000 houses will 
lead to increasing problems. The Norfolk LTP answer to the Government demands for more 
sustainable transport, but the Government is not providing effective measures to support such 
a policy. Neither does the Government put up a minium funding to develop the transport 
infrastructure to meet the growth in population andtraffic.  
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During the last years local government has been chaged, new roles were created and tasks 
shifted. Regions were introduced at the level below the national Government. The Regions are 
posed to be an important instrument in implementing Government policy. Norwich belongs to 
the East of England Region, which has both a governm nt office (GOEE) and a Regional 
Assembly. The local officials are well aware of theimportance to keep good relations to the 
regions and central Government, as Vigar found: “Generally speaking local actors paid civil 
servants at national and regional levels considerable attention, partly because finance was 
dependent on the “selling” of schemes and packages to civil servants and ministers.” (Vigar 
2002:146) Possibly will this reform strengthen the power of Government officials and reduce 
the influence of local politics. It is certain that the “rules of the game” has changed in UK and 
it is difficult to see who will be the winners and losers, but looking at the history it may seem 
that Norwich will continue to be forgotten. 
 
6.2.5.4 Developing Norwich's Economic Strategy and Action Plan 
The Government expects areas to develop local strategic partnerships. In Norwich the first 
Economic Strategy was launched in 1987. Since then, 'Shaping the Future', (the Economic 
Strategy for Norfolk) and the Regional Economic Strategy have been developed. The Norwich 
Economic Strategy fulfils two roles, it is:  
• a key element of the Norwich Partnership (the Local Strategic Partnership)  
• an area building block for 'Shaping the Future' (the Local Economic Partnership) 
 
Key stages in the development of Norwich’s Economic Strategy and Action Plan were:  
• production of a Norwich Economic and Labour Market Assessment by Norwich City 
Council, to create an up-to-date labour market information source, to underpin the 
development of the new strategy  
• the Norwich Economy Round Table was formed. At first it debated the state of the 
Norwich economy and formulated a consultation process  
• extensive written consultation process with approximately 5000 Norwich businesses 
and other stakeholders. This was supplemented by a consultation program of four 
receptions hosted by the Lord Mayor for the Business Community (involving 
approximately 500 business people), four Business Forums and consultations with 
special interest groups and individual business leaders  
 
The economic strategy developed in partnership withthe business community shows that the 
shift from Government o Governance has gone far in ten years. One can also see the change 
from formerly when employed “planners” were promoting the strategy and plans, to the active 
involvement of a larger group of stakeholders – a Qu ngo (quasi autonomous non 
governmental organization) is formed, both in producing the strategy and not at least 
implementing it.  
 
These developments do not represent a sustainable tr nsport future for Norwich. The City 
may be changing attitude towards cars in the city, but Norfolk County is still clinging to the 
“predict the need for roads” and then “provide the roads” paradigm. Colin Buchanan said this 
forty years ago: “— if the environment is sacrosanct, and if no major reconstruction can be 
undertaken, then (car) accessibility must be limited.” The environment in the 1960s was a 
local environment, today also the global environment has to be included, and then reduced use 
of the car becomes a central task. The main means to curb car accessibility beside economic 
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measures like petrol price, etc, is to localize activities with good public transport access and to 
limit parking.  
 
Norwich has chosen to cater for good car accessibility/parking in the city centre as well as at 
several P&R sites around the city. The reason for this is to uphold the Top Ten position of UK 
retail cities. This way of thinking which strengthen the car as the most efficient (sole) mode of 
transport, is part of the car growth paradigm or the “predict and provide” philosophy, which is 
contrary to what the ”The New Realism” propagates. The path Norwich follows is not 
sustainable (cars and resources, oil, emissions, sprawl) in the long run, but maybe it is the 
only path politically possible? The other side of the coin is that the Norfolk and Norwich area 
may have become so car dependent that without the car, social exclusion threatens as this 
statement indicates: As the Regional Economic Strategy makes clear, ‘a vibrant regional 
economy needs excellent strategic and local transport infrastructure’. The Regional Social 
Strategy identifies access to transport as a major bar ier in terms of escaping poverty and 
social exclusion through work, and this in turn has direct links to health. Citing a research 
study, it asserts that ‘both individuals and employers increasingly feel that unless someone 
owns a car, they will not get and keep a job, and that public transport is irrelevant and not 
designed for those who are working’. (EEDA Integrated Regional Strategy, 2005) The 
solution to this problem in a sustainability perspective is to improve public transport 
(network, frequency, fares) to make it available, affordable for all, and useful i.e. covering all 
the major destinations. It is not a long-term soluti n o make car transport cheaper and 
affordable to deprived groups.  
 
The consequences of these changes in tasks, authorities and powers are probably many. 
Firstly, complex processes are going on at different l vels and times. Consensus was sought 
for in the Land Use and Transport planning processes, but may be “window dressing” and the 
time period used for talk may lead to missed opportunities. Who gains? Who Loses? There 
are signs that Norfolk politicians and administratos have learnt to use the LTP process as a 
vehicle to obtain certain goals, i.e. the Northern Distributor Road. The environmentally 
sustainability transport goals seem to be used to promote road building as the main solution. 
An open and transparent planning process would ideally search for alternative solutions 
instead of promoting only one solution, which the organizational setup, seems to produce.  
 
6.2.5.5 Norwich Area Economic Study 
Norwich Area Economic Study307 from 1987 listed seven major developments to revitalize 
the city over the following 12 years:  
1. A47 Southern Bypass 
2. District General Hospital 
3. Castle Mall Shopping Development 
4. Office construction for Norwich Union with redevelopment of the Bus Station 
5. Development of Norwich Riverside for housing, offices, shopping and a pool 
6. Completion (possibly) of the Inner Ring Road between Queens Rd and Riverside Rd  
7. Development of Lotus Cars with an increase of 800 in workforce (outside city border) 
 
By 2005 all are realized except for the completion of the IRR, which was stopped in 1993. All 
of these items have major LU&T consequences depending upon the planning policy and 
                                                
307 Peter Townroe 1987 cited in Meeres 1998  
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planning decisions. The common feature is the car orientated planning concept they build 
upon. Car accessibility and ample parking is a key feature in all. Even the Bus Station 
Development with its futuristic design, has the required number of parking places, although 
the principles in PPG 13 advise the opposite.  
 
6.2.5.6 Norwich’s Economic Strategy 
The focus on solutions for the car continues in the new millennium308. The strategic Actions, 
Targets and Output/Outcome listed under the heading: Develop sustainable transport 
infrastructure (including parking) are shown in the following table. 
 
Action Target Output/outcome  
Increase parking provision through construction of 
Chapelfield car park 
Chapelfield car park opened Sept 
2005 with 1000+ spaces – 50 000 
sq meter prime retail space 
Successfully 
completed  
Increase parking provision through completion of St 
Andrew’s car park 
St Andrew’s car park opened in 
July 2005 with 1000 spaces 
Successfully 
completed 
Improve sustainable transport and access to employment 
by providing a new orbital bus service to link residential 
areas with peripheral employment centres 
Service in place 2005 Successfully 
completed 
Reduce road traffic and support local businesses At least 3 large businesses review 
their freight logistics 
Not yet achieved 
Develop sustainable solutions and trial alternative fuels 
for motor vehicles. EU Smile projects 
Commence 2005  Trials to start 
2006. 
 
There were five tasks in the strategy, three of them successfully completed. Two parking 
houses were opened in 2005, each with 1000 plus space . The third was a new orbital bus 
service to link residential areas with peripheral employment centers, which started late 2005. 
The EU project SMILE started in 2006 trials with alternative motor vehicle fuels. The only 
action not yet achieved was “reduce road traffic”. It seems that the pattern repeats itself. 
Reduction of car traffic is there as an aim and action, but not achieved. On the other side 2000 
extra parking spaces were built in the centre of Norwich and presented under the heading 
Develop sustainable transport infrastructure. These two parking houses will generate an extra 
16 000-20 000 car trips daily, but still presented un er the sustainable transport slogan.  
 
6.2.6 The situation, as seen by a senior politician 
 
I have included a lot from the interview with Adrian Gunson, conservative, leader of 
Transport committee, Norfolk County Council, because it illustrates many of the complex 
problems within politics and public administration in Norfolk and Norwich and also how 
different the perspectives are at different levels, not only in England, but also in Denmark and 
Norway. There are problems that seem “impossible” to solve in our democracies, also called 
“wicked”309. Some of these wicked problems are caused by the way we organize public 
administration. The interview is as close to oral presentation as possible.  
                                                
308 Norwich’s Economic Strategy Key Actions 2005-2006. Performance Report. 
309 See Rittel and Webber ”Dilemmas in General Planning Theory”. Let me take one example from Norway. A 
public commission (NOU Eie og bruk av privatbil) advised in the seventies hat it should cost less to own a car 
and more to use the car. Absolutely everybody of all political shades agreed, but after 30 years the system is 
unchanged!  
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Jobs, housing and transport are the most important issues. 
I think the major land use and transport challenges for Norfolk arise in the first sentence from the 
growth in the population in the county. The governme t policy for 2021 is that we should have 73 000 more 
houses in Norfolk. It puts a big strain on communications, and its at least a problem of employment because in 
Norfolk, we need job led growth, because the natural growth in Norfolk is not job led, its retirement led. So one 
of our main issues revolves around the location of housing, the provision of transport, and the attracion of jobs 
for the people who come to Norfolk.  
Congestion and road capacity is important.  
One of the subsidiary issues is that there is congestion in the Norwich area, partly because of the fact 
that the growth of population is to the North of Norwich, all the suburbs are for the North, pretty well, and 
particularly the lack of a Northern bypass, is one of the main subsidiary problems. The roads aren’t good 
enough on the edge of Norwich, they’re rural roads, and the road through the centre is congested. So its 
communications allied to this increasing population, because we got congestion with the population we got 
already, we have more houses, we’ll get more congestion, unless we get infrastructure around the Northe n 
distributor.  
Only the car fits the criss-cross travel demand. 
So people have to travel to the towns to work, that’s the point I’m getting at. So there’s more 
communication, better roads are needed, in order to get to the town to do your work. People don’t just work in 
the nearest town. What I’m getting at is the jobs, people will have to travel to the jobs, and have to use the car.   
To steer people’s home locations is difficult. 
We are trying to encourage the growth in market towns310, because with that sort of size the county can 
provide, can make sure they got a high school, for the children, at least one primary school, they’ll have a 
library, a fire station, they’ll always have doctors, surgery, and a bank, so you can get those facilities nto that 
sort of town, therefore, if you got those facilities, you expand. It’s easier to get people to build houses than to get 
people to build factories.  
Both commuting and home-working are increasing. 
We do have a number of people now who work on theirown from their houses using internet, and 
computer, you know, or they work two or three days a week from their house, they travel to London three days a 
week or something, we have that. We have people commuting to Cambridge.  
Local employment is needed. 
The danger of Norfolk being a dormitory for people: People coming and living here but working 
elsewhere. Quite many people work in London. What we would like is more locally generated employment. 
Businesses is getting bigger and bigger, and bigger businesses tend to, to want to have a presence in the capital 
city, London, you see. A lot of our businesses, have actually been taking over, they actually got a lot of jobs here 
now, but there’s, there’s not a head office anymore, point is, what’s left in Norwich is a small subsidiary now.  
Accessibility is the problem, not land for businesses. 
First of all, the availability of land and access, we’ve got a Business park and we’ve got a Science park 
next to the university. Now that Science park, we’re trying to get a better road access, because it’s not far from 
the southern bypass. So the land is available, we do our best at the county to get the accesses, it does epend on 
business being attracted to Norfolk, the land might be available, we fight hard to get good communications, to 
London. And again we tend to suffer, you see. 
Transport infrastructure must be improved. 
We press for railways, good railways, and the A47, the road to Kings Lynn you see, which is not dualed, 
its I think that about a quarter is dualed. Well tha  means you see, that it can make us uncompetitive in Norfolk. 
This government is against roads, that mean that they ration money for roads. And we lose out on roads, we’ve 
always lost out on roads, because of our remoteness. We don’t want motorways in Norfolk, we don’t want 
Norfolk to be like, say Essex, or Middlesex. All weant is to have job opportunities and reasonable 
communications, respecting the heritage and countryside of Norfolk, because we want people to still come here 
and want to visit, for tourists and for nature and everything.  
Funding of transport infrastructure is uncertain and unpredictable. 
There’s a lot of uncertainty in the bidding system. I ean, its, we battle, and we argue, and we fight and 
all the rest, and we get the members of parliament to support us, but has a long history of Norfolk being 
defeated, worse than Suffolk, worse than Suffolk, our next door county, worse than Cambridge on the otr side. 
                                                
310 This policy was actively pursued in the nineties, without big success according to interview with planner 
Allison McErlane 
 
 227 
It’s very difficult to get much change, every road improvement we’ve had, we’ve had to fight for it, even A47 
bypass.  
The local transport plan, this year, there’s one element of it, called integrated transport, where 
previously we had 13 million a year, this year we’ve got nine and a half million. Now that integrated transport 
pays for parking ride, the bus parking ride, it pays for road safety schemes, for new footways, pavements, for the 
thirty mile an hour speed limit, new thirty mile an hour speed limit, congestion crossings, pelicans, zebra 
crossings. We came out as the best, the fourth best county on planning and transportation in England, the fourth 
best, and yet we got no reward for it.  
Lack of integrated and joined up policies. 
There is not a integrated approach and you see, you could get an integrated approach if the local 
authorities had more power, because then the responsibility would be in one place, and if they could raise what 
money they wanted, they’d have to operate within the law of course, but what is happening is that the 
government feeds the counties as a branch of government, as an agency. Which means we have the worst of all 
worlds, because if you’re an agency and you’re run totally by government, government must pay total 
responsibility for what you do and what money they give you. But we’re in this sort of halfway house where we, 
where we get responsibility but government decides what we do.  
 
This description of the important land use and transport issues and challenges made by a 
senior politician in Norfolk, are very similar to the description coming from senior politicians 
in Aalborg and Kristiansand. It seems that the three cities are facing similar type of challenges 
regarding jobs, housing and transport, albeit to different degrees. They also experience the 
same type of frustration of unpredictable funding for roads and deficient public transport 
services. The car is taken for granted by the politicians in charge in the three cities and car 
reduction strategies are hence not top priority. How d  politicians and planners deal with 
these often conflicting challenges and unpredictable opportunities? That question crops up 
several times throughout this research and is commented on in all the four cases.  
 
6.3 Land use and transportation planning  
 
6.3.1 The Norwich Inner Ring Road: a brief history 1945-1994 
 
The Norwich Plan made just after the Second World War introduced an outer and an inner 
ring road around the historic core of Norwich. Also Traffic in Towns showed the Inner Ring 
Road (IRR) and a huge diamond motorway junction at the Thorpe railway station. In 1967 a 
major traffic survey was done: the Norwich Area Transport Strategy (NATS). This first 
NATS study is documented in the 1974 and 1975 plans. In essence they keep the road 
network structure with the two ring roads and prioritize on what road links to provide new 
capacity to cope with the strong traffic growth. For years the missing link on the inner ring 
road (IRR) phase 3, was high on the priority list. However, the funds needed to implement the 
plan came far slower than anticipated. When IRR then was put forward for planning decision 
in the middle of the eighties, the plan met an aggressive grass root movement.  
 
6.3.1.1 Norwich Road Action Group – NRAG 
NRAG was decisive in stopping the IRR. One of the key persons in NRAG was Denise Carlo, 
here is how she describes the start of the action gr up: “The writing was on the wall for the 
third phase of the Norwich Inner Relief Road back in 1988. Norfolk County Council, 
defensive and bunker-minded, had failed to see the signs: public disillusionment over urban 
road-building and government alarm over global warming. Community groups and 
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individuals joined forces at the inaugural meeting of the NRAG in 1988. We believed that the 
road could be defeated and we succeeded.” 
 
After meeting a cold shoulder from the Norfolk County, NRAG switched target: “We 
concentrated our efforts on the next tier of local government – Norwich City Council. If the 
City could be persuaded to oppose the road they would act as a lever on the County. For four 
years, we cajoled City officers and councilors, identifying the road’s supporters, our anti-
road allies and the wavers.” In the end the City Planning Committee turned around and 
opposed the published route. After that support also came from English Heritage, the Royal 
Fine Art Commission, the Broads Authority and the Chamber of Commerce who went against 
the IRR proposal. The IRR went to a Public Inquiry where it lost. In the Public Inquiry Report 
the inspector described the IRR as “temporary and costly answer” and summing up he 
concluded that traffic restraint appears “inevitable and desirable”. The Minister subsequently 
upheld the Inspector’s conclusions.  
 
6.3.1.2 Case study of the Inner Ring Road in Norwich, a plan abolished in 1993. 
In a study of the IRR Greenaway and Graham questions he claim that in the nineties “a new 
view has emerged that new roads serve to generate extra traffic, cause unacceptable 
environmental damage and greatly contribute to pollution and global warming.” This claim 
of a paradigm shift at the national level, does not fit with the complexity of decision making 
at the local level, is the thesis they state in the case study of the IRR (Greenaway et al, 2000).  
 
The “rules of the game” or the “structure” may put local politicians in a fix: “City politicians 
and planners were desperate to attract transport investment of any kind to Norwich which had 
been cold shouldered for so long by the Conservative-dominated county; even if the Inner 
Ring Road was not ideal it was linked to other NATS2 investments.” (Greenaway 2000:828) 
The leadership can be very important in complex planning cases, the then County Surveyor 
denied that he was terribly ambitious who thrived on building roads, and would railroad his 
way through, but saying “that you very often can’t get to the stage of completion without 
being fairly strong minded.” (Greenaway2000:825) A parallel to this may be found nearly 
twenty years later in the way the Northern Distributor Road (NDR) in a very short time has 
become embedded in the LTP 2006-2011, even before the public consultation had been done. 
Key persons at the county level drive a road building policy that may be looked at as contrary 
to the Government aims and policy (see ch 6.3.5). 
 
Several of the persons interviewed in 2004, talked of the strained relations between the county 
and the city, caused by the IRR case. Most were saying that the matter was forgotten, but 
others thought it might still be of importance in the relationship between Norfolk and 
Norwich. In the NDR case (see ch 6.3.6) there is no doubt that Adrian Gunson, the committee 
chair both has a strong will and a keen interest in realizing the NDR project. The initiative to 
study the NDR came from Norfolk without the usual assessments in the land use plans, about 
the same time the Green Party (members were active against IRR and the party opposes NDR) 
won 5 seats in Norwich City Council.  
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6.3.2 Land Use and Transport plans 
 
In this section follows first a list of the land use and transport plans for Norfolk and Norwich. 
Thereafter the most important land use plans are discussed, following a discussion of the two 
local transport plans (LTP).  
 
6.3.2.1 List of Land Use and Transport plans 
Land use plans – structure plans  
Norfolk County was responsible for the following plans:  
Norfolk Structure Plan 1976-1991, approved 1979 
Norfolk Structure Plan Replacement plan for 1981-1996 was approved 1988. 
Norfolk Structure Plan 1993. Approved 1993 with sustainability comments. 
Norfolk Structure Plan 1999. Approved 1999. 
 
After 2000, what is a Structure Plan and why have on ? The Structure Plan provides the 
strategic land use, transport and environmental planning policy framework for local planning 
and development control and the long-term planning guidance to statutory and other agencies 
in the preparation of their own plans and programs. Following the Reform to the Planning 
System, the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) will replace the Norfolk Structure Plan when the 
plan is formally adopted. The Norfolk Structure Plan from 1999 has basically been updated 
and used as input to the Draft Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) and East of England Plan. 
 
Norwich City was responsible for the following plans:  
City of Norwich. Norwich Local plan. PLANNING FOR THE 1990s. Adopted 1995.  
City of Norwich. Replacement Local Plan for the City of Norwich. Adopted 2002. 
 
Transport strategy and plans 
Norfolk County was responsible for the following plans:  
Norwich Area Transportation Study, June 1974. A Transportation Strategy for 1986. 
Issues and possibilities.  
Norwich Area Transportation Study, October 1975. A Transportation Strategy for 
1990. basis for the IRR.  
NATS2 Norwich Area Transport Strategy, 1991. Sets out strategy until 2001 
NATS3 Norwich Area Transport Strategy, 1998. Sets out strategy until 2011. 
 
LTP - Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06 
Annual Reports reporting on LTP progress. 
NATS4 Norwich Area Transport Strategy, 2006. Sets out strategy until 2015. 
LTP - Local Transport Plan 2006-2011 
 
6.3.2.2 Norwich Local plan 1995.  
The Norwich City Local Plan PLANNING FOR THE 1990s, which was adopted in December 
1995, is the local authority development plan or physical pl n used to guide land use and 
building permits in Norwich District. The word sustainable is not used in the Overall Aims 
nor in the Strategic Objectives. However, under the c apter on managing change it is stated: 
For this approach to be successful, it needs to be part of a coordinated strategy for 
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sustainable development with the adjoining Districts Councils. This is now in place through 
policy N2 of the approved Norfolk Structure Plan. The local plan states the need for a 
coordinated strategy, but does not go into the possibility of conflicting aims between for 
example the three NATS Districts. 
 
I have chosen to highlight two issues in the Local Pl n. Firstly how the plan looks at the 
problems ahead and secondly how the reaction to the IRR public inquiry is shown in the plan. 
First, some key facts and issues from Chapter 9 Transport: 500 000 vehicle trips are made in 
Norwich every weekday, 42% increase in traffic flows is projected by 2006, some 40 000 bus 
trips are made daily, 3 Park and Ride (P&R) sites ar  operating (in 1995), Bus Gates provide 
bus priority on two routes into the City, peak hour traffic speeds are only marginally faster 
than those in central London, over 16 000 cars parkin the centre. Second, as Highway 
Authority, Norfolk County Council is responsible for traffic and transportation issues across 
the County. While it delegates traffic management fu ctions to the City Council, it maintains 
powers and makes decisions on major schemes and road investment. The County Council had 
reviewed its Transportation Strategy for the Norwich Area. However, the decision by the 
Secretaries of State in 1993 to refuse permission for the construction of the Inner Ring Road 
Phase 3, a central element of the Norwich Area Transportation Strategy (NATS), meant that a 
further review of that strategy was required. The major challenge in the 1995 Local plan is the 
traffic forecast of 42% growth in ten-fifteen years, which will increase congestion, emissions 
and accidents if not measures are taken. Traditionally this has meant to build more road 
capacity. Growth was predicted and capacity provided, but this paradigm could no longer be 
followed in Norwich according to the recent IRR inquiry.  
 
Already in the nineties Park and Ride and Bus Gates r  parts of the transport policy, but 
these measures can’t solve the major challenge: How will the conflict between the rapid 
increase in traffic and by that demand for capacity on the one side, and the LU&T strategy 
and policy on the other side be solved? This conflict was not solved in the 1995 Local plan 
and will also be looked at in the later plans and strategies. 
 
6.3.2.3 Norfolk Structure Plan 1999 
The plan provides: the first opportunity to integrate “sustainable development” principles into 
the structure plan (page 8). However, even if the plan flags sustainability it is not able to 
choose between a sustainable course and a road-building course. Some policy statements from 
the Norfolk Structure Plan, 1999 shows this dilemma:  
The transport strategy is to improve accessibility n the Norwich Policy Area by: 
1. improving facilities for walking, cycling and public transport 
2. improving access to support the economic health of e policy Area, and 
3. accommodating growth in the number of trips by means other than the car  
 
These aims points to the need to improve facilities for soft modes, but the public transport 
services are not mentioned. This is because the public transport services are market regulated 
and only indirectly influenced through agreements between the bus companies and public 
authorities. The car access is looked at as the basis for economic health or growth. The 
problem with the growing number of cars and increasing car traffic shall “not be solved”, but 
instead the growth in the number of trips shall be “accommodated”. Major road projects will 
not be built it is stated in the 1999 plan: The strategy does not envisage any significant 
increase in road capacity (P84).  
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The pedestrian and cyclist policy is positive, but non-committing:  
Safe, direct and convenient networks of routes for cyclists and pedestrians will be developed, 
including: 
1. Improvements to pedestrian and cycle priorities at junctions, and other locations that 
pose particular problems 
2. the development of the Hall Road and former railway lines as traffic-free, high quality 
pedestrian/cyclist routes 
3. the development of a network of safe routes to schools, and 
4. provision for pedestrian and cycle access and facilities at transport interchanges 
 
The County realizes that public transport is outside their scope: since the deregulation of bus 
services in 1986, the influence local authorities can exert on enhanced services is limited to 
on-street bus priorities to reduce bus journey times and improve reliability (page 85). But still 
the county sets aims and tasks to be done both within and outside their policy means: The 
efficiency and attractiveness of public transport services will be improved by:  
1. bus priority measures on defined bus corridors 
2. a replacement bus station for Norwich and the upgrading of public transport 
interchanges at Castle Meadow, St Stephan’s Street and Thorpe Railway 
Station/Riverside 
3. improvements to public transport information 
4. improving the quality of services through bus quality partnerships 
5. working with the Rail industry to improve rail services into Norwich 
6. securing new rail halts as part of major developments, where appropriate, and 
7. the provision of facilities for coaches 
The parking policy is quite ambitious:  
The parking policy for the Norwich Policy Area will be based on the following elements: 
1. no new long-stay parking in the city centre 
2. long-stay parking to be catered for by a bus-based park and ride network at the 
following locations (7 mentioned). Associated bus priority measures will be 
introduced on the routes to the city centre  
3. all publicly available car parking within the city centre to favor short-stay users, 
residents and people with disabilities 
4. controlled parking zones in the area between the city centre and the outer ring road to 
protect residential amenity and support central area parking policies 
5. parking provision at new development in the city centre limited to a) operational use, 
and b) visitor/customer needs where these replace existing provision 
6. parking standards for new development in the Norwich area outside the city centre 
will be applied to reflect the development’s use, location and accessibility by non-car 
modes. Where alternatives to the car exist, developers will be required to provide 
reduced parking levels depending on the level of accessibility by non-car modes. In 
these circumstances developers will be expected to assist in meeting the remaining 
travel demand through the support of alternatives, principally through commuted 
payments, and where appropriate to fund measures to prevent on-street parking 
 
The Norfolk Structure Plan 1999 (which was in force until 2007) sees the car as the main 
transport mode and the basis for economic growth. Alternative modes will be developed, but 
there is not any real wish of facilitating a mode shift to more sustainable modes. Sustainable 
development was introduced in the previous structure plan, but sustainable transport is not a 
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stated aim in the 1999 plan. The plan does not envisage any significant increase in road 
capacity, which of course had to be said only a few years after the Government said no to the 
IRR in the public inquiry! How the county will address the major capacity deficiency in the 
Norwich road network is not answered. However, only two years later in 2001 the County 
starts planning a major road project, the North Norwich Distributor Road.  
 
The deregulation and privatization of public transport was an intended Conservative Party 
policy, and the Conservative County Council leave it to the market forces to improve public 
transport services. It is up the market’s “invisible hand” to provide more effective and 
efficient services. The bus priority goals are positive seen from a sustainable transport 
perspective. The parking policy with the massive effort on Park and Ride is part of a strategy 
of pulling customers from a vast area in cars into Norwich, hardly sustainable in the long-term 
with the amount of vehicle kilometers and transport work produced. Also with new 
developments in the city centre, one may ask if the policy in practice will mean a growth in 
the number of parking places in the centre? 
 
6.3.3 Replacement Local Plan for the City of Norwich 2002 
 
The City of Norwich adopted the Replacement Local Plan for the City of Norwich in July 
2002. It consists of a main report and a separate report with Appendices & Proposals Map 
Extracts. This plan replaces the Local Plan adopted 1995, and marks an enormous shift in 
focus compared to the Local Plan. The first chapter is called: Strategic Objectives and 
Sustainability, and the first sentences are: Sustainable development is at the heart of this 
Local Plan. This reflect the national strategy, set ou  in “A better quality of life, a strategy for 
sustainable development” 1999. It is based on four broad objectives: 
• Effective protection of the environment 
• Prudent use of natural resources 
• Social progress which recognizes the needs of everyon , and 
• Maintenance of high and stable levels of economic growth and employment 
 
These principles are followed up throughout the plan, as the following examples show: On 
page 209:    “alternative forms of transport need to be made at le st as attractive as car for 
many journeys. Norwich’s compact form provides considerable scope for this modal shift 
towards sustainable forms of transport to be possible.”  If current trends continue, traffic 
levels in Norwich will increase by around 30% by 2016.  
 
Structure plan policy T1: Para 11.15:    “A key element of the strategy is the adoption of a
hierarchy of transport modes in which, as a general p inciple, greatest priority is given to 
transport modes with the least environment impact.”   
 
The mode hierarchy is: 
1. walking 
2. cycling 
3. public transport 
4. taxis 
5. essential motor vehicles 
6. non-essential motor vehicles” 
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Partnerships to reduce travel are to be established with the City Centre, Norwich airport, 
University of East Anglia. The means used are Business Travel Plans, which include parking 
policy on the business premises, and Employee Travel plans.  
 
The Local Plan states that: Car free housing will be permitted in locations of high 
accessibility, provided that---. Note, people are not encouraged or allowed to build car free 
housing generally, but certain conditions have to be met, like parking provision nearby.311  
 
The Local Plan is exemplary as a document showing how vertical coordination and 
integration of policies can be done, and also the horizontal integration is thought of. The 
principle of turning the traditional car planned system on its head in the mode hierarchy is an 
example for other cities who also could give priority to: ”walking, cycling and public 
transport, then taxies, essential motor vehicles and l stly non-essential motor vehicles.” 
Aalborg in Denmark had a similar mode hierarchy in their plans in the early eighties, but it 
disappeared after a short time. It will be interesting o see if Norwich manages to build a 
lasting transport policy based on this mode hierarchy where the environmentally friendly 
modes are first priority or will it just become an emblem of Norwich having the right attitudes 
while Norfolk County continue to rule? 
 
6.3.4 Local Transport Plans – LTP 
 
It is statutory for all “local transport authorities” to produce a Local Transport Plan – LTP. 
Norfolk County Council is the transport authority for Norwich District Council and produces 
the LTP for the county, which of course then contains the conflict dimension between rural 
and urban areas.  
 
The LTP process is a result of the thought/knowledge that “road capacity in urban areas could 
not be increased to meet demand forecasts of the late 1980s” (Goodwin cited in Bulkeley, 
2003). The LTP replaced the former Transport Policies and Program system, through which 
local transport planned and funding was allocated. The features of the LTP system are 
according to Bulkeley the following: 
• Five-year plans: greater certainty of funding 
• Partly a bidding document, but also a strategic planning document for a local audience 
• Consideration of both capital and revenue spending 
• Greater local discretion over allocation of resources 
• Inclusive approach, involving operators, greater public and local business participation 
• Greater emphasis on targets, performance indicators nd monitoring in areas not 
previously covered by packages 
• Emphasis on integrated transport solutions to encourage public transport, cycling and 
walking 
 
The five-year LTP will be funded according to “the quality of the strategies they contain” 
(DETR, cited from Bulkeley) and how it meets the other Government criteria set out in 
national guidance. The focus is thus on how strategies tie objectives and measures together to 
deliver the targets. Major schemes (those with budgets over £5 million) must demonstrate 
                                                
311 This clause is probably an anticipation that peopl wi l have cars even in car free housing.  
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their contribution to the LTP, but is funded separately. Continuing funding over the five-year 
period is determined by the success of the LTP in delivering on the targets and performance 
indicators set.  
 
The LTP must be followed up with an annual progress port, hence the development must be 
monitored. This has created a far more thorough basis for assessing congestion, traffic growth 
and change, and indeed emissions.  
 
6.3.4.1 The Norfolk County: NATS Local Transport Plan 2001-2006 
The first LTP, which was submitted to Government in 2000, covered the five-year period 
from April 2001 to March 2006. This LTP was rated fourth best on implementation312: “It has 
been rated by government as one of the best in the country and the County Council was 
subsequently made National Centre of Excellence for Local Transport Delivery.” Centers of 
Excellence are held up as examples of best practice to h lp other local authorities improve 
their performance. Norfolk County Council was one of only 16 authorities invited to apply, 
but as Gunson stated (ch. 6.2.5): “we came out as the best, the fourth best county on planning 
and transportation in England, the fourth best, and yet we got no reward for it. We were told 
last year that if we came out well, we’d get a reward, cash reward. We got nothing.” 
 
£ 170 million funding was obtained for LTP 2001-2006.  
The following table shows how the Norfolk LTP covers investment and maintenance for the 
County. The Norwich Area was allocated £ 3,391 million for investment the first year of the 
LTP 2001-2006. The conflict between investing in the rural areas and small towns or in the 
major urban area is of course the basis for this alloc tion, but there is no right or wrong way 
to do this, only political goals.  
 
Scheme type Year 2001/02 
Norwich Area 3.391 
King’s Lynn 549 
Great Yarmouth 611 
Broads 463 
Rural 3.067 
Norfolk Coast 381 
Countywide schemes 3.756 
Overall Total excl major 12.218 
Maintenance total 19.247 
Sub Total (Integrated Transport & Maintenance) 31.465 
Major schemes 5.696 
Program TOTAL (Including Majors) 37.161 
Table 6-5 LTP 2001/2006 investment and maintenance budget 
 
The economic growth and car friendly policy is another point in the LTP investment scheme. 
Over the five years LTP the sub-post Park and Ride gets £ 7.8 million out of total for Norwich 
of £ 18.6 million. More than 40% of the funding in the Norwich part of the LTP budget goes 
there, which hardly can be said to be a sustainable transport policy. 
 
                                                
312 The GO East gave Norfolk County Council the honour after evaluating The fourth LTP Annual Progress 
Report 2004, because it: “excelled in the delivery of scheme types and in the progress towards core indicators.” 
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6.3.4.2 LTP, growth and the NDR 
20% of Norfolk businesses considered the “lack of communication links /transport 
infrastructure” to be the principal barrier to growth. This is of particular concern in relation to 
these areas of Norfolk identified as eligible for funding to improve economic activity. Both 
the East of England Development Agency’s Regional Economic Strategy (East of England 
2010) and Shaping the Future (Public Private Partnership) includes the following strategic top 
priorities:  
• Preferred Route determined for Northern Distributor Road. 
• A growing regional airport in Norwich 
 
6.3.4.3 EIP of East of England Draft Plan Regional Spatial Strategy 
The Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) for the East of England underwent an Examination in 
Public (EIP).313 It was very important for Norfolk and Norwich to cnvince the independent 
panel that the plans and policies are well prepared, coordinated and integrated in the Regional 
Spatial Strategy, and that the strategy supports the Governments policies. The EIP process 
takes many months, and the representatives for the different counties (and cities) are 
advocates for their plans. The NDR and the major roads A47 and A11 were therefore 
prominent items in their presentations to the panel, since they are seen as necessary to 
accommodate the 33 000 houses allocated to the Norwich area, and necessary to create jobs 
for the people in general and in the new housing in particular. Economic growth and housing 
were the arguments pushed.  
 
6.3.4.4 Plans are one thing, the allocation of money another! 
The Government Office for the East of England (GOEE) decision on the Local Transport 
Plan cash allocation for the year 2005/2006 was preent d in positive terms: “Norfolk will 
get good funding for road maintenance and rural bus sub idies”. However, in reality there 
is less than preceding year for core issues in the LTP, which all hit Norwich heavily: 
• integrated transport 
• park and ride 
• road safety schemes 
• minor road improvements 
• pedestrian facilities  
• cycle routes. 
 
The funds coming to Norfolk for transport projects in 2005/6 were as follows (Norfolk 
web, accessed February 2007): “£19.6m for road maintenance, slightly lower than last 
year’s £19.8m.   £2.5m for rural bus subsidies, once again the highest allocation in the 
eastern region and an increase of 3.9 per cent on last year’s grant. However, this does not 
keep pace with inflation in the transport industry, which the County Council will have to 
meet.   £9.7m for integrated transport to spend on a whole range of projects, from road 
safety schemes and minor road improvements to park and ride, pedestrian facilities and 
cycle routes. This is £3.5m (27 %) less than last year’s allocation.” The County Council 
did not receive funding to improve access to the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital 
                                                
313 The EIP Panel Secretariat announced in 2005 the following: The Secretary of State has decided that an 
Examination in Public (EIP) should be held to debat and test the draft revisions to the Regional Spatial S rategy 
(RSS) for the East of England  
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via a new link road and improvements to the B1108. However, the government was keen to 
discuss other ways to improve access. 
 
6.3.4.5 Monitoring of the LTP progress 
One of the strengths of the LTP system is the monitori g of progress towards objectives and 
targets, and the annual reporting.  
NATS First Annual Progress Report on the Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06.  
NATS Second Annual Progress Report on the Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06.  
NATS Third Annual Progress Report on the Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06.  
NATS Fourth Annual Progress Report on the Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06.  
 
In parallel with the monitoring process, the county started to review the strategy to come up 
with a new strategy, the NATS4. This process started in 2003 with outlining problems and 
challenges, and consultation:  
Norfolk County Council, April 2003. Norwich Area Transportation Strategy Review 
(NATS4). Transport Related Problems and Issues.  
NATS Consultation on the LTP 2006-2011: Have your say on the future of transport 
in Norfolk. Hearing finish December 2005.  
 
6.3.4.6 Delegation presses Government for better roads 
A high-powered delegation from Norfolk and Suffolk met the Minister for Transport in 
London March 2006 to press for better transport links to Norfolk. The group also presented a 
transport document - ‘Norfolk on the Move’ - prepared by Norfolk’s economic partnership, 
Shaping the Future, and a delegation leaflet. 
 
The delegation followed the decision by the Department for Transport to classify trunk roads 
as either regionally or nationally important. All of Norfolk’s trunk roads (A11, A47 and A12) 
have been classified as regionally important and will therefore be prioritized for funding by a 
regional board in competition with other local and regional schemes. The immediate effect of 
the decision was that the committed dualling plans for the A11 and A47 were removed from 
the national program. Widespread pressure from the County Council, MPs, local media and 
others prompted a Government rethink and the A11 Attleborough bypass is back in the 
programme. However, the delegation told the Minister that it is essential the A11 Thetford to 
Fiveways and A47 North Burlingham schemes are also reinstated. Council Leader Alison 
King said: "Dualling of the A11 and A47 is vital to the economic future of the county and 
there is therefore an urgent need for Government to accept its responsibility for improving 
Norfolk’s trunk roads. The delegation shows the widespread commitment to drive the county’s 
economic progress and widen job prospects.” Chief Executive Tim Byles said: “In March 
2000, ministers announced their long-awaited commitent to dual the whole of the A11 by 
2008. The announcement in November 2005 was a huge step back for Norfolk.”  
 
6.3.4.7 Cycling and walking policy 
The NATS4, which was adopted 2004 aims to:  Provide easy access for people to and within 
the city, meeting individual needs and maintaining the economic health of Norwich, by:   
• Make sure that journeys are sustainable 
• Minimize any adverse impact on people's health and enjoyment of the city or upon the 
historic or natural environment 
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Figure 6-7 Cycle lane in Norwich  
Source: Norwich home page                 
 
NATS4 will seek to achieve this by:  
• Encourage people to get into the city without using 
cars by improving facilities for walking, cycling and 
public transport like Park & Ride 
• Encouraging alternative forms of transport when 
looking at new schemes. The order of priority is 
walking, cycling, public transport, taxis, essential 
motor vehicles, non-essential motor vehicles 
• Tackling accidents and the environmental impacts of 
traffic 
• Supporting the economic health of the Norwich area 
 
It is claimed that NATS has already met the following 
targets:   
• More people are using public transport 
• Fewer people are being hurt or killed in road accidents 
• Norwich is consistently ranked in the national top en shopping centers 
• Fewer cars are crossing the inner ring road 
 
In the Norwich area, around 10 per cent of residents cycle to work314, compared to a national 
average of three per cent (the 2001 census showed that 6% cycled to work). The County 
Council wants to build on these high levels and is committed to providing a good quality 
network of cycle routes in and around Norwich. 
 
6.3.4.8 Local Transport Vision 2021 
The Norwich Area Transportation Strategy (NATS)315 looks forward to 2020s and will form 
the framework for making future decisions about all aspects of transport in the Norwich area. 
The vision for 2021 is the following: “Norfolk is a well-connected place in which to live, do 
business and to visit, and is known as a national le der in making the transport system safer 
and reducing the transport impacts on climate change.” According to the vision document, 
this means that “people will have better travel and transport choices around Norfolk, but they 
will be able to get where they need to in a more sustainable way through a wider choice of 
travel options.” I have difficulty in seeing how wider choice will lead to more sustainable 
transport. The 2021 Vision must be far stronger linked with goals and measures for it to be 
more than empty words. It is not enough to make people change because “they will be 
provided with information they need to raise their awareness of the choices available”. The 
only instrument the strategy envisages is policy integration: “Norfolk will grow in a way that 
is more sustainable and that reduces the need to travel, particularly through the integration 
of spatial, economic and transport policy”. These naïve statements about the future make me 
wonder where the competent and professional planners i  Norfolk have gone? The tension 
between economic growth and sustainable development is hidden, the trade off between 
                                                
314 http://www.norwichareatransport.org/traveltransport/nats/default.asp Accessed June 2007 
315 The County Council adopted the former NATS strategy in 1999 and the revised strategy in October 2004.  
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different policies and actions apparently is of no i terest. The “spin doctors” looks like having 
replaced the planners in the collaboration and forming of the Vision 2021.  
 
6.3.4.9 Is the LTP an instrument for road building? 
Norfolk County Council states on the homepage that t e first Local Transport Plan made good 
progress towards the targets, especially that the program of park and ride sites has contributed 
to the reduction in traffic growth in Norwich and reduce congestion. I have shown that on an 
average day only 2500 cars use the 5000 parking places, hence the contribution to traffic 
reduction has not yet reached far (ch. 6.3.4.4). Another point the Council is satisfied with is 
the reduction in accidents.  
 
One difficulty in the first Local Transport Plan was that: “it did not have a clear Top-Down 
relationship between vision, aims and objectives, through targets to the work programme. 
Many of the objectives were too aspirational and some were not supported by work programs, 
so it was perhaps not surprising that we did not achieve these objectives”. This 
acknowledgement comes from the Norfolk County, shortly after the plan got praise and honor 
for being such an excellent plan for delivery. The major shortcomings of the first LTP was 
that it failed to meet targets for local air quality, which in fact got worse. Neither did the plan 
contribute to national targets of carbon dioxide reductions.  
 
The shortcomings of the first LTP point directly to car use and vehicle kilometer traveled. As 
we have shown several times the basis for the planning i  Norfolk County is a car ideology 
where the talk of shift to alternative modes becomes a necessary ritual because the EU and the 
Government has set goals for more environmentally sustainable transport. The second LTP 
has somewhat changed focus to also become a vehicle to obtain investment money for roads 
from the Government: “The Norwich sub-regional strategy recognizes the Norwich area as a 
centre where growth will be focused. It recognizes the importance of providing essential 
infrastructure including a Northern Distributor Road, and improvements to the A11 and A47 
trunk roads, needed to accommodate growth and support the development of the Norwich 
area as a sustainable community.” ( page 6) The NDR project is a traditional “predict and 
provide” project, which is deemed necessary to support the future growth prospects of 
Norwich. But to fit into the LTP system and the “new realism” the NDR has to be “dressed in 
environmentally friendly clothes” and carry wide popular and business support to be able to 
win through and be implemented. So far the County has done an excellent job to do this, but 
there can be no doubt that the NDR will generate new traffic, the VKT will increase and the 
CO2 emissions and the local emissions of NOx, etc. will increase, contrary to the aims, goals 
and objectives. The second LTP shifts focus and concentrates on selling the road projects to 
the Government. Both the growth argument and sustainable community concept are used to 
support the overall Norfolk strategy. This strategy also involves the partnership “Shaping the 
Future” and active lobbying the Government, and it has become necessary to produce a 
satisfactory Strategic Environment Assessment on the LTP316. The process of negotiation and 
networking has perhaps taken precedence to the plan and the substantive issues?  
 
 
 
                                                
316 Norfolk web: Environmental report, and Provisional Local Transport Plan 
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6.3.5 Some important projects 
 
Chapelfield Hill, Castle Mall, Riverside, University of East Anglia (UEA) with the research 
park and Norwich Airport with the Industrial Estate are some of the key drivers for future 
growth, and also major traffic generators. Other important projects are Bus Station, 
Westlegate pedestrianisation proposal and St Andrews Car Park. In addition to several 
thousand parking places built/required for new development in the centre, a total of 5000 
parking places have the last years been established on 6 Park and Ride sites. Sufficient 
parking space to keep Norwich among Britain’s Top Ten Retail cities has been a cornerstone 
in the practice parking policy.  
 
6.3.5.1 Chapelfield  
Norwich's latest major new retail development Chapelfield opened September 2005 on the 
site of a former factory and close to the former Nofolk and Norwich Hospital. With 90 stores 
including 15 cafés and restaurants, and a 1000 space car park, Chapelfield represents a £350 
million investment in the City. The opening of Chapelfield has, it is claimed, created up to 
2000 extra jobs in the City, in addition to the 800 temporary jobs created in the construction 
phase. The development contains over 50 000 m2 of retail and restaurant space, 118 flats and 
more than 1000 parking spaces.317 A rough estimate would say that the parking spaces lone 
will generate more than 6000 trips per day and 118 flats roughly 400-500 trips per day. The 
impact of Chapelfield will probably be greater and more noticeable than predicted.  
 
6.3.5.2 St Andrews Car Park 
The £8 million St Andrews car park opened in July 2005, and offers shoppers 1084 parking 
spaces within walking distance to city centre shops. Over 60 000 motorists have used the new 
St Andrews car park in the first 13 weeks since its opening and feedback from customers has 
been really positive, it is said on the Norwich City homepage.318 
 
If each space is used 4 times per day, that is 4000parked cars per day, which generate one trip 
to and one trip from the parking. In sum on a busy da  St Andrews Car Park, which is located 
close to the City Hall in the centre of Norwich, will generate around 8000 trips.  
 
6.3.5.3 Westlegate  
Westlegate is a short street in the centre, which the Norwich City planners wanted to rebuild 
as a pedestrian street, but the Norfolk County politicians prevented that. From the 
consultation leaflet for the project one can read: Westlegate is part of the main shopping area 
in Norwich city centre. It has a range of shops andforms an important link between different 
shopping areas. The environment is poor for pedestrians. The pavements are narrow and 
some parts of the road pedestrians have to be protected by guardrails.  
 
Further about the intentions it says: The Councils want conditions for pedestrians using 
Westlegate to be greatly improved. The street could also be made much more attractive. 
                                                
317 Norwich City homepage, accessed October 2005. 
318 Norwich City homepage, accessed October 2005. 
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Improving the street could maximize trade for local shops. Keeping the city centre economy 
strong and successful is a high priority for Norwich and Norfolk. 
 
The public was asked to say their opinion about three alternatives:  
• Pedestrianization 
• Part-time Pedestrianization 
• Pavement Widening 
• Stay as it is 
 
The consultation results showed an overwhelming support for the pedestrian scheme: 
72% voted for the Pedestrianization scheme (60% full and 12% part). Nearly all of the 
stakeholders were for the scheme, except the Norfolk C nstabulary who claimed “additional 
congestion is likely to create significant additional problems.”  
 
Estimated consequences on congestion:  
1. additional delay Outer Ring Road plus 1% 
2. on parts of IRR during evening peak could be as high as plus 5% 
 
The pedestrian scheme was not adopted. After discussions in the Highway committee in 
two/three meetings, it was decided in February 2005: Resolved to approve a permanent 
scheme for Westlegate, open to traffic for 24 hours with widened footpaths and any other 
safety measures the officers identified necessary. This decision, which can be labeled Norfolk 
against Norwich, is against the result of the consultation, against the majority of the 
stakeholders and against the proposal of an experiment. It is for more car traffic and against 
the city environment. Some City Councilors interviewed during the planning process 
expressed worry about the coming final decision. They shared the view of the respondent319 
that was “hopeful”, but “afraid that the County would go against”. 
 
6.3.5.4 Parking policy and Park and Ride (P&R) 
The very successful P&R system, in the words of the County, had 2571 cars using 5000 
parking spaces on an average day. Assuming an average st y of five hours per car, then only a 
quarter of the places were used (25% utilization). The investment in P&R in Norwich is 
therefore really mainly catering for peak demand, like a few days before Christmas. But still it 
is highly awarded and a real success story as one ca  read in the box.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
319 Member of the Highways Committee and City Councillar Lubcock intervied a few days before the final 
decision.  
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Source: Norfolk County home page, 4 May 2007 
 
6.3.5.5 Norwich bus station  
“Public transport is terrible compared with other cities both UK and EU. In reality we have 
two bus stations, one in Surrey Street getting refurbished, and 600-800 meters linear bus-
station in Castle Meadow and no contact between the two. It will take a very long time to 
improve interconnectivity320.”  This statement was a good description of the stateof the public 
transport system and services in Norwich in 2004. The route pattern was the traditional one 
with buses going from the city outskirts and the small towns into Norwich and back. There 
were different companies running their own lines without good connections or an integrated 
ticketing system. Information about the services wanot good.  
 
When Norwich's £5 million bus station opened for business to the people of Norwich and 
Norfolk on August 30th 2005321 it was an improvement as stated on the web. The new facility 
has been provided by Norfolk County Council, which claim that it is the country's most 
advanced bus station and a dramatic improvement on the old site, which had deteriorated 
over many years and lacked facilities for the general public.  
 
Norfolk County web side had this background to the new terminal: Four years ago, people in 
Norwich were asked how to improve public transport as part of a consultation on the City 
Council’s City Centre Transport Plan. The biggest priority for local people was improving 
the bus network - as buses often get caught up in general traffic. That priority is well 
underway to being met, with the new bus station part of the County Council's £9.5m 
Government-funded scheme to improve the bus network in and around Norwich. As well as 
the bus station, the Public Transport Major scheme is also providing a better network of bus 
                                                
320 Interview with Bob Gledhill, Green councillor  
321 Norfolk County web side, accessed October 2005. Notice how the County is presenting itself as beneficiary.  
Park & Ride keeping a million vehicles out of Norwich city centre 
The six successful Park and Ride sites on the outskirts of Norwich, provided by Norfolk County Council, are now 
keeping almost a million motor vehicles out of Norwich city centre. Records show that 938 576 vehicles, mostly 
cars, used Norwich Park and Ride sites in the 2006/7 financial year, meaning that almost one million vehicles are 
being kept out of the centre, helping to ease congestion on city centre roads. 
With six Park and Ride sites - at Harford, Norwich Airport, Costessey, Thickthorn, Sprowston and Postwick - 
Norwich has the most permanent Park and Ride sites in the country, with almost 5000 parking spaces on offer.  
Adrian Gunson, Cabinet Member for Planning and Transportation at Norfolk County Council said: "The Park and 
Ride sites provided by the County Council, benefit the people of Norfolk when travelling into Norwich have proved 
successful since the very first site opened. "I've heard much praise from customers about the quality of our 
colourful Park and Ride service, with more and more motorists using the sites all the time. I am confident that more 
than a million vehicles will use the six available sites in the coming year. "These services, along with the award 
winning Norwich Bus Station, not only help travellers to Norwich by making their journey into the centr  more 
pleasurable, but also help keep a lot of cars out of the city centre for the benefit of Norwich residents. Park and 
Ride is proving a real success story." 
Passenger numbers have been increasing over the years, in line with new sites opening. In 2005 a total of 
1.7million (1 780 009) people used Park & Ride, andin 2006 3.3million (3 305 066) passengers used the sites. 
All the routes and sites are colour coded, with differently coloured buses serving different park and ride sites, 
making it easy for passengers to spot their bus. Nation lly, Norwich Park and Ride has been recognised as a sector 
leader with the service awarded highly commended in two categories of the British Parking awards in 2006.  
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lanes around the city, a public transport interchange at the railway station, ticket machines 
and improved passenger information and waiting facilities. 
 
Electronic passenger information screens are also located in each bay, telling passengers the 
routes and times of the next three buses to leave ech respective bay, with some services even 
showing how many minutes away they are thanks to Real Time ability. This high-tech facility 
is a major advancement on the original bus station, which opened in 1935 and operated until 
Norfolk County Council purchased the land in Novembr 2002 for a new facility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8 Norwich Bus Station  
 
My comment is that the new bus station does little to solve the big problem of buses getting 
caught in traffic or the interconnectivity between the different routes and companies. The 
biggest priority for local people in the consultation was improving the bus network so that 
they could travel faster across the city. The Bus Station does not improve local traffic much, 
since it mainly serve regional buses. Norwich need ffective measures to influence the private 
bus companies and has a very long way to go before a modern public transport system is in 
place. Public – private agreements on a voluntary bsis is the main instrument used. It 
remains to be seen how effective this is in Norwich. 
 
6.3.6 The Northern Norwich Distributor Road - NDR 
 
The Draft LTP 2006-2011 was sent for approval early in 2006, but the planning process had 
already structured the issues and possible alternatives. The NDR had through this process 
become deeply embedded in the LTP 2006-2011. The NDR was not mentioned in the Norfolk 
Structure Plan 1999 or in NATS Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06. A major road 
investment project has during the review process becom  part of the Norwich sustainable 
development plans. This happened because the County could play the districts against each 
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other, most are for the NDR with only a minority against in Norwich. The NDR lies mainly in 
Broadland District and Norwich it is claimed will only get benefits of less through traffic and 
the opportunities for closing roads and introducing more bus priority schemes open up. Hence 
the transport in Norwich becomes more sustainable caused by the NDR. What they didn’t 
include was the general traffic growth and the traffic generating effects of the NDR, which 
probably in a few years will cause the congestion problem to be back as it was before the 
NDR.  
 
Norfolk County Council approved the Northern Norwich Distributor Road (NDR) in 
September 2005. The basis for this decision was several years of planning322. The County 
Director of Transport and Planning reported that: “This report restates the need for an NDR, 
which is included as a regional priority in the draft East of England Plan323, together with the 
benefits that it would bring to Norwich, Norfolk and the region. The road remains an essential 
part of the Norwich Area Transportation Strategy (NATS), which, when implemented, would 
relieve congestion on the ring roads and radial routes, facilitate improvements to public 
transport and relieve congestion in the northern suburbs.” This statement makes two 
interesting points, firstly that the NDR has become a r gional priority long before the local 
planning process has concluded. Secondly the stated reason for the NDR is congestion relief 
and the possibility of improving public transport. The economic growth arguments that access 
to Norwich Airport and Industrial Estate and the possibility the NDR opens for further 
housing development close to the airport, are subdued. This is probably because these 
arguments may be said to be contrary to Government policy. 
 
6.3.6.1 History of the Norwich Distributor Road 
An NDR was first considered in the early 1990’s. Much work was undertaken then on 
alternative routes, including environmental assessmnts, and a public consultation was carried 
out in 1994 as part of a review of the Norfolk Struc ure Plan. Whilst the majority of 
respondents supported an NDR, there were strong environmental objections to parts of the 
routes. Furthermore, national policy also began to change towards a presumption against 
providing additional highway capacity, and less money was made available for road schemes. 
The proposals were therefore dropped and the NDR does n t feature in the Norfolk Structure 
Plan (1999)324.  
 
The need for a road was reconsidered as part of the 2003/4 review of the NATS. Norfolk 
County claims that: “National policy had moved back towards providing additional highway 
capacity where required. With this in mind, a brief was issued in December 2001, to assess 
possible NDR route options.” Notice that the County already in 2001 started planning the 
NDR, at that time there were few if any indications, that the national policy was “mowing 
back” towards more road building.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
322 Norfolk County: NNDR Stage 2 Environmental Assessment Report. Need for the Scheme 10 JB/R1C093 Rev 
0 21 October 2004 
323 The County has already in 2004 managed to get the NDR into the regional plan as a priority. 
324 Interviews and documents are the source for this. 
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Figure 6-9  The Northern Norwich Distributor Road – NDR, proposed alignment.  
Source: Norfolk web site. 
 
6.3.6.2 The NDR and the Draft Local Transport Plan 2006 – 2011 
Long before the consultation with the public had taken place the draft LTP 2006-2011 had the 
following formulation (page 6): “The Norwich sub-regional strategy recognizes the Norwich 
area as a centre where growth will be focused. It recognizes the importance of providing 
essential infrastructure including a Northern Distrbutor Road, and improvements to the A11 
and A47 trunk roads, needed to accommodate growth and support the development of the 
Norwich area as a sustainable community.”  One may ask if the consultation with the public 
only is done because it is required. There seems to be little room for the opposition to the 
NDR. 
 
The traffic forecasts independent of the NDR, were giv n in three alternatives: 0.9% - 1.8% - 
2.6% annual growth as shown in the table below. 
 
Year 1996-2006 1996-2011 
Economic growth forecast Low Central High Low Central High 
Traffic forecast (% increase) 9 18 26 13 25 36 
Table 6-6 Traffic forecast for NDR 
 
The developments that generate significant amounts of traffic are: 
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• Norwich International Airport 
• Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital/Norwich Research Park (generating 14 000 
trips per day) 
• Out of town developments: Longwater Industrial Estate and Housing estate with 1600 
houses close to it generating 10 000 daily trips, located to the western end of NDR. 
 
The Norwich International Airport is central in the growth strategy for Norwich (Shaping the 
Future) and it “also offers potential for relieving pressure on congested airports in the 
southeast”, which it recognizes will put pressure on the current access roads. The NDR is 
therefore required within 10-15 years.  
 
6.3.6.3 Norwich Area Transportation Strategy – Consultation Results 2003 
The NATS Consultation was carried out between 6 October and 13 December 2003 on a 
Preferred Transportation Strategy for the Norwich Area. The consultation comprised  
• Leaflets posted to over 130 000 households and busines es in the Norwich area, with a 
total of 143 019 brochures and questionnaires distributed across the county 
• Consultation materials to stakeholders including businesses, interest groups and 
transport operators 
• Public meetings in locations across the Norwich area 
• Exhibitions in locations across the Norwich Area  
 
21 073 postal questionnaires were returned, together with over 800 separate written responses. 
567 of the postal responses were received from organizations and local councils (town, parish 
and district). An additional 343 questionnaires were received via the website. The response to 
the consultation was 16% of questionnaires being return d. In addition, public meetings were 
generally held. During the consultation, over 350 calls were received on a dedicated helpline 
number. 
 
In a general summary Norfolk County claims that “the NATS consultation has been a major, 
successful consultation, and received a good response. The response from the consultation 
showed that, in general, there was support for the Preferred Strategy. The response from the 
consultation also showed that there was broad support for a Northern Distributor Road (78% 
supported the NDR in 2003). However, because of issues raised and some viable alternatives 
to NDR consultation options, supplementary consultation is necessary. Overall, the 
consultation results support the Preferred Strategy.”   
 
6.3.6.4 The NDR consultation process 2005. 
Have your say on the future of transport in Norfolk was the title on the consultation paper 
with Questionnaire attached. The consultation closed after eight weeks (16th December 2005). 
The themes and measures for questions were: 
• Getting about 
• Reducing congestion 
• Improving environment 
• Road safety 
• Looking after transport infrastructure (how to spend your money) 
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The public were asked to answer by crossing of statements related to the five themes. Here are 
two examples of how language and the choices given ar  helpful in getting the wanted results 
from the consultation. 
 
Q1. How important is each of the following for helping people to get around?  
Answer Choice Q 1.3: Continue building costly new schemes such as cycle 
routes, pavements and bus lanes 
 
Q2 How important is each of the following for reducing congestion?  
Answer Choice Q 2.5: New roads (with other improvements) 
 
Notice the wording that normally small cheap schemes ar  termed costly. Normally extremely 
costly new roads in urban areas (like the NDR) are presented as the natural and self-evident 
answer to reduce congestion! This bias towards enhancing the positive sides of a project and 
to reduce and remove negative sides, are well known from my own planning experience at the 
micro level to the arguments for the war in Iraq at the macro level. Project promoters are more 
preoccupied with getting their projects funded and implemented than with making balanced 
analysis.325 I will return to this point in the discussion.  
 
6.3.6.5 Growth and the NDR 
20% of Norfolk businesses considered the “lack of communication links /transport 
infrastructure” to be the principal barrier to growth. This is of particular concern in relation to 
those areas of Norfolk identified as eligible for funding to improve economic activity. Both 
the East of England Development Agency’s Regional Economic Strategy (East of England 
2010) and Shaping the Future (Public Private Partnership) view high quality transport 
infrastructure as being essential to ensure the future prosperity of Norfolk. Shaping the Future 
includes the following strategic priorities:  
• Preferred Route determined for Northern Distributor Road. 
• A growing regional airport in Norwich 
 
6.3.6.6 NDR report September 2005 
The plan had to go through EIP, Examination in Public326, and the County strategy was:  
6.1. Planning 
6.1.1. The NDR is included in the draft East of Engla d Plan as a scheme with regional 
priority status.  
6.1.2. In the draft list of matters to be debated at the EIP, the NDR does not feature as a 
separate topic. However, the objections of statutory and non-statutory environmental bodies 
will ensure the NDR is debated within the Norwich Sub-Region Topic under ‘Key 
Infrastructure’. A statement in support of the NDR has been prepared and is attached as 
Appendix 3 of this report. 
6.2. Economic Assessment 
6.2.1. The further work undertaken since March has confirmed the strong case for the 
NDR in wider economic terms. Alongside this, the Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR) of the routes 
remain very good, within the range 2.7 to 4.2. The BCRs have been produced using standard 
                                                
325 Flyvbjerg et. al. has in the book Megaprojects and Risk shown and measured how systematically this is done  
326  EIP, Examination in Public is an instrument that also should be used in other countries.  
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methodology and recent government advice suggests thi  would, by itself, justify the scheme 
being built. 
6.2.5. Also, as reported previously, the recent government advice states that a good BCR can 
be degraded if the environmental impacts are significant. The impact of the NDR on the 
Wensum could be judged as such a case and is, therefor , a factor to be considered in 
choosing a route if government finance is to be sought.  
 
This strategy show how skilful and well prepared the County was before the examination in 
public of the NDR project. Notice also (6.2.5) that if the environmental impact crossing the 
Wensum river is too great, then they might opt for n t seeking government finance, to avoid 
head on conflict between Ministries (clever maneuvering I would say).  
 
6.3.6.7 Norwich and Norfolk Transport Action Group 
The Norwich and Norfolk Transport Action Group wants to stop the NDR. The group has 
members with experience from the fight against IRR (see 6.3.1). The Action Group hired a 
well-known consultant to provide arguments against the Northern Distributor Road327. The 
conclusions drawn by the consultant were the following:  
1. There are good reasons for caution about the scale of housing growth being proposed 
for the East of England region.  
2. The Regional Transport Strategy is based on a highly optimistic view of resources.  
3. The functional relationship of NDR to the planned housing developments in north 
Norwich has not been investigated by Norfolk County Council. 
4. The claimed effect of relieving existing radial routes of congestion appears modest, 
and likely to be swamped by the planned level of housing provision.  
5. NDR will generate traffic on local roads accessing it.  
6. While the NDR might help people to access the more diffuse pattern of jobs which is 
an established trend, it is likely itself to exacerbate the problems of employment 
decentralization.  
7. The economic significance of Norwich Airport is for business travel and the NDR is 
of limited relevance for access to the airport.  
8. Demand management is the main strategic tool for ensuri g that improved transport 
provision does not simply trigger longer journey distances.  
9. Demand management is an increasingly important strand of Government policy.  The 
implementation of a national road pricing scheme would change patterns of demand in 
such a way as to make the NDR redundant not long after it can be built.  
10. The appraisal of NDR options by Norfolk County Council did not include 
consideration of demand management, removing both an alternative approach to 
tackling congestion and a means of funding solutions.  
11. Developer funding is a possibility, but depends upon there being an adequate surplus 
value from development.  
12. Private Finance Initiative is potentially an expensive funding route.  
13. Government approval of a LTP major scheme bid depends upon the proposal being 
put forward within the framework of Government policy.  
                                                
327 The company Urban & Regional Policy by Alan Wenban-Smith was commissioned in July 2004 by the 
Norwich and Norfolk Transport Action Group to provide an overview of the case for inclusion of the Norwich 
Northern Distributor Route (NDR) in the draft RPG14 then being prepared by the East of England Regional 
Assembly (EERA) 
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It is not difficult to find the conclusions in the consultants report well argued, but they need 
political backing to weigh in the further process. Politicians use “double talk” (Brunsson 
1989), one type of talk for action and one for creating support as the following comments 
show. Demand management is in theory an important instrument, however it is not so 
politically. It is still unlikely that the Government will force a city to take demand 
management into use and therefore it will be up to the local community to put forward such 
proposals. With deep political divisions about this in trument, I will think that it will not be 
introduced for years in Norwich District and the surro nding Districts.  
 
Developer funding even with only a token amount of funds, will add breadth and strength to 
the NDR case. Private Finance Initiative is still even with a lot of shortcomings, regarded as 
one important way to keep public investment down. Last point is that the NDR does not 
readily fit within the framework of Government policy and hence is unlikely to be funded. 
With an innovative finance package with many contributors and political backing from 
Districts, County and Region together with strong business support, the chance of getting 
final approval for the NDR may be far larger than the consultant imagines. 
 
6.3.6.8 Different views of the NDR 
The leader of Norfolk County Council Highways and Transport committee had these views 
on the NDR:  
Interviewer: If you, some say that the Northern distributor road is generating new traffic, do you agree 
with that?  
Respondent: This is kind of argument performed by the Greens in Norwich. I don’t agree, because the 
Norwich Northern Distributor Road is to enable us to make conditions in the city and round the 
Northern suburbs more acceptable for the people wholive there. At the moment, cars take shortcuts 
through the closed streets of Norwich, some of them b ing blocked up but they still take them. The 
Northern Distributor road would enable us by creating extra capacity to take traffic off the residential 
roads in Norwich and then the suburbs. It would also enable us to stop traffic, I mean straight through 
of Norwich.  
 
It will also enable us to deal with the growth that’s taking place to the north, the housing growth, the
shopping growth, the out of town shops, and it willenable us to deal with the extra housing, which the 
region and government say that we’ve got to have, a lot of which will be around Norwich. One of the 
reasons that so many new shops around the north of Norwich because it’s so difficult for people to get
into Norwich. All the big, big sized ones, furniture and so on, are on the outside of Norwich 328. And if 
the shops are there, then people will go to North, won’t they?  
 
Interviewer: You don’t see it as a paradox: both building more r ads and aiming at shifting people from 
cars to public transport, walking, and so on? 
Respondent: No I don’t think that’s a paradox, because the aim of the Northern Distributor is to enable 
us to put restrictions on roads, which are unsuitable for heavy volume of traffic. The Northern 
Distributor is to take pressure off urban roads. The Park & Ride is to do exactly the same, take the 
pressure off urban roads, to allow people to catch buses for the last part of their journey.  
 
The arguments for the Northern Distributor Road can be summed up as in the following 
points: 
1. Safeguard residential roads 
2. Stop traffic straight through Norwich 
3. To provide necessary access to land use developments 
                                                
328 My comment: The land use planning and development co rol has been outside the control of Norwich City 
Council 
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4. Take pressure off urban roads 
5. High quality transport infrastructure is essential to ensure future prosperity 
 
In 2008 the NDR was sent for Government approval and at the same time the tender process 
was started, as announced by the Norfolk County on their web page.329 
 
6.3.7 Unitary authority 
 
In 1974 local government was reformed into a two tier local system with county councils and 
district councils (cf. changes in Norwegian and Danish local government at the same time). 
Norfolk County became responsible for both land use strategy and transport strategy by the 
Structure planning. While the six districts in the county, of which Norwich City is one 
(formerly Norwich was a borough), became stakeholders and discussion partners. Thus the 
national government should create the broad framework and overall policy and the counties 
should develop the local strategy within this framework.  
 
Norwich Labour Party did not want to extend city borders to become a unitary, in the 
seventies, because the surrounding suburbs were not labour. “Some “wrong decisions” were 
taken” is how a present party member describes the issue330. Labour had a majority in 
Norwich for 70 years, placed in the middle of the very conservative Norfolk County. In the 
nineties new unitary discussions took place, and these may also have been influenced by this 
history? The Burnham committee on local government r form in the 1990ties led to new 
unitary administrations many places, but not in Norwich, even if it according to the size could 
have become a unitary authority. One reason for this continuation in Norwich may be that the 
Norwich city border does go through densely built up areas and thus the “city” population is 
divided into several neighboring districts. The traditionally politically conservative county 
and labour city may also be one cause of this continua on of the two-tier system in Norfolk 
and Norwich. The tension between the Conservative County and the Labour City was quite 
old, particularly bad in fifties and sixties. It can be traced at the bureaucratic level as well, for 
example conflict between the county surveyor and city officials. The conflict is not 
historically long, but is mainly some folklore tensions between laws, church, landowners and 
workers331. City boundary is important both for the politicians and the citizens. In the fifties 
the labour party didn’t want the big suburbs outside the city into the city afraid of losing their 
majority in the city council, nor did the relatively wealthy suburbs want to be part of Norwich 
City.  
 
Greenaway (op. cit.) commented the splitting of LU&T planning on different levels thus: 
“Blair wanted to reorganize government and to find place for the minister of agriculture in 
another ministry (the agriculture ministry was “captured by the agricultural producers”) and 
the reorganization had the effect that structure planning went to the regions and transport 
strategy remained at the county level (if not unitary). Hence the opportunity for one authority 
                                                
329 In July, we submitted our Major Schemes Business Ca e (MSBC) to the Department for Transport (DfT). 
This document sets out the justification for the NDR and will be used by DfT to decide whether the scheme 
should be formally included in its programme for future funding known as 'Programme Entry'. DfT's decision is 
likely to be announced early in 2009. (www.norfolk.gov.uk accessed August 2008.)  
330 Interview with Brian Morrey Labour councillor Norwich City Council. 
331 Interview 140904, John Greenaway, Senior lecturer EAU.  
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to integrate land use and transport in one comprehensive plan covering an area like a county 
or a city was lost.”  The Norwich chief transport planner was in an interview332 asked about 
LU&T planning responsibility being placed at different levels: Structure plan at regional level 
and transport at local level? “There is a need for sensible LU&T planning, the city has mass 
enough to handle and integrate key LU&T decisions. The government was met with the wrong 
tactic when unitary politics was decided. Several similar size cities has unitary rule.”  
 
Through the interviews and with increasing insight into plans, it became clear that the way 
local government was organized into Norfolk County and Norwich District as one of six 
districts in the county had great influence on LU&T planning and implementation of policy. 
Several politicians were interviewed in 2004 – 2005. Not one of the politicians raised at that 
time the possibility of applying again to become a unitary. But in January 2007 Norwich did 
send such an application.  
 
6.3.7.1 Norwich bid for unitary January 2007 
Norwich City Council reported in January 2007, that it would apply to the Government to 
become a Unitary.333 The present problems are outlined in the report One City, One Council 
and can be summed up in this line:  
Duplication of services, lack of focus on the needs of the City, lack of direct 
accountability and uncoordinated approaches to key strategic issues 334.  
 
Norfolk County reacted fast and opposed the Norwich unitary bid strongly (cited from 
Norfolk web):  
 
Norfolk and Norwich - a good team that should stay together335 
Norwich City Council is bidding to become a unitary uthority taking over the 
responsibility of delivering all the services and functions to Norwich people that are 
currently delivered by the County Council. If it succeeds, it would mean that Norfolk 
would have two different councils planning and deliv r ng the large scale ‘people’ 
services (social services, child protection, fostering and adoption, schools support etc) 
that are currently delivered by one. Government has announced that 16 councils 
bidding for unitary status are to go forward for futher consultation. Norwich City 
Council’s bid based on its current boundaries and a 127 000 population has been 
shortlisted. We continue to oppose this bid. 
 
Norfolk County Council Leader Shaun Murphy gives hi reaction to Norwich’s bid for 
unitary: “We don’t believe that a case for such radical change in this piecemeal 
fashion has been made or that it can be justified in terms of cost to the taxpayer or 
disruption to essential public services. So we are concerned about Norwich’s bid for a 
number of reasons.” 
 
The following arguments can be stated against u itary:  
                                                
332 Norwich chief transport planner Andy Watt, Septembr 2004  
333 A Government commission is still looking into this question in 2008.  
334 This lack of accountability and uncoordinated approaches in key strategic issues can be said to be the case 
also in Aalborg and Kristiansand, regarding planning a d financing of roads and bus services.  
335 Accessed at www.norfolk.gov.uk on April 6, 2007  
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• Economics of scale, the competence needed and the cost of running small authorities. 
• Economics of scope, the rational division of the territory into sub areas.  
• Tradition, identity and pride, e.g. Norfolk Regiment. 
• Local politics, poorer people in the inner city and more wealthy in the suburbs may 
shift the balance between the parties.  
• Scare of redistribution of funds from the suburbs to the city.  
• Norwich as a unitary, would make a “hole” in Norfolk, how to organize the remnants? 
The centre-periphery discussion.  
 
6.4 Analysis and discussions 
 
6.4.1 Norwich land use and transport planning, a summary  
 
Land use planning in Norfolk has focused on supporting and allocating growth. Allocation of 
building land for housing and employment has been th  main task. The population of 
Norwich urban area has nearly doubled while it stagnated in the city. In Norwich City the 
main task has been and is economic growth and as part of that to keep the city in the Top Ten 
retail cities in Britain. The Castle Mall, Riverside and Chapelfield developments are prime 
examples of this policy. Each of these developments has more than 1000 parking spaces. 
They are thus major car traffic generators. 
 
The historic city of Norwich with many hundred listed buildings has lost thousands of 
industrial work places in the centre leaving many Brownfield areas. Redevelopment of these 
and new developments have been “sympathetic” to the historic centre, both in building scale, 
form and style. It is a result of skilful planning and conscientious decisions. However, the city 
is still accepting/demanding ample parking in new and redevelopment projects. St Andrews 
Car Park with 1086 spaces is the most recent example. The City has not managed to change 
the parking policy to support a more sustainable transport policy with reduction in the use of 
the private car. An example is that the present parking policy is not supporting and promoting 
car-free housing, but “Car free housing will be permitted in locations of high accessibility, 
provided that…”. Why are you not allowed to build car free housing generally? Why is the 
Council not saying car-free housing is the only type of housing we will permit in the 
redevelopments in the city centre? One answer is that the politicians fear that the public 
opinion would be against – “not ripe yet” – so they l ave the matter not to stir the voters. 
Another reason may be pressure from developers and a third “the embeddedness of the car”. 
There is often a lack of political leadership it seems when sustainability measures inflict on 
the car system.  
 
The major new housing estates have been established outsi e Norwich District. This is a 
typical suburban growth using the old radial road network pointing to the city centre, as the 
main road infrastructure. With employment moving out f the centre and spreading, e.g. 
Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital/Norwich Research Park, University of East Anglia, 
Norwich Airport and Industrial estate, the travel patterns have changed. The old radial road 
network has not been able to cope properly with the new travel pattern, resulting in 
widespread congestion. This is further increased by the steady increase in commuting to work 
over larger and larger areas.  
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Until the IRR was stopped in 1993, the expansion of the road network had been the prime task 
for infrastructure provision. From then on a new policy had to be developed. The Park and 
Ride system became a corner stone in the strategy and by 2005 six sites with 5000 parking 
places have been established. Shuttle buses connect the si es with the centre. Still the concept 
behind the Park and Ride system is car based, it is not representing a shift to other modes. 
Norwich opened in 1967 the first pedestrianized street in Britain, but the city has not been 
able to develop the pedestrian system much further. Norfolk County is the Highway Authority 
and has a major say even in the Joint Highway Agreement with the city. The Westlegate case 
can illustrate that there are different cultures and perspectives in the City and County. The 
City councilors are occupied with the place, the histor c fabric and the daily life, while the 
perspective from the County is how the transport sys em – with the car as the major mode – 
enhances economic competitiveness of the area. The City wanted Westlegate to be 
pedestrianized, but lost on a split vote to the majority from the County.  
 
The IRR public inquiry meant that the NATS strategy had to be rethought. The soft modes 
and public transport in particular had to play a more important role. Public transport was in 
the eighties deregulated and privatized. The public transport authorities had little influence 
over public transport services. How could the city improve the conditions for walking and 
cycling? How could a cycle network be funded? These questions got their answer in the new 
system of Local Transport Plans from the year 2000 onwards.  
 
The LTP 2001-2006 represents a change in focus in the NATS strategy. Public transport shall 
get a new information system with “real time information” showing when the bus will arrive 
and depart. A new bus station gets priority (the Bus Station to £5 million opened in 2005) and 
bus priority schemes introduced. The plan should also develop the facilities for walking and 
cycling with a cycle net to be established. Together with the Park and Ride system this was 
the strategy in LTP 2001-2006. Road building was out. However, the car traffic and with it 
congestion keep growing except for crossing the IRRinto the city centre, where traffic 
numbers are going down. The forecasts of traffic growth told of an increasing gap between 
road capacity and demand in the near future.  
 
Already in 2001 the County starts a preliminary study of NDR, contrary to the Structure plan 
1999, and the aims of the LTP. Only two years later th  NDR is part of the East of England 
Regional Strategy and embedded in the LTP 2006-2011 proposal! The NDR lies mainly in the 
Broadland District, but the main benefits the county claims will come to Norwich city because 
the through traffic can be substantially reduced. The NDR had support from 78% of the 
answers in a consultation, but there are environmental conflicts especially in the Wensum 
river valley. In Norwich City opposition exists, primarily from the Green Party, who has 
promised to fight the NDR. “The Achilles heel of the NDR is its funding” as one informer 
said336. The NDR has both to be included in the LTP and separately apply for funding from 
the Government. It is well embedded in the provisional LTP 2006-2011, but there might be 
opposition to the NDR in the city that goes wider than the Green party. The bid for funding of 
the NDR as a major project has firstly to compete with other regional projects and secondly to 
convince the Government that it is in accordance with the present policies. Both of these 
obstacles might be forbidding? What the end result will be won’t be known for another few 
                                                
336 Interview with Rupert Reed, Green Councilor Norwich  
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years, but it certainly is a good example of the conflict between coping with traffic growth by 
restraint and by building new capacity. It demonstrates the different perspectives between the 
traditional “predict and provide” thinking and the thinking behind “the New Realism” in 
English planning. It also demonstrates the different thinking at the county level and the city 
grass root level.  
 
6.4.2 Technocratic and Sociocratic planning ideals in Norfolk 
 
Faludi and van der Valk (1994) make the distinction between technocracy and sociocracy as 
two types of planning ideals. In the technocratic ideal the politicians set the goals and the 
planners find the right means and instruments to achieve the goal. A model often called the 
synoptic or rational planning model (Banfield). The sociocratic ideal involves everybody and 
through negotiation between the public and private players the road ahead is found. A model 
propagated by Healey as Collaboration and Forester as Deliberation. By placing these two 
concepts as two ends of a line a perspective of how planning has changed in Norwich can be 
found. The Public Inquiry on the IRR can be seen as the end of the former type of 
technocratic planning in Norwich. However, the tradition, knowledge and skills of the 
planners experienced with technocratic planning will still be there for years. The “New 
Realism” which brought the LTP is more a sociocrati type of planning putting emphasis on 
consultation with stakeholders and the public. From the first LTP to the preparation of the 
second LTP there is clearly a learning process in which Norfolk County adapts to the signals 
and guidance from Central Government, but also learning on how to frame a strategy and use 
consultation to support the strategy. The NDR is a case in point. It is not mentioned in the first 
LTP 2001-2006, but already in 2001 the “technocrati” planning of the NDR starts with 
evaluation of different alignments. It then gradually emerges in the annual monitoring reports 
of the LTP and is included as an item in the consultation questionnaire. About the same time 
the County pushes to get the NDR into the East England regional strategy, with success. By 
2004 it is embedded in the regional strategy and 78% of the population supports the NDR, 
hence it becomes a natural part of the strategy in the provisional LTP 2006-2011. Focus then 
shifts to the environmental consequences of the diff rent alignments of the NDR and thereby 
the focus is also shifted into the neighboring Districts from Norwich District. Some say that 
the urban population never has got the chance to voice their opinion about the NDR and the 
whole strategy has been to manipulate and steer the proposal through, which may be said to 
be “good” old fashion technocratic planning. The case illustrates that while the overall 
planning process is shifting towards more sociocratic ideals, the established powers adapt 
readily to new ideals and also learn how to play both strategically and tactically within the 
new framework. 
 
6.4.3 The goals and signals are not compatible 
 
On all levels the conflicting aims of both investing i  infrastructure to reduce congestion and 
reducing the car traffic, is apparent. In England the Government has set this long-term aim: 
Reliable, safe and integrated transport for everyone, which respects the environment. This 
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objective shall be achieved by service agreements337 setting targets as the following two 
targets:  
• Reduce congestion on the inter-urban trunk road network and in large urban 
areas in England below 2000 levels by 2010 (joint target with the Highway 
Agency). 
• Secure improvements to the accessibility, punctuality nd reliability of local public 
transport (bus and light rail) with an increase in use of more than 12% by 2010 
compared with 2000 levels. (Appendix D, DfT (2004) cited from Hull 2004 ) 
 
It is difficult to see how this objective can be achieved in urban areas with two service 
agreements without making a choice of which of these targets is the most important. On the 
one hand PT passenger numbers shall increase by 1.2% per year and congestion shall be 
reduced. This increase in PT numbers does not in any w y help to reduce congestions as 
wanted. For such a reduction in congestion car use must be dramatically reduced (the rise in 
car ownership considered) or investment in road capa ity must be very much higher than in 
the last decade. When goals are ambiguous and conflicting the local agents must take part in 
all projects and planning processes to maximize the possibility of getting funds or other 
benefits to their local area. This is apparent in the following statement “City politicians and 
planners were desperate to attract transport investment of any kind to Norwich which had 
been cold shouldered for so long by the Conservative-dominated county; even if the Inner 
Ring Road was not ideal it was linked to other NATS2 investments.” (Greenaway 2000:828) 
 
6.4.4 Growth: Exchange value versus Use value.  
 
Economic growth is wished for everywhere and many business interests and politicians still 
believe that investment in big transport infrastructure promotes growth. A case study in 
Bristol and Newcastle showed: “The dominant policy discourse has sought investment in the 
strategic road network to enhance the economic competitiveness of urban areas.” (Hull 
2004). The yearning for more economic growth is strong in Norwich and shows in the day-to-
day planning decisions. The £270 million Chapelfield development, which uses the site of a 
former chocolate factory, provides some 140 new homes, 1000 car parking spaces and about 
80 shops. The transport consequences of this major development are played down during the 
decision process even if it contradicts the PPG13 and the adopted Land Use and Transport 
strategy. The economic arguments – new jobs and new business – are the most important 
arguments in this case as in many others. “Local authorities are often too fearful of losing out 
on new development (and jobs) to impose too many coditi ns on development (such as 
location criteria), particularly in the case of major prestige developments.” (Stead 2003) If 
we look at this from the other side and ask if it is politically possible to vote against a project 
like Chapelfield, the answers from the interviewed were that “to vote against such a project is 
political suicide!”  
 
In Norwich there are clearly strong interests in economic growth that push for new 
development, new housing, new roads, etc. It is the exchange value338 pursued by the business 
                                                
337 Service agreements are the instrument public authorities use to influence other agencies or actors to aim at 
certain goals, for example to get a bus company to intr duce a new route, higher frequency, etc.  
338 An apartment building provides a “home” for residents (use value) and rent for the owner (exchange value). 
See chapter 2.3.2 on Logan & Molotch for further discussion. 
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community, which is the driving force. The residents’ appreciation of the historic city, the 
place value or use value, often opposes the developm nt interests in exchange value. This was 
the conflict in the IRR case. In the NDR case it remains to be seen if this conflict will be 
strong.  
 
6.4.5 Financing transport infrastructure and Public Transport services 
 
Financing transport infrastructure and public transport services is steered by a complex 
system, in which private and public both compete and cooperate. There is no longer a clear 
distinction of what is of private and what is public interest due to the New Public 
Management ideology. Within the public sector one oft n talk of joined-up policies and 
integrated planning, which seem hard to achieve. The Norwich case is a prime example of 
policies not being joined up and integrated planning being dismantled when partial 
implementation take place. The rules governing the financing of infrastructure and the 
organizing of public sector with tasks and authority placed at many levels form the incentive 
structure. Politicians, planners and stakeholders play on this incentive structure to pursue their 
different goals.  
 
The LTP is both the land use and transport plan creating the vision and aim for the future of 
Norwich and the vehicle to be used to apply for getting money to implement the policy. The 
rules are such that Central Government may fund all new schemes, or scheme A, C, H or no 
new schemes in the LTP. Thus the LTP strategy may be pulled apart by the funding process 
both in the realization of different projects and i the timing of these.  
 
Most nations are financed by taxes, which in turn is used for national projects like defense, 
health care, rail and road infrastructure, etc. This system gets small cracks when motorists 
have to pay tolls or congestion charges in addition. Both the tax system and the local levy 
system are very dependent of how the money is used. If the local communities ”never” get 
any benefits, then social unrest may start and challenge the policies. In Norfolk the public 
clearly feel that their traffic problems are great, and many feel that the Government is not 
willing to finance the solution to their problems. This over time will be an increasingly strong 
political argument, which will be used in the LTP bidding process. On the other hand some of 
the public is strongly for the “green policies” also aimed for in the LTP. In negotiations and 
decision making between the Government Office, region, county and district involving 
planners, politicians and stakeholders at all levels, these contradictions will be played on and 
the result will be highly uncertain.  
 
Vigar, on the topic of funding and “selling” of schemes, states (Vigar 2002:147): The 
concentration of regulatory and investment power amongst civil servants and ministers 
clearly make it vital for local authorities to understand changes in the direction of thinking at 
the centre! Generally speaking local actors paid civil servants at national and regional levels 
considerable attention, partly because finance was dependent on the “selling” of schemes 
and packages to civil servants and ministers. The power game often creates a gap between the 
ambitions and the reality on the ground. In Norwich exemplified with the increase in 
emissions and congestion. Reduced car traffic would “solve” both these problems, but instead 
the politicians are pursuing the road-building path because the incentive structure makes that 
the most rational way to behave for the County politicians. Likewise, few politicians put 
 
 256 
effort in pursuing better public transport services since these are deregulated. The incentive 
structure therefore led to skewed financing of infrast ucture and public transport 
implementation compared to the land use and transport planning goals and joined-up policy 
aspirations.  
 
6.4.6 Ruling Coalition? 
 
With the New Public Management and the “market-turn” many new stakeholders have 
entered the land use and transport planning and policy field. The former fixed planning 
procedures and processes are challenged and new forms of participation and cooperation are 
formed. Networking becomes important for information exchange and influence. The LTP for 
Norwich urban area aims to develop more sustainable transport. Hence, managing the city 
land use and transport development – the ability to change the course – is important. Stone, 
based on his study of Atlanta, has defined a regime as the set of arrangements by which a 
community is actually governed, or the informal arrangements by which public bodies and
private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions. (Stone 1989:6)  
 
John Greenaway who has studied and followed Norwich politics in a professional capacity 
was asked if a “ruling regime” existed in Norwich: “The hospital case339 shows that such 
networks of powerful elites exists, the Norfolk mafia. Individuals that sit on the university 
board, John Innes research park board, involved in financing hospital through PFI. Hospital 
networks linked to conservative party, but good at taking up new Labour’s ideas like Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI). But always more complex than it seems and full of paradoxes like 
the radical medic professor fighting for moving thehospital to new site with better research 
facilities.”  The broadening of former technocratic public planning to sociocratic planning 
open up for “stakeholder planning” (Innes, 1996) and other forms of skewed influence, unless 
the process is transparent. I will not follow up if such a network also influences LU&T policy 
in detail, but only comment on the recent involvement of stronger business interests in public 
planning (see ch. 6.2.9). The NDR for example must probably have a substantial portion of 
local finance to be implemented. Networking within a group of stakeholders is needed to 
create such a package of local finance and that process may be interesting to follow to see if a 
“the ruling coalition” exists in Norwich.  
 
Another point Greenaway raised was on democratic def it: “Apart from the complexities with 
the two councils, the loss of power and prestige the local government have experienced over 
30-40 years, probably last 100 years is more important. Thatcher started the deliberate 
building down of local government, and the New Governance continues under Blair: 
independent national bodies at the local level are created (PFI, Training and Education 
centers, etc) and at the same time local government is limited both statutory and financially.” 
Apart from the greater involvement of business interests and the reduced influence of elected 
councilors, there is also the role and status of public planners in this. I did not in the 
interviews delve with this question, but very often a discontent emerged. From being public 
servants charting a good or the best future for the city, the planners felt more and more as 
underpaid scapegoats. This will probably also influence Land Use and Transport planning in 
Norwich.  
                                                
339 The hospital case is reported in Greenaway 2001.  
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6.4.7 Politics and individuals matter 
 
Key persons matter, indeed they are often crucial in bargaining and networking process, as 
Vigar found in his study of Kent County Council: The policy networks tied KCC to sources of 
funding in Westminster and Brussels, and changes in transport policy at these levels, 
influenced shifts in the county’s transport policy, but it was also critically dependent on the 
efforts of key officers to generate social capital, which helped KCC gain resources: Our boss 
is very shrewd he goes straight in there and finds the decision makers and they like him doing 
that. (Vigar 2002:146) 
 
The Kristiansand case showed how local municipality nd county politicians cooperated with 
the MPs – “the Agderbench” – to successfully obtain road funding. It was therefore surprising 
for me to discover that the MPs in England have little room to influence Government policy 
on roads investment. They are elected from one-man constituencies and may not easily go 
into a coalition with other MPs to fight for a road in their area. This is very different to the 
Scandinavian tradition with several MPs elected from each county and coalitions across party 
lines and counties are more of a rule than the opposite. Both city and county politicians and 
indeed administrators keep in close contact with the county’s MPs in Norway. In many cases 
they are central in creating solutions, especially on road investments. The role of MPs was 
asked in Norwich, and the following list was compiled from answers to this question: What 
results are successes for an MP? 
• Factory closure resistance 
• Press notices on constituency performance, education, etc 
• Media stories and picture 
• Attract new public offices  
• Network use to help industry, districts, individuals 
• Generally, attract inward investment 
 
In Norway and Denmark road investment would be prominent on such a list. This is one key 
to understand the differences between Norway and England. In an equivalent case as the 
Norwich Northern Distributor Road in Norway, it would be impossible to put the city on the 
sideline because of the need to get politicians on all levels from the MPs to the city councilors 
to work together. In England it seems that the MPs play a different and more disclosed role 
and that the networking between the government office officers and the county planners are 
most prominent, as the example from Kent above, show . In the NDR case Norfolk County is 
sole defining the strategy, which is aimed at convincing the Government Office to adopt the 
proposal and fund it. One may say that the NDR project becomes more of an administrative 
project where the words used to describe the project b comes most important, while a similar 
project say in Aalborg would be far more political, involving politicians and bargaining on all 
three levels. There is on the other hand no doubt that the Norfolk County politicians are in 
charge of the LTP process and the plan focus. They ar  also central in the discussions between 
the Region and the County.  
 
In these processes certain actors have a far greater opportunity to influence Land Use and 
Transport planning and policy than others. Also different actors have different time horizons, 
different strategic skills and ability to gather support. The interview with Adrian Gunson, 
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Norfolk County Cabinet Member with responsibility for Planning and Transportation, 
revealed a strong will and burning ambition to improve the transport situation for the (rural) 
county population, both public transport and car. In the foreword to NATS First Annual 
Progress Report on the Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2 05/06, Adrian Gunson says: 
“Following the Local Council elections in June, the Council is now in Conservative control. 
This will obviously mean that there will be some changes in emphasis, for example, a greater 
emphasis on rural footpaths.” My judgment is that Gunson would follow such a policy very 
successfully and quite rightly, that was his deal with the voters. Accordingly, the 
implementation of the NDR has become a major goal bth for Norfolk County Council and 
him personally. The planners in Norfolk County have of course to support this 
implementation effort. The point I would like to make is that a politician in the same position 
with less energy and will, could easily be run over by the full time employed county 
professional planners. Some actors are influencing the LU&T planning and policy (as all 
other policies) more than others, but it is extremely complex to reveal their true influence.  
 
In such a power game it seems that the sustainable tr nsport goals of reducing car traffic and 
shift to more environmentally friendly modes, have only few and weak proponents. This is the 
case for Norwich, and as shown in the earlier chapters for Aalborg and Kristiansand.  
 
6.4.8 What if things had been done differently in Norwich? 
 
Counterfactual thinking tries to imagine what had happened instead, if some events/decisions 
had been different. We have listed some such events below and will try to answer that 
question. 
• IRR could have been built. 
• Land use strategy different. 
• Fewer parking spaces at Castle Mall, Riverside, Chapelfield, St. Andrews parking, etc. 
• Much better bus services. 
• Far fewer P&R places. 
• Much improved Bike & Walk network. 
 
If the Inner Ring Road plan had not been stopped by the grass root action and subsequent 
public inquiry, then we assume that it would have be n built in the early nineties. Apart from 
the physical intrusion in the built environment, I would think that the overall traffic flow in 
Norwich urban area would only have been marginally higher and the traffic pattern slightly 
different. The effect would be to move the queues around between the junctions until some 
sort of equilibrium was reached. It would probably e so marginal that it would be difficult to 
get a reliable answer from traffic models. The traffic generating effect of the Inner Ring Road 
would be marginal compared to the yearly traffic growth in the Norwich urban area, which 
gradually is expanding the congested area from the centre and outwards. The Inner Ring Road 
could in a sustainability perspective be said to open up for closing the city center for through 
traffic, but that would have had to be decided by the Highway Committee, which so far has 
been very pro cars (see ch. 6.3.4.3).  
 
If Norwich had pursued an alternative land use strategy with building high-density mixed-use 
developments on Brown-fields close to the centre, far more jobs would have been within 
walking distance from home and far more jobs would have had fair public transport 
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connections. It is however not certain that more and more specialized jobs and more and more 
specialized skills would fit this strategy leading to a shift in house or job location or both, 
instead of shifting the people closer to the city centre. Another possible result of such a 
strategy could have been a Norwich redevelopment as “the retiree’s heaven” close to the 
centre, while the young and mobile workforce moved out to more attractive locations? The 
greater surrounding area influences both the job and housing market in the Norwich area, and 
any land use strategy could lead to unexpected results. It still seems that Norwich should have 
been more active in pursuing redevelopment and Brown-field development (with few parking 
places) close to the city centre than was the case the last decade. It also seems likely that such 
a strategy to support the adopted sustainable development policy, would have contributed to 
less car travel.  
 
If fewer parking spaces at Castle Mall, Riverside, Chapelfield, St. Andrews car park, etc. had 
been built, Norwich would have been less attractive to some car using shoppers. On the other 
hand one could with less traffic in the city centre use more road space for pedestrians, outdoor 
shopping and cafés. It might be that the retail turn-over would have been less with fewer 
parking spaces in Norwich, but that is not at all certain judging from experiences other 
places340. The extension of the pedestrianized area in Norwich is very limited and it might be 
that enlargement of this area combined with less parking and less traffic would substantially 
enhance the attraction of Norwich city centre.  
 
Much better bus services benefit firstly those who do not have access to a car. Secondly it 
would attract some former cyclists and walkers. In most cities the travel time difference, the 
out of pocket costs and the comfort of the car, make it very difficult to attract people away 
from the cars to shift to bus transport. In Norwich therefore, better bus services would in itself 
not do much to the modal choice, but could/can prepare the ground for further restrictions on 
the car in the city centre. Over time an effective bus priority strategy would reduce bus travel 
times, but hardly reach competitive door-to-door travel times as experienced with the car. 
However, if there is no parking available (or it is very expensive) at work or close to work, 
then public transport becomes attractive. Far fewer P&R places would have the same effect as 
reducing the number of parking spaces in the centre, as outlined above. One could estimate 
the effects more precisely by making a survey of the P&R users. However, lacking such data I 
would claim that the real difference is the planning ideology lying behind these 5000 P&R 
places in Norwich, which is the traditional thought t at it is possible and economically viable 
to build enough road capacity and parking spaces to cater for future growth in car numbers 
and traffic, except for the inner city. The White Paper A new deal for transport. Better for 
everyone scraps this ideology of predict and provide, but in Norfolk County Council it is still 
alive. Without a real change in the car ideology Norwich will continue on an unsustainable 
path. The amount of parking available clearly influences car usage.  
 
The Norwich City Council adopted an alternative policy to the County policy by the Mode-
hierarchy outlined in chapter 6.3.3, represents a different d velopment path than the present. 
If implemented it would mean that the soft modes have priority, that a maximum number of 
parking places would be allowed with new developments, that the 5000 Park&Ride places 
would be redeveloped for, say, housing and that parking garages in the centre would over time 
                                                
340 See fx B Norheim, Urbanet, 2007 on a comparison of city centre parking supply in the major Norwegian 
cities.  
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be changed for other uses.341 More effective Business and School Travel Plans would also 
over time remove most of the employees’ parking, to make them shift mode. Much improved 
Bike&Walk net in Norwich will improve conditions for walkers and cyclists. A far more 
comprehensive transport policy including restrictive measures on car use must be in place 
before mode shifts occur. Such a development path is dependent upon broad support from the 
public and it would probably require that Norwich Urban Area obtain self-rule for such a 
policy to have a chance.  
 
6.4.8.1 Summing up the counterfactual discussion  
This counterfactual thinking shows that important, but still relatively marginal changes would 
have taken place if another course of events had happened in Norwich. Each event or measure 
was not in itself enough to change the development in a substantial way. An interesting 
question is if these changes could have created an alter ative path of development in 
Norwich. There are examples, as will be seen in the chapter on Davis, that events reinforce 
former events and create path dependence. But, in the present situation it is probably 
necessary to make a comprehensive and integrated strategy for Norwich urban area and 
follow the strategy up with decisions and investments until the strategy is implemented. This 
requires that the Government devolve the necessary powers to the local authority area 
according to the EU adopted principle of subsidiarity. The Commission for Integrated 
Transport has a similar argument 342:  
 
“In seeking to identify where powers and delivery responsibilities should lie, account needs to 
be taken of all functions and service delivery relevant to both congestion management and 
transport accessibility, using the principles of sub idiarity (that decisions should be taken at 
the lowest possible level commensurate with the achievement of these overall objectives).” 
 
                                                
341 There is space for 600-900 houses on the P&R places, calculated with 50 houses per hectare 
342 Commission for Integrated transport, Moving forward: Better Transport for City Regions. Gov London 
March 2007:11 
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6.5 Main conclusions and lessons from Norwich 
 
A city with sustainable transport goals and policy implemented and high local job creation is 
far more robust than other cities in case of a crisis. Moreover it will have the benefit of less 
emissions, accidents, etc. and a healthier population. Compact cities with good public 
transport services, good cycling and pedestrian network and facilities have an advantage in a 
sustainability perspective. Norwich has not developd the public transport system nor the 
Bike and Walk system as the backbone of its transport system, although the intention to do so 
is there (see ch 6.3.3). Over the last ten-fifteen y ars the bus services have deteriorated 
making the car the “sole” alternative for most trips. Together with the changes in lifestyles, 
demography and the location of jobs and housing over a large region, the resulting trend is 
one where transport in Norwich and Norfolk is becoming more and more environmentally 
unsustainable.  
 
If Norwich had implemented the sustainable transport licy in the LTP it would have been in 
a better position to cope with the future, as long as the alternatives to the car is functioning. 
Both people living and working in the city, and peole living in the city and commuting for 
work, could manage fairly well if public transport services both in the city and the county had 
been improved over the years. Public transport, however, can hardly cover the long regional 
work trips to many different locations within acceptable door-to-door travel times.  
 
The regional development in England is in rapid change as shown in the two reports343: “The 
people, where will they work?” and “The jobs, where will they go?” The macro economic 
forces are creating vast urban fields such as South East England. Norwich is at the edge of 
this field, but clearly influenced by the growth corridors London-Cambridge-Peterborough 
and London-Ipswich, but Norwich is not a high achiever coming to economic growth344. The 
policies and strategies to create growth then naturally take prime importance. The present 
economic strategy builds on the strategy developed 1997. Sustainable development is 
embedded in the plans, but the concept is “watered out”. Car traffic generating projects are 
marketed as sustainable, reduction of car traffic is there as an aim and action, but not 
implemented. The city of Norwich is becoming less robust and more unsustainable because an 
active automobility policy is implemented, while the sustainable transport policies and actions 
seem not to be achieved. The lack of responsibilities n the City Council (lack of unitary 
authority) may partly be a reason, but the car policy followed in practice is also important. 
The sustainable transport development, which the LTP and other plans aim at, has not yet led 
to increased robustness and a more environmentally sustainable transport development in 
Norwich.  
 
The people in Norwich urban area could have been in a far better position if measures to reach 
the sustainable transport goals in the plans had been implemented. However, Norwich still has 
very good opportunities to become more sustainable ccording to the EST aims: Sustainable 
transportation does not endanger public health or ecosystems and meets mobility needs 
                                                
343 Breheny Michael, 1999 The People: Where will they work? and The Jobs: Where will they go? TCPA 
(www.tcpa.org.uk)  
344 The rate of unemployment in the Norwich City Council area stands at 3.4% compared to a country rate of 
2.1%. The Index of Deprivation 2004 indicated that Norwich is the most deprived district in the Eastern Region. 
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consistent with a) use of renewable resources at below their rates of regeneration and b) use 
of non-renewable resources at below the rates of development of renewable substitutes. It has 
a compact and relatively dense city, but also with substantial brown fields that can be used for 
development. It has good policies, plans and aims according to the planning documents. But, 
a new course may require that the growth of car traffic is decoupled from economic growth 
and that restrictive car measures are implemented. With the present fragmented system of 
government such a policy change seems impossible. There is a need to devolve powers and 
introduce the principle of subsidiarity, so that the people in the cities get more influence over 
land use and transport planning and policy.  
 
6.5.1 Norwich Councilors and Public have hardly any influence 
 
LU&T planning and policy as practiced by Norfolk County gives stakeholders preference in 
front of the elected councilors in Norwich City Council. The latter has political legitimacy and 
answers to the electorate, the stakeholders answer to no one but their own interest and peer 
control within the group. The county may choose which group of stakeholders it cooperates 
with in each case. In the NDR case the different business interests and forums were used to 
promote the case. Districts in which an opposing view to the need of the NDR was strong, 
would as far as possible be kept outside the process. Norfolk County has the power to set the 
agenda and steer the planning process, which may be used to promote one particular solution. 
Some will say that the period Norfolk County Council both was responsible for Land Use and 
Transport planning was ideal. The county was sufficient size so that a bird’s eye view gave 
perspective and then one could close in and plan for Norwich urban area as an entity. Why 
then did this set up not work properly? First, Land Use and Transport planning is only one 
measure, it must be coordinated with the effect of other measures and forces as economic 
instruments, investments and growth motors. The institutions involved must also be 
coordinated across levels and layers, to be able to provide an integrated policy. Trading with 
favors/disfavors occurs, and the location of new activity is the premium sought for in these 
trade-offs. The political system gives few incentives for local politicians to stand up for their 
voters, when higher levels demand loyalty. Second, it may seem that congestion is the 
politically preferred way to hide the allocation and on-allocation of means. It is easier to 
meet the voters and blame someone else (the economy, central Government, the Regional 
Assembly, etc.) for not solving the congestion problem, than to stand up and say that my 
political party and I have other priorities. To change the allocation of funds the congestion 
and traffic problems must possibly become so bad tht a climate of desperation is created and 
the voters demand alternative policies (Vigar 2000). Third, the system of collecting taxes 
centrally, subsequently handing them out to cities and counties according to the present policy 
preferences, is not an optimal way of allocating funds for transport infrastructure. This is 
further aggravated by the public transport services being deregulated and privatized and 
outside public control.  
 
Two basic weaknesses 
1. Sustainable development requires major trend shift in everybody’s car use, hence it 
requires broad support from the public. Broad public participation is also necessary for 
such policies to be proactive (the precautionary principle). Is a “climate of despair” the 
only alternative to create such a broad support and is it a realistic alternative? 
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2. Local support for higher density, less car use and more walking, cycling and public 
transport use will not come as long as the car is superior in terms of travel time, 
quality and “out of pocket costs”. Therefore the soft modes must be made more 
attractive relative to the car. Further investment in car infrastructure is only sensible if 
the car user pays all external costs or an equitable system of road pricing is in place.  
 
The LTP process has given the opportunity to plan for reduced travel, but the instruments 
actually used are only information (e.g. campaign for green driving) and infrastructure 
provision. Norwich urban area planning issues must be treated in the Norfolk LTP. After the 
county council decides on the LTP, it goes to GO East ngland for the bidding process. The 
LTP is in theory a comprehensive plan, but some elem nts are always prioritized. There is 
therefore a risk of the integration built into the LTP will be falling to pieces gradually by 
partial funding and implementation of projects. Secondly, a major project might come through 
for political reasons, independent of the LTP consultation. On the other hand, a major project 
very much needed may never be financed because the Gov rnment prioritizes something else, 
say light rail schemes. Thirdly, there are tensions between national objectives and locally 
determined strategies, which create difficulties in achieving a comprehensive and integrated 
approach. In sum:  
1. The White Papers are inconsistent giving contradictory or ambiguous signals. 
2. The central funding scheme undermines any incentive a  the local level to go 
for “strong” car reduction policies. 
3. Regional level institutions have lacked the power to create a framework, which 
could have overcome the disincentives to adopting travel reduction policies, in 
particular, the risk of losing out economically to their neighbors. 
 
A broad guiding, spatial framework for land use andtransport planning is very important. It 
must be embedded and rooted in the public, and LU&T must be integrated not only in 
planning but also with funding system and other economic measures needed to fulfill the 
plans.  
 
6.5.2 Norwich and the four research questions. 
 
6.5.2.1 Explain the main factors in LU&T change in Norwich. 
The most important factor in LU&T change both physical and policy wise was demand for 
building land creating activity and pressure on the built environment and its transport system.  
• The population growth in Norwich urban area happened almost totally outside the city 
(district) border. 
• Norwich has developed its retail business far beyond what the local demand should 
entail (no. 9 retail city in UK). 
• An old historic city with hundreds of listed buildings, Norwich has increasingly been 
seen as valuable by the public, and therefore put more pressure on politicians to 
preserve this heritage.  
• The increase in car ownership and use has created seriou  problems for Norwich.  
• The need for sustainable development and the need for environmental protection have 
increasingly put pressures on Norwich. 
 
 264 
• The new liberalism and the problems of financing the national state have led to new 
ways of organizing the public sector and the role of changing public institutions.  
 
6.5.2.2 Explore how LU&T change was resisted, opposed, promoted. 
Because the population growth took place outside the city borders, the city concentrated on 
developing the retail and tourism part of the economy, which led to major rebuilding in the 
city centre. This has been done with great concern for the historic buildings and is an 
excellent example of combining heritage with modern demands (shopping and tourism). The 
development of Norwich city centre was done without m ch opposition.  
 
On transport the County’s predict and provide ideology met resistance from both the grass-
roots and the city when the completion of the Inner Ring Road came up. But less than a 
decade later the Northern Distributor Road surfaced as a remnant of the old ideology and is 
still not finally decided. Norfolk County Council is active in promoting the Northern 
Distributor Road, so far with little opposition.  
 
The LTP for Norwich urban area, which has received a prize in 2004 when it was judged one 
of the best LTPs in England, was produced by the County and should be the vehicle to 
implement Government policy at the local level. The sustainability goals are so far not 
reached and the LTP is also used to promote the Northern Distributor Road, which will 
generate more car traffic in the already very congested urban area of Norwich.  
 
6.5.2.3 Examine the role of institutional relations in explaining processes of LU&T 
change and inertia. 
The fragmented roles for LU&T planning and policy have been a major cause behind change 
and inertia the last 30 years. Norfolk County Council has had the planning powers and the 
Norwich District (City) Council has become only one of many stakeholders in the LU&T 
processes. The new regions will further diminish the influence Norwich can exert.  
 
6.5.2.4 To use the above analysis to look for the feasibility of challenging existing 
patterns of mobility. 
Planning documents have from the late 1990s had Sustainable development and protection of 
the Environment as overarching goals. The Mode hierarchy is an example to follow for other 
cities since it represents an EST strategy although without any practical effect so far in 
Norwich. A shift in the planning documents has occurred, but not in the practice of the county 
planners. The city planners produced The Local Plan 2002, which is a very good plan in an 
Environmentally Sustainable Transport perspective, but it has not influenced the County 
much so far. The County supports research on alterntive bio fuels, but there are no 
indications that restrictions on car use may be an option. The City has a more varied view on 
the need for car reduction strategies, but hardly any real influence.  
 
The traditionally very strong Central Government in UK has kept its position, which in 
practice give the bureaucrats in the Government Offices very wide powers over land use and 
transport planning and indeed the funding of the LTP’s and special projects.  
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6.5.3 Norwich case study lessons 
 
In Norfolk County Council a pro-car perspective still dominates Land Use and Transport 
planning. To push economic growth and keep the election promises, politicians of most 
parties struggled to: 
• attract businesses and to get other advantages (a new government office located in the 
county, expansion of existing ones, etc.) 
• get money from Government both for investment and services (e.g. Enterprise zones, 
Public Transport)  
 
Being one of six districts in Norfolk County, Norwich City Council becomes a minor player 
out of six against the County. This makes comprehensiv  and integrated Land Use and 
Transport planning for Norwich urban area biased because the districts do have very 
conflicting problems, outlooks and aims. Why does thi happen when goals adopted both at 
the national and local level aim at more sustainability transport and claim that restrictions on 
car use are necessary?  
 
Some lessons:  
1. The aims and signals are ambiguous and contradictory. They give room for different 
interpretations and can be used both to unite and to divide. 
2. The institutional structures and the need for growth make it politically “impossible” 
(political suicide) to vote against/prevent big projects. 
3. The incentive structures honor growth, big projects, new areas for business 
localizations and investment in transport. 
4. The “Rules of the game” favor rural areas against urban areas (the dimension county 
versus city can be found in many contexts as road buil ing versus public transport, 
buses in the city versus in the rural area, financing of city projects, bus and LRT - light 
rail transport). 
5. The Northern Distributor Road (NDR) may seem rational i  a county context, but not 
in an urban context given the goals set. 
6. Sustainability demands precautionary action now to prevent negative long-term 
effects, but some claim that widely different actions now may lead to the same long-
term goal. Hence, rhetoric is used to hide different objectives and the weighting of 
short term and long term consequences. 
7. Fragmented institutions make it very difficult (impossible?) to reach long-term goals.  
 
6.5.4 Sustainable transport strategy for Norwich? 
 
Based on the lessons drawn above, I have made an outline of a strategy to change the course 
towards an environmentally sustainable transport system in Norwich:  
 
1. A comprehensive bike- and walk network with secure crossings must be established 
before it will be used to a large extent.  
2. The bus services and the bus system must be adapted to suit the customers travel 
needs and the travel time door-to-door must be less than double of the car travel time. 
This will require maximum 10 minutes frequency of departures daytime and few bus 
exchanges. The costs of using the bus are compared with “the out of pocket costs” 
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using the car. That means that the bus services must be far cheaper than they are today 
in Norwich (free travel for children under 14 as in London is a good example).  
3. When the above points one and two are in place, the parking policy can be gradually 
sharpened by increasing the price for both public and private parking. Thereafter can 
regulation of the parking supply, length of time allowed to stay, the localization of the 
parking places, etc be implemented over time.  
4. Land use policy should support transport policy. Norwich should therefore actively 
encourage “car-free housing” and set maximum limits for the number of parking 
spaces allowed with redevelopment. Mixed-use345 and high-density regulation open 
for less demand for the car for local trips, and should be pursued. Such regulation is 
also flexible to meet future changes in demand for housing or offices. It raises 
questions if developments like Chapelfield and St Andrews car park should be 
allowed, and if it is possible to prevent such car generating developments? St Andrews 
car park is certainly part of the “provide for the car paradigm”, but it is probably not 
possible to prevent developments like these two until a ational framework and a 
comprehensive car restraint policy functions (i.e. points one to three above). 
5. Congestion charges and road tolling. The London Congestion Charging, which 
reduced traffic by 25% in the city center, is a success according to some and a waste 
of resources according to others346. It has certainly not got broad political support in 
England. Norwich on the other hand seems geographiclly perfect for a combined 
congestion and tolling system. Such a system facilit tes the use of the price 
mechanism to marginally reduce the peak hour demand, and at the same time collect 
considerable income. To get political support for such a scheme I believe the 
following two conditions must be met:  
a) The revenue collected goes to the City of Norwich, and should exclusively be 
used for transportation purposes (building roads, bu  stations, light rail, etc and 
to subsidize bus fares and services). 
b) An agreement with Central Government, Region and County must guarantee 
that the Norwich citizens are not losing out in the bidding for funds through the 
LTP process.  
 
6.5.5 Major lessons from Norwich 
 
In general the number of organizations that have to cooperate to attain a goal decides the 
transaction costs. When the numbers of actors or organizations increase, the complexity 
                                                
345 Mixed-use as an instrument will be more or less effective depending on the situation in which it is used, see 
for example the studies by Petter Næss in Copenhage nd other cities. In suburban areas, mixed-use cannot be 
generally recommended in order to reduce climate gas emissions from transport. If the workplaces are 
specialized, they are likely to recruit employers from all over the metropolitan area, not only from the local 
neighborhood, and because the suburbs are generally much more accessible by car than by public transport, most 
employees will arrive at their workplaces by car. Studies in Copenhagen, Oslo and other places have 
demonstrated this. As long as it is a city with a strong and attractive centre, densification close to the main centre 
of the urban region contributes to reduce the amount f travel and to increase the proportion of non-motorized 
travel. To some extent, residential development close t  the centers of second or third order towns may also be 
favorable in terms of greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Specialized workplaces should, however, not be 
located to suburban centers, as a large extent of car-based criss-cross commuting is the likely result of such 
workplace decentralization. However, in urban fields like the Randstadt and South East England where both jobs 
and homes are undergoing locational changes, the result may be uncertain.  
346 See for example Litman, Todd: www.vtpi.org/london.pdf 
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increases and transactions costs go up. British land use and transport planning has undergone 
major changes during the last decade. New regions have been established and tasks have been 
shifted between the levels increasing complexity and fragmentation. The different distribution 
of resources and powers creates imbalances along the private-public dimension, and within 
the public sector between the levels. The new and old institutions and organizations have to 
learn to cooperate and function in a changing and uncertain world, not least influenced of the 
global economic forces, Internet and the new liberalist ideas. This complex world I have tried 
to pin point in a few major land use and transport lanning effects for Norwich:  
• The institutional set up with region, county and district make the inter-institutional 
power play more important than achieving integrated lan  use and transport solutions 
for Norwich urban area. Sustainable development goals have not so far had a 
noticeable impact on the land use and transport development in the Norwich urban 
area. 
• A democratic deficit in the system is associated with the institutional set up and the 
incentive structure formed. There is a lack of “accountability”. Those persons, who are 
elected and have to face their voters, do not have the decisive say in land use and 
transport matters in their area.  
• Pro car issues tend to “win” all the time, as exemplified by Westlegate, parking 
required for redevelopment, and the Northern Distribu or Road. It is more than 
“growth ideology” that causes this, it is also the fact that the car is so much taken for 
granted – has obtained a hegemonic position – that it becomes a winner time and 
again.  
 
The Eddington study347 supports the above conclusions: The current network for sub-national 
decision-making in transport is highly complex, with a number of different structures and 
organizations and a large number of players. Within a single functional economic area, a 
number of different bodies can play a role in decision-making, responsibilities for different 
policy levers are often split across different bodies, and funding streams may not be 
structured to make incentives for effective decision-making. Sub-national decision-making 
bodies often cooperate closely across a single functio al economic area – but such 
partnership working may impose unnecessary costs if it has to cooperate across 
inappropriate functional splits in responsibility and/or there are too many parties involved. 
 
6.5.6 Devolution of powers needed 
 
Land Use and Transport measures are not sufficient on their own. They can only be used to 
their full extent as part of a comprehensive policy where the market and economic 
instruments work together with regulation within an overarching framework (Cervero 2002). 
To secure involvement from the public and legitimacy for the politicians the principle of 
subsidiarity should guide the transfer of powers from higher authorities. Land Use and 
Transport planning and spatial policy at the local level should/must be supported by a 
framework that prevents the local authority making the “wrong decisions” on issues where 
important consequences apply to a wider regional or even global scale (avoid ending up in the 
prisoner’s dilemma). 
 
                                                
347 Eddington, Sir Roy: The Eddington Transport Study Department for Transport, December 2006, HMSO 
Norwich.  
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To sit in traffic queues every day as many do in Norwich seem a wrong way to solve the 
demand and supply for traffic capacity. Still, it is not enough only to expand supply; measures 
to control demand as pointed out in the “New Realism” must be used. However, the “car 
owning democracy” as Margaret Thatcher called our sciety where the majority use the car 
every day, has to support such measures to reduce transport demand.348 How can one create 
support for such measures as outlined above in Norwich? The answer to this question may 
follow this kind of reasoning:  
1. The majority must have trust in the politicians deci ing (there should be a local 
referendum) 
2. People must be convinced that the money collected for congestion charges or tolls 
come back as improvement to transport for everybody in the city (the money collected 
must not be used for schools, etc. or in another place) 
3. The Government must guarantee that money collected is a supplement to the ordinary 
grants received (this condition was guaranteed for the Norwegian city Bergen Toll 
Road Ring in the mid eighties, but has gradually disappeared with time for later Toll 
Ring schemes) 
4. Another type of communicative planning349 is called for to get such comprehensive 
schemes through and make the turn towards more sustainable development possible. 
                                                
348 Tony Blair used similar rhetoric in 1996 when he targeted the votes of “Middle Britain”: The Mondeo Man. 
349 Amdam propose that a city can use legitimising planning as a meeting place for communicative and 
instrumental planning to coordinate actions in organis tions and society. Legitimising planning is conerned 
with how cities and regions can use planning as a tool to justify its existence: a) through social mobilising 
bottom-up, b) through its own actions and achieved results, and c) by accept from higher placed authorities in the 
management system (Roar Amdam 2005:30). 
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Norwich case – Annex I  
Short list for standard comparison of the case cities – NORWICH  
 
 
 Norwich 
Background Norwich is proud of being a major retail shopping centre in UK, number 9 highest ranking 
retail centre in terms quality and range of facilities. NATS – Norwich Area Transport 
Strategy, is put together by a partnership consistig of Norfolk County Council, Norwich 
City Council, Broadland District Council and South Norfolk District Council. The NATS 
area is about 400 sq km with a population approx. 243 000 in 2000. 107 000 dwellings, and 
about 1100 new dwellings are built every year. 140 00 jobs of which 94 000 in the city. 
Special 
LU&T  
 
 
Redevelopment of old industrial sites in the city centre has added thousands of square 
meters of floor area of shopping, offices and parking (Castle Mall, Riverside, Chapelfield).  
Very poor PT, but major improvements planned. 
The Northern Distributor Road (NDR) is a major LU&T planning issue.  
Land Use 
 
Strong growth in Norwich urban area, but outside city border (Broadland , South Norfolk).  
Major redevelopment areas in city centre changing from industry to mix use 
shopping/offices/flats with ample parking. 5000 parking places in six Park and Ride 
schemes with bus shuttles to city centre. The conceptual model behind LU&T planning and 
P&R is “maximum of free car use”. The NDR which lies outside Norwich District border, 
will relieve through traffic in the city. But also access to the airport and the employment 
area there, for commuters and developers of new housing estates.  
LU&T 
Policy 
 
Norfolk County Council has been responsible for LU&T structure, planning and strategy. 
LU at the strategic level is now the responsibility of East of England Region. Norfolk 
county is still responsible for the transport planning - LTP, and the “heavy” partner in the 
NATS partnership. The NATS area is divided between three district councils with their 
different problems and opportunities. LU policy and strategy is different in Norwich 
compared to the other case cities, because of no abund nce but scarcity of building land.  
The Norwich expansion has happened across border in the surrounding districts..  
Major industrial companies closing down in the city centre have opened for redevelopment, 
and many more sites will be available in the coming years. Shopping and offices have been 
a priority. The Buchanan legacy of coping with the car and give due consideration to 
historic buildings and environments, has been followed in Norwich. The Inner Ring Road 
was stopped in a Public Inquiry 1993. The structure plan 1997 has not NDR in it, and 
neither the first LTP. It emerges in 2001, and is presented as an important part of the LTP 
2006-2011.  
The mode hierarchy in the Local Plan 2002, putting walking and cycling on top is in line 
with environmentally sustainable transport thinking.  
Transport 
Financing. 
 
 
UK changed /are changing both transport policy and Government structure. It started with 
the white paper “A New Deal for Transport” where thdecoupling of transport growth 
from GNP growth was sought. In effect road building should be curbed and PT improved. 
LTP was introduced. The old system with a very strong central Government, made the 
policy contingent. Who would get financing? Where? When? could not be foreseen. It 
remains to be seen if the new LTP system is better. 
Central Government is still very strong/decisive in allocation of road investment money. 
The regions are about to get a greater say in the decision process. The NDR is part of LTP 
for NATS, but lies mainly in Broadland District. The planning concept “Free Car Use” or 
the alternative using “PT as the main system in urban areas”, may well be the decisive 
factors when the NDR apply for financing. 
Comments 
 
A very strong central government gives little room for LU&T policy at the local level. A 
very pro-car ideology is “taken for granted”. The local democracy is not very well 
developed. Active use of the principle of subsidiarity and a unitary Norwich urban area 
might turn the present unsustainable development towards a more sustainable course.  
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7 The City of Davis CA– the US Bike City 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this introductory section the Davis Case Study is set. The study is focusing on LU&T 
planning and policy as an instrument to reach the goal of a sustainable urban transport as 
part of sustainable urban development. The section ontains a description of both the city of 
Davis and the nearby jurisdiction University of California Davis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The City of Davis is the US Bike City350 and some have even called it The Bike City of the 
World (Lofland 2004). Davis has been bestowed with "the honor of being the sole community 
at the platinum level” by the League of American Bicyclists (see ch 7.6.2). Thinking that 
there was no place for environmentally friendly modes in the US, Davis with an abundance of 
bikes, but also huge SUVs and trucks, with local wel -functioning bus services and quite a 
few trains daily, forced me to ask questions. Was it  result of deliberate policies and actions, 
or did it just happen caused by exogenous forces? When so many cities struggle to get people 
to use soft modes like walking, cycling and public transport how did Davis manage to become 
a biking city and what role did land use and transport lanning play? 
 
7.1.1 The city and the university 
 
The city of Davis is a quiet idyll in an expanse of agricultural land. A “one-company” town 
20 km from the state capital of California, Sacramento, the company being the University of 
California Davis (UCD.)  
 
Davis is 25 square km in area and has 64 000 inhabitants (2560 persons/sq km), a slight 
decline in population occurred in 2004. Over the last ten years the growth has been on average 
1.7 %, most of this strong growth came in a few years. The city “grows” by developing 
                                                
350 Bicycle Magazine 2003 
Davis facts 
In 1925, a city commission was established, and in 1927 the first zoning was adopted. 
General Plan GP 1958 was the first comprehensive plan,  
General Plan GP 1973 energy concern and growth control 
General Plan GP 1987. Bike plan introduced 
General Plan GP 2001 present, adopted by City Council resolution May 2001.  
 
Council: Five elected members to city council, sitsfor four years, with staggered shifts 
every two years. Mayor elected by and within the group of five council members.  
 
The City: Size 26 sq km (10 sq miles). Population 65 000 in 2005, average yearly growth in 
the nineties 2.4%. In the Davis population figures about 17 000 are students, the rest of the 
students live on campus or outside Davis. GP planning area 160 sq mi, about 415 sq km.  
2000 figures: 23 249 houses, 2.5 persons per househld, 58% rented 42% owner occupied, 
income 22 945 dollars (annual growth 3.9%).  
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agricultural land, which is annexed from Yolo County. Growth has been a very contentious 
issue through the city history. The City Council, which has five members elected on a non-
partisan vote, adopted “Measure J” in 2000351. The measure says that any council decision on 
annexation of land for urban development most be put to the population for a ballot. The local 
democracy is thus far developed.  
 
Figure 7-1  The location of Davis 
 
 
The City of Davis presents itself as “the Bike City” and has chosen to use “The Penny-
Farthing” or the velocipede as the city logo, giving one aspect of the city identity352. The Bike 
City was fought through by a group of citizens in the sixties, against strong opposition from 
the City Council, city administration and the police. It required an election in 1966 for the 
bike proponents to win, but then all doubts were put aside and the new council introduced 
bike lanes on all roads where possible.  
 
 
Figure 7-2 Location of Davis and Sacramento  
 
 
                                                
351 In March 2000, 54% of voters approved a Council-proposed measure requiring a “vote of the people if the 
City Council approves development on land outside of city limits.” 
352 Declared America’s Best Cycling City 1995 by the Bicycle Federation of America  
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Davis has a grid system with 80 feet (about 24 meters) wide roads and it was only to paint 
new lines in the streets to create the bike lanes, although exemption from the state regulation 
on road markings was necessary. But the city went further and said that bike paths should be 
built in all new developments and the bike network should connect to all schools, green belts, 
paths and downtown. A bike transportation strategy was created. Along the arterials with 
heavy traffic it was more difficult to establish good bike solutions, and Davis has still – 40 
years after the “bike revolt” not been able to fully implement the bike strategy. “Nothing has 
really happened with the bike strategy in Old Davis since the seventies” the UCD bicycle 
coordinator said353 “it somehow stagnated”.  
 
Figure 7-3 UC Davis is also taking care of the bike heritage! 
 
The City of Davis borders to the UCD campus, but has no 
jurisdiction over the campus area even though it is difficult to 
see where the downtown of the city stops and campus begins! 
UCD is a separate jurisdiction and has its own police force, 
road maintenance staff, planning department, etc. House prices 
in Davis are high and increasing fast. “The faculty can’t afford 
to live in Davis” is how the UCD planning director354 put it.  
 
The University of California has several campuses: UC Los 
Angeles, UC Irvine, UC Davis and so on. UC Berkeley is 
probably the most famous of these. UCD started as an 
agriculture college a hundred years ago and is still very good 
in biology, ecology and environmental sciences. Another famous research area is at the 
Institute of Transportation Studies, which excel in alternative fuels and energy (natural gas 
and hydrogen fuels). UCD is an own jurisdiction and has its own police force, road 
maintenance staff, planning department, etc. At present there are about 28 000 students and  
11 000 faculty and staff positions in total at UCD, but some are located other places in the 
Sacramento region. In the UCD Long Range Development Plan 2000-2015/2016 the aim is to 
handle an additional 5000 students and 10 000 employees. (This is an allocation of growth 
decided by the State of California through the UC Board of Regions.) New housing 
development for about 4000 students and 500 employees on campus is proposed, but still 
there will be a demand for housing the coming years from 1000 students and 10 000 persons 
employed by UCD and affiliated research institutions. The nearly 5000 students and staff 
living on campus are not registered as inhabitants in the city.  
 
The housing problem caused by low supply and high prices is also enlarged by external 
demand. “Davis is a “bedroom community” for many Sacramento and the Bay Area” said the 
city planner355. Sacramento is only 20 km away, but it is a one-hour drive to the Bay Area and 
thus a far commute. Commuters, which contribute to a very high traffic density in the peak 
hours, increasingly use the Interstate Highway I-80with 4 lanes in each direction and at times 
the congestion is heavy. Another pressure on Davis to grow is the future prospect of the 
Sacramento Region. The Sacramento Region Council of Governments has recently produced 
a Blueprint for the Region towards 2050. From the 1.8 million people today, the region is 
                                                
353 Interview with David Takemoto-Weerts, 16 May 2005.  
354 Interview Robert Segar, 06 May 2005.  
355 Interview with city planner Bob Wolcott, 28 April 2005.  
 
 
  273 
expected to grow to 3.5 million people, which means that every year 34 000 new citizens will 
require housing, schools, transport etc in the region.  
 
The city of Davis has a budget of about $ 107 million. More than 80% of the budget is created 
locally. It is therefore a very strong pressure on the City Council for growth just to maintain 
the level of services the city provides. With a slow growth policy the population of Davis will 
age and the retired share will increase. The city has had a very successful policy of preventing 
“shopping malls” to support Downtown shopping, but it also means that quite a few go to 
nearby Woodlands to shop, which of course reduce the potential sales taxes for the City of 
Davis. All these factors taken together will give th  city considerable challenges the coming 
years. 
 
Figure 7-4 Map of Davis  
 
 
 
During the seventies and eighties a competing image to “the Bike City “of Davis grew: “the 
Eco City”. With such a background one could think that the City of Davis would be a 
forerunner regarding sustainable development and sustainable transport, but is it? This is a 
study of how Davis has approached LU&T planning andhow it has performed to influence 
the development towards more sustainable transport.  
 
The timeline of important land use events in Davis is hown in the next section.  
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7.1.2 Davis Timeline 
 
DAVIS Lines through Time 1868 – 2005  
Nine periods Year Events 
Expectant congregation 1868 – 1871 
Wheat-growing shipping point 1872 – 1890 
Almond cultivation center 1891 – 1904  
1868 Davisville founded by Cal P the railroad 
company 
University farm locale 1905 – 1916  1906 Start of the university campus 
 1917 Davis incorporated as a city 
Urbanizing municipality 1917 – 1929  1925 City planning commission was established 
 1927 The first zoning was adopted. 
Depressing locality 1930 – 1945  1929 Wall Street collapsed, depressing Davis 
 1942 Highway 42 Bypass opened 
Growth period after World War II 1958 City of Davis. General Plan. This was the first
GP, the first comprehensive LU&T plan. 
 1964 City of Davis. General Plan amendment of 
1958 plan. 
 1966 The Bike election, creating The Bike City 
 1969 City of Davis. General Plan amendment of 
1964 plan. 
Progressive community 1972 – 1989 1972 Electoral revolt against “mindless” growth 
ECO city/UCD/student uproar   
 1974 City of Davis. General Plan. 
  Village Homes, “Ideal community 
 1979 City of Davis. GP amendment of 1974 plan. 
 1984 City of Davis. GP amendment of 1979 plan. 
 1987 City of Davis. General Plan. 
Brundtland Commission Report  1987 City of Davis. Comprehensive Bicycle Plan. 
First Bike plan.  
 1987 Pass Through Agreement with Yolo County 
Contested place 1990 –  1991  
 1994 ATTF Alternative Transport Task Force  
Growth control by the people 2000 “Measure J” 
 2001 City of Davis. General Plan. Present 
 2001 City of Davis. Comprehensive Bicycle Plan. 
 2002  
UCD plan very high growth, plus 15.000 2002 UCD Long Range Development Plan 
 2002  
 2003 Yolo County General Plan & Bikeway Plan 
 2004 Sacramento Blueprint Plan 
 2005 Fifth Street Traffic Operation Study 
 2005 UCD Alternative Transportation and Parking 
Investment Study 
Covell Village rejected at the ballot box! 2005 60% voted NO, 40% Yes to expand Davis 
   
 
Up to the seventies most people adhered to the slogan Whatever is good for UC at Davis is 
good for Davis. However, then complaints came that the “gown” (the University) made plans 
and changes without informing the town and taking account of the effects on the “town”. 
(Lofland 2004:8) This conflict is still there, but very much subdued. The Long Range 
Development Plan for the University will have tremendous growth impact on Davis, but 
hardly discussed in the public. It seems that the UCD and City Council agree to make as little 
noise as possible about the future growth and expansion plans.  
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In Davis history there are some constants (Lofland 2004:8) 
• Shop at home. Patronize local merchants. 
• Davis has a severe housing shortage. 
• We are proud that Davis has a small town character. 
 
7.2 History and situation  
 
7.2.1 Some Davis facts  
 
US cities are “local” governments, voluntarily formed by and for their citizens, but with very 
different tasks compared to local governments’ tasks in Norway and Denmark. The role of the 
City of Davis reassembles that of the technical department in a Norwegian municipality, 
dealing with:  
Growth management (population growth, housing)  
Maintenance of transport infrastructure (also water, s wage, waste)  
Maintenance of parks & green areas 
Built up areas. Monitoring and framework for change. 
Annexation of new land for building. 
 
The Davis City Budget 
The budget for 2003-2004 was hundred and seven million dollars ($ 107 000 000 in total and 
about $ 1650 per head of population). Different taxes were nearly a third of the income and 
the biggest item on the income side. Transfers from the state and federal governments were 
about a fifth of the total income. On the expenditure side parks and community services was 
the largest item 31% followed by police 28% and the fire corps 17%. In the context of this 
case study it is important to notice that the city is heavily relying on the income from taxes 
and development to maintain the level of services. This is a very strong driving force for US 
cities to develop new housing areas and increase population. UCD is the major employer in 
Davis with 17 000 employed, the next on the list are the schools (DJUSD) with 800 
employed, the City of Davis with 423 employed and the hospital (Sutter Davis) with 385 
employed. Thus Davis is uniquely dependent on the university for its existence and 
livelihood, a true “one company town”.  
 
Yolo County 
Yolo County is nearly surrounding the City of Davis and UC Davis (Sonora County is 
bordering along a small stretch towards the south). Yolo County is mainly an agricultural 
landscape with smaller towns scattered across the county. Close to the City of Davis are the 
towns of Woodland, Winters and West Sacramento (own jurisdiction separated from 
Sacramento city).  
 
Sacramento City and Region 
Sacramento city lies 20 km east of Davis. The city is the capital of California and seat for the 
Governor (in 2005 Arnold Schwarzenegger) and has some 350 000 inhabitants. In the city 
region or metropolitan area, however, there are close t  2 million inhabitants. This fast 
growing region exerts considerable pressure on the property market in Davis (se below), but 
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not any formal, hierarchical influence on the land use and transportation planning in Davis. 
SACGO356  Sacramento is a voluntary association of neighboring cities and counties. 
 
7.2.2 Transportation and Mode Split in Davis 
 
The Davis urban area that has a sharp border against the urrounding agricultural area is 
divided in two jurisdictions, the City of Davis and UCD. Each of these jurisdictions has 
different aims and tasks. There are no common statistics for Davis urban area or common 
studies looking at the area as one unit. In this section we have therefore used the available 
data and studies to produce a picture of travel in Davis and how these trips are shared between 
the different modes of travel: car, public transport, walking and cycling, but first, some data 
on transport in Davis.  
 
7.2.2.1 Transportation in Davis 
Davis has 48.8 miles of bike lanes and 49 miles of bike paths. Eighty percent of all collector 
and arterial streets within city have bike lanes and/or bike paths, the highest ratio in any US 
city. A UCD campus survey done in 1996 showed that 60 percent of the student population 
either biked or walked to campus, and 20 percent of faculty and staff walked or biked, 
averaging 15 000 to 18 000 bikes on campus each day. There is an estimated 53 000 bikes in 
the city and modal share of 20 to 25 percent of daily trips (Toor 2004:192)   
 
UCD is very active in providing transportation services. 
At the university the UCD Transportation and Parking Services (TAPS) employs a full-time 
bike coordinator to run the bicycle program. Together with 10 part-time student employees 
and in conjunction with Campus Police, he enforces traffic and equipment regulations. TAPS 
offers the Transitpool program for faculty, staff and students, which give discounts and 
parking permits, etc. Trainpool is another program giving discounts to ride Amtrak trains.  
 
Unitrans is a student run organization, provides transit servic s for the university and the City 
of Davis. The service that started in 1972 is open to the general public and is partly funded by 
the City of Davis. Unitrans operates fourteen routes, providing 2.5 million trips annually, and 
on the average weekday carries nearly 15 000 people. Students pay $24.50 per quarter for the 
bus program as part of their fees. Annual budget $2.5 million (labour 70%, fuel 10%, 
materials 20%). Income: student fees 57%, Davis Transportation Development Fund 18%, 
Yolo County TDA funds 1%, federal operating funds 14%, university contribution 3%, fare 
and bus pass sales 4%, others 4%. Green Transport is being developed in Davis. Twenty-
seven of the forty-four bus fleet operated in 2002 on natural gas (CNG) accounting for 80 
percent of annual mileage. A research project of mixing hydrogen (30%) with natural gas is 
used on five buses in full-scale tests.  
 
7.2.2.2 The trend in mode share in US 
The trend in mode share for the journey to work in the United States is shown in the following 
figure. The data is from the national census and moe share is given for every ten years 
starting with 1960. The automobile was used for 67% of the trips in 1960, since then the 
                                                
356 Sacramento Area Council of Governments 
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usage has grown to 88% of the work trips in 2000. Public transport 4.7%, cycling 0.4% and 
walking 2.9% together with work at home 3.3%, add up the rest (Pucher 1999).  
 
Figure 7-5 Mode share, journey to work in the United States since 1960. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Will Toor and Spencer W. Havlick. 2004: 131. 
 
 
Cycling in US had in 1995 a modal share of 0.9% of all trips, walking 5.5%, public transport 
1.8% and the car close to 90%. Notice that cycling doubled in last five years in the table:  
 
Table 7-1 Annual US bicycle trips and bicycle modal share, 1977-1995 
 1977 1983 1990 1995 
Bicycle trips (millions) 1272 1792 1750 3141 
Adjusted bicycle trips mill. 1476 2078 2030 4141 
Bicycle modal share % 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 
Auto modal share % 83.9 85 87.1 89.3 
Transit modal share % 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 
Walking modal share % 9.3 8.5 7.2 5.5 
 
More than half of all bike trips were for social and recreational purposes in the US in 1995:  
 
Table  7-1 Bicycling by trip purpose, US, 1995 
Trip Purpose Percentage of all 
bicycle trips 
Work commuting 9 
Shopping 12.7 
Personal business 12.5 
Social or recreational 57 
School 8.8 
All trip purposes 100 
 
 
The US “automobility culture”, which the figure above is an indication of, is far from 
sustainable, no matter what definition of sustainability one chooses. The question then arises, 
is Davis, the US Bike City very different from this picture? Which it is, as will be shown in 
the following.  
 
7.2.2.3 UC Davis campus survey 1996 
A 1996 campus survey at UC Davis showed that 60% of the students either biked or walked, 
and 20% of faculty and staff walked or biked, averaging 15 000 to 18 000 bikes on campus 
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each day (Toor 2004:193). Both groups compare very favorably with the figures for the US as 
shown in the national census data357, where 88% used the car for the work journey.  
 
Figure 7-6 Mode split at UC Davis 1996  
 
 
7.2.2.4 UC Davis, Housing and Transportation Survey 1988.  
UCD employees residing outside Davis are very car dependent (97% of trips). Nearly half of 
the UC Davis employees, who also lived in Davis in 1988, used the bike for the work trips 
(45%) while 4% walked. Public transport was used by less than one percent. Only 51% of 
those UC Davis employees residing in Davis used the car for the trip to work.  
 
Table  7-2 UCD mode split among employees 1988 
Mode split 1988 UCD employed 
Percent of trips Davis residents Outside Davis residents 
Car  51 97 
Public transport 0.5 0.9 
Walk 4 0.1 
Bike 45 1.3 
 100 99 
Source: UC Davis, 1988. Housing and Transportation Survey. Arthur C. Lowe, Planning and Budget Office. 
 
7.2.2.5 Mode share in Davis 
With the growth in income and car ownership cycling has decreased in Davis. There are very 
poor statistics from the earlier days, but as Lofland observes: “Several studies and everyday 
observation showed a marked decline in bike use over the 1990s into the 2000s”. Decline in 
bike use among high school students was especially dramatic (as was the increase in SUV use 
among them) (Lofland 2004:146). 
 
A major transport study for Sacramento region has very good data on the present cycling in 
Davis358. The following table shows the mode share in the City of Davis, the University of 
California, Davis (UCD) and the Sacramento Region.  
 
 
                                                
357 US national census data 2000. Source: Will Toor and Spencer W. Havlick. 2004: 131. 
358 Source: Sacramento Region Travel Survey 2000. Analysis of the 2000 SACOG Household Travel Survey. 
Prepared by DKS Associates for Sacramento Area Council of Governments. July 25, 2001. 
 
 Students mode split UCD 1996
Walking/Cycling
61 %
PublicTransport
16 %
Car 
23 %
UCD Employees mode split 1996 
Car
76 %
PublicTransport
4 %
Walking/Cycling
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Mode share  
% of Trips  
2000 
Davis 
 
UCD 
All trips 
UCD 
To/From  
Sacramento 
downtown 
Sacramento 
Suburban 
Sacramento 
Rural 
Car 75 53 42 77 94 94 
Public Transport 1 7 17 3 1 0 
Walking 10 16 3 17 4 4 
Cycling 12 24 38 2 1 0 
Table  7-3 Mode split Sacramento survey 2000  
 
The City of Davis had in 2000 more than twenty percent walking and cycling of the total 
number of trips, which is very high in a US context. In Davis only 75% of the trips were with 
the car, which is low compared to rural or suburban S cramento with a car mode share of 
94%. This latter figure is representative for California, except for downtown in the major 
metropolitan areas. Public Transport in California is virtually non-existent when looking at 
total travel and average figures.  
 
The City of Davis and the University – UCD - are separate jurisdictions and data on mode 
share are often given only for UCD since cycling there is very much higher than in the city as 
such. UCD “work journeys” are probably best reflected in the UCD To/From, which shows 
41% of the total as walk/bike trips virtually the same as for All trips. During the day the bike 
is heavily used for trips downtown as seen in the To/From data with 38% cycling, since 
walking downtown is slightly too far for lunch trips etc. Public transport makes up about 17% 
for “work journeys” to UCD, 7% of all UCD trips and only 1% of the Davis trips. This partly 
reflects that the bus network and services run by the s udents, is designed to cater for the 
students travel to and from campus. That being said, the network also does cover both 
downtown and the whole of Davis fairly well. The UCD campus survey in 1996 is shown 
below and compared to the 2000 survey data. The rough calculation where the data for 
students and employees are weighted, show about fifty percent walk/bike share while the four 
years later and more thorough study show forty percent.  
 
Even if the 1966 survey might be pro bike biased, it is clear that the UCD campus is unique 
with about half of the trips using soft modes and public transport. Also interesting is that the 
UCD policy has managed to get 12% of the employees to u e Van/Carpool.  
 
Mode split 
% of trips 
Davis 
2000 
UCD 
All trips 
2000 
UCD 
To/From 
2000  
UCD 
Students 
22.000 
1996 
UCD 
Employees 
9.000 
1996 
UCD all 
trips 1996. 
Weighted 
calculation 
Car 75 53 42 21 62 33 
PublicTransport 1 7 17 16 4 13 
Walking 10 16 3 
Cycling 12 24 38 
60 20 50 
Van/Carpool    2 12 5 
Other    2 2 2 
Table  7-4 Mode split Sacramento survey 2000 weightd  
 
The 2000 data are from Sacramento Region travel survey. The 1996 data are from a study by 
Takemoto Weerts, the UCD bike coordinator, cited in Toor 2004:192, based on questionnaire 
survey with unknown reliability. The author has done the weighted calculation to make the 
columns comparable.   
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7.2.2.6 Sacramento Region. Household Travel Survey 2000 
In the Sacramento Region the car is used for more than 90% of the trips, walking 5%, but 
public transport only 1% and bike 2%. This is typical pattern for most regions in California. 
Both the City of Davis and UCD come out very favorably in this survey. The car is still the 
dominant mode for UCD residents with 53%, but 24% cycle, 16% walk and 7% use public 
transport.  
 
Table  7-5 Mode share for all trips, Davis, UCD and Sacramento Region 
Mode split 2000 Davis UCD Sacramento Region 
Car 75 53 91 
Public Transport 1 7 1 
Walking 10 16 5 
Cycling 12 24 2 
Source: Sacramento Region Travel Survey 2000. Analysis of the 2000 SACOG Household Travel Survey.   
 
Figure 7-7 Sacramento and Davis. Journey to work by mode 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above shows journey to work by mode for Davis City, Sacramento Downtown and 
Region, notice cycling in Davis. It is the use of the bike that makes Davis most sustainable of 
the three areas. This is a result of 40 years of bike policy in Davis and the very active policy 
of the neighboring jurisdiction UCD. Both Davis and UCD have an active policy promoting 
the use of bicycles, they have invested heavily in the bike infrastructure and run a Transport 
Demand Management program.  
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7.2.3 Government and Governance in California.  
In this subchapter I have picked out and commented a few central points from planning 
legislation and practice in California, which is very different from the northern European 
tradition. William Fulton’s book from 1999: Guide to California Planning, is the main 
source.  
 
7.2.3.1 Land use regulations have a long tradition in USA 
It was surprising to me to discover the long traditions and old planning legislation in USA. 
California for example decided already in 1937 thatcities should produce a General Plan for 
its territory. One of the first examples of zoning ordinance is from New York’s Manhattan, 
from 1916, the purpose of which was to secure the interests of the rich, that ”mansions of the 
bourgeoisie” should not be redeveloped. Ownership of land is always important, the driving 
force in new development. Federal, State, County and Local Government own most land in 
California. It has been and is an important source of income for counties to sell land to 
developers to get tax revenue from development. The pric  of land will therefore be closer to 
the market value in California than in Europe where the price is often politically decided.  
 
Networking and alliances are also common in Californ a. Local Government Planning and 
Decision-Making is involved with and often intertwined with the following:  
1. Rule makers  
2. Government Agencies  
3. Real-estate developers  
4. Citizen groups.  
 
Consistency between the General Plan and the local plan may be a problem in many 
countries. To prevent arbitrary political decisions California decided in 1971: The General 
Plan and Zoning Ordinance must be consistent with eac  other (page 82). Laws change 
marginally every year (fairly similar processes both in Congress and State), but the change 
over time may be great, both regarding signals and practice.  
 
Coming from Norway and discovering that California has managed to control land use along 
the coast far better than Norway and in line with Denmark and England, made me envious. In 
1972 Proposition 20 established the Costal Commission and gave it jurisdiction over 
development permits and planning in all coastal areas of California. Contrary to Norway there 
is no way for local authorities to circumvent the Commission.  
 
7.2.3.2 Litigation and political decisions in the hierarchy 
1978 Proposition 13 cut property taxes dramatically and thus indirectly exerted strong impact 
on planning. 
 
Litigation occurs for two main reasons: 
1. regulating private property through planning often raises constitutional issues.  
2. planning law is based on the concept of “citizen enforcement”, local governments are 
held accountable to the law through litigation  
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Litigation is costly and requires ample resources, which probably make it easier to “run over” 
a poor neighborhood by a planning ordinance than a wealthy area. Three examples of 
litigation causes are:  
• the statutory case in which the plaintiff argues that some state or federal law 
has been violated.  
• a homeowner group might argue that the local general plan is not consistent 
with the local zoning ordinance. 
• that an environmental impact report should have been pr pared on a project, as 
required by state law. 
In 1991 a series of mutual agreements promising cooperation on biodiversity and related 
issues between federal and state regulatory and landowning agencies has increased 
cooperation with local government. Political leadership is important for effective cooperation. 
 
States establish the procedural structure in planning, but not contents of plan. In New York, 
Florida, etc. (about 10 states) the state government plays a direct role in planning policy 
establishing specific policy goals local government must pursue in land use policy. (Fulton 
1999:89) Local Governments have theoretically unlimited freedom, but state agencies might 
intervene. 
 
7.2.3.3 Planning practice & California Environmental Qualit y Act CEQA 
Agreements (contracts) are one main instrument to “control” future development. There is no 
administrative authority to enforce these, but the agreements are supposed to be enforced by 
direct citizen action or “citizen enforcement”. Citizens and groups of citizens should hold 
local government accountable, be watchdogs. Enforcement of planning laws by judges, are 
according to Fulton (1999:90) apparently preferable to California’s voters and politicians than 
a bigger bureaucracy in Sacramento (see later about the Davis and Yolo “Pass through 
agreement”).  
 
“One great weakness of California’s approach to planning policy is that neighboring 
jurisdictions are rarely required to work together or even take each other’s plans into account. 
Each try to reap benefits and avoid the harmful side effects like traffic. The only way to gain 
any influence over its neighbor is to follow the citizen enforcement and sue.” (Fulton 
1999:90) 
 
CEQA lawsuits often concern neighboring jurisdictions. Oftentimes these lawsuits are settled 
for “mitigation money” – e.g. funds for traffic improvements – without going to trial. “CEQA 
has changed from a tool to stop projects to mitigaton machine that spurs forth mitigation 
measures.” (Fulton 1999:91)  
 
DoT - Department of Transportation (federal) is the major funding source for both highways 
and transit facilities. Cal Trans, California Department of Transportation, is responsible for 
state highways. Recently the power to plan these facilities has been assumed by regional 
transportation planning agencies. 
 
Land use and transport planning legislation and practice in California is different from the 
Norwegian tradition. It is apparent that more instruments are available, which will open for a 
wider range of solutions if used.  
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7.2.4 University of California, Davis – UCD  
 
UCD is owned by the state of California and is part of the University of California system. 
The Board of Regions governs the development and management of the UC system, among 
other things it allocate to each campus a number of students as a goal in their planning. 
The population of California is growing very fast, mainly due to the number of births. This 
put pressure on the education system, and therefore the universities are set to increase the 
number of students substantially in the coming years. After an allocation of growth numbers 
from University of California Board of Regions, UCD must plan for an additional 15 000 staff 
and students until 2015/2016. 
 
The Long Range Development Plan (2003) is the UC Davis campus General Plan. In the plan 
enrolment is projected to increase to 32 000 students in 2015-16, an annual growth of 2.2%. 
Expected total campus growth to 2015, will be plus 15 000 persons (5000 students, 10 000 
faculty, staff, research), bringing the total campus opulation from 36 445 in 2002, to 51 645 
in 2016. How can/should the City of Davis cope with this external demand, 10 000 new jobs 
require housing, schools, services etc. Where should these be localized? Which are the 
consequences of different alternative locations of new housing and not least, the commuter 
patterns and GHG emissions associated with these altern tive LU&T strategies? 
 
Getting new faculty very often implies two persons needing work, and Davis is too small to 
offer a wide selection of jobs. Settling outside Davis may therefore be the preferred 
alternative for many. An article359 with title Searching for the best highlights that to recruit 
good people the challenge is great: “ bout half or more of potential hires involve partner 
issues” according to the dean of the division of social scien es. High house prices in Davis 
will further press for location in an area where houses are cheaper. A third cause for settling 
in Sacramento for single people and young couples without children would be the far larger 
supply of services and entertainment.  
 
7.2.4.1 UCD Long Range Development Plan, LRDP. 
The Long Range Development Plan (2003) is a comprehensive plan for the future 
development of the campus. Below are listed some of the land use and transport goals in the 
plan:  
Area Objectives: 
1. Transportation. Integrate campus, local, and regional land use and transportation 
patterns. 
2. Housing. Work with the Davis community to provide adequate and affordable housing 
choices for students, faculty, and staff. 
3. Open space. Continue to develop…. 
4. Economic and Fiscal Health. Work with neighboring jurisdictions…. 
5. Agriculture preservation. Work with local and regional jurisdictions…. 
 
Resource objectives. Circulation systems:  
1. Continue Transport System Management, measures include  
1-additional bike parking and paths,  
                                                
359 The California Aggie May 3, 2005 
 
  284 
2-conversion to alternative fuel vehicles,  
3-incentives to decrease single occupancy vehicles, such as transit, rideshare, carpool 
and shuttle programs. 
2. Reduce traffic conflicts 
3. Support Transit Systems 
4. Multiple Parking Strategies. Keep parking affordable and accessible, including 
demand reduction measures (such as on-campus housing and shifting support services 
functions to sites outside the Academic Core) and maintaining low cost parking 
choices in the overall inventory. 
 
To cater for the future growth UCD plans to build houses for some of the additional 15.000 
staff and students. There will be built houses for 4000 students and 500 faculty houses on 
campus. This is catered for in the: Neighborhood master plan 2003-2015. The area required 
for the new campus housing will be: 225 acres (53 acres faculty/staff, 30 acres student 
housing, 17 acres mix-use housing, open space 52 acres, recreation fields 20 acres, elementary 
school 3 acres, circulation system 48 acres. The length of the internal bike paths is 6.7 km (4.2 
miles). 
 
7.2.4.2 A joint transportation systems management plan  
For many years the City of Davis and UCD has had a very good cooperation based on the 
following agreement360: “In 1991, the campus and the City of Davis completed a joint 
transportation systems management plan, which outlined strategies for reducing dependency 
on single occupancy vehicles and related air emissions. In addition to the bicycle and transit 
systems mentioned above, the campus actively pursues a range of alternative transportation 
measures and incentives, including but not limited to alternative fuel programs, rideshare and 
carpool.”  
 
UCD is actively implementing and developing the means to fulfill the aims of this agreement, 
but the impression one gets from people is that Davis City Council has been less active in the 
follow up of the agreement.  
 
7.3 The City of Davis, important and major events  
 
7.3.1 Land use and transportation planning  
 
The development of land use and transportation in Davis can be looked upon as two parallel 
intertwined processes, the City Council policy and the UCD policy. The people of Davis have 
contested the strong population growth through decas. Land use and transportation planning 
and policy are the instruments used by the different groups to achieve their ends. Cases lost 
often crops up again and influence other cases at a later stage. The development process has 
turns and twists, but there is a path through the history which we will show in this chapter. 
Underlying the day to day issues and decisions are m jor questions about the future of Davis: 
“Most everyone in town agreed that Davis should grow slo ly, recognizing that at some point 
                                                
360 The Long Range Development Plan, page 31.  
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its roads would become overcrowded, bicycling around town would become difficult, crime 
would approach big-city proportions and the community would face other ills typical in 
larger cities. Perhaps most alarming was the notion hat Davis might lose its small-town 
character without even realizing it.” (Fitch, 1998: 74)  
 
But how much growth is slow growth? Over the years the opposition groups have developed 
excellent skills in fighting development plans, obviously having had “professional” help from 
UCD employees, who were husbands, wives and friends. There is a two sided feeling about 
growth, on the one side UCD must grow to keep the city e onomically healthy on the other 
side there is the NIMBY (not in my back yard) effect and the worry that big society will 
damage the city as one opposition group puts it361: "Good cities are rare! Let's not rush to 
lose ours." It is the path of events and issues that have had lasting and deep effect on the land 
use and transportation development of the City of Davis we highlight in this section. 
Following the path of events require detailed inquiry into the land use and transportation 
planning processes. Highlighting some events does therefore not mean that the daily practice 
with applications, proposals, plans and decisions are forgotten.  
 
The major land use and transportation events have been: 
• The Bike City 1966 
• Village Homes 1975-82 
• The General Plan and the Bike Plan 1987 
• Pass Through Agreement 1987 
• Alternative Transportation Task Force – ATTF 1994-96 
• The Measure J 2000. 
• The General Plan and the Bike Plan 2001 
• Covell Village 2005 
• Diet the 5th Street? 
 
Davis grew at a rail infrastructure junction, and there are still Amtrak services to Sacramento 
and the Bay Area. Crossing the rail track with roads nd to create good access to parts of the 
city and the highway system has therefore been difficult. Contrary to the European cities, the 
issues of traffic congestion and the funding of roads re not included in the listing because 
they are not any longer major issues in Davis, but they have been earlier.  
 
The State Highway 40 Bypass was opened in 1942. Since then there have been conflicts 
between the State of California and the City of Davis concerning junctions, land, etc. several 
times. But today the Interstate system is well developed and bypasses Davis close to the City 
Centre, without being much concern for the City Council. In 1995 the last major controversy 
was closed after 35 years of fighting. During these years a rail underpass had been tested in 
three referendums. The following statement from the campaign leaflets shows the intensity in 
the debate: “In 1988, Davis citizens saved Central Park from being paved over by the city. 
Keeping our downtown pedestrian-friendly is equally vital if Davis is to maintain its 
community feel. A four-lane truck route and 9000 more car trips daily will forever change our 
city, which is one of the last remaining true downtowns in California.” 362  
                                                
361 Wildhorse Opposition Association in a leaflet during a 1995 referendum over the 425-acre project (Fitch 
1998). 
362 Opponents to the widening of Richards Boulevard, before the referendum in 1996, cited from Fitch.  
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7.3.2 The Bike City - created 1966.  
 
Biking caught on during the Second World War, and continued to be popular throughout the 
fifties. But there were so many bikes on the streets and sidewalks that many found them a 
nuisance. In December 1965 the chief of the police announced a “get-tough bike policy” 
which was a “crash program for citing violators” using “special teams of officers in the field”. 
The chief “also expressed doubts about establishing bike paths” an idea that had been 
presented to the Council a year earlier. (Lofland 2004:131)  
 
Eve Child, had been the moving spirit in drafting and circulating a petition calling for 
“bicycle paths on all arterial streets and parking areas in shopping centers”. “The Council 
members stared at us incredulously when we presented our ideas, but after a year of work in 
April 1966 the Council grudgingly authorized a “pilot program” of a few lanes on small side 
streets”. Bike lanes became a hot topic at the spring 1966 council election and the new Mayor 
led the authorization of a wide-ranging and arterial system. Thus began what would become a 
major system of bike lanes and through this Davis also got its identity as a bike city as these 
metaphors indicate: The City of Bicycles. The Bicycle Capital of the World. (Lofland 
2004:132) 
 
Davis pioneered bike lanes on streets, although it had to fight the California legislature to 
make them legal, and creating a model for other cities to follow. The university followed up 
the city effort by connecting campus with city paths, closing off the campus core to cars, and 
adding high-visibility bike parking at virtually evry campus building. Bike Roundabouts and 
traffic signals with bike-only light cycles at major intersections are innovative features of the 
Davis bike culture.  
 
In 2005 Davis is still a bike city  
The cycling in the seventies and eighties are not well documented, but the following travel 
survey data from 2000 supports that Davis is still a bike city. A comparison of modal split in 
Davis with Aalborg and Kristiansand show that Davis is a bike city even with an European 
look:  
 
Davis  
Work journeys:  car 59%, PT 6%, walk 5%, cycling 31%. 
Non work  car 75%, PT 1%, walk 12%, cycling 10%. 
 
Aalborg 1999 
All trips  car 63%, PT 9%, walk 9%, cycling 19%. 
 
Kristiansand all trips   
1998 SC  car 63%, PT 10%, walk 13%, cycling 14%. 
2001 NTP  car 70%, PT 20%, walk 3%, cycling 7%. 
 
“Several studies and everyday observation showed a marked decline in bike use over the 
1990s and into 2000s” (Lofland, 2004:155). One reason for the decline in cycling is the 
increase in students’ car ownership, as the bike promoter said: “In my student days, we were 
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poor. Now, they’re really wealthy, 80% own cars and many exclusive ones, far more costly 
than I can afford.”363 
 
The League of American Bicyclists honored in 2005 Davis of becoming the sole community 
at the platinum level among the bicycle friendly communities:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.3 Village Homes 
 
7.3.3.1 Village Homes are born 
Mike and Judy Corbett together with some other “environment” students designed in the early 
seventies Village Homes, a sixty acre (24 ha) mixed-use residential “garden village” 
incorporating innovative ecological and social features. It was an effort toward sustainable 
development inspired by Howard’s Garden City (Corbett and Corbett 2000:21).  
 
The principles behind the design of the Village Homes community are ecologically 
sustainable development and not only the physical design, but also community building by 
common gardening projects and other collective activities. The design focuses on walking and 
cycling by putting paths in the green common area (the use of solar energy, treatment of 
ground water, etc. is not mentioned here). The area set side for roads and parking 
substantially less compared to normal designs. The bike paths are connected to the main bike 
network. The idea was that the design should support that the automobiles were used as little 
as possible. It has through this ideology also been a strong support for the use of 
environmentally friendly transport in Davis.  
 
The process of developing Village Homes was met with opposition. “The staff objected to the 
narrowness of the streets, the inward-facing houses, and the long cul-de-sacs. The fire and 
police chiefs objected to the layout and worried about access for emergency vehicles. The 
entire process taught us that change must originate wi h local elected officials, staff people 
have a tremendous investment in doing things the same way as they did them yesterday.” 
(Corbett and Corbett, 2000:25) Thirty-two banks andloan institutions refused to finance 
Village Homes364 and the design was the laughing stock in realty circles365. Once built it 
                                                
363 Interview Tim Bustos 240505  
364 The Bank of America did not turn down the loan because of the economic risks involved, but “they simply 
found the project’s philosophies distasteful.” Corbett 2000:26 
First Platinum-level Bicycle Friendly Community Recognized  
The League of American Bicyclists is recognizing Davis, California, as a Bicycle Friendly 
Community at the platinum level, the first time the top designation has been awarded to any 
community in the United States. “We're delighted to recognize Davis as an outstanding city for 
bicycling,” said Andy Clarke, executive director of the League of American Bicyclists. “For 
forty years, Davis has had one of the highest levels of bicycle use in the country – currently 17 
percent of journeys to work are made by bike. This comes as a direct result of policies and 
choices they have made over the years. Bike lanes ad tr ils permeate the community and 
enable people of all ages to ride to school, to work, and for recreation and errands. The city 
and university also have exemplary education, encouragement and enforcement programs.”  
Source: (www.bikesbelong.org).  
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became an icon for eco-friendly housing development and visited by famous people 
(president Carters wife, president Mitterand and Jane Fonda). The Village Homes ideology 
was founded in ecology: for the environment, for the use of renewable resources, for 
husbanding with land and water. The design recognized the car, but minimized the area 
allocated for the car. It used the walk and bike paths s the central transportation element to 
promote the use of the bike, a design close to the present term “sustainable design”.  
According to professor Mark Francis the following points make Village homes unique 
(Francis 2003):  
 
• Streets: narrow, meandering, cul-de-sac streets. 
• Stormwater Drainage System: above ground natural creeks. 
• Fences: not allowed on side streets to keep area opn. 
• Density: standard for total area, but residential lots smaller to get large open spaces. 
• Housing mix: range from 500 sq ft to 3500 sq ft. 
• Homes and Energy: energy efficient houses, most are passive solar. Some are active 
solar water, heating. 
• Landscaping and Vegetation: designed to support yealy changes in temperature. 
• Homeowners Association: 3 gardeners and manager employed to maintain community 
centre, swimming pool and gardens. Produce sold.  
 
I might add to the list that it also has small community center with a kindergarten, some 
office, a common swimming pool, and a nice Italian restaurant, Ostaria Fasulo. Originally the 
name was Plumshire Inn, established by Michael Corbett. 
 
7.3.3.2 Comparison of Village Homes and Conventional Neighborhood 
Many books are written about Village Homes, the following comparison of Village Homes 
and a Conventional Neighborhood is fetched from: Francis (2003). 
 
The themes for comparison were:  
 
• Demographics 
• Evaluation of houses 
• Evaluation of neighborhoods 
• Evaluation of friends and socializing 
• Agriculture 
 
The following table shows that Village Homes systematically score better on major 
sustainability indicators:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
365 Solar technology was very new at this time, and the local estate agents knew little about it and trusted it less. 
They actively discouraged prospective buyers, disparaged the experimental features of the project, and r ised 
concerns about resale value. Corbett 2000:27 
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Transportation Village Homes Control neighborhood 
Average annual miles per car 11 300 13 400 
Average miles per household  210 270 
Average gas mileage of vehicles 27 mpg 23.5 mpg 
Gasoline consumption per car per year 422 gallons 577 gallons 
Gasoline consumption per household per year 753 gallons 1171 gallons 
Energy consumption   
Total yearly energy consumption per household (kwh) 44 900 kwh 67 700 kwh 
Recycling   
glass 75% 64% 
paper 43% 17% 
Organic waste 34% 29% 
Table  7-6  Village Homes, an early example of a sustainable neighborhood development  
 
7.3.3.3 Why not replicated? 
Village Homes developed 1975-82, has been widely hai ed nd many books have been written 
about it, but it has not been replicated, neither in Davis nor other places. Why? 
 
In Davis the Aspen development in the nineties has some of the basic innovative thoughts 
from Village Homes, and it was expected that Covell Vil age would further develop these 
ideas in practice. The Covell Village development was as described in ch. 7.6.8 rejected in a 
ballot, so even in the span of thirty years the design idea has not spread.  
 
Some comments fetched from the Corbett’s book on why not replicated:  
 
Two of the leading developers in Davis ”the main reason there aren’t more Village 
Homes is there’s only one Mike Corbett” and “requirements now for higher density 
development in Davis and the ongoing concerns of City Public Works regarding 
drainage and layout”.  
 
Wolcott and Loux, city planners: “Many citizens throughout the city look with pride to 
Village Homes and question why no similar model has been built in the past 20 years.” 
The two planners suggest that the reasons for this are increases in land prices and 
changes in home styles and tastes. City standards in Davis and elsewhere remain a 
substantial barrier for a developer wanting to build a similar project.  
 
Mike Corbett offers an assessment of why the project has not been reproduced. “The 
problem is not that the public does not want it. They come here and see what we have 
done and say, Why isn’t everybody doing this? But developers are so close-minded. 
They continue to build thousands of places where you can’t get around without a car.” 
 
The reasons Village Homes are not replicated should also be looked for in the market led 
system. Profit is one main reason. The image of Village Homes is completely different from 
what is advertised as the American Dream House. The developers don’t want to take the risk 
of something different. Each developer minimizes his own risk by producing housing that is 
presented as the “dream” and also he is reinforcing the “dream” with his own marketing.366 
                                                
366 When the sub-prime bubble burst, it was shown that the risk was quite large. But the high risk did not hit the 
developers, apart from the developments being built. The costs were transferred to the house buyers firstly, and 
to the banks secondly.  
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Developers also react on the large common area in Villages Homes used for gardening, wine 
yard and other community activities, thinking that the density is too low. But, the overall 
density is not very different from other neighborhoods in Davis with about 10 houses per 
hectare. This is because the design has concentrated he houses with small gardens to the east 
and a large common area with community facilities to the west. Without an abundant common 
area, another development will lack the unique qualities of Village Homes. In a private 
development such areas are as a rule filled with houses, boosting the profits on the 
development.  
 
Village Homes represented both a novel neighborhood design and a community ideology of 
participation and cooperation about many common activities. As such the project met with 
hostility in the banks that refused to fund the development. It therefore needs a developer 
willing to take this extra cost of convincing the financiers, the public planners and the future 
buyers. In addition there are as the statements above show, many barriers in the planning 
system itself. The police think the streets are too narrow and the inhabitants will have 
difficulties in parking. The public works engineers point out that refuge collection will be 
very difficult and the narrow streets are difficult to maintain. In other words how the 
municipalities in their daily practices use zoning and planning ordinances, prevent the ideas in 
“Smart Growth” and “New Urbanism” to be realized and the unique Village Homes to be 
replicated. 367  
 
7.3.4 A measure to prevent sprawl – The Pass Through Agreement 
 
In 1987, the City of Davis and the County of Yolo executed a Pass Through Agreement, in 
response to the city’s redevelopment plan. The agreement ensures that the city will “pass 
through” specified property tax increments to the county. The “pass through” is conditioned 
upon the county not approving ”urban development” wi hin the city’s planning area but 
outside the city border, without city approval, thereby avoiding ”leap frog” growth or growth 
which is difficult to service 368. In practice this means that Davis City pay Yolo County part of 
the income from development, against Yolo promising not to allow development close to the 
city borders. This agreement has been very effectiv in containing the expansion of Davis and 
the main reason that shopping centers and other devlopments have not cropped up along the 
city’s edge.  
 
This agreement is not giving Yolo County adequate covering of the costs, since the prices in 
the agreement have not been adjusted over these years. Yolo County has therefore asked to 
renegotiate the economic terms of the agreement369.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
367 At the Yolo seminar in 2005 Judy Corbett pointed out that “Smart Growth” projects still was hindered by the 
land zoning (see Appendix I under Davis) 
368 To be able to control development that is costly to service was one of the main causes for the Norwegian 
1965 planning act  
369 Davis Enterprise May 24th 2005. 
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7.3.5 The General Plan and the Bike Plan 1987 and 2001  
 
The first city plan for Davis was produced 1927, while the first comprehensive land use and 
transport plan for Davis is the General Plan from 1958. Three years later a plan for Davis core 
area was presented, but failed at the outset 370. Downtown Davis is sacrosanct for many of the 
citizens, representing what is valuable: the heritage nd roots. When the Core Area Plan 
ridiculed this attitude: “Like everything else, downtown must change to survive in a changing 
world, or it will follow the dinosaur to extinction.”  it had lost, even though it presented a 
promising future for Davis: “The focal point of the new downtown would be the Tird Street 
Parade, an ambitious scheme for connecting the university campus with the downtown 
business district. Lining Third Street would be department stores, specialty shops, restaurants 
and offices in buildings up to eight stories high. T ird would be closed to automobile traffic 
except at cross streets, and an attractively landscaped pathway would be added for bicyclists 
and pedestrians. "The gently curving bicycle path will occupy the center of the present street," 
the core area plan explained. "Under arching shade tre s, there will be benches and sidewalk 
cafes along the promenades on either side. Fountains, pools, sculpture, light standards, and 
planting will provide beauty; and commercial display stands, bulletin boards and booths 
where cigarettes, magazines, books and flowers are old will enliven the scene.” (Fitch 1998)  
 
This core feeling among Davis residents must be acknowledged to understand the land use 
and transport planning, and indeed the use of the dev lopment control and other measures to 
safeguard the city.  
 
The State of California legislation has since 1937 required that each city and county prepare 
and adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for its jurisdiction and any adjacent 
related lands. 371 
 
Seven themes are to be included in the general plan:  
1. Land use element. “Designates the proposed general distribution and general location 
and extent of uses of the land for housing, busines, industry, open space, including 
agriculture, natural resources, recreation, and enjoyment of scenic beauty, education, 
public buildings and grounds, solid and liquid waste disposal facilities, and other 
categories of public and private land use of land. The land use element shall include a 
statement of the standards of population density and building intensity recommended 
for the various districts and other territory covered by the plan.” 
2. Circulation element. Transport system correlated with land use elements of the plan. 
3. Hosing element. Existing and projected housing needs. 
4. Conservation element. Water, land and natural resouces.  
5. Open space element. To preserve natural resources, production resources, outdoor 
recreation, public health and safety. 
6. Noise element. 
7. Safety element. Risks from seismically induced events, flooding, etc. 
 
                                                
370 In 1961 Livingston and Blayney presented a plan for Davis Core Area Plan, a Davis with a population of  
75 000 in1985. The plan was based on le Corbusier’s ideas.  
371 Nearly 30 years before similar legislation in Norway.  
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Already in the Davis General Plan 1973, the year after the Environment conference in 
Stockholm, energy conservation and integrated transport were included as themes in the plan: 
“a sophisticated, comprehensive energy conservation framework that called for a better 
integrated transportation system, innovative building regulations and public education.” The 
director of planning declared that the plan had “changed the shape of the city from sprawling 
suburbia to a well-managed, compact community.” (Lofland 2004:140) 
 
As part of the General Plan review in the mid eighties, Davis produced the first 
comprehensive Bike Plan, which confirmed the twenty year old policy of establishing a 
comprehensive network for walking and cycling covering the whole city with good access to 
major traffic generators. The Bike Plan also recognized that the bike infrastructure alone was 
not enough to make people use the bike in competition w th other modes. It therefore called 
for a bike promotion policy to inform the public and make awareness of the positive effects of 
using the bike372. The General Plan and the Bike Plan of 2001 are in essence the similar set of 
plans from the 1987 ones rolled forward, but with more emphasis on walking and cycling. 
The 2001 plans were also strongly influenced by the ATTF as described in ch. 7.6.6 below. 
The General Plan 2001 was produced with extensive collaboration with the residents of 
Davis. “We are specially proud of extensive public hearings and participation” as the planner 
said 373.  
 
Bike plan 
The statements on the Bike Plan and Bike Promotion that follows are from an interview and 
talks with Tim Bustos the Davis Bicycle and Pedestrian coordinator 374. “Bicycle 
transportation is institutionalized in the General Plan. The city adopts policy of bike travel in 
new developments, ensure links to existing trip generators (standards and design guidelines).   
One of the best bike networks in the country. Good lanes and paths and most important good 
connections both in communities and along arteries.” 
 
“The Bike City is threatened by the change in demography. New people with no culture of 
using bikes or public transport, is moving in. Together with less self containment, ie people 
both living and being employed in the city, puts pressure on the city economy, the transport 
system in different ways and indeed the mode split.”   
 
On bike promotion and encouragement: “We have picked the fruit. Now demography is 
changing. Earlier people were attracted to Davis by UCD and Bikes, but now people are 
flocking to Davis. They are more auto centric, more inclined to use their cars. When they 
move here, they are not changing their habits. Quality of life is lowered, even that was the 
reason they came!”  
 
There are some successes, like the “Bike commutes” and “Bike week” promotions, they are 
really important. A lot of people on the fence, they say: I would like to use the bike, but… 
They need incentives. People are scattered over a scale “Never ever bike” to “Positive, 
possible bike user”. 
 
                                                
372 Tim Bustos was thereafter employed fulltime as the City of Davis Bicycle and Pedestrian coordinator and 
UCD followed up and employed David Takemoto-Weerts as the UCD Bicycle coordinator. 
373 Interview with Bob Wolcott 180505.  
374 Interview Tim Bustos, Davis Bicycle and Pedestrian coordinator 20th May 2005 
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“Hardest to reach are the young people, the students. We were broke when we were students, 
but now students are affluent. More ride cars now and more ride costly cars. Commercials to 
get people to buy new cars use enormous amount of money, we can’t compete. They talk 
about image – what your girlfriend or mate think of y u. That’s why we do bike days etc. we 
can’t compete.”  
 
There are several lessons in these statements: First, the city has institutionalized cycling in the 
land use and transport planning, and importantly in the standards and design guidelines. The 
city has thus secured that the cycling mode is equally important as roads in new 
developments. Second, the bike city is threatened by change in the population, income, car 
ownership and life styles. To get their time-budgets together many people have to use the car. 
The Blueprint for the Sacramento Region discussed below, illustrates this point. Thirdly, bike 
promotion is necessary to give the environmentally friendly cycling mode a voice, although a 
tiny one compared to the massive marketing of the car. Bike promotion can in a local 
community attract some new cyclists and it supports the existing bike users.  
 
Bike planning and parking policies  
Goals of the Bike plan: 
• Goal to maintain system of facilities 
• Encourage bike travel 
 
The Bike plan shows that a lot can be improved with the bike infrastructure and maintenance, 
and it accordingly sets many specific goals. However, many of the goals are the same as in the 
former Bike Plan, and the means proposed are education, encouragement, and similar. 
Although these means are important, one may ask if not Davis should have developed 
minimum standards for the bike infrastructure similar to those in force for roads and traffic. 
Such standards would strengthen the city planners’ po ition in negotiations. As it is the 
developer and the city may come to some development agreement, in which the bike net may 
or may not be the loser. Without such standards it is also very difficult to improve the old part 
of the network, which certainly has deficiencies.  
 
7.3.6 Alternative Transportation Task Force – ATTF 
 
The City Council set up the Alternative Transportation Task Force 1994375, charged with 
exploring “the potential for increasing the use of transportation modes that provide an 
alternative to the gasoline or diesel fuelled automobile.”  The ATTF report was divided into 
two parts. Part one deals with the basic problem of car dependence and the lack of LU&T 
integration, which is thorough and very principal. Part two is a list of policy items with 
description and proposed action, divided into Primay and Secondary Projects. Primary 
projects are listed under headings:  
1. Bicycle Transportation.  
2. Pedestrian Transportation. 
3. Electrical vehicles 
4. Transit 
 
                                                
375 UCD Institute of Transportation Studies was founded three years before in 1991. 
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Main conclusions from ATTF:  
• Recommend to put new criteria for land use and mobility into the General Plan.  
• City Council to oversee the development of new criteria.   
 
The task force recommended: “systemic changes to land use planning and transportati n 
systems, as well as specific short-term improvements tha  would enhance bicycle, pedestrian, 
electric vehicle and transit transportation”.  
 
Most of the recommendations were adopted in the General Plan in 2001376. Implementation of 
the General Plan objectives with actions is however another issue, as the parking policy 
objective to underpin more transit use show:  
 
GP policy 4.1.1 Reduce parking at locations that are well served 
Parking charges at UCD campus is not popular with the Davis downtown business 
association, but it verbally supports the City Council strategy. However, it strongly resists 
introducing a stronger parking policy and parking charges downtown. The bike coordinator 
had the following comment to this policy item in the General Plan: “Difficult, continues to be 
controversial, e.g. train depot. They demand parking even if they live a mile away.”  
 
7.3.7 Growth, Ecology and “Measure J”  
 
The “election revolution” of 1972 is how Fitch describe the birth of “progressive ” Davis, 
which had “an abundance of middle-class high-achievers out to save the world”. Failing that, 
they at least want to save Davis from “urban sprawl, suburban shopping malls, the world’s 
love affair with automobiles and other afflictions of the modern world” (Fitch 1998)377. Bob 
Black, former student president and new 1972 member of the City Council, was an ecology 
front fighter. He was also close to the group around Mike Corbett thinking of building an 
ecologic village – the Village Homes. The 1973 GP was hailed as ”a sophisticated, 
comprehensive energy conservation framework that called for a better integrated 
transportation system, innovative building regulations and public education”. The Davis 
planning declared that the plan had “changed the shape of the city from sprawling suburbia to 
a well-managed, compact community” (Fitch, p140). 
 
Davis likes to talk of itself as the Eco City, an uderstanding that goes back to the seventies 
and the 1973 General Plan, which at that time was very radical. It also opened up for the 
famous development Village Homes and the attempt to design a community on environmental 
and ecological principles. The idea was among other things that the design should support that 
the automobiles were used as little as possible. It has through this ideology also been a strong 
support for the use of environmentally friendly transport in Davis. The Eco city movement 
somehow fizzles out with the Reagan era, but the sustainable transport ideas and control with 
development linger on. 
 
Growth has been a very contentious issue through the ci y history378. Before the 1972 election 
a task force revising the General plan proposed to limit and control the city’s future growth 
                                                
376 Interview Bob Wolcott 
377 The city of Davis web site www.city.davis.ca.us/pb/cultural/about.cfm  
378 Between 1950 and 1987 the yearly population growth was incredible 6.4 % (Bike Plan 2001, page 1) 
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through a system of housing allowances. In 1981 the council voted to limit the population at 
50.000 in 2000. In 1986 measure “L” was adopted “Davis should grow as slowly as possible, 
and that annexations should be discouraged.” The Davis city council sought to forestall future 
threats of sprawl by the “pass through agreement” with Yolo County (see above). According 
to this the city purchased the county’s promise “not to develop on Davis borders” with 
ongoing payments to the county from the city’s redevelopment agency” (Fitch, p139). At the 
turn of the millennium another decision on growth control came. The City Council, which has 
five members elected on a non-partisan vote, adopte “M asure J” and put the proposal before 
the electorate in 2000379. The measure says that any council decision on annexation of land 
for urban development must be put to the population for a ballot. This measure became 
decisive in the Covell Village development proposal, as we will outline below. 
 
7.3.8 Covell Village 
 
Covell Village380, a 160 hectare area which was proposed to be developed with about 1600 
houses was the first proposal put before a ballot according to “Measure J” in November 
2005. The city administration seemed strongly in favor of developing Covell Village381 and 
had together with the developer put forward a proposed agreement in which the developer put 
in a “package” of additional benefits for the community.  
 
The project was presented as “new urbanist” with emphasis on walk-ability, attractive design, 
open space and habitat areas and other features382. The design for Covell Village have a very 
good internal system of bike paths placed in open gr en space and also excellent contact with 
the main bike network in Davis. Nine over- and underpasses were to be built to improve the 
safety and attractiveness of the bike mode. Free public transport was to be provided to the 
residents (see also the Kristiansand case for discussion on zero fare). The Covell Village 
proposal did include all demands from the City providing for walking and cycling. This 
substantial “package” of benefits reflects that the developer had to make the new development 
seem like a good “thing” to more than half the electorate in Davis, to be able to go ahead with 
project, which has a sales value of upwards of one billion dollars when finished.  
 
The Covell Village Plan went through the following public process: 
Planning Commission: 
May 18: Public hearing 
May 25: Deliberation/recommendation 
June 1: Deliberation/recommendation 
City Council:  
June 7: Initial public hearing 
June 8: Additional public hearing 
                                                
379 In March 2000, 54% of voters approved a Council-proposed measure requiring a “vote of the people if the 
City Council approves development on land outside of city limits.” 
380 Designed by Michael Corbett, the designer of Village Homes. 
381 Judged from statements in several articles in Davis Enterprise spring 2005. 
382 “Principles of New Urbanism” adopted by the Congress for the New Urbanism, promotes neighborhoods that 
are walkable; interconnected; mixed use and diverse; a range of housing types, sizes and prices; quality 
architecture; increased densities; defined center ad edge to neigborhood; with centrally located public spaces; a 
smart transportation network, including bicycle and pe estrian friendly design elements, and sustainable features 
that reduce use of finite fuels and respect the natural environment.  
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June 14: Deliberation 
June 21: Deliberation/decision 
November 8th  2005: Ballot/Referendum according to “Measure J” 
 
7.3.8.1 Series of presentations in Davis Enterprise 
Covell Village plan takes shape383. 
The developer of the 388-acre site would have to build and equip a new fire station for the 
city, buy another police car and fund other public safety operations, maintain the 
subdivision’s park for several years, help pay for traffic calming measures on nearby streets 
and preserve agricultural land, according to a draft agreement between the developers and the 
city. Bill Roe, one of the developers: “the draft agreement is the result of an unprecedented 
partnership with Davis citizens and Davis city government. Crafted after decade of public 
input, design, planning, review and negotiation, the agreement guarantees that this innovative 
solar neighborhood will bring benefits to all Davis and reflect our community’s values.”  
 
Opponents, organized as a large residents’ group, Citizens for Responsible Planning, say that 
the project represents fast growth, would burden existing streets, facilities and residents, and 
violates the 2001 update to the City’s General Plan. The Davis Enterprise also answer the 
opponents: “If approved as written, the developers would have to preserve 776 acres of 
agricultural land, install rooftop photovoltaic systems on every single-family home in the 
project, and fund a community amphitheatre and public art.”  
 
Project’s fiscal analysis still neutral384. 
The proposed 422-acre Covell Village could cost the city $284 000 per year on average and 
bring in $344 000. Davis Finance Director Paul Navazio ran calculations on varying inflation, 
city personnel costs and home appreciation values. Ba e case scenario used a 3% inflation 
rate, 5% appreciation in homes resale value and 5.4 % annual increase in personnel costs (for 
providing city services to the new residents and housing area), which gives on average  
$66 000 net revenue per year, or $998 000 over the 15-year time frame. If better conditions: 
2% inflation rate, 7% appreciation in homes resale v ue and 4.4 % annual increase in 
personnel costs, it will generate on average $344 000 per year in net revenue for the city. 
 
The project:  
• 1864 homes and housing units,  
• parks and habitat areas, a school site,  
• facilities for several local organizations and the Davis Joint Unified School District, 
• a retail centre across from Oak Tree Plaza and  
• a city fire station  
 
The ballot theme: 
“The trick here is to find a way we can do all that that’s rational and uphold the purpose of 
Measure J, but also is realistic enough to accommodate some flexibility as conditions and 
needs change over time” said Bill Emlen, community development director for the city.  
                                                
383 Davis Enterprise, Sunday May 15, 2005.  
384 Davis Enterprise, Monday May 16, 2005.  
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The draft ballot list does the following: 
• Allocates a number of units to each type of housing proposed in the subdivision and a 
number of acres for each type of open space proposed. 
• Dictates the types of offices, retail and other non-residential operations allowed in the 
commercial “Village Centre” 
• Spells out some design characteristics for the neighborhood, such as energy-efficiency 
measures, some detail on how traffic would flow andsome specifics on how houses 
would be designed. 
• Lists the developers’ obligations and funding responsibilities.  
• Outlines the phases of development for subdivision, including specifying a timeline 
for the construction and sale of the designated affordable housing units for low-, 
moderate and middle-income residents. 
 
7.3.8.2 Developer Contributions, Dedications, and Obligations  
The Covell Village project has been planned over th last 10 years. During this time there 
have been extensive talks with the city. The result of these talks are shown in the following 
listing of what the developer will contribute to the city:  
 
As part of the development of the Project, the Develop r shall:  
Designate a 3-acre site for a fire station.  
Provide $4.202 million dollars in funding to construct and equip a 12 000 square foot Fire station  
Donate $470 000 for fire apparatus and a police vehicl .  
Donate $12.1 million over a 9 year period towards City public safety operating costs.  
 
Donate land and $2.75 million for a community center recreation building to be located in the Village 
Center.  
Acquire and donate to the City the existing Nugget fields located on the east side of Pole Line Road.  
Donate to the City for agricultural preservation, fee title or agricultural easements on 776 acres of 
land, 722 of which are contiguous acres and directly adjacent to the City boundary.  
 
Donate a 10-acre site within the project to the Davis Joint Unified School District (“DJUSD”).  
Donate $1 million to DJUSD for capital improvements.  
Establish a financing district to provide funding for DJUSD schools in the estimated amount of $60 
million dollars over 30 years.  
 
Maintain, and pay the cost of maintaining to city standards, parks, and greenbelts for a period of five
and one half years from the date the City approves th  final map encompassing the park and/or 
greenbelt.  
Fund a community amphitheater and public art improvements.  
 
Establish a transportation assessment or financing district on properties in the Project to fund 
unlimited bus use by its residents. Operational shortfalls in early years will be fully funded by Covell 
Village.  
 
Install 1KW solar photovoltaic systems on single-family residences.  
 
Construct 9 bicycle/pedestrian undercrossings, including Covell Boulevard and Pole Line Road, linking 
Covell Village to the City’s bicycle/pedestrian network  
 
Such substantial obligations the developer has agreed to must be passed on to the house 
buyers. The demand for houses in Davis must be very high to secure the developer a return on 
 
  298 
his investment. It is interesting to see the range of obligations agreed on. They include a new 
fire station, recreation center, a new school and $2 million per year in 30 years to the school 
district, free bus transport for the new residents a d 9 undercrossings for bikes and 
pedestrians. To keep in the eco-city tradition, all houses in Covell Village will have solar 
panels  
 
7.3.8.3 The “Measure J” ballot and vote. 
In March 2000, 54% of voters approved a Council-proposed measure requiring a “vote of the 
people if the City Council approves development on land outside of city limits.” Until 2005 
this Measure had not been used, but came up in the fall of 2005 regarding Covell Village.  
 
The Davis City Council adopted the Covell Village resolution with a four of the five council 
member for the motion, against one vote against, in June 2005. The resolution was however 
not effective until after a referendum had been held: “This Amendment shall not be effective 
unless and until the action is ratified by the voters in a “Measure J” election, as specified in 
City of Davis Ordinance 2008, the Citizen’s Right to Vote on Future Use of Open Space and 
Agricultural Lands Ordinance.” 
 
The referendum according to “Measure J” adopted by the City Council in 2000, became 
“Measure X” in the election of 8th November 2005.  
 
On November 8th 2005 19 015 out of 36 658 registered Voters (51.8%) took part in the 
referendum. 59.9% voted NO, while 40.0% voted YES to annexation of land for 
Covell Village.  
 
7.3.8.4 Conclusion on Covell Village 
The ballot result was an enormous surprise to the establishment in Davis, who had backed 
Covell Village strongly. It was also a big surprise to me, after following closely the 
preliminary presentation and promotion of Covell Village in spring 2005. The presentations in 
the press show that there is a considerable distance between the cost of each house and the 
price they expect to get. 10 years of planning, ample public facilities seem to be accepted 
without much concern for the total economy of the project. What was at stake was a NO in the 
ballot, which would mean postponement of the project for several years and risk that it would 
never be realized. This explains the unusually high “development gain” offered to the City. 
 
There is substantial value in the project. Say 2000 houses each selling for $500 000 which 
gives a total sales value of one billion dollars for the whole project. The pressure to realize the 
project will therefore probably resurface again after some time. From a land use and transport 
planning point of view, the Covell Village design supports the bike city. Within the area is 
good walk and bike net. This is connected to city network with nine undercrossings and offers 
therefore a high safety level. The estate is also within cycling distance to UCD and 
downtown. On a higher regional level, it might be that many of the possible house buyers in 
Covell Village would work outside Davis and then use the car.  
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7.3.9 Diet the 5th Street? 
 
Crossing the Fifth Street has for years been a dangerous for both bikers and walkers. It was 
therefore taken into the General Plan under Policy MOB 1.9: Implement the following 
specific projects to improve traffic flows and increase the use of non-vehicular transportation 
modes. This was followed up with: Action item 2.1.5:  
Pursue study to determine feasibility of removing two motor vehicle lanes on 
Fifth Street, between “A” and “L” Streets (currently a four lane facility). Add 
bike lanes with additional space that will be created.  
 
The City accordingly got a consultant to come up with a proposal. On 12 May 2005 Davis 
Safety Advisory Commission met to decide the issue. Th  meeting was open to the public and 
shown on local television385. The recommendation was: Maintain the current configuration of 
4 lanes on Fifth Street between B and L Streets. Approve safety improvements at junctions 
with C, D, and J Streets.  
 
This recommendation was against what the public had expected from the General Plan 
decision and led to a counter report from the North Davis Community. The area community 
group had before the meeting made an impressive report with high professional quality. Steve 
Tracy, was the professional planner that presented th  alternative plan “Diet the 5th Street”. It 
in essence wanted to put in cycle paths and shorter and safer pedestrian crossings by reducing 
the number of lanes from 4 to 2. The neigborhood also reported 60-80 accidents per year, 
against the officially recorded 4 pedestrian and 22 bicycle accidents over 5 years. After 20-30 
of the public had addressed the meeting, only one had spoken for the City’s proposal. It was 
fairly clear that the community proposal could handle the traffic, and it was highly probable 
that the Diet plan would improve the situation for vulnerable road user a lot.  
 
But only one of the four men on the Commission voted for “Diet the 5th Street” the local 
public alternative. Tim Bustos told me later that he was sole in Public Works who supported 
the Diet, and he was ordered not to speak at the meeting386. It shows that local politics are not 
always the same on the concrete level as it is on the General Plan level.  
 
How can this vote be explained? The city proposal was developed in cooperation with a 
consultant over a long time and represented conventional traffic engineering thinking about 
car traffic capacity. There are only a few consultants who have any experience with 
considering pedestrians and bikes in traffic planning. Traffic accident statistics under-report 
the number of pedestrian accidents, which can explain the difference in accident numbers 
between the city proposal and the alternative plan.387 It might be that this explains the 
traditional proposal the city put forward. A tradition that has for decades focused only on 
solutions for the car may also react with hostility when a community challenges their 
professional authority as happened in this case. Lastly, the case says something about the 
connection between the General Plan and implementing of tasks that challenge the free car 
                                                
385 On 12 May 2005 Davis Safety Advisory Commission met to decide: Fifth Street Traffic Operation Study. 
386 “I am the only one supporting the community proposal, none of the engineers at Public Works do. I wasnot 
allowed to speak at the meeting 12th of May.”  
387 In Norway less than 10% of the bike accidents are registered according to the National Cycle Plan, 2001.  
 
  300 
use. Public Works clearly thought that the alternative plan would lead to reduced capacity and 
rallied against it.  
 
7.3.10 California, Sacramento, Yolo and Davis growth 2005 
 
7.3.10.1 Strong population growth  
The population on the west coast is growing strongly388:  
• California grew from 2004 to 2005 with 539 000 resid nts or 1.5% to 36.8 million  
(36 271 000 – 36 810 000). This is mainly natural gowth and the Latinos and Asian 
birth rates make the ethnic composition of the state change.  
• Sacramento County increased with 1.8% from 1.346 to 1.369 million.  
• Yolo county grew 1.7% from 184 660 to 187 743.  
• Davis lost inhabitants for the first time ever and ended up with 64 401 – a reduction of 
132 compared to the previous year.  
 
In the Sacramento region several cities had growth rates well above 5% per year: Elk Grove 
10.6%, Lincoln 16.8%, Yuba City 13.5%. These are “nw” suburban cites in the Sacramento 
area were the developers are very active building new housing.  
 
The growth in the Sacramento region comes mainly from two sources:  
a) outlying areas in the region, and  
b) former residents of the Bay area who want cheaper housing.  
 
7.3.10.2 Growth and Development in Yolo County. 
Yolo County (183 042 inhabitants 2003) is updating its general plan based on the idea “the 
highest and best use of land within Yolo County is one that combines minimum urbanization 
with preservation of productive farm resources and open space amenities.” 
 
Joint local/county/state organizations drive much of the land use change. There are three 
major players and/or big employers: the state/local government, the university (UCD), the 
Cache Creek Casino (This is a major employer and income generating machine, and also a 
major actor on the property market). Preservation of atural resources and agricultural land, 
increasing the costs of housing, demands for better services and infrastructure, social inequity, 
and growing budget problems are just some of the difficult issues facing the county.  
 
7.3.11 The Blueprint for the Sacramento region 
 
Sacramento Area Council of Government (SACOG) produce  the Blueprint for the 
Sacramento region towards 2050. SACOG is a cooperation between the six counties El 
Dorado, Placer, Sacramento, Sutter, Yuba and Yolo (in which Davis lies). By 2050 there is in 
the region expected another 1.7 million people, one million new jobs and 840 000 new homes. 
With the present car ownership transferred this will also mean another 1.3 million cars one the 
roads the coming decades.  
                                                
388 Statistics from the major newspaper Sacramento Bee,  May 05 2005 
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SACOG initiated the Sacramento Region Blueprint Transportation/Land Use Study to 
examine future growth patterns and the potential effects on the regions transportation system, 
air quality, housing, open space and other resources. Significant future congestion would be 
the result if the present growth patterns and current transportation investment priorities 
continued. Extensive public participation was thought necessary and local officials, civic 
groups, environmental advocates, the development community, business leaders and the 
public were brought together in the attempt to guide how the region grows over the next 50 
years. From March 2003 and over the next year 37 worksh ps in neighborhoods, cities and 
counties were held together with two Regional Forums. More than 5000 people used the 
projects interactive modeling software to study how the region might develop. A Draft 
Blueprint Scenario was presented in the autumn 2004. This was followed up by a public 
opinion survey (interactive on www.sacreregionblueprint.org or questionnaire to be returned). 
In addition a scientific telephone poll was done.  
 
7.3.11.1 Blueprint: Awards and prizes   
The Sacramento Blueprint was well known and already before the project had been finalized, 
several awards were bestowed on it.  
• One of the “Top 50” programs Harvard University “Innovations in American 
Government” Competition, Kennedy School of Government, 2003. 
• The Governor’s Award for Environmental and Economic Leadership, 2003. 
• The Federal Highway Administration Transportation Planning Excellence Award, 
2004. 
• The American Institute of Architects California Chapter Presidential Citation, 2004. 
• The Environmental Council of Sacramento (ECOS) Enviro mental Leadership Award, 
2004. 
 
The awards were given because of the innovative way the Blueprint promoted environmental 
values, for leadership in public government, and the modeling of how land use and transport 
interact, which was used to explore the environmental effects of alternative locations in the 
region.  
 
7.3.11.2 The two Scenarios  
Two Scenarios were chosen by the SACOG Board of Directo s for presentation to the public:  
• Base Case Scenario 
• Draft Preferred Blueprint Scenario for 2050 
 
The situation in 2000 and the expected situation in 2050 were:  
   2000   2050 
People   1.949 million  3.653 million 
Jobs    0.921 million  1.885 million 
Households  0.713 million  1.540 million 
 
Amount of growth:  
People   1.7 million 
Jobs    1 million 
Dwellings  840 000 
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Many more cars  
At present 785 cars per 1000 persons, which keeping the cars per head constant, the number 
of cars will increase from 1.53 million cars in 2000 to 2.87 million cars in 2050.  
Provide housing choice 
Under the Base Case in 2050 over two thirds of the region’s housing would be single-family 
homes on large lots. Under the Blueprint Scenario, m st housing would still be detached 
single-family, but 18 percent would be single-family homes on small lots.  
Use of Existing Assets 
Under the Base Case all new development would be on vacant land. The Blueprint Scenario 
suggests 13 percent of all new housing, and 10 percent of all new jobs, would occur through 
reinvestment.  
Use land efficiently 
Under the Base Case, new development would need an a ditional 660 square miles (1700 sq 
km) of land. In the Blueprint Scenario, 13 percent of all new housing, 300 square miles (780 
sq km) of new land would be needed for urban areas.  
Conserve Natural Resources 
The Base Case would convert 166 square miles (430 sq km) of agricultural land into urban 
uses. With the Blueprint Scenario, 100 square miles (260 sq km) would be converted from 
agricultural to urban uses. 
Mix Land Uses 
Under the Base Case scenario, 26 percent of people would live in communities with good or 
balanced, mix land uses by 2050. In the Blueprint Scenario, 53 percent would live in balanced 
communities. 
Design for Quality 
In the Base Case scenario, 34 percent of people would live in pedestrian friendly 
neighborhoods. In the Blueprint Scenario, in 2050 that number would rise to 70 percent.  
Provide Transportation Choices 
By using the Blueprint growth concepts for land useand right-of-way design, use of soft 
modes will be encouraged, and the remaining auto trips will be shorter it is claimed.  
 
Type of trips (in percent) Auto Transit WalkBike 
Existing 92% 1.1% 6.9% 
Base Case Scenario 93.7% 0.8% 5.5% 
Draft Preferred Blueprint Scenario 84% 3.0% 13.0% 
 
Daily vehicle minutes of travel (per household per day) 
Existing 64 minutes 
Base Case Scenario 81 minutes 
Draft Preferred Blueprint Scenario 62 minutes 
Vehicle miles traveled (per household per day) 
Existing 41.9 miles 
Base Case Scenario 47.2 miles 
Draft Preferred Blueprint Scenario 35.3 miles 
 
 
Growth to be located near transit 
In the Base Case, 2 percent of new housing and 5 percent of new jobs are located within 
walking distance of a bus or train service with 15-minute frequency. In the Blueprint 
Scenario, those figures rise to 36 percent of new houses and 38 percent of new jobs.  
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Per capita emissions 
With the Blueprint Scenario, per capita, there willbe 14 percent less carbon dioxide 
(greenhouse gas) and particulates (related to asthm) compared to the Base Case.  
 
7.3.11.3 Comments on Blueprint Scenario 
Professor emeritus Al Sokolow389: “The Blueprint is unrealistic unless something is done to 
the land use planning policy. Yolo county loses 600 acres per year. Blueprint says it will lose 
20 sq miles the next 50 years, 300 acres per year.” As presented there seem to be little doubt 
as to what alternative developments, which is most su ainable. The Base case projection 
continuing shows a sprawling car dependent development in the region like in the Bay area. 
However, even the Blueprint Scenario show a daily vehicle travel per household of 56 km, 
which with about 700 000 new households by 2050 gives an additional daily VKT of 39.2 
million kilometers. On a yearly basis this amounts to (an addition to the present population 
travel) about 14 billion vehicle kilometers traveled. The immense challenge of how to cope 
with the negative consequences like greenhouse gas missions from this transport work is not 
discussed in the Blueprint.  
 
The Blueprint Scenario clearly illustrates that it is possible to change the development trends 
in the region even under very high future growth. To a European it seems the obvious way to 
go, both in terms of life quality and building a more resilient society. Through the legislation 
and land use planning system in California the means to govern the future land use 
development is there. It requires that the SACOG cooperation continues, and that the costs 
and benefits from future developments are distributed “fairly” between cities and counties. 
This represents a formidable task, and past history d es not support the idea of managing 
growth, far less steering the growth towards “smart growth” and “TOD – transit orientated 
development”. 
 
Investment in transport infrastructure has facilitated longer work journeys and a wider choice 
of places to live. In the Davis Bike plan from 2001, this trend is commented: “There is, 
however a dramatic shift in demographics now occurring within the city. As the I-80 corridor 
continues to grow between San Francisco and Sacramento, Davis is becoming the new 
“suburb” or “bedroom community” to larger cities in orthern California, such as 
Sacramento. There also appears to be a growing number of residents that commute to the Bay 
Area.” (Davis Comprehensive Bike Plan, May 2001, page 1) Another aspect of this trend is 
that firms are more and more “foot-loose” and localize more unpredictable than before. How 
the investment in the highway system will influence where people live and where jobs will be 
located, will transform the spatial activity pattern and thus the demand for transport capacity 
(i.e. road-capacity). This applies for the SACOG region, but also the interconnection with the 
Bay Area.  
 
The challenges in the region calls for an integrated land use and transport strategy and an 
effective Land Use and Transport policy. There is not any indication that the present system, 
which is heavily relying on the market demand and developers proposals, will be able to 
break the present trends as shown in The Base Case Scenario. The Blueprint Scenario is a 
vision of an alternative future, which requires substantial changes in the present strategies and 
policies.  
                                                
389 At the UCD Yolo seminar May 2005 
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7.4 Analysis and Discussion  
 
7.4.1 Davis, a sustainable island in a sea of sprawl. 
 
The achievements of Davis are great. The city stand out compared to other cities in 
California. Davis has:  
• A comprehensive and safe bike network 
• Many cyclists (31% of all work trips on bike) 
• Cheap and good public transport running on alternative fuels 
• Established mobility management (bike promotion, car sharing, parking policy) 
• Avoided edge developments by land use control  
• Set a new standard for community development (Village Homes) 
• Developed subsidiarity within a Californian framework 
 
In sum Davis is unique in the way the city has managed to develop a multifaceted governance 
system where the ultimate power rests with the citizens. Davis is unique in the way the city 
has managed to retain a very high number of cyclists against the powerful US “car society”. 
Davis is also unique in the way an integrated land use and transport policy has been 
incrementally developed resulting in high awareness of the need for environmentally 
sustainable transport and concrete actions resulting in a good public transport system using 
alternative fuels. Davis is also unique as being a “one company town” coexisting with UCD in 
a symbiotic relationship, without UCD the bicycle city would probably not exist and neither 
the city? The lesson is that UCD has followed up the city strategy, and developed and 
implemented a “business travel plan for the university” according to the city’s strategy. (UCD 
has implemented the host city’s strategy far more effective than the universities in 
Kristiansand, Aalborg and Norwich, even if these strategies were different) 
 
7.4.2 Future: Davis is part of a huge and expanding region 
 
Challenges to Davis Bike City  
The challenges to Davis Bike City are the present growth pressures due to changes in jobs and 
housing, and the slightly longer term threats from income growth, car ownership and 
lifestyles. The major global challenges seem not yet o influence people in general. The 
demography of Davis is changing also because the post-war “baby-boomers” are retiring. 
With increasing numbers of retired more houses come up for sale and the new house buyers 
may be turning Davis into a dorm-city for Sacramento and Bay Area. There is already a trend 
for some students, staff and faculty to live outside Davis. The Davis City no growth policy 
has contributed to increasing house prices. UCD claims that the house prices increase far 
more than faculty salaries do. “Faculty can’t afford to by a house in Davis”. With increasing 
income, car ownership also increases, and some studnts buy flats instead of renting. 
Combined with modern lifestyles, these factors pullsome of the students and faculty to settle 
closer to Sacramento. At the same time the high prices and few new small flats for rent or 
sale, push these groups out of Davis.  
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What’s taken “for granted”? 
The climate challenge seems to have little impact on the American car society. There seem to 
be a basic belief in new, cleaner fuel technology and perpetual high mobility. One might say 
that the car discourse has reached hegemonic position. There is hardly a voice to be heard in 
the public discourse that oil resources are scarce and the use of petrol should be economized. 
Rather the gas price is far too high and must come down again: “If I could I would lower the 
price of gas for you immediately” president George W Bush390. 
 
Market instruments like congestion tolls, parking charges, impact fees on development are 
kept outside the common debate and will be difficult implement. The most popular vehicles 
(the US has about 800 vehicles per 1000 persons) are the Pick Up Truck (the larger, the better, 
with engines often 5-6 liters) and SUV (special utility vehicles.) The image of these vehicles, 
and indeed their need for space, is very much supporting housing development with minimum 
two garages, plus parking space for guests and teenag  children cars. “Smart growth” 
development or the Davis renowned development “Village Homes” seem close to absurd 
against the need for supplying adequate space for the families cars391.  
 
Speaking in Davis, Jared Dimond392 explained what he called the phenomenon of the gatd 
community, where members have their own security force, their children attend private 
schools, and they receive pensions and health care. There is no motivation for them to care 
about the state of the police force outside their gates, public education, health care or Social 
Security. The US with its ideals of isolation and consumerism, has become the gated 
community of the world. With globalization, media and mass communications, one country 
falling, no longer falls unnoticed, he said393. Is there a chance that Davis will be moving 
towards “a gated city”? At present Davis is a very open and including city, but the no-growth 
strategy and land use planning policy will push house prices further up and at some stage 
small gated neighborhoods may be created. This may be supported or hindered by the 
municipality land use planning and planning ordinances. In the long run Davis need to be 
supported by a regional framework that allows Davis to continue along an environmentally 
sustainable path created by an alternative land use and transport policy to most other cities. 
Two challenges a) car use and b) segregated and locked in neighborhoods.  
 
7.4.3 Which factors were influential in LU&T change in Davis?  
 
In Davis there has been a continuing contest between growth and slow change since the early 
days. This still continues and therefore Lofland named the period from 1990 onwards as 
Contested place. Within this framework ideas and ideology from theoutside has descended 
on Davis and turned into policy and projects. The first of these ideas was Dutch cycling 
practice which was adopted in Davis after broad public pressure. The council election in 1966 
became a Bike election, against the Establishment fronted by the Chief of Police and City 
officials. The second wave of ideology was the ecology and environment wave around 1970. 
This lead to a “revolution” at the council elections 1972, longhaired and even bearded 
councilors replaced the suit and tie image that thus far had prevailed. The ecology and 
                                                
390 National Public Radio, news 17 May 2005.  
391 See also the article by Knaap “A requiem for smart growth.” 
392 Author of Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. 
393 The California Aggie 180505 
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environment wave also gave birth to Village Homes, a renowned housing estate in Davis built 
on the sustainable principles energy conservation, husbandry of land and resources plus 
reduced pollution.  
 
Village Homes built on collective ideas: cooperation, sharing and local self-sufficiency 
instead of car based activities like shopping in malls, etc. Cycling was of course the mode of 
travel in the high quality neighborhood with lots of open spaces and commons, instead of 
neighborhoods designed for the car with individual “show houses”. The birth was not easy, 
however, and again the Establishment was strongly against new ideas. In the short term 
Village Homes represent a high quality trend break as against the traditional sprawling 
housing development in the US. In the long term Village Homes represent the future ideas of 
more self-contained neighborhoods as later promoted as Smart Growth and New Urbanism.  
 
The Davis officials fought the Village Homes proposal for years, using the adopted technical 
standards and regulations as weapon. The roads were too narrow for the fire engine to get 
through and it couldn’t get out again from the cul-de-sacs, and so on. Today Village Homes is 
a thriving place. Many books have been written many bout it, the wife of president Carter 
visited the place, and Judy Corbett, one of the developers, became “Time woman of the year”. 
The car accessibility is good by European standards, but slightly constrained compared to 
other neighborhoods. This may be one reason why Village Homes never caught on, never was 
replicated. The sustainable, ecological image is contrary to the houses representing the 
American Dream, which have a highly individualistic image, three garages and plenty of 
space around. Evidently this is where the developers find their profits! The Reagan era pushed 
all collective ideas aside, individualism and market forces ruled. After the Brundtland report 
some of the environment ideas from the seventies resurfaced. In Davis the City and UCD 
went into The Joint Transportation Management Agreement. This is very much based on 
sustainability ideas: promoting cycling, develop public transport and use parking policy as a 
restraint on the car. Both partners employed their own Bicycle Coordinator to follow up the 
agreement. Some years later the Alternative Transportation Task Force (ATTF) proposed that 
the City Council should adopt strong “sustainable transport” aims. The university has been far 
better than the elected Davis City Council to follow up these aims and implement change. 
UCD still continue the agreed policy with parking pricing, preferences for car-sharing, 
support for car-sharing and economic support of public transport.  
 
The City’s Bike policy has over the years turned into symbolic policy with most emphasis on 
information and campaigns to change people’s attitudes, more than a policy for improving the 
bike infrastructure and increasing bike use. The General Plan and Bike Plan from 2001, both 
keep the cycling and walking aims high. Both want to protect the environment and have a 
steady and slow growth. Extensive consultations over several years with the public in Davis 
in preparing the General Plan should have made it representative for the majority of citizens. 
But “Diet Fifth Street” which was the North Davis Community alternative to the Fifth Street 
plan “the solution for the car” that the City promoted, had no chance to be adopted. Even if 
the “Diet Fifth Street” plan was inline with the General Plan and the Bike Plan, and also 
widely supported both professionally and by the loca  area, it lost. It may be that the plan lost 
because it threatened the free car use and reduced car capacity slightly to improve conditions 
for cycling and pedestrians? This may lead to the question if bike projects only are possible if 
“cars” are not threatened? The adopted plan for Fifth Street is conceptually based on traffic 
management ideas from the sixties, while the “Diet F fth Street” was in line the present 
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thinking in traffic safety and the “New Urbanism” ideas. Ironically the traditional male pro 
car planning ideas were fronted by female engineers both as official and consultant at the 
Davis Safety Advisory Commission meeting May 2005. In the Fifth Street case the 
Establishment and the free car ideology won against both the City ouncil’s adopted aims and 
objectives, and against a vast number of very engaged citizens.  
 
The Fifth Street case was decided finally by the City ouncil. It was not possible to test the 
decision in a ballot. That was not the case with the proposed city extension, the Covell Village 
plan, which surprisingly lost the ballot 8th November 2005. 60% of the voters said no to the 
new housing subdivision, contrary to the advice of the Establishment, the City Council and a 
host of well-known citizens.  
 
7.4.4 Facilitators and barriers to change towards the environmental 
agenda?  
 
The 1966 “Bike election” forced change against resistance from the Establishment, fronted by 
the Chief of Police. The mood of the times in the years with Vietnam opposition, the election 
1972 and several years of fighting with City officials (Standards and regulations were used to 
fight the proposed design) opened up for the Village Homes development.  
 
After the Reagan years, the Brundtland Commission report 1987 brought the Joint UCD and 
City of Davis agreement. It also led to the Alternative Transportation Task Force (ATTF), 
which the City Council set up. But still and continui g, “planning” was out, the market forces 
ruled and the aims and recommendations led to few practical consequences.  
 
The transport geography in California has over the years changed bringing increasing sprawl 
and long distance commuting, which made cycling and walking modes only to be used in the 
neighborhoods. The car society, with more than 800 cars per 1000 persons, has become so 
embedded in California that the car is close to being the only mode. In Davis, from the outset 
such a “natural” cycling city, one should think that the use of the bike would have been kept 
at the high level from the seventies, but the no growth policy and the general change (income, 
population structure, lifestyles) have supported increasing car use. However, a more proactive 
policy by the City Council (like the UCD policy) could have maintained more bike and walk 
use. How Davis voters would have reacted to a more proactive policy, we will never know. 
 
The adopted “Measure J” in 2000, became the end for Covell Village, who lost in the 2005 
ballot. The Davis citizens have literally said “Stop the world, I want to get off!” The long 
history of conflict between population and economic “growth” in short modernization on the 
one side, and “to keep Davis as it is” on the other side decided the ballot. One may say that 
people turned against growth at the referendum this time around. The Covell Village offered 
Davis a host of benefits, among them extensive bike and walk network, plenty open spaces 
and solar panels on all new houses. All of these are ve y positive in a sustainability 
perspective, but not enough to convince the citizens of Davis. Maybe it was also a vote 
against further growth in car transportation, furthe  climate change, further depletion of fossil 
resources and so on?  
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7.4.5 Which role did institutions – “the rules of the game” play in Davis?  
 
One difference between Davis and the European case study cities, is that the citizens of Davis, 
the City and the City Council have far more power over Land Use and Transport than in 
European cities. Firstly, a majority in the City Council rules with a final say, which is not 
hampered by other, higher levels of government. Second, the Council can bind the later 
Councils decisions by adopting measures like “Measure J”. With a non-partisan vote, this is a 
far more direct democracy than we have in Europe, possibly with the exception of 
Switzerland. Thirdly, Davis is not dependent on higher levels of Government to finance the 
budget, public transport or transport infrastructure. The lobbying for funds from higher levels, 
which is a prime task for European local politicians, is not necessary for the Davis politicians. 
Hence the opportunity to run an integrated Land Use and Transport policy is far greater in 
Davis, than in Europe as was shown above. Still the Davis politicians has to adhere to public 
opinion and is less free to maneuver than the university administrators, which to some extent 
explain the difference between the city and the university.  
 
The institutional framework and how power is distributed across government levels make it 
possible for the Davis City Council to decide land use and transport policy without inference 
of the county or state. However, without the UCD’s own active policy and support of the city’ 
policy it would probably not have been implemented. This is a major difference to Europe 
where the national governments directly and indirectly have a great influence on local 
authorities. Within this framework there are still vested interests that resist changes and the 
hegemony of the car culture is making policy shifts towards environmentally sustainable 
transportation very difficult. It is necessary to develop a framework from the federal level 
through the state and down to the local level for environmentally sustainable transport to 
become effective. Without such a framework it will become very difficult for a city to 
promote sustainable transport on its own. 
 
The sustainability agenda in the University City of Davis has far better terms than in most 
places, because of the well-educated and environmentally concerned inhabitants. In the sixties 
and seventies this came through both in voting and in policies, but in the eighties with 
“market rule” were words like nvironment and planning and sustainable hardly used. 
However, in the new millennium it seems that the globa  environment discourse has regained 
some influence on local policy in Davis.  
 
Possibly will the increase in fuel prices swing thependulum back towards more 
environmental concern and action? The dramatic fall in the sales of SUVs and big Trucks in 
the autumn of 2005 may be a sign of changing attitudes to the car. If this is followed up by an 
upsurge in the demand for smaller more environmental friendly cars, it may also lead to 
demand for a more sustainable Land Use and Transport policy at the local level? At UCD, the 
Institute of Transportation Studies (ITS) has become a leading research institute on alternative 
fuels. The increasing oil prices further boost ITS research funding and Davis will probably 
continue to be the real life laboratory for this reearch.  
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7.5 Conclusions and Lessons 
 
7.5.1 Counterfactual discussion 
 
What would have happened if Village Homes were never built, or if the Bike petition lost at 
the election in 1966? It is of course impossible to give more than a speculative answer to such 
counterfactual questions, but they may shed light on the development that occurred. In the 
following table some of the important events in Davis are looked at under such counterfactual 
thinking:  
 
Event If the event had not happened? 
The Bike City 1966 Davis would have been far more car dependent today  
Village Homes 1975-82 Housing in Davis would be far more sprawling, with less green open space 
and certainly less cycling. An interesting question is if Peter Katz would 
have written the book “New Urbanism” without Village Homes?394 
The General Plan and the 
Bike Plan 1987 
These plans embedded the Bike city and the Eco city further in the minds 
of Davis citizens and strengthened the identity of Davis as place. Such 
perceptions were later decisive in the Covell Village referendum. Without 
these plans the two positions as Bike coordinators w uld not exist, and the 
bike strategy non-existing. Possibly influenced the vote on Covell Village?  
Pass Through Agreement 
1987 
Instrumental in preventing edge developments, without it Davis would 
have got shopping malls at highway junctions. 
Alternative Transportation 
Task Force – ATTF 1994-96 
 
 
 
 
ATTF did strengthen the perception of Davis as future orientated 
sustainable city with concern for the environment, ac ive in preserving 
resources through cycling and solar heating. The syn rgy between the city 
and UCD was further strengthened by ATTF. Without adoption of the task 
force’s ideas, the buses would probably still run on ordinary fuels, and 
UCD would probably be a little less successful on hydrogen research?  
“Measure J” 2000. The measure strengthened democracy (subsidiarity) by transferring power 
from politicians to the citizens. Without this measure Covell Village would 
have been developed. It has also consequences in the future for all new 
developments. 
The General Plan and the 
Bike Plan 2001 
These plans outline the vision and aims for land use and transportation in 
Davis as small-scale bike friendly city, not wanting to grow fast or sprawl. 
Without these plans the future course would be less distinct. 
Covell Village 2005 It is a paradox that Covell Village project fits with the vision outlined in 
the two plans above, if the “residents” would work in Davis. If they all 
would be commuting, then Covell Village would contribute to the 
increasing car dependence in the region. 
Table  7-7 Counterfactual discussion: If the events had not happened? 
 
This counterfactual discussion shows how dependent events are of earlier events, and how 
gradually the path towards the bike friendly Davis of today has been developed. The land use 
and transportation system has increasingly been improved. The bike network with over- and 
undercrossings is extensive, and the modal split in Davis has a unique cycling share. The path 
drawn has been vulnerable many times. If one or more of the events had not happened, Davis 
would probably have developed quite differently. Most certainly this different path would 
                                                
394  Peter Katz, Peter Calthorpe, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Andreas Duany, Elizabeth Moule, and Stefanos 
Polyzoides were invited to dinner at the home of Judy and Michael Corbett in 1990, which led to The Ahwa nee 
Principles (Corbett 2000:11). It very likely also led to the first congress of “New Urbanism”? 
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have been the “car-led” path, resulting in less walking and cycling. It is also probable that the 
“car-led” path would have led to a more sprawling development, like in nearby Woodland.  
 
The question of additionality or ‘deadweight’ is a key problem in counterfactual thinking. It 
revolves around the counterfactual question of what would have happened had a particular 
public policy, grant, plan, etc. not been implemented. To what extent has the policy 
contributed to particular outcomes, i.e. had an additional effect, and to what extent has it 
simply reinforced what would have happened anyway, i.e. been ‘deadweight’? (Hambleton 
and Thomas, 1995:13) The methodological problems in an attempt to isolate the effects of a 
single factor in multi-causal social relationships are grave (Sayer, 1992)  
 
If we apply that thinking to the Davis events listed, the ATTF and the GP 2001, both may be 
said to contribute little, the course of events would be the same. I will doubt that. The ATTF 
clearly has influenced the choice of fuel on the buses and also supported research at UCD 
who got a laboratory outside the door. The same can be said about the General Plan. Without 
it Davis would have had less force to meet the pressure from the regional population growth 
and car dependence. The Covell Village (if built) would not be suitable as a “bedroom 
community” under the GP thinking, but should facilitate housing for local people and 
therefore sustainable transport within Davis (whether at would have been the result, we will 
never know. The voters clearly didn’t take the risk.). 
 
The events listed form the trajectory of the Davis development, each event seem to reinforce 
the path and thus give additional weight to that par icular path, which has been a path of 
growth control and environmentally friendly bike transport.  
 
7.5.2 Davis is different  
 
The framework and structure for Land Use and Transport planning in Davis is different from 
Europe in several respects. 
 
Funding 
First, local taxes pay for public transport services, investment and maintenance of roads 
(Federal grants are available for public transport in the metropolitan areas). The costs and 
benefits of new development are also born at the local authority level. This may introduce 
NIMBY effects, but on the other hand who are better than the local authority or as in Davis, 
the population in a referendum, to decide such issue ? The legitimacy of decisions taken in a 
referendum is very high, which is important when market forces drive most other decisions. 
 
Growth pressure 
Second, Davis has a strong and continual growth pressu  on it. UCD grows rapidly and 
faculty and students need housing and services. The city fights not to be run over by this 
growth. Also, the surrounding Sacramento region is growing fast and puts even more pressure 
on Davis, which can be read in the high house prices. The Davis City decisions must be read 
in the light of this growth pressure.  
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Self-rule  
Third, Davis has far more independence and power to rule Land Use and Transport on its own 
territory. The EU policy of “subsidiarity” can be sen in practice in Davis. The Davis local 
authority has power over the land use and transport network in the jurisdiction, but not the 
highways or rail lines. The State deals with the highway and the city its own network, as long 
the highway is not functioning as a local distributor within the city. This is contrary to the 
three European case cities where the highway also is the major local road in lack of a bypass. 
Then questions arise on the use (access and intersections for the city) and indeed on financing 
the part of the road with many uses. This mixed use and mixed funding of urban roads, is 
therefore a major issue in the three European cities.  
 
Public participation – ownership to development  
Fourth, and linked with subsidiarity thinking mentioned above “the wearer knows where the 
shoe gnaws”. Many like Vigar claim that “to achieve a more sustainable transport policy in 
the future, commitment from citizens is vital for successful implementation” (Vigar 
2002:200). The story of Davis shows a long time commit ent for cycling, for 
environmentally friendly housing, for alternative and low energy transportation, and growth 
control. These issues have been fought, some lost and some won. In some of the cases, the 
people in power use the structure and institutions t  win. An example is that the Davis 
Bicycle Coordinator was not allowed to speak in the Fifth Street case. He opposed the strong 
car oriented traffic engineering ideology in the administration, and stood on the side of the 
adopted City Council aims and the North Davis community. He represented a threat to the 
Public Works engineers’ paradigm and was silenced, which is one of many examples of 
biased information and the power play in organizations. Davis has a safety valve in that the 
City Council may decide that certain issues must be decided by a referendum, a mechanism in 
which Covell Village lost. “Diet Fifth Street” never got the chance to be tested by the public.  
 
7.5.3 Questions asked and lessons learnt 
 
Question one: How was the land use and transport connection in Davis? Which were the 
effects of planning and policy on the choice of transport mode? Was the development 
caused by a deliberate policy and was it sustainable? 
 
The development of the land use and the transport system is well connected in Davis. The 
City Council made a decision in principle in the 1960s to develop a bike network. This has 
been gradually expanded and cycling and walking is now embedded in the planning and 
policy structure. UCD has developed an integrated transport policy for the car-free campus in 
cooperation with the city. It was based on the principle of the bike network mentioned above, 
and further developed to cover all modes (public transport, walking, mobility management 
including parking policy) plus testing and using alternative fuels on buses. The Davis policy 
has been put to the people in elections and referendums; it has been deliberated, tested and 
contested over years. Davis has a far more environmentally sustainable transport system than 
most US cities and can be compared with some of the best practice European cities. However, 
looking towards the future for Davis the threats are there.  
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Question two: How could the observed land use and transport development be explained? 
Which were the factors facilitating cycling and which were the factors inhibiting more 
sustainable transport development? 
 
Cycling infrastructure combined with bike promotion, traffic management schemes and 
parking policy are factors that promote cycling. Both Davis City and UCD have for many 
years successfully done this, and the number of daily cyclists is far higher than most places in 
the USA. Hindrances for cycling and walking in Davis where the basic infrastructure is in 
place, is lack of safe infrastructure, particularly safe crossings Downtown. It is the perceived 
safety, which is important for people’s choices. The Davis City Council has not been able 
(wanted?) to implement pedestrian streets, parking restrictions or other measures, which are 
regarded as negative towards the car. Secondly, the alternative modes available and the time, 
cost and ease of using these, govern mode choice. The car is a superior mode for most people 
for most journeys, even in Davis. To break the embeddedness of the car culture at the city 
level seems very difficult without a strong framework. 
 
Question three: What if any, are the lessons from Davis for medium sized cities in Europe? 
 
Subsidiarity in practice 395.  
 
The first lesson from Davis is how local democracy has been developed based on the principle 
of subsidiarity. The decisions both for land use and local transport are taken at the city level 
without interference from higher levels. The American and European traditions have evolved 
substantially different. Subsidiarity is, ideally or in principle, one of the features of 
federalism. In a European context subsidiarity is the idea that a central authority should have a 
subsidiary function, performing only those tasks, which cannot be performed effectively at a 
more immediate or local level396. For land use and transport planning in Europe the 
competence for planning and decisions should accordingly be decentralized or delegated from 
central government to regional or local authorities. In California and Davis one may say that 
the subsidiarity principle is established since the city decides both land use and transport 
policy, and is sole responsible to finance and imple ent the policy. The City of Davis has 
gone even further and introduced a referendum in particular cases as the final decision maker. 
Thus the decisions of the elected representatives in the council may be checked/controlled by 
the voters. This makes the council decision-making more transparent and enhances 
democracy. The transparency the referendum demands gave Davis a sizeable development 
gain through the Covell Village negotiation, which would have been released if it had been 
adopted.  
 
Integrated land use and transport planning – a necessity  
 
The success of Davis in creating a relatively environmentally sustainable city has two main 
causes: firstly the self-government of Davis and secondly cooperation with the physically 
close but separate jurisdiction UCD. Both of these have the final say in land use and local 
transportation issues and may implement their own strategies. Both of these jurisdictions have 
had the power to implement their own separate program and policies. In Davis they have 
                                                
395 Subsidiarity is the principle which states that matters ought to be handled by the smallest or the low st 
competent authority. Also see chapter 2.1.7  
396 The Oxford English Dictionary 
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cooperated and implemented an integrated land use and tr nsport strategy. This is unlike cites 
in Europe. The problem of implementation in Governme t hierarchies is well known. Plans 
and decisions may be developed and decided by one state organization and financed by 
another, while implementation often demands active players locally (Friedman 1987). The 
second lesson from Davis is that integrated land use and transport planning is necessary, and 
further that the organization responsible for planning and policy should also be responsible 
for funding and implementation. Attached to this is that the major employers and institutions 
like universities, must adhere to and support the city land use and transport strategy.  
 
An Environmentally Sustainable Transportation Framework 
 
The third lesson from Davis is that a city cannot i the long run develop a sustainable 
transport policy without adapting the policy of the larger region it is part of. If the state of 
California and the Sacramento region had an active sustainable transport policy, Davis would 
have had more understanding and leeway to develop rstrictions on car use. Without such a 
framework, the city policies will be limited to “promotion and marketing” of sustainable 
transport policies. A hierarchical framework across levels is necessary for a city to develop in 
a sustainable way and to avoid what Hull cited above called “ the regulatory abyss and the 
institutional fragmentation of policy makers and public transport providers”. There is also a 
necessary condition that the instruments and tools available at the local level must not be 
contradicted or opposed by more general instruments decided by the state or at federal level.  
 
Davis has developed measures that work with the market e.g. Pass through agreement, Urban 
extension ballot. The Pass through agreement is an ex mple of Davis paying the County 
compensation for not developing the land at the city border. The Urban extension ballot 
would, if the City Council proposal had gained a majority of votes, have given the city a 
substantial development gain, which is close to finding the market value of thedevelopment. 
In the three European cities such development gain usually remain with the developer. Such 
measures are less common in Europe that mainly relies on zoning regulations. There is also an 
important side effect of these measures, that they ar  openly discussed and transparent. This 
limits “confidential negotiations” and “closed politics” to a minimum and gives fewer 
opportunities for corruption or handing out favors. 
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Annex I – Davis Case  
Short list for standard comparison of the case cities – Davis 
 
 
 Davis 
Background The US Bike City from the mid sixties and still. University city with no jurisdiction over 
UC Davis, which grows strongly. Davis General Plan aims at slow growth, city expansion 
to be decided in referendum (Measure “J”) NIMBY, highly educated university employed 
citizens, commuting increasing, house prices soar.  
Undergraduates are not allowed to bring cars, and are extensive bike users. 
Special 
LU&T  
 
 
No-growth island in a sea of sprawling growth. 
Measure “J”. 
Democracy. 
Bike City, but the car culture wins. 
University of California, Davis, UCD, an own jurisdction.  
Land Use 
 
No reserve land for building, except densification.  
Annexation of agricultural land outside city borders necessary to grow.  
City Council decision to annex land for urban development must be put to the people in a 
referendum, Measure “J”, e.g. Covell Village 2005.  
Strong steering possible, but “No Growth” Davis is limited of being an “Island Paradise” in 
a sea of sprawling metropolis. 
The close neighbor jurisdiction UCD secure strong growth in jobs, hence future 
employment of no concern of City of Davis.  
LU&T 
Policy 
 
The Bike City and later the Eco City (Village Homes) has strongly influenced the design of 
new housing estates (e.g. Covell Village) green, parks, water, paths, etc.  
Downtown however very car dominated with parking everywhere along streets and off 
street, instead of bike lanes/paths.  
LU for shopping in the city strongly managed. No major Shopping Mall in city! 
Ample, wide corridors for road infrastructure secured, even in new housing estates (one 
example of New Urbanism: Aggie Village/MF) 
Well connected to Interstate highway and rail system. 
Two bikeway projects built: house demolished and Putah Creek underpass to 5 mill $.  
Transport 
Financing. 
 
 
Highways are not a responsibility of the city council. 
The F-Street case and controversy shows how city administration/public works/consultants 
overrule massive citizen involvement for less car capacity and more secure BW facilities. 
City Council responsible for both solution a d financing of local road and BW safety 
schemes. This is the same as in most countries, not Norway.  
Old Davis has a poor BW net, which must be enhanced and enlarged over the ordinary city 
budget.  
Development of new housing estates pay for connection to existing network for all modes. 
Hence, solution up to the developer, except when annexation must be done. Then the 
developer must put forward a proposal which is so go d that the voters by it. This gives the 
city administration ample bargaining power against the developer, limited by the 
development giving adequate returns, i.e. a market functioning.  
 
PT in Davis is remarkably good because it is financed and run by the UCD students. The 
net cover Davis fairly well and the services cost 1$ per ride, but undergraduates for free 
(TAP). During vacations the services are very limited.  
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8 From the past to the future? 
 
 
The climate threat, the urban transport chaos, the population explosion, the north – south 
divide, and the questions of sustainability fill the media. What relevance has land use and 
transport planning in medium sized cities to these qu stions? In the earlier chapters I have 
looked on the role land use and transport planning has had in four cities’ development. In this 
chapter we try to assess the usefulness of land use and transport planning as an instrument to 
govern future development. I therefore explore three different hypothetical situations.  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The study of the four cities has been an effort to create knowledge about land use and 
transport planning broadly defined, and its effects on development and change. The 
knowledge produced has been used to reconstruct and describe the path of development to 
understand the forces and mechanisms creating events on that path. Can this knowledge 
produced as part of a backward looking perspective, be used to understand the future, and in 
case how? 
 
Kierkegaard’s aphorism “we live forwards and understand backwards” can be said to 
resemble what I have been trying to do. I have tried to understand the past development in the 
cities with the purpose of using this understanding as an aid or tool for the future. Gunnar 
Olson takes this statement a bit further and asks: “What does it mean to understand?” in his 
book Abysmal397 where he in depth studies the philosophical basis for crossing the abyss 
between our past and our future. He uses the god Janus, the doorkeeper, who can see both 
ways as his medium to answer the question. My position on taking some knowledge and 
understanding from the past and apply it on the future is that philosophically the answer is no, 
we can have no knowledge about the unknown future, only beliefs, although the beliefs can be 
more or less well founded. However, as we have seenin the four cities, there are structures 
and institutions strongly embedded in our world andmaking us take some things for granted, 
without questioning. So what I try is to question “that for given taken” by exploring the 
effects of three different “future” situations on our type of cities. If most things continue, what 
will be the effects of interfering say with land use and transport policy? To explore this 
thought I have done three tests or simulations into the future of the four cities or similar 
cities.398 The three tests are:  
1. Two alternative policies BAU (business as usual) and EST (environmentally 
sustainable transport development) are tested on an im ginary model, the city of 
KAND. 
2. What are the effects of alternative home locations f r 15 000 new employees at a) 
UCD in Davis, and b) UiA in Kristiansand?  
3. What if an oil crisis occurred, how would the people in the cities cope? 
                                                
397 Gunnar Olsson, 2007. Abysmal. The University of Chicago Press 
398 This exploration has been done before I compare the four cities, because I believe that some future thoughts 
would be inherent in my thinking and then it is better o do the tests explicitly, instead of discussing their merits 
afterwards. 
 
 316 
8.2 The city of KAND – the imaginary model city 
 
The first question asked in this chapter is how growth and development would impact on the 
transport trajectories under different assumptions f modal split the next 20-30 years in an 
imagined city of 200 000 inhabitants.  
 
8.2.1 Basic situation 
 
The city of KAND is an imaginary model city to be used for reflections about the future. First 
we look at the city under a trend or business as usual (BAU) perspective and calculate the 
change in travel and CO2 emissions until 2030. Then an environmentally sustainable transport 
(EST) policy is charted and at last the two policies BAU and EST are compared.  
 
Basic premises  
The city had 200 000 inhabitants in the year 2000, and the population growth is 1 % per year. 
The trend from 1990 to 2000 is fairly close to the c ange in the four case cities described 
earlier.  
• The length of the average local trip was 5.6 km 399 in 2000, which is increasing by 1% 
per year.  
• The number of local trips per head and per day was estimated at 2.4 trips/day in 2000. 
This will be increasing by 0.3 trips/day per 10 years.400  
 
The person kilometer traveled per day was in 2000 for the city a total of 2.69 million pkm 
(980 million person km for the whole year). If we imagine a business as usual (BAU) trend 
for city of KAND 1990 - 2030 some key figures are shown in the nexttable:  
 
Mode split 1990 2000 BAU2010 BAU2020 BAU2030 
Car 66 76 80 84 88 
Public Transport 14 7 6 4 3 
Walking 15 13 11 10 8 
Cycling 5 4 3 2 1 
      
Population 1% growth per year 180 000 200 000 220 000 242 000 266 200 
Local Trips per head&day 2 2.4 2.7 3 3.3 
Local Trip length 5 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.4 
      
Total daily person km, million 1.80 2.69 3.68 4.94 6.50 
Change from 2000   137 % 184 % 242 % 
Table  8-1  Key figures for the growth in KAND towards 2030. 
 
From the table one can see that total local travel in the city measured in person kilometer 
increases from 2.69 million pkm per day in 2000 to 3.68 million pkm per day in 2010 (long 
trips outside the city is not included). The very large change in person kilometer traveled has 
                                                
399 The average length of local trips is estimated to 5.6 km after an assessment of how many trips are intra urban 
or local trips (about 40% of the total trip length) and how many are long trips out of the city. The 5.6 km length 
of local trips is also a conservative estimate to av id charges of blowing up the figures and results.  
400 Travel activity, both number of trips and length of trips, increases with increasing income and education. An 
increase of 0.3 trips/day over 10 years can be expected if GDP continues to grow as forecast.  
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three causes: longer journeys because of dispersion and sprawl, more trips because of income 
rise and greater population. 
 
8.2.2 How will modal split develop in KAND? 
 
The basis for the different simulations done has been the following table showing what I have 
called a BAU trend continuing until 2030. The increas  in mode share for the car was ten 
percentage points from 1990 to 2000. In the forecast thi  increase is gradually decreasing 
toward a share of 88% in 2030 as shown in the table below. It is supposed that the amount of 
car travel will peak at about 88% of the total travel (in Sacramento region the equivalent 
figure for 2000 was 93%).  
 
 1990 2000 BAU2010 BAU2020 BAU2030 
Car 66 76 80 84 88 
Public Transport 14 7 6 4 3 
Walking 15 13 11 10 8 
Cycling 5 4 3 2 1 
Table  8-2  Modal split for KAND until 2030. 
 
The numbers in the table are presented in the column in the next figure, showing the well 
known trend of increasing car traffic and diminishing travel with soft modes. This figure is 
probably not very different from the equivalent in many other medium sized cities.  
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Figure 8-1 Trend in modal split for KAND towards 2030 
 
In the next figure the total daily travel per mode is shown. With the car a total of 2 million 
person km was done daily in 2000, this will increase to about 5.7 million person km in 2030. 
Walking is increasing from 0.35 million person km in 2000 to 0.55 million person km per day 
in 2030. The walking share was 15% in 2000 and the share falls to 8% in 2030, still the total 
person km walking increases due to the population gr wth of 33% for this period and the 
increase in mobility. Public transport shows a small increase for this period, but the cycling 
mode a reduction.  
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Figure 8-2  Daily travel per mode BAU trend, million person km  
 
 
8.2.3 What if modal split is kept at the 1990 level? 
 
What will the picture of 2030 be like if modal split is kept at the 1990 level with 66% car, 
14% public transport, 15% walking and 5% cycling? Remember that both the number of trips 
and the length of local trips are steadily increasing towards 2030, mainly due to increase in 
income. When this increase in mobility is combined with the increase in population in the city 
of KAND, then the total travel in 2030 becomes 6.5 million person km (same as in BAU 
2030). The next figure shows the travel per mode with 1990 modal split level.  
 
Figure 8-3  Total daily travel per mode, MS  at 1990 level in KAND, million pkm 
 
The increase in the use of the car is much lower when t e modal split is kept constant than in 
the BAU alternative. It ends up with 4.3 million person km per day in 2030, while the BAU 
alternative above showed 5,7 million km with the car. There are substantial gains in keeping 
the mode split constant in a city, not allowing thecar share to keep increasing. Both walking 
and public transport grow to a level close to one million person km each when modal split is 
kept at the 1990 level. Still, even this trajectory with constant 1990 modal split is far from 
sustainable. In 2030 this policy alternative is not anywhere near the 1990 car travel, and hence 
emissions affecting the local as well as the global environment will be much higher than in 
1990, even if the modal split is kept constant at the 1990 level. The car usage is more than 
three times that of 1990 in 2030. Public transport is four times as high as 1990, which should 
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mean more buses and better frequency. The real benefit from this scenario probably lies in the 
fact that the population will use walking and bike for 20% of the journeys, which will lead to 
better health, better condition and less fat. However, the contribution to global warming is 
three fold (assuming that the CO2 emissions per car is constant) and the same when it comes 
to local emissions of CO, NOx and particles. 
 
8.2.4 An Environmentally Sustainable Transport policy for KAND 
 
An environmentally sustainable transport (EST) policy for the city of KAND aiming at 50% 
environmentally friendly transport as cycling and walking, and 50% motorized transport has 
been designed. It is the transport volume measured in person km, which is divided fifty-fifty. 
The gradual change in modal split is shown in the figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-4  EST policy in KAND, change in MS towards a fifty-fifty split in 2030, %. 
 
The trajectory of such an EST policy aiming at half the person travel shall be done by walking 
and cycling is shown in the figure below. Car travel p aks at 2.5 million person km per day 
between 2010 and 2020, thereafter it is very slowly reduced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-5  EST policy in KAND, total travel per day per mode, million pkm 
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8.2.5 The BAU and EST policies compared 
 
The most interesting part of the comparison of the BAU and EST alternatives is that a small 
and gradual shift can in the long term becomes a major change of course in a more sustainable 
transport development direction. The car use increased from 1.2 to 2.1 million person km 
from 1990 to 2000, and is forecasted with another similar increase till 2010 reaching 3 million 
person km per day in the City of KAND. From 2010 the increase in car use continues in the 
BAU alternative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-6  BAU and EST policy, City of KAND, million pkm per day per mode. 
 
If we look at the EST trajectory it starts in 2000 and has a slightly lower increase in car use 
than in BAU, but still increasing to 2.5 million person km in 2010. Associated with this 
increase in the car use in the EST alternative is an increase in walking (from 0.4 to 0.6 million 
person km), cycling (from 0.1 to 0.2 million person km) and use of public transport (from 0.2 
to 0.5 million person km) between 2000 and 2010.  
 
This no way implies dramatic changes taking place over ten years. However, over three 
decades the difference between the policies becomes significant. Needless to say that the EST 
policy is close to achieving the policy goals set in many cities. For most people I would guess 
that they would hardly notice if the policy was EST rather than BAU, because the gradual 
change caused by a tightening of the measures givespeople time to adjust their travel 
behavior. Even if this gradual change towards EST had been implemented one ends up with a 
doubling of the transport volume from 2000 to 2030 (BAU represents a tripling). If vehicle 
technology is improved so much that the emissions are on average halved for the total car 
population, the total climate gas emissions will be constant. The main point from this exercise 
is therefore that it is possible to change towards n EST trajectory and obtain substantial 
emissions reductions compared to the present trends. However, to attain a level of mobility 
that is sustainable further reductions in the emissions from transport must be done. The 
challenge is formidable, which underline the need to start bending the present unsustainable 
path is urgent. Why is it that the BAU policy continues everywhere, while the simulation 
shows that it is possible to change towards the ESTdevelopment without much hardship? I 
shall come back to this question in the last chapter. 
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8.3 Home locations for 15 000 new employees at UCD and UiA 
 
8.3.1 Introduction  
 
The next question asked was how the location of the homes of 15 000 new employees at two 
universities affects total travel and emissions. In the first simulation the 15 000 are employed 
at the university UC Davis and in the second simulation the 15 000 are employed by UiA in 
Kristiansand. I have done the exercise to evaluate the ffects of different policies on two real 
life situations. How does it matter where workers locate their homes in relation to their work? 
This is a fundamental question in land use and transport planning and many plans have been 
made to make the distance as short as possible betwen the work place and home. But the 
choice of home location is influenced of many factors utside the realm of land use planning. 
Still empirical evidence show clearly that urban struc ure influences travel, see Næss (2006).  
 
8.3.2 UCD get 15 000 new employees 
 
Davis will get 15 000 new jobs (10 000 staff and 5000 students) in the next 10-12 years 
according to the UCD Long Range Plan. Imagine that all:  
a) settle in Davis  
b) settle in the Sacramento Region outside Davis 
 
Only journeys to work are looked into in the experiment. Those who settle in Davis will adopt 
a modal split according to policy intentions expressed in the plans as shown below. For those 
who settle in the Sacramento Region there are two altern tives. The BAU (Business As 
Usual) alternative is an extension of the present modal split and trends, while the EST 
(Environmentally Sustainable Transport) alternative is constructed. The modal split figures 
used are shown in the table below. These are combined with the average distance home-work-
home from the second table and used for calculation of travel per mode, total travel and 
associated CO2 emissions.  
 
The assumptions used in the calculations are the following: 
250 workdays/year 
BAU:  car occupancy 1.2 car, 18 passengers per bus in Davis and Region.  
EST:  car occupancy 1.0 single driving, 4 when car sharing, 25 passengers per PT vehicle 
Emissions of CO2  car 200g per km, bus 400 g per km 
 
The modal split assumptions are shown in the table below. The Davis and BAU Sacramento 
Region figures are close to the present, while the EST Sacramento region represents a 
dramatic change in travel compared to the present mode choice.  
 
Modal Split Car Car share PT Bike Walk 
Davis 20 % - 20 % 33 % 27 % 
BAU Sacramento Region 93 % - 7 % - - 
EST Sacramento Region 20 % 40 % 40 % - - 
Table  8-3  Modal Split in Davis and Sacramento, simulation of home location. 
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The estimated average distance between home and the university is 5 km shorter for those 
using public transport than the car in the Sacramento Region because you have to live not too 
far away from the transit route to choose public transport. 
 
Average distance home-
work-home km 
Car Car share PT Bike Walk 
Davis 8 - 6 6 2 
BAU Sacramento Region 60 - 50 - - 
EST Sacramento Region 60 60 50 - - 
Table  8-4  Distance to work for the location of 15 000 homes simulation. 
 
8.3.3 UCD results of locating 15 000 homes at different places  
 
The following table shows total and individual travel (work journeys only) per year both in 
person km and vehicle km, and it shows the total and individual CO2 emissions per year. It is 
striking that if all 15 000 locate in Davis the CO2 emissions per individual will be 
exceptionally low, only 0.07 tons or 70 kg per person, while in the extreme alternative of all 
located outside the city, each person emits 2.35 tons of CO2. This shows that land use and 
transport policy have a huge potential. 
 
 Davis SacReg EST SacReg BAU 
Sum PKM per year 20 000 000 210 000 000 222 500 000 
Sum VKM per year 5 250 000 70 500 000 175 694 444 
Sum CO2 tons 1 100 14 700 35 278 
PKM/person 1 333 14 000 14 833 
VKM/person 350 4 700 11 713 
CO2 tons/person 0.07 0.98 2.35 
Table  8-5  Total and individual travel and CO2 emissions, different locations of homes 
 
The figure below illustrates the large difference between the case that all settle in Davis and 
all in Sacramento Region. If all settle in Davis the average length of the work journey will 
only be a few kilometers and the associated transport volume and emissions low. 
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Figure 8-7  UCD alt. home locations, individual travel (km) and emissions (tons) 
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The differences between the BAU and EST policies on 15 000 people located freely in the 
Sacramento Region with one thing in common the work at UCD in Davis, are large. The 
figure shows that the vehicle km traveled are less than half for the EST alternative compared 
to BAU. The total traffic (work journeys only) is reduced from 175 million vehicle-km to 70 
million vehicle-km, a reduction of 60%. This substanti l reduction in car use has of course a 
similar reduction in emissions, accidents, etc. TheCO2 emissions in the BAU alternative is 35 
278 tons of CO2 per year, which in the EST alternative is reduced to 14 700 tons of CO2 per 
year, a reduction of 58%.  
 
When all settle in the Sacramento region the average length of the work journey will be much 
longer. The difference in person kilometer traveled in the Sacramento BAU and EST 
alternatives are not big, but the difference is large between the vehicle kilometers traveled. 
This is caused by reduction in the car mode and show  that even if land use policy is market-
led the transport policy might matter to a large extent. If the transport policy makes people 
shift to other modes for the work journey, then the CO2 emissions per individual might be 
reduced by about 60% from 2.35 tons to 0.98 tons.  
 
The figure gives several messages, firstly it the self evident situation that if a company in this 
case UCD, increases with 15 000 new employees and they all come to live in close distance to 
their work, both the person km traveled and the vehicl  km travel will be low. More 
surprising is the very large difference between locating the 15 000 people in Davis alternative 
to their location in the Sacramento Region. The person km traveled increase ten times401.  
The second main message from the figure above is that it is possible to handle transport in 
different ways and it matters a lot regarding GHGs and fuel consumption. Perhaps the most 
important message is that the CO2 emissions from the work journeys of the same 15 000 
people located in Davis instead of the Sacramento Region, only would be 0.07 tons CO2 per 
person per year. This is extremely low and illustrates that a compact city with a strong bicycle 
policy can go very far towards environmentally sustainable development transport.  
 
8.3.4 UiA in Kristiansand gets 15 000 new employees 
 
The effect on transport volume and thereby CO2 emissions of alternative home locations for 
15 000 new workers has also been simulated for Kristian and and UiA (at present there are 
about 8000 students and staff at UiA). The first simulation is that all 15 000 locate their home 
in Kristiansand and travel to work with the same modal split as at present. The location of 
their homes within Kristiansand will be all over, but half is expected to locate in the new areas 
allocated in the general land use plan (Kommuneplan).  
 
The second simulation is that all 15 000 will be located in Agderbyen Region outside 
Kristiansand. The prime locations are Søgne, Songdalen, Lillesand and Mandal. Two 
alternative transport policies are tested. One is the present policy of business as usual BAU 
and the second is an environmental sustainable transport policy EST. The work journey in the 
BAU alternative is dominated by the car while the EST alternative presumes that an active 
transport policy has shifted people into car-sharing a d public transport.  
 
                                                
401 The pkm differ in the BAU and EST alternatives because people in the EST alternative locate closer to transit 
interchanges and therefore travel shorter than if located in distributed settlements 
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The assumptions for the UiA simulation are the following:  
 
The modal split assumptions are shown in the table below. The Kristiansand and BAU 
Agderbyen Region figures are the same as the present mode split, while the EST Agderbyen 
Region represent a dramatic change in travel compared to the present mode choice.  
 
Modal Split Car Car share PT Bike Walk 
Kristiansand 69 % - 5 % 6 % 20 % 
BAU Agderbyen Region 93 % - 7 % - - 
EST Agderbyen Region 20 % 40 % 40 % - - 
Table  8-6 Modal Split in Kristiansand and Agderbyen, location of 15 000 homes.  
 
The estimated average distance between home and the university is 5 km shorter for those 
using public transport instead of the car in the Agderbyen Region because people have to live 
not too far away from the transit route to choose public transport. 
 
Average distance home-
work-home km 
Car Car share PT Bike Walk 
Kristiansand 16 - 14 6 2 
BAU Agderbyen Region 44 - 40 - - 
EST Agderbyen Region 44 44 40 - - 
Table  8-7  UiA average distance to work, location of 15 000 homes. 
 
8.3.5 UiA results of locating 15 000 employees at different places 
 
The following table shows total and individual travel (work journeys only) per year both in 
person km and vehicle km, and it shows the total and individual CO2 emissions per year. If all 
15 000 locate in Kristiansand the CO2 emissions per individual will be 0.46 tons per person, 
while the Business As Usual policy (close to the prsent) each person emits 1.73 tons of CO2, 
close to four times as much.  
 
 Kristiansand EST Agderbyen Region BAU Agderbyen Region 
Sum PKM per year 46 875 000 159 000 000 164 000 000 
Sum VKM per year 34 646 000 51 900 000 128.889 000 
Sum CO2 tons 6 958 10 860 25 889 
PKM/person 3 125 10 600 10 933 
VKM/person 2 310 3 460 8 593 
CO2 tons/person 0.46 0.72 1.73 
Table  8-8  Travel and CO2 emissions from different locations of homes 
 
The figure below illustrates the large difference between the case that all settle in Kristiansand 
and all in Agderbyen Region, the distance from UiA to the location of the home is very 
important. The difference in person kilometer traveled in the BAU and EST alternatives are 
not big, but the difference is large between the vehicle kilometers traveled in the BAU and 
EST alternatives (and the corresponding emissions). Assuming a shift from BAU to EST, the 
CO2 emissions would be reduced by 60% from 25 000 tons t  10 000 tons per year. If an 
effective policy to implement the goal of shifting persons from cars to public transport had 
been in place in the Kristiansand region, then commuters shifting to public transport and car-
share could obtain a similar reduction.  
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Figure 8-8 Alternative home locations, individual travel (km) and emissions (tons) 
 
The next figure illustrates the importance of how peo le are transported. The first message is 
the self evident situation that if UiA increases with 15 000 new employees and they all come 
to live in close distance to their work, both the person km traveled and the vehicle km 
produced will be low. It is a very large difference b tween locating the 15 000 people in 
Kristiansand alternative to their location in the Agderbyen Region. The person km traveled 
increase three times, hence policies that make people settle close to work will reduce 
commuting and CO2 emissions substantially. The second message from the figure is that an 
effective transport policy shifting people from cars to public transport and car-sharing has a 
huge potential. The vehicle kilometer traveled can be reduced by 60% if an effective bus 
alternative and organized car-sharing are in place.  
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Figure 8-9 Yearly travel, alternative home locations, person km and vehicle km. 
 
Lastly, the simulation did not test an EST policy for Kristiansand, but used the present modal 
split. The 15 000 workers produced 34 million vehicle kilometer in Kristiansand. This large 
transport volume indicates that the potential for a substantial reduction is there, but requires 
an effective transport policy, which so far has not been the case. 
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8.3.6 Comparison of the two cities. 
 
If we compare the location of all the 15 000 homes in the universities’ host cities Davis and 
Kristiansand, it is noticeable that the person km traveled are larger in Kristiansand than Davis 
as the next figure shows. The average travel distance is therefore larger in Kristiansand than 
in Davis. Looking at the vehicle km traveled the difference has increased, which is because 
the people in Davis use the bike and walk more thanin Kristiansand.  
 
 
Figure 8-10  Transport in Kristiansand and Davis, person km and vehicle km in millions.  
 
Davis is an example of a compact city having had a bike policy for many years. Both the 
university and the city have developed an integrated land use and transport policy. The UIA in 
Kristiansand has a new campus, which is designed based on the car as the main mode of 
transport with ample parking close to the buildings while the students have to walk several 
hundred meters to the bus stop. Land use and transport planning is one explanation of the 
difference between the cities. If Kristiansand and UiA develop a transport policy aiming at 
mode shift then substantial reductions in the CO2 emissions from the work journeys can be 
obtained.  
 
On the regional level there are similar differences as shown in the next figure. The large 
difference in transport volumes between locating the 15 000 new jobs within the city versus in 
the region is very noticeable. The person kilometer traveled in the BAU alternative is fairly 
similar to the EST alternative in both regions, butwhen changing to an EST policy a large 
difference in vehicle kilometer traveled occurs causing a reduction in emissions. The 
Sacramento region is larger than the Agderby region and hence the gain in vehicle km 
traveled is greater because of the longer distances.  
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Comparison of Kristiansand & Agderby region and Davis & 
Sacramento region, pkm, vkm and CO2,  per person and per 
year.
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Figure 8-11 Comparing Kristiansand and Davis regions, 1000 pkm and vkm, CO2 in tons.  
 
 
The lessons from this exercise are several, I will highlight two: 
 
Firstly, a transport and travel policy producing an effective and efficient public 
transport service together with a good car sharing system have the potential to reduce 
the CO2 emissions substantially without reducing accessibility drastically.  
 
Secondly, a land use and housing policy combined with economic incentives that make 
people choose to live close to work (at least one of the workplaces in case several in 
the family work) will have a tremendous impact to reduce CO2 and other green house 
gases. It will also save fuel and contribute to better health because of more walking 
and cycling.  
 
Notice that the lessons drawn point to an integrated set of instruments, like a transport and 
travel policy and a land use and housing policy combined with economic incentives. The 
present lack of “joined up” or integrated policies has been caused by the fragmentation of 
public policy and because of all the barriers and hi rances that prevents society and 
politicians reach their goals, discussed several places in this study. The Sacramento Region 
and Davis will have a good starting level to implement these to policies, if and when a global 
agreement on CO2 that forces everybody to reduce their use of the car will be in place. The 
number 15 000 (5000 students and 10 000 research staff) i  taken from the UCD Long Range 
Plan. All of these can be settled on UCD land as an extension of the City of Davis, but 
location also in the city is probably better.  
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Theoretically it is possible to imagine a fairly drastic transformation of land use and 
transportation even in such a car based area as the Sacramento Region. The two major 
hindrances for such transformations are: a) a supply led housing market, and b) our 
dependence and pleasure of the car. 
 
The Kristiansand and Agder Region have less chance of implementing the necessary policy to 
promote a change in location and transport policy. That is because of the planning paradigm 
taking the car for granted, “the car has come to stay”, and the fragmented institutional 
structure that prevents a comprehensive plan-led policy t  be established. Theoretically there 
are substantial gains, but to obtain those gains two changes must be effectuated. Firstly, the 
land use policy in Kristiansand must change to make housing more affordable and attractive 
combined with a restricted parking policy at the university. Secondly, the public transport 
must be more attractive especially higher frequency and faster travel time, but price and 
comfort is also important.  
 
8.4 What if an oil crisis occurred?  
The third question asked is what if an oil crisis occurred, how would the daily life in the four 
case cities be affected?  
 
8.4.1 Introduction  
 
The oil crisis scenario is tested out on each of the four cities and the “same” two high income 
families with two or more cars. That is because such families will probably be more 
representative of the situation 10-15 years ahead judging from the expected increase in 
income. Trend data suggest that rising car ownership and use is largely a function of rising 
real per capita income. As income per capita increases, the relative price of automobile travel 
declines and value of time increases, making the higher speed of automobile travel more 
attractive402. With fixed travel time budgets this means that the distance between home and 
work can increase, something that is further facilitated by improved roads. Automobile 
ownership and use has increased faster in Europe than in the US over the past decades, and 
most in the high-income groups403, but still the US is some twenty years ahead. Commuting to 
work is increasing partly caused by the decentralization that is occurring in most urban areas 
in Western Europe404. 
 
Two “typical very successful family” is chosen as the medium to explore the effects of an oil 
crisis. Both families earn well and are well educated, the woman is a university professor and 
the man is a high school teacher. Family A lives and works in the city, while in family B both 
workforce participants commute to work far distances. The families have three cars, which is 
an increasing group in all the four countries.405  
                                                
402 Giuliano, Genevieve and Dargay, Joyce. Car ownership, travel and land use: a comparison of the US and 
Great Britain. Transportation Research Part A 40 (2006)  106-124. 
403 Pucher and Lefèvre 1996. 
404 Gillespie 1999 The changing employment geography in Br tain, in Breheny M, ed, The People. Where will 
they work?  
405 In Kristiansand 24% of families have 2 or more cars, in the neighbouring municipality Søgne the number is 
42% and in US 62%. 
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Both families use their cars a lot, but the distance traveled for the journey to work is far longer 
for the commuting family B. The three-car family is very common in the US, but not yet in 
Europe. With household income above NOK 750 000 then in Norway 2% have no car, 35% 
one car and 63% two or more cars (RVU 2001). With rising real incomes we are on the way 
to catch up with the US also on car ownership. The ot r strong trend caused by rising 
incomes beside increasing car ownership is that people travel more, both with their cars on 
local and longer trips, but also with airplane to mre distant destinations. There is also an 
associated land use sprawl, people buying bigger and better houses further away, resulting in 
fast increasing commuting in all four cities.406 The two “successful families” A and B are 
critical cases designed to capture these changes, to make the results more valid and 
interesting. The simulation was also checked for how it would impact on low-income 
families.  
 
The four cities are of different shape and form  
Kristiansand with the bridges in transport system defining the structure has a longitudinal u-
shaped form. About half the population live within cycling distance to the centre, although 
some housing estates are on top of hills. Most new d velopments as laid out in the plan 
(Kommuneplanen) take place 10 km or more from the city centre. This development is 
towards the east and the plan foresees Kristiansand growing into Lillesand municipality. The 
regeneration of city centre and building on formerly vacant land (Elvebredden øst, Tangen, 
Odderøya) will increase the population in the city entre with more than two thousand 
persons. Aalborg has grown around the shortest crossing of the Limfjord, about one third of 
the population live north and two-thirds south of the Limfjord. Within 4 km from the centre 
one finds the majority of the population. The distance between the City Hall and the outskirts 
of the built-up area is 6-8 km.  
 
Norwich has grown around the castle and cathedral and spread out from the market place in a 
circle. Most of the urban population lives within a 4 km distance from the City Hall. The 
Norwich District’s (municipality) population of 120 00 persons live within a radius of only 3 
km. Davis is located at the railway junction and designed as a grid lay out. Most people live 
within a distance of 4 km to the City Hall and nearly ll less than 6 km. The terrain is flat and 
superb for cycling.  
 
These differences and all other available data as travel surveys, etc. have been used when I 
have evaluated the effect of an oil crisis for each of the two families in each of the four cities. 
The evaluation started with locating home and workplaces. Then the alternative ways to travel 
to the different destinations and purposes where looked at in turn. On this basis some general 
conclusions were drawn. In the presentation below I nly describe the starting situation and 
the main results for each city.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
406 This is true for families with children, the main contributor to sprawl. There is also a tendency that when the 
children grow up, some of these families buy homes clo e to the city centres. This trend is further pushed by 
divorce, lifestyle changes, etc.  
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8.4.2 The travel patterns for the families A and B in four cities 
 
Overview of the situation for Family A and Family B in each of the four cities. 
 
Kristiansand   Family A Kristiansand   Family B 
Family A consists of two adults working full time 
and boy 12, girl 18. They live and work in 
Kristiansand and have three cars. She is professor 
at UiA, he teaches at a local high school. Both use 
their car for work and the girl drives to high 
school. Most weekends they go for long overnight 
trips. 
Family B consists of two working adults and boy 
12, girl 18. They live in Kristiansand, she works in 
Lillesand 30 km away. He works in the Tvedestrand 
100 km away. The girl drives to high school. They 
are very active in the weekends and use all three 
cars a lot for shorter trips. Occasionally they go for
long weekend trips. 
 
Aalborg   Family A Aalborg   Family B 
Family A consists of two adults working full time 
and boy 12, girl 18. They live and work in Aalborg 
and have three cars. She is professor at AAU, he 
teaches at a local high school. Both use their car 
for work and the girl drives to high school. Most 
weekends they go for long overnight trips. 
Family B consists of two working adults and boy 
12, girl 18. They live in Aalborg, she works 30 km 
away. He works south of Viborg 100 km away. The 
girl drives to high school. They are very active in 
the weekends and use all three cars a lot for shorter 
trips. Occasionally they go for long weekend trips. 
 
Norwich   Family A Norwich   Family B 
Family A consists of two adults working full time 
and boy 12, girl 18. They live and work in Norwich 
and have three cars. She is professor at UEA, he 
teaches at a local high school. Both use their car 
for work and the girl drives to college. Most 
weekends they go for long overnight trips. 
Family B consists of two adults working full time 
and boy 12, girl 18. They live in Norwich, she 
works in the Steam Museum at Diss 30 km away. 
He works in the outskirts of Peterborough 100 km 
away. The girl drives to college. They are very 
active in the weekends and use all three cars a lot
for shorter trips. Occasionally they go for long 
weekend trips. 
 
Davis Family A Davis Family B 
Family A consists of two adults working full time 
and boy 12, girl 18. They live and work in Davis 
and have three cars. She is professor at UCD, he 
teaches at a local high school. Both use their car 
for work and the girl drives to high school. Most 
weekends they go for long overnight trips. 
Family B consists of two working adults and boy 
12, girl 18. They live in Davis, she works in 
Sacramento 30 km away. He works in the Bay area 
100 km away. The girl drives to high school. They 
are very active in the weekends and use all three 
cars a lot for shorter trips. Occasionally they go for
long weekend trips. 
 
 
8.4.3 If an oil crisis, how will the four cities fare? 
 
To answer this question each city has been dealt with separately, but here I use Kristiansand 
as an illustration of how the assessment was done. In a distance of 3 km from the city hall 
about 20 000 people live, 25% of the population in walking distance407. Within 5 km from 
city hall about half the Kristiansand population live, cycle distance. Topography in 
Kristiansand is very varied, several housing estate r  100 meters above sea level with 
winding and steep roads as access roads (Tinnheia 2500 inhabitants, Slettheia 3500 
                                                
407 I have set walking distance to 3 km and cycling distance to 5 km, which obviously can be discussed. In times 
of crisis I would think that these lengths would be acceptable to the majority.  
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inhabitants, etc.), while the one square city centre Kvadraturen is on level 5-10 meters. The 
difference in height and the steep roads make cycling and walking less attractive than in a 
more gentle landscape.  
 
In Kristiansand 85% of the car trips take place within the city, 11% to and from city, and 4% 
outside city. The family B where both adults commute is as yet a small, but growing minority. 
The total number of trips within Kristiansand was 200 000 trips per day, but only 23 000 trips 
between the city and other places.  
 
8.4.3.1 Travel changes in the four cities 
Family A: The number of short trips by car severely curbed. Girl stops driving to school. No 
cars used for local work trips. Long overnight trips still priority one, but some substituted 
with other modes and destinations. Davis is coming out best for this family A because of the 
compact city, well developed bike/walk net and fairly good public transport. Norwich is very 
compact, but poor bike/walk net and poor public transport makes local trips strenuous. 
Aalborg has a good bike/walk net, which is far more us d than in Kristiansand that has a fair 
bike/walk net. However, in both these cities the distance across town for those living on one 
side and working on the other, is beyond cycling distance for most people. Both cities have 
the basis for a good public transport system. Because of the low density the bus services will 
be infrequent and consequently the journey time far longer than when it was done in a car.  
 
Family B: The number of short trips will be severely curbed. Girl stops driving to school. The 
woman shifts to bus and the husband enters car-sharing schemes with two others. (Reduced 
fuel consumption for work by 2/3, also the wife’s Toyota Corolla used by husband for his car 
sharing trips) Weekend trips reduced and new combinatio  of trips organized (reduce km 
traveled by 50%). Davis is coming out best for thisfamily B because of the compact city with 
short distances to the local bus stops and the railway station, and fairly good public transport 
services to the major destination/work places around the city. If the husband is not able to join 
a car-sharing scheme, he will be really worse off because of poor public transport to most 
places 100 km away from Davis.  
 
Norwich is the centre of a radial road network around the city. The bus services are very 
infrequent in the sparsely populated rural area with small towns and villages scattered around. 
Car-sharing should be possible for many because of the large number of people living in the 
Norwich travel to work area (370 000).  
 
Kristiansand is the “engine” in the regional development, taking place within a spatial 
structure consisting of a narrow band of settlements along the trunk road located as pearls on 
a string, Kristiansand being the big pearl in the middle. This structure is very good for 
developing public transport and car-sharing. Fairly fast after the oil crisis workers would 
probably cooperate and start car-sharing, the bus improvements would take a little longer time 
to happen. Our man in family B commutes to work in Tvedestrand from Kristiansand on a 
daily basis. At present there are 92 persons who commute between these two places in that 
direction408. It will be difficult to organize car-sharing since they are so few commuting. 
Public transport demand will probably also be low fr the whole stretch and hence it will be 
necessary for our man B to change bus once or twice ith the extra time and costs required. 
                                                
408 SSB Pendlingsstatistikken  
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Aalborg has a more circular travel to work area more similar to Norwich. Therefore 
commuters like our family man B will suffer from poor public transport supply and few 
others to share a car with for his particular destination.  
 
8.4.3.2 Consequences and Evaluation 
Family A: The major change in lifestyle is not using the cars for work or school, and reduced 
car use for other local trips. Change to walking, cycling and public transport for local trips, 
more local shopping and leisure. The long leisure trips marginally reduced in length and 
numbers. The total family cost of travel increases, but not dramatically. The family adapts by 
not using the car for local trips. Instead they use more time consuming alternative travel 
modes, which give positive effects of getting closer to the local community and the health 
effects of more physical movement. The saved costs f r local trips are more than offset by the 
increased costs for weekend trips, which the family tries not to change. This family manages 
to continue with most former activities, but the shift of transportation modes make life less 
flexible and transport more time consuming. The costs for transport increase. Most families 
like this one will probably say that their lifestyle has been changed, but with both negative 
and positive sides. The families in Davis and Norwich manage an oil crisis quite well 
regarding local trips because of the compactness of these two cities. In Kristiansand and 
Aalborg there are say one quarter of the population, hat live/work in the outskirts and outside 
cycling distance to the city centre, which will get some problems with travel.  
 
Family B: Both parents will use more time for work trips and flexibility is reduced even if the 
car-sharing alternative functions for both. If car-sharing is not possible, then the time used for 
travel will increase a lot. The weekend trips have to be reduced, which reduces the activities 
the family took part in. The consequences are more c stly and time-consuming travel, which 
require more organizing. It makes life less flexible than before for all. More time is needed for 
travel and the journeys are far more costly. The active life of the family using a large 
geographical area had to be substantially reduced. Most families like this one will probably 
say that their lifestyle has been changed a lot in a negative way. In family B both husband and 
wife commute out of their home city. In all four cities it is likely that the question of changing 
jobs or home will arise, because of the time spent on the work journeys.  
 
The Norwich family will probably manage best for long journeys due to the densely 
populated and a well developed transport system in the region and manage an oil crisis quite 
well regarding local trips because of the compactness of the city. In Kristiansand the modern 
lifestyle households who go skiing at Hovden 230 km away every weekend in the winter and 
practice golf, sailing and water sports in the summer will be hit hard of fuel rationing. The 
same type of households in Aalborg will manage better due to shorter distances to most 
activities. Davis people will have to dramatically cut the recreational travel they are in habit 
of, like skiing beside Lake Tahoe and surfing along the coast.  
 
8.4.4 Summing up the oil crisis scenario. 
 
An oil crisis will hit different people differently in the four cities, but in general most people 
will adapt to the new situation and continue to work at the same place as before, it is the non-
work trips that will have to be changed.  
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For most of those living and working in the same city (Family A), the consequences are 
acceptable, but those with a very “modern” car oriented life style may find them close to 
unacceptable. This is especially so because work and leisure tend to be organized around fast 
travel with the car.  
 
For all of those living in the city and working outside the city (Family B), the consequences 
are severe because the journey to work may take too much time. Again those with a very 
“modern” car oriented life style will find the consequences of an oil crisis very time 
consuming and thereby breaking up their carefully worked out time budgets. To many people 
this may seem a very negative change of lifestyle and reduced life quality. People are very 
flexible and will in reality choose between many alternatives to meet an oil crisis, one such 
way will be to work from home as much as possible 
 
Davis citizens living and working in Davis are very well positioned in the case of an oil crisis: 
 
1. Transportation: Walk, Bike, Public Transport can hadle most local journeys over 
night. 
2. Housing: Village Homes show how! Covell Village can be built in short time. 
Downtown can be substantially densified. 
3. Energy: Buses already on natural gas. Housing can expand the use of solar energy and 
water heating.  
 
However: Those citizens commuting to work will have to change travel habits to car sharing 
and use public transport. For some the journey timeo work will be very much longer than 
before. Those who have lived an active outgoing life for recreation far away, which is applies 
to many in Davis, will have to change their habits.  
 
Let us take Aalborg as an example and look back at the EST aims: Environmentally 
Sustainable Transport does not endanger public healt  or ecosystems and meets mobility 
needs consistent with a) use of renewable resources at below their rates of regeneration and 
b) use of non-renewable resources at below the rates of development of renewable substitutes. 
The hypothetical oil crisis will make transportation in Aalborg more sustainable than at 
present because of the shift to soft modes (this also holds for the other cities, but Aalborg has 
the most pronounced EST-goals). The resulting modal split will be in the direction of both the 
Charter and Commitments, and the Traffic and Environment Action Plan. Thus external 
forces may help Aalborg City to achieve its goals, something the city has not so far managed.  
 
How would an oil crisis impact on low-income families?  
The low-income no car family would experience improved public transport services because 
of increased demand, and thus benefit by an oil crisis. The low-income family with a car 
would experience an oil crisis as negative since the increased cost of fuel would put pressure 
on an already strained economy. The impact on those families would also depend on their 
dependency of the car to cope with daily life. The location of homes and jobs would decide 
the impact they would feel. Already there is a concer  that access to the employment market 
is difficult without access to a car (see the Norwich case). An oil crisis would hit low-income 
families with a car hard, and this will be worse if homes and jobs are located such that the 
public transport alternative is poor. Some of these families would probably fall out of the job 
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market or experience difficulties getting access to the job market because of the increased 
costs of using the car.  
 
Lastly, there seems to be no reason to believe that an oil crisis will be so unacceptable that 
people will revolt and blame their politicians. The consequences of an oil crisis seem to be 
tolerable for the majority in all four cities. In the longer term supposing the oil crisis is lasting 
there will be changes in both home and job locations, a d the travel patterns for shopping and 
recreation will probably change a lot.  
 
8.5 Summing up chapter eight 
 
We asked three questions about the future in this chapter.  
• Two alternative policies BAU (business as usual) and EST (environmentally 
sustainable transport development) are tested on an im ginary model, the city of 
KAND. 
• Which are the effects of alternative home locations f r 15 000 new employees at UCD 
in Davis?  
• What if an oil crisis occurred, how would the people in the cities cope? 
 
The question of BAU and EST policy trajectories and the effect of different policies show that 
most people probably would adapt to EST policy without having to change their lifestyles 
completely. An EST policy developed over ten years would save substantial amounts of oil 
and largely reduce CO2 and other emissions, thus fulfilling the stated objectives and aims. 
Hence to understand the resistance to turn away from the BAU policy and the interests that 
support the present very unsustainable land use and tr sport planning and policy one has to 
look elsewhere than to the effects of an EST policy, because that will be very effective in 
reaching set goals.  
 
The alternative locations of the homes of 15 000 new university employees at Davis and in 
Kristiansand illustrates that land use planning can co tribute to shorten trip distances and in 
an integrated policy contribute to mode shift. There is a vast difference in the amount of 
transport produced if new workers locate in city or in the region outside the city. The 
consumption of fuel could yearly be reduced from 7000 liters per person to 2000 liters 
(Kristiansand) and 9000 liters to 300 liters (Davis), and the CO2 emissions per person from 
1.73 tons to 0.46 tons (Kristiansand) and 2.35 tons 0.07 tons (Davis). Associated with this 
reduction in the amount of transport is a reduction in all other negative factors the use of the 
car produce, as accidents, local emissions, noise, etc.  
 
Both in California and Europe the freedom to settle wherever you want is held in high regard. 
When this value is combined with the freedom to use the car whenever and wherever you 
want, the result is the expanding travel to work areas as one see in the Agderbyen and 
Sacramento regions, as in Aalborg and Norwich.  
 
The answer to the third question is that the social and economic elite in the cities would 
manage fairly well with an oil crisis. The long distance commuters and the low-income 
families with a car would suffer the oil crisis the most. The cities with a balanced transport 
system and policy would manage well, while those citi s with a policy based on a strong car-
 
 335 
ideology would be worst off. The low-income family with a car would experience an oil crisis 
as negative since the increased cost of fuel would p t pressure on an already strained 
economy and some of these families would probably experience difficulties with access to the 
employment market. The other main lesson from the w at if an oil crisis question was that 
there will not be created a strong crisis, most people in the four cities will cope with an oil 
crisis fairly well. Hence, not even an oil crisis will create a strong pressure on the politicians 
and by that create more demand for sustainable transport development. The oil crisis 
simulation shows that the gap between the environmentally sustainable transport development 
goals and the evidence created on the ground may continue to widen. 
 
The theory holds, most of the necessary instruments are there, but it is the use of the 
instruments that is lacking. Without a political leadership that really works towards EST goals 
and a consistent policy framework from the national level down to the cities being in place, 
we can forget about sustainable transport development.  
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9 Discussion  
 
9.1 Introduction to the discussion  
 
This chapter sums up and further examines the evidence in the preceding chapters and returns 
to the theoretical discussion in chapters 2 and 3 to address the aims of the dissertation which 
are restated below.  
 
The aims of the dissertation are:  
• How was the connection and interaction between landuse and transport in the 
cities? What effect did planning and policy exert on the choice of transport mode? 
Was the development caused by a deliberate policy and was it sustainable, and in 
case how and why? 
• How could the observed land use and transport development be explained? What 
were the factors facilitating cycling, walking and public transport; and what were 
the factors inhibiting more sustainable transport development?  
• What if any, are the lessons from the case cities for other medium sized cities in 
Europe? 
 
The first two aims are discussed in this chapter, while the lessons drawn are presented in 
chapter 10. A comparison of organization and Land Use and Transport policy responsibilities 
in the four cities is shown in the diagram on the next page. Similar diagrams were used 
extensively in cross comparison of the cities and a more elaborate one is included as an 
appendix to chapter 9. The diagram is related to the discussion in chapter 2 on typology and 
the model presented in Figure 2.5.  
 
Further in the chapter a discussion on the detailed results extracted from the above case 
studies of the individual cities is presented and then discussed in a cross comparison of the 
cites.  
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Scheme of comparison of policy responsibility and results in the four cities. 
 
What was the LU&T 
connection and 
interaction? 
Car transport was an important 
driver in the location of 
business and homes. LU policy 
adapts to demand for building 
land. City Centre pressure. 
CONTEXT: fast economic 
growth, toll road special. 
INSTITUTIONS: support car 
and economic growth.  
Car transport was an important 
driver in the location of 
business and homes. LU policy 
adapts to road infrastructure.  
CONTEXT: periphery with 
very slow growth. 
INSTITUTIONS: LU&T an 
instrument for growth.  
Park&Ride well integrated in 
City Centre shows integrated 
LU&T planning. Outward urban 
LU expansion, but LU depends 
on old transport network.  
CONTEXT: Norwich historic 
city. Building land very scarce.  
INSTITUTIONS: Strong 
Central Government. Norwich 
city without LU&T powers.  
LU was managed, local  
T-network planned for all 
modes. Trunk road bypasses 
city.  
 
 
CONTEXT: UCD provides 
growth, no city concern.  
INSTITUTIONS: Davis has 
self-rule in LU&T planning.  
 
Land Use Planning 
 
 
Municipality decides LU plans. 
AIM: Facilitating growth. 
 
Municipality decides LU plans 
AIM: Facilitating growth.  
 
County decides structure plans 
AIM: Facilitating growth. 
Locate new homes. 
 
Municipality decides LU plans, 
but Referendum for Urban 
extension AIM: Control growth. 
 
Development Control 
 
DC an instrument in a market-
led LU planning 
DC an instrument in a market-
led LU planning 
DC an instrument to take care of 
listed buildings and keep the 
position as retail city 
DC an instrument to steer / 
control development towards 
aims 
 
Transport Planning 
 
Municipality should plan 
transport structure in the 
general plan, but relies heavily 
on Highway Agency 
Municipality in cooperation 
with County produces plans 
County makes the Local 
Transport Plan, the focus of 
which may not be integrated 
urban policy 
The City Council makes the 
general plan with transport 
planning integrated. No mixing 
of inter and intra urban traffic! 
 
Road Infrastructure 
& Finance 
 
 
Parliament/National Highway 
Agency finances roads, plus 
user payment. 
3rd generation local user Toll 
Roads Package 
Parliament/National Highway 
Agency finances roads.  
Government finances roads 
through a bidding process on the 
Local Transport Plan. Major 
projects special bidding 
procedure 
The major highways are not an 
integrated part of the city 
structure as in the 3 other cities. 
Davis finances own roads. 
 
Public Transport & 
Finance 
Infrastructure 
Running costs 
PT financed by county who 
decide fares and subsidies. 
BusMetro infrastructure 
directly financed by MoT, HA, 
County and City 
PT financed by city after the 
2007 reform, before that the 
county. 
PT market solution, but County 
subsidize some routes. Public 
Private Service Agreements. 
Davis PT student/UCD run TAP 
Financed by student levy, UCD, 
and City plus passenger income. 
An interesting model to try out 
other places? 
 
 
 
                             City  
Issue 
Norway Kristiansand 
STRONG GROWTH 
Denmark Aalborg 
SLOW GROWTH 
England Norwich 
SLOW GROWTH 
California Davis 
STRONG GROWTH 
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9.2 Comparison the 4 cities, regarding LU&T issues 
 
9.2.1 The quest for growth.  
 
The four cities were at the start of the twenty first century in different situations regarding 
growth. Kristiansand was bursting with confidence aft r a decade of strong growth, however 
the end of the eighties was different. Aalborg has only increased population with a few 
thousand over 40 years, which hardly gave the municipal ty room for new tasks. The old city 
of Norwich, now an administrative district in Norfolk County, has had a constant population 
about 120.000 for many decades while the population outside the city border has grown 
strongly and caused that the population in the Norwich urban area has doubled. Davis has 
grown strongly as the principal settlement servicing the former agricultural college, now the 
University of California, Davis. The UCD has grown strongly for years and with it Davis. The 
city of Davis is the only one of the four that has a harp distinction between the city and the 
surrounding rural area.  
 
The different growth histories and paths impinge on b th the perceptions on how the present 
situation is and the outlooks towards the future. Agency and actors each with different 
perceptions of the future act within formal and informal institutions. Sometimes there is 
congruence between the formal and informal institutions and the results seem rational and 
goals are achieved. Other times only partial goals were achieved as we repeatedly have seen 
above in the case descriptions of the four cities. Very often the goals promoting the car were 
the ones realized, while the aims concerning an enviro mentally sustainable transport future 
were not achieved.  
 
I have several times proposed that the principle of subsidiarity (as practiced) should be used 
to change the institutions governing land use and transport planning in the three European 
cities to redress this. The alternatives to devolve powers and give the cities (functional urban 
areas) self-rule regarding land use and transport policy, are three:  
 
• Continue with the present practice and institutions.  
• Concentrate powers to the national/regional levels and reduce the influence of the 
local people.  
• Dismantle the less than a hundred years old land use and transport planning system, 
and let landownership and the market rule.  
 
The first two alternatives or a combination of the wo will probably be in the interests of all 
the organizations and the vested interests in and around land use and transport planning 
system. In my opinion the major problems revealed in this study will remain unsolved with all 
three alternatives. The new liberal ideology has already as shown above influenced the land 
use and transport planning system to a large extent, possibly a start of a dismantling process? 
The effect of this market turn in planning has been a market-led land use planning and a 
transport planning with the car as the main (sole) bject.  
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9.2.2 Land use 
 
Kristiansand 
Kristiansand has had a stable majority – Conservatives and Christian right – for decades and a 
land use and housing policy based on an ideology of facilitating growth. The Structure plan 
(Generalplanen) from 1969 reserved huge areas of building land, which still is enough for a 
couple of decades. Land reserves for building (supply side management) has been a key 
element in this policy to keep prices down and attrac  businesses. Inward investment is also 
lured with very attractive housing estates, green city and a splendid coastline as part of the 
land use policy. There has been a broad agreement abou this policy. As part of the 
Sustainable City project a densification policy was adopted but NIMBY reactions caused a lot 
of political pressure and the politicians closed the public planning activity for greater density 
and let it be up to the market to come up with densification projects. The politicians also 
reacted on was the administrative reduction of building permits to build on new land in 
support of the densification policy. This led to a limitation on the supply side with sharp price 
increases as a result, which was politically unacceptable, at least rhetorically. The sprawling 
land use in the Kristiansand region is partly caused by the competition between municipalities 
to attract new people to settle, a competition that also keeps the value of land down. One 
could propose interference in this market from the regional level. In that case the region (in 
practice two counties) had to allocate a maximum of new houses to be built in each 
municipality. That would be impossible to think of as a locally agreed solution because of 
lack of trust in the county. It had therefore to be part of a national policy, but that would also 
have been “impossible” because of the political climate, a broad political majority would keep 
the liberalized housing policy and never think of frcing municipalities through an allocation 
of a certain number of houses to be built.  
 
In England they have a system of regional allocation of housing (see Norwich case), but that 
is to solve the opposite problem. The challenges in Great Britain are vast areas of substandard 
housing, enormous migration from the north to the southeast and that far too few new houses 
are being built. Norwich has therefore been allocated the task of building 30 000 new houses 
until 2020. The idea that the Norwegian or Danish Government should allocate regional and 
municipal housing quotas with the purpose that the quotas should prevent some municipalities 
to build new houses to force people to settle somewhere else with the aim of reducing car 
commuting is politically entirely unacceptable at present.  
 
Aalborg 
Aalborg has reserves land for building that will last decades, both close to the city centre as 
redevelopment on both sides along the Limfjord, and in the outskirts where large growth areas 
are planned. Considerable investments in utilities for these areas, are sunk. Land Use and 
Transport policy has aimed at establishing Aalborg as the growth pole and prospering 
regional centre in north Jutland. Building land reserves are available for at least twenty years 
and can receive the location of a major company “over night”. Ample areas along the 
waterfront are being released due to decline in industries. Transport corridors and junctions 
have influenced Land Use more than the opposite way in Aalborg. The major shopping centre 
City Syd has had consequences for the shop-structure in theregion, by attracting shoppers 
from a large area. The proposed development of City Nord has therefore not been granted 
permit because of this reason. Shopping in the city centre versus peripheral shopping is an 
issue often discussed.  
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Norwich 
Norwich urban area has experienced strong population gr wth, but outside Norwich city 
border. The Norwich city council is therefore mainly concerned with the reuse of built area. 
Major redevelopments are changing the city centre from industry to mix use 
shopping/offices/flats with ample parking. 5000 parking places are established in six Park and 
Ride schemes with bus shuttles to city centre. The conceptual model behind LU&T planning 
and Park&Ride as part of this thinking is “maximum of free car use” except the City Center. 
Land use strategy is now the responsibility of East England Region, while Norfolk County is 
still responsible for the transport strategy and is the “heavy” partner in the Norwich Area 
Transport Strategy partnership. The Norwich Area Trnsport Strategy area is divided between 
three district councils with their different problems and opportunities. This difference in views 
will show in the solutions and strategy the partnership develops. LU policy and strategy is 
different in England/Norwich compared to the other cities, because of the scarcity of building 
land. The Buchanan legacy of coping with the car and at the same time give due consideration 
to historic buildings and environments, has been followed with great success in Norwich. The 
structure plan 1997 has not the Northern Distributor R ad in it, and neither the first Local 
Transport Plan in 2000. It emerges in 2001, and is thereafter presented as an important part of 
the Local Transport Plan. The NDR road project, which l es outside Norwich District border, 
will if built relieve through traffic and improve conditions in the city. But there are also major 
growth interests behind the NDR, which aim at improving the access to the employment area 
at the airport, better conditions for commuters andthe developers of new housing estates.  
 
Davis 
Davis’ close neighbor the separate jurisdiction UCD, secures strong growth in jobs, hence to 
facilitate growth is of no concern of City of Davis. There are no reserves of land for building, 
except through densification. Annexation of agricultural land outside city borders is necessary 
for the city to grow. A City Council decision to annex land for urban development must be 
put to the people in a referendum, the last such attempt was the Covell Village proposal in 
2005. The Bike City and later the Eco City (Village Homes) has strongly influenced the 
design of new housing estates: green, parks, water, paths, etc. Downtown is however very car 
dominated with parking everywhere along streets and off street, instead of bike lanes/paths.  
Land Use for shopping in the city has been managed strongly, preventing the major shopping 
chains to locate. Ample, wide corridors for road infrastructure have been secured, even in new 
housing estates (one example of New Urbanism exists: Aggie Village). Strong steering of 
land use is possible, but “No Growth” Davis is limited of being an “Island Paradise” in a sea 
of sprawling metropolis. Davis is different: a strong environmental concern, well educated 
and highly competent residents (UCD employees) and a reaction to growth has brought the 
city into a unique position regarding land use and transport development.  
 
9.2.3 Transport, financing of infrastructure and services 
 
9.2.3.1 The four cities 
Kristiansand Transport 
New leaders in 1992 managed to solve the major problem through many years, the trunk road 
E18 and lack of capacity, even if the former leaders had tried the same. The new trunk road, 
financed by road tolls, was obtained by clever use of the existing institutions and by building 
stakeholder consensus. The consensus of interests about the Toll Ring and substantial 
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investment in the highway leave some interests out. Those were the car-less and those 
wanting shift to a sustainable development course. Parking policy has been a constant, only 
with yearly adjustments of parking charges to follow inflation.  
 
Aalborg Transport  
Road tolls are not allowed in Danish cities. The system of financing roads is by Government 
grants. The decision on the 3rd Limfjord crossing gives the county opportunity to fight for 
Government investment money as part of the national highway network system (can be 
contested by the state). This may become an important decision in the struggle to get 
financing as compensation for investments in Copenhagen area. The big H (store H ) 
compromise about the Great Belt connection, which led to building the motorways E45 and 
E39, might be a model for securing compensation of a Femer Belt decision? The 3rd Limfjord 
decision was facilitated by very skilful political maneuver by the county mayor, while the 
Aalborg mayor opted out of the process.  
 
Norwich Transport  
England changed /is changing both transport policy and government structure. It started with 
the Blair Government introduced the white paper “A New Deal for Transport” where the 
decoupling of transport growth from GDP growth was sought. In effect road building should 
be curbed and public transport improved. Local Transport Plans (LTP) were introduced as the 
main instrument to implement national policy in thecities. The old system with a very strong 
central Government, made the policy contingent. Who would get financing where and when 
could not be foreseen. It remains to be seen if the new Local Transport Plan system is an 
improvement. Central Government is still very strong/decisive in allocation of road 
investment money. The regions are about to get a gre ter say in the decision process. For 
years the conservative Norfolk County had to get investment money for roads in the labour 
city of Norwich, from a conservative Government. With Blair the same conservative Norfolk 
had to get money for transport projects for a no longer labour city in competition with the 
problems and projects in the huge urban areas like London, Birmingham and Manchester.  
 
Davis Transport  
In Davis highways are of no concern to city council because the trunk road is not passing 
through the city centre. The City Council is responsible for both solution and financing of 
local roads, Bike and Walk network and traffic safety schemes. The development of a new 
housing estate has to pay for connection to existing network for all modes. Hence, the design 
is up to the developer, except when annexation mustbe done. Then the developer must put 
forward a proposal, which is so good that the voters “buy” it. This gives the city 
administration ample bargaining power against the developer, limited by the development 
giving adequate returns, i.e. a functioning market. Public Transport in Davis is remarkably 
good because it is financed and run by the UCD students. The net covers Davis fairly well and 
the services cost 1$ per ride, with zero fare for undergraduates.  
 
9.2.3.2 Financing infrastructure and services - a general argument 
The major reason for a very different development rga ding road building is the way it is 
financed. The diagram above shows similarities and differences between the cities.  
Both Norway and Denmark has a system where the Parliament finances a road program 
exclusively. This means that when a project has come into that program it will be built sooner 
or later. Hence there is massive effort to get projects into that program.  
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Both the Kristiansand and the Aalborg case had suchroad planning and programming as 
major events, and in Norwich planning of the major road NDR gradually emerges from 2001 
onwards. In addition Kristiansand has adopted Toll R ad financing, which makes proposals 
pass through Parliament at great speed compared to the raditional program. The third Toll 
Road package entails that users pay about 85% of the costs and Government only 15%, but 
then the implementation and building of new roads goes fast.  
 
This system of a national road program makes it virtually impossible to have an effective, 
integrated and comprehensive transport policy for the city. This is because financing of the 
alternative to the car, public transport, is done at county or municipal level where more funds 
to public transport means that money for something else must be cut, like old folk’s homes or 
schools. This fragmented system can explain why the politicians in the Parliament one day 
adopt sustainability goals and the next day they ar distributing money to increase car use. 
The same goes for local politicians, they move from sector to sector or decision to decision 
without having to have an overall rational attitude, only make decisions on each case in 
isolation based on intra-sector rationality.  
 
The roads in Norwich shall be financed through a bidding system according to the quality of 
the Local Transport Plan or as a major scheme. Withlimited resources this gives the 
Government officials a major say in how money is allocated on different projects and the 
“selling” of projects becomes important. Vigar points out that “The concentration of 
regulatory and investment power amongst civil servants nd ministers clearly makes it vital 
for local authorities to understand changes in the dir ction of thinking at the centre. Generally 
speaking local actors paid civil servants at nationl and regional levels considerable attention, 
partly because finance was dependent on the “selling” of schemes and packages to civil 
servants and ministers: We spend much of our time ensuring that they (the civil servants) are 
well fed when they are here and we try and break down barriers, and try and develop rapport. 
Over the TTP we see them almost weekly, they are almost part of our team so they understand 
when they sell things to their bosses and we understand their problems.” (Transport planner 
cited in Vigar 2002:146) 
 
Key persons matter in the “selling” of projects to obtain funding is an experience many 
planners share, as this story from the county of Kent in England: “The policy networks tied 
Kent County Council to sources of funding in Westminster and Brussels, and changes in 
transport policy at these levels influenced shifts in the county’s transport policy, but it was 
also critically dependent on the efforts of key officers to generate social capital, which helped 
Kent County Council gain resources: Our boss is very shrewd he goes straight in there and 
finds the decision makers and they like him doing that.” (Transport planner cited in Vigar 
2002:146) The E18 story from the Kristiansand case is a similar example of selling the project 
to the national decision makers.  
 
The Government in England also advocates the use of Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) that 
can be an extra lever in the bidding process. The selling of projects, the negotiations with the 
different decision makers, the networking to create support for the project and not least the 
leverage that PFI may provide by putting political pressure on the officials may make the 
process arbitrary. Overall this seems to be a system that is not well designed if 
environmentally sustainable transport shall be the outcome, which easily may be sidelined in 
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such processes. This is mainly due to the uncertainty introduced by the PFI financing, which 
probably will be supported and partly provided by local business interests. The business 
interests will be concentrated on getting money for road building, the other parts of the Local 
Transport Plan may easily lose out in such a process.  
 
For the city of Davis the problems are different. The Interstate Highway passes by with 
several junctions and the railway passes through the ci y centre. The mix of local and long-
distance traffic using the major roads is not the case in Davis as in the three other cities.  
 
The general lessons are that in Kristiansand, in Aalborg and in Norwich key persons good at 
timing and selling of projects, made profound difference to the road projects’ chances of 
being funded and implemented. In all three cities, the projects had been on the agenda for 
years without making progress. Then “new persons” took charge and succeed.  
 
9.2.3.3 Financing public transport infrastructure and services 
Planners have since the sixties409 seen public transport as a main mode of transport competing 
with the car within cities (Vigar 2002). Time and time again this has been repeated in policy 
documents, like Norwegian white papers410. However, public transport has continually lost 
competitive edge of two reasons: economy and travel time. The car has become relatively 
cheaper to public transport over many years. While t e car costs are decided in the market 
(except external costs of emissions, accidents, etc.), it is the politicians who decide the price 
of public transport. They decide the fare level by pa ing the difference between the revenue 
and costs of public transport in both Norway and Denmark. The public transport travel times 
door-to-door in the cities are in general twice (between 1.5 and 3 times longer) compared to 
car travel times (see CfIT 2004).  
 
Bus travel times can be reduced in several ways, important measures are an own priority 
track, priority at traffic signals, own lanes, etc.. The road network in cities is designed and 
managed for the car. At traffic signals a bus counts as three passenger car units and green 
light is given according to the number of cars approaching the junction. With another 
conceptual model the city network could be designed to optimize the time used to transport 
persons instead of optimize the time used to handle the cars (a car carries on average 1.5 
persons and a bus about 30 passengers in city traffic). On both of these issues economy and 
public transport travel time the politicians are in charge. The bus fares are decided year by 
year as a budget item. The traffic signal settings are decided by the Highway Agency traffic 
engineers within a broad framework, which is not preventing them from setting the signals 
according to the number of persons transported. Thus in any city the City Council can decide 
to prioritize passenger transport instead of cars, but they hardly ever do. Angela Hull used the 
word abyss to describe the gap between public transport policy aims and the policy the 
politicians practice (see ch. 2.1.3). The cost of public transport will probably increase with the 
general growth in costs. I have made a proposal that could stem the cost and fare spiral in 
public transport by attracting more passengers:  
 
 
 
                                                
409 First stated by Barbara Castle who was Minister of Transport, GB.  
410 E.g. St. meld. nr. 26 (2001-2002) Bedre  Kollektivtransport  
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Public transport – a Green Grant proposal  
Today, the county allocates money after first deciding how much to schools, how much to public 
transport, etc. Then the allocation is geographical distributed, how much to urban area and how much to 
the rural rest. This allocation decides price, frequency and quality of public transport services in 
Kristiansand and Aalborg. 
 
One could for example imagine a Green Grant to public transport, which would give each passenger 20 
NOK per trip instead of making the passengers pay (the amount to be sufficiently high as to be 
effective)411. The goal of mode shift has been there for ages, but not very successful. The amount of 
travel and therefore emissions caused by commuters in the Kristiansand region is substantial. The Green 
Grant to public transport users (and operators to improve services) can potentially reduce large amounts 
of these emissions. The attractiveness of the car is very great and the dependency of it keeps increasing. 
It is a challenge to increase the attractiveness of public transport in order to make it more competitive 
with the car. Instead of focusing on negative measures for the car, a positive set of instruments may be 
created to facilitate mode change, but the institutional set up prevents that at present.  
 
To create a multimodal system with more balanced role for each mode, the main thing to 
change is institutions that govern the allocation of funds to road building and to public 
transport. The Government should do an exclusive alloc tion of funds to a public transport 
program, the same way as the roads are funded. This will remove the present system where 
public transport is set up against old folks’ homes. Secondly, the organization of public 
transport could be after a spatial model (county, municipality, urban area) or a sector model 
(part of the Highway Agency or an own public sector), but the allocation model should be the 
same as for road investment money. Thirdly, at what level should the allocation of money be 
done (central, regional, local)? The Kristiansand case shows, as a lot of other evidence, that 
the present institutions and organization represent a hindrance to reach the goals of modal 
shift, which are deemed necessary to achieve environmentally sustainable transport 
development. The present rules and organization must be totally changed to remove this 
hindrance. It is not enough with minor changes in organization. I would argue that the 
principle of subsidiarity could remove some of the present barriers. The powers for transport 
infrastructure and services should be devolved to the local urban areas and thus given as much 
autonomy as possible. There are few arguments besides traditions that prevent such 
devolution of powers when the national interests are s feguarded. For example to decide local 
toll collection rests in the Parliament, but the money is collected locally from predominantly 
local users and spent on local projects so why should the Highway Agency and the Ministry 
of Transport have such a strong position in the process? 
 
 
9.2.3.4 Parking policy in the cities 
 
In Kristiansand the City Council keeps adding parking places in the city centre. The new 
concert hall Kilden will be built with 400 parking spaces and planning is ongoing for 1000 
places underneath the city square. In addition several thousand parking spaces will be built as 
part of building of flats, shops and offices in thecentre. These parking places will of course 
generate traffic, which the present road network in Kvadraturen can not handle with an 
acceptable level of service. The Kristiansand parking company owned by the municipality 
seems to focus on income and providing more and more spaces following the general traffic 
                                                
411 Alternatively or as a combination to the price the passengers could get free breakfast, newspapers, drinks, etc. 
Such measures are already well known from air transport and long-distance bus transport Kristiansand-Oslo.  
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growth. The parking norm for new building is still he “free car use” regulation from the early 
seventies, although recently modified for the city entre. A continual debate is going on about 
the level of charges and amount of parking. The parking policy has not been used to reduce 
traffic, the competition between city centre shopping with paid parking and shopping at malls 
with free parking outside the centre being one reason.  
 
In Aalborg, the parking requirement norm for new buildings is still requiring many spaces 
(the functional approach) after a review some years ago. The technical administration building 
as an example is situated on a vast parking lot even if it is part of the new water front revival 
(also with poor accessibility by bus). A continual debate goes on about the level of charges 
and amount of parking. The parking policy in Aalborg has not been used to reduce traffic, the 
competition between city centre shopping and outside hopping malls being the reason. 
Aalborg is also developing the city centre with easy car access and good parking facilities as 
the main conceptual model, although the Aalborg Charter and Commitments prescribe the 
opposite. Hence both Kristiansand and Aalborg will continue the next five to ten years (that is 
the time needed to change the committed local plans) to develop car traffic generators and 
make their city centers even more car orientated. 
 
In Norwich it has become clear to most politicians that the vulnerable city centre with its 
historic buildings must be safeguarded against car raffic, but still the level of traffic and the 
number of parking places to be allowed is discussed. Norwich has detailed parking norms for 
new building and regeneration to keep the level of parking in the centre constant. The Park & 
Ride schemes with 5000 places are part of that policy. Also there is a policy to make firms 
and other institutions like the University produce Business Travel Plans and use workplace 
parking as an instrument to provide more green travel.  
 
The City of Davis is not using parking as a means to hift mode, nor is paid parking 
introduced. However the UCD follows an active parking policy with parking provision and 
charges well balanced, preferences for car share and so. The parking policy is integrated in the 
University transport policy and worked out in cooperation with the city.  
 
9.3 The study results 
 
9.3.1 A new role for public land use and transport planning. 
 
The major finding in this study is that the main fuction of the land use and transport planning 
system in the three European cities is to support and f cilitate inward investment. Land use 
planning functions to keep the supply of land for building as high as possible given the local 
constraints. Transport planning has two interconnected purposes: one purpose is to acquire 
money for road investments from the Government and Parliament, and the other is to secure a 
well functioning and effective road network, free for congestion. The impacts of land use and 
transport planning in the three European cities differ. In Kristiansand the toll collection is 
providing the city with a high class, very traffic generating motorway system. Aalborg already 
has a motorway through the city, which strongly influences where jobs and people locate. The 
3rd Limfjord crossing will further influence land use and strengthen car dependency. Norwich 
urban area has not got money for road building for years. Congestion is therefore worse than 
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in the other cities. Still the city has managed to stay in the Top Ten as a retail city, partly due 
to 5000 Park&Ride places established. 
 
The results from this study fits with the conclusions from a major research program that 
showed that the planning legislation in Norway is adequate: “it is not the weaknesses in the 
planning act that is the main reason” (Loktra 2000: 52). The formal governing opportunities 
have been increased in Norway through changes in the planning act412. The Kristiansand case 
shows that HA has strengthened its role and impact contrary to the intentions in the legislation 
changes, because the municipal politicians realize that the only way to obtain money from the 
state is through the Highway Agency. They also think (rightly or wrongly) that the 
competence in the HA is better than in their own administration and that the role of municipal 
planners should be to support growth and development. Municipality planners should 
therefore concentrate on legality control of projects and assess the plans’ compatibility with 
the municipal master plan. The municipality planners can if they are at all included be 
“hanger-on” in such processes. Both in Aalborg and Norwich a similar focus on road planning 
was revealed.  
 
The fragmented institutions set high demands on the ability to govern and the ability to take 
the opportunities given. This requires knowledge, competence and the ability to build 
networks and coalitions to create support in governance processes. With a greater influx of 
“private” planners and more emphasis on the behavior of private actors in the market, the 
indications are that this is a development that weakens public planning.  
 
9.3.2 How do the findings relate to the research questions? 
 
First some meta explanations: 
 
• The markets decide, the elected politicians are not governing only administering 
change. 
• Is there a lack of real support for the adopted goals? Or is it so that contradictory goals 
and repeated goal discussions highlight the sustainabil ty goals, promote car growth 
and hide the politicians’ powerlessness? The politicians benefit from institutions that 
hide the powerlessness. Institutions that are protecti n against overbids and populism, 
also make politicians unaccountable.  
• Lack of crisis understanding. There is real disagreem nt about consumption, 
investment, saving and the time dimension   to day -  or  -  in the long term. Political 
promises for years ahead, as plan decisions often are, shield the real intentions and 
short-term actions.  
• Automobility has become a societal institution, embdded in the structure, making 
local business growth inseparable from growth in the car system.  
 
Looking at the more detailed land use and transport planning, the weak implementation of 
goals can be explained by: 
 
                                                
412 See for example Mønnesland, J. Næss, P. Strand, A. (1994): Arealplanlegging og kostnadseffektivitet. 
Rapport 1994:8. NIBR  
 
 347 
• The goals function as symbols, they have been the same over decades and are rolled 
forward and presented slightly differently from time to time. However, there are 
hardly any questions about the past and on how it went, of what goals were achieved 
or who was responsible for what policies, monitoring of performance is virtually non-
existent.  
• City development, land use and transport trends continue in conflict with the goals and 
the gap keeps increasing. The modal split share goes in the wrong direction and 
accidents remain a major challenge, because growth has first priority. 
• The local environments in the cities are improved, but the local and global emissions 
grow and accidents and noise continues to be major problems, but not so strong 
political problems that policy change is needed. 
• The city development is less environmentally transport sustainable today than a 
decade ago, and to turn the trend requires greater ffort for each year coming. This can 
be caused by deliberate policies of pushing the problems ahead to future generations 
and/or a belief that new technologies will solve thproblems. 
 
9.3.3 On the gap between aims and results. 
 
9.3.3.1 Growth and highways 
Three of the cities had a new major road on top of their list, but not Davis. The threat of future 
congestion was the stated reason for this priority, but the aim was also very much to support 
economic growth in the city. Three of the cities were very occupied with growth, but not 
Davis. Davis has the University of California Davis as a growth machine next to the city 
centre. The city of Davis has because of the rapid growth at the university over the years 
become more and more occupied with controlling growth (Fitch, 1998). The three European 
cities have on the contrary been working on a broad sc le to create growth. City branding and 
marketing is one such effort, network building and cooperation with business another, and the 
support of business estates and “parks” focusing on kn wledge industries, creative industries 
and information and communication technology is a third way of facilitating growth. The 
combination of a university, research institutes and new businesses in “knowledge parks” to 
support innovation is the “hot thing” at the moment. The cities use land use planning to offer 
attractive sites for such activities to expand and to attract new businesses to settle. Attracting 
inward investment (Logan and Molotch, 1987) has become an important activity and therefore 
road investment is sought for. The investment part of the road network is important in a 
growth perspective, together with other aspects such as congestion relief and not least to 
improve car accessibility for businesses and workers. 
 
The three cities had to obtain money for road building from the Government. The rules 
governing such allocation set the terms of the local planning process, which at the same time 
had to use the statutory land use and transport planning process. In Kristiansand the Mayor 
and the County Highway Agency Director, both new at the time, managed the planning 
process exemplary through a two by two set of hurdles, and the city is fast expanding the 
capacity of the road network financed mainly by local road tolls (this road building effort will 
continue the next 10-20 years because of the toll agreement with the Parliament). In Aalborg 
the County Mayor gave the planners two years to finish the planning for the 3rd Limfjord 
connection, after 30 years of “planning”. In Septemb r 2003 the road alignment was fixed in 
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both the City Council and the County Council on two consecutive dates413. These decisions, 
which were not without conflicts, open up for the fight to get money from the Parliament 
(Folketinget).  
 
Norfolk County with a traditional Conservative majority in the Council, restarted the planning 
of the Norwich Northern Distributor Road in 2001 to relieve congestion in the centre of 
Norwich city, to improve access to Norwich Airport and nearby business park and to improve 
the road network in the northern part of Norwich urban area. The Blair Government 
introduced a new transport policy in 1997 named “The New Realism”414 which says that the 
problem of increasing traffic demand cannot be solved by increasing road building, both the 
growth in passenger and freight transport must be decoupled from the GNP growth, the 
transport demand management (TDM) policy was born. The Norwich Northern Distributor 
Road, which incidentally is strongly opposed by the Gr en Party in Norwich city, may seem 
to be against Government policy and the presentatio of the project has therefore focused on 
how it supports that policy by saying it will provide a better environment and cleaner and 
greener city. The County is very skillfully using the Local Transport Plan, the East England 
Region and its cooperation with business to circumvent the hurdles ahead for the road project. 
“The finance is the Achilles heel of the Northern Distributor Road” said a Norwich City 
Councilor415. The planning is still going on and different private finance initiatives are sought 
for.  
 
Davis is in another situation, not having to strive for growth, but it is also different with 
respect to the road network. The trunk road network in USA was “finished” thirty years ago. 
Davis has access to the Interstate Highway passing close to the city centre, with several grade-
separated junctions. The highway has three lanes in ach direction, but need increased 
capacity to be able to keep up with the traffic growth. In the sixties and seventies there were 
huge conflicts between Davis and the Highway Agency about design solutions and who 
should pay for them, so they were a bit ahead of European cities.  
 
9.3.3.2 Summing up growth and highways. 
The quest for economic growth is closely connected to the car system and ideology. An 
ideology that is oblivious to all other solutions than building more roads. When the solution – 
a new road with more capacity – is clear, the institutions form the problem and process. There 
is strong competition about scarce money for road investment and to get into and be 
prioritized in the national road program as in Norway and Denmark, require skilful dealing 
and coalition building. The best players get their roads funded and implemented, it is not 
decided by cost-benefit factors416. The incentives and disincentives are forming the planning 
process: one has to get broad agreement about one alig ment, and there must not be any doubt 
that the “right” solution has been found. In practice this means that the Norwegian National 
Policy Provision for Coordinated Land Use and Transport Planning from 1993, which 
demand that public transport alternatives to road building proposals hould be evaluated, are 
                                                
413 After an appeal to Naturklagenævnet, the alignment must be reconsidered, it is not legally “fixed”. 
414 This nickname is probably more known among researchers than the planners I interviewed.  
415 Interview with Rupert Reed, Green Party 
416 Knutsen og Boge (2004) ”Norsk vegpolitikk 1960-2000” and Spangen, I. (1995): ”Institusjonelle 
forutsetninger for en miljørettet samferdselspolitikk”  TØI rapport 3006. 
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put aside. There is a risk for such an evaluation to open up for discussion of alternatives and 
doubts about the effectiveness of the road proposal.  
 
The city “Toll Road Rings” are unique to Norway in which a formal agreement between a city 
and the Parliament allows a city to collect money from road users with the purpose to build 
new roads. The local area must be willing to pay substantial parts of the total costs of highway 
projects as tolls (85% locally financed of the last Toll Road Package in Kristiansand)417. The 
“bidding” process in England based on the Local Transport Plan is a process where the 
Government Office administrators decide. It is more closed and far less transparent than the 
Scandinavian process for financing roads. Another major difference is the strong political 
involvement at all levels in Norway and Denmark, while in England that had been transferred 
to officials.  
 
The competition about scarce resources as road investment allocations, has another and 
important side. If the money is not coming to “my” city or county, it may end up in the 
neighboring city or county. The spatial impact of investments leads to the formation of 
coalitions like rural against urban, centre against periphery. It was this dimension that forced 
up the local share in Kristiansand. In Aalborg the 3rd Limfjord connection was used as an 
argument for the periphery to get some compensation from the rapid growth in Copenhagen. 
In Norwich I would guess that if the city had been a “unitary” then the Norwich Northern 
Distributor Road would have been looked at differently. It might possibly not have been 
under planning, although politicians may see that project as the only option to acquire large 
Government funds. It was Norfolk County who has a different perspective than the city, who 
proposed the road. 
 
9.3.4 Wrong combination of means with regards to aims 
 
There is a long tradition in believing that the carwill solve the majority’s transport problems, 
possibly with the exception of a small minority of politicians without political strength. The 
task of land use and transport planning has been seen to facilitate car-based development, 
regardless of goals, ambiguous or not. (Confer Buchanan’s belief in the car, but difficult 
because of heritage, economy – not enough money for investment, and in Norway where 
farmland largely was preserved and escaped of city expansion, because new developments 
leap-frog farmland and the new housing estates wered v loped in forest/nature areas further 
away from the city centre with car only access.) 
 
The detached house has been (and is) the dream that is m rketed, usually planned as a 
neighborhood with access from the major road, which transferred/caused the state to become 
responsible for the traffic instead of the developer and the municipality. Public transport was 
not necessary and the BikeWalk provision only within the neighborhood if at all. (Ideologies 
from le Corbusier to Colin Buchanan, and Frank Lloyd Wright and the ode to the car, which 
contributed to the model for house design: the detached house, and for neighborhoods: low 
density and easy car access). 
 
                                                
417 At first a toll-agreement secured a major portion of the funding from the Government. Some small amount is 
set aside for PT and BikeWalk investments. 
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9.3.5 Wrong pricing of transport lead to waste of resources? 
 
Lack of fair pricing in transport has been recognized for decades, but only very marginal 
changes have been done to the system. It is the external costs (accidents, emissions, noise, 
etc.) from both freight and passenger cars which is not covered. Too low costs lead to excess 
consumption, but that does not necessarily imply that more correct costs would lead to 
increased use of more environment friendly transport. The effects of higher costs, i.e. more of 
the external costs covered by car users, could either lead to reduced car use or have no impact 
on car use because the costs would be transferred to other budgets. In Norway there is also a 
substantial group that claims that the external costs are more than covered. The Government 
tax on cars bring in yearly about 45 billion NOK, while the Government spending on the road 
transport system is only about 15 billion. Irrespective of this discussion the interesting 
question is if land use and transport planning has been used to compensate for these external 
effects? Such compensation could for example be that a development is stopped because of 
the lack of BikeWalk path and safe access to schools. The municipalities can use both 
compulsory and voluntary measures to solve the problems and let the development go ahead, 
but in fact such measures are very little used. There are two main reasons for this, firstly the 
politicians want the project to go ahead without putting extra costs on the project (the growth 
argument) and secondly, and associated with the first point there is a profound scare that 
developments of any size are ”lost” to the neighboring municipalities418.  
 
The pricing of public transport does not cover the cost of travel. Public transport is therefore 
subsidized or as it is called “public purchase of travel”. The organization of public transport is 
at the county level in Norway and funds are allocated to public transport after competing with 
funds for schools, etc. The result is that the public subsidy is far below the “optimal” which is 
around 40% (Larsen 1993, Norheim 2002). The organization of public transport has been 
debated in years without the Government being willing to change the system. In Denmark 
where the system was fairly equal to the Norwegian, the responsibility for public transport is 
now transferred to the municipalities. In England, which deregulated and privatized public 
transport in the late eighties, there is a trend towards greater public responsibility for public 
transport, which can be seen in concessionary fareso  passengers above 60 years of age and 
free public transport for below 16 years. The effects of the public transport organization and 
institutions are however equal in the three cities: there has not been integration of the different 
modes in a comprehensive multimodal transport policy. The road sector and the car ideology 
has a hegemonic position, while public transport is treated as a social responsibility where a 
minimum level of service should be maintained. The task of keeping enough activities at the 
county level to keep it viable has in Norway been more important than an integrated transport 
planning policy in the big cities. Note that a comprehensive policy does not automatically 
mean an optimal implementation of the policy, the problems of implementation and timing 
both in time and space as indeed resistance to the plans will still be there.  
 
 
                                                
418 IKEA chose to locate in the Sørlandspark after heavy infighting. The infrastructure and access is in 
Kristiansand while the site itself is in Lillesand municipality in another county. The Innsigelse instrument has 
been used several times against different plans in the Sørlandspark, common for these have been “too fast 
growth, the effect on retailing in the region and too much pressure on the road capacity”.  
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9.3.6 Mode shift 
 
The car offers door-to-door transport in comfort and the far lowest travel times compared to 
public transport. The car is also cheaper than public transport when, as people usually do, 
only count “the out of pocket costs”. If one also includes frequency of service, waiting time, 
regularity and punctuality, and a very low standard of traffic information to users, then it is 
clear that the car is the “winning” mode. The large parts of the public transport users in the 
three cities were persons without access to the car. In Kristiansand and Aalborg there are clear 
indications that university campuses with ample fre parking together with the increasing car 
ownership among students are shifting students frombuses to cars at a noticeable speed. 
Increased car availability among students also makes it possible to rent detached housing 
further away. In Davis the university had a rule of first year students not being allowed to 
bring a car as an element in the integrated transport policy to support walking, cycling and the 
use of public transport (free for undergraduates and one dollar fare for others). But also in 
Davis there are quite a few students who rent houses in the surrounding area (Westlands, 
Sacramento) and drive to Davis. This is increasing it is claimed, because of the high price on 
rental. I have the impression that in Norwich the same underlying forces are at work, yet 
without having come as far as in Kristiansand or Aalborg. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, the students are a year or two younger when t y start at university, and secondly the 
university has a parking and travel plan policy to pr mote green travel and reduce emissions. 
There are also attempts from the County/City to improve public transport in Norwich, but few 
levers to be effective.  
 
There are two main lessons from this lack of mode shift. Firstly, an integrated transport policy 
is working well in Davis (especially at UCD) with means and instruments used, which are 
available but not used in the three other cities. Scondly, there is a lack of monitoring and a 
disinterest in following how the total transport picture is changing in the cities. This lack of 
knowledge supports the business as usual policy, which in Kristiansand and Aalborg is a 
supply led land use policy to facilitate growth and a transport policy to promote car use. The 
public transport policy, which is a “budget” policy where the allocation to public transport 
decides the services and prices, is separated from the road infrastructure policy and the 
parking policy. The improvements and changes made in the cities from 2002 onwards as the 
BusMetro in Kristiansand and metro bus in Aalborg, the bus priority at traffic signals and 
information systems in all three cities are all realized with extra money from the Government 
and/or from EU projects419. None of these, as such very positive public transport 
improvements, have been part of an integrated land use and transport policy where restrictive 
measures to reduce car usage were an issue. It is a “carrot policy” designed from the top down 
by the governments without the stick, in Norway it is even called “reward money”. These 
ideas and projects will be useful and benefit public transport and the users. It is also useful for 
the cities and the governments in building a picture of being public transport friendly and 
effective in implementing projects. Both the cities and the governments know that these 
improvements may only have a marginal effect on mode choice. As the County Transport 
Planning Director said420: “The test of the BusMetro project is the ability of the municipality 
to use land use planning to densify around the major nodes.” Such Transit Oriented 
                                                
419 The same type of improvements to public transport has been discussed generally and also in these three citi s 
for thirty years! 
420 Interview County Transport Planning Director, Leif Storsve 
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Development requires either a demand in the market for such intensive developments or the 
municipality has to run an active land use policy and use the levers available to facilitate such 
heavy developments. With the tradition in Kristiansd of being adaptive to the market forces, 
it might take a very long time before the BusMetro will be instrumental in making people 
shift from cars to buses.  
 
9.3.7 Road investment generates new traffic. 
 
The investment in new roads and increased capacity in urban areas generate new traffic421. 
The most interesting question in this regard is how it affects land use planning and other 
modes in the cities. Fosli422 found that the effects of the toll ring financed investments in 
Bergen were: Both car and bus accessibility were improved, but the travel time for cars far 
more than for public transport. In other words the massive investment in new roads in Bergen 
has made the car more attractive and competitive versus public transport. There are clear 
indications that this is already the case in Kristiansand and Aalborg. With the plans for E39 
and Rv456 in Kristiansand and the 3rd Limfjord crossing in Aalborg it is likely that the travel 
time difference in both cities will continue to increase to the benefit of car drivers.  
 
Land use takes longer to change, but changes in the patt rn of both house and business 
location will probably give a further push towards commuting and increase the travel to work 
area in both cities. Land use and the location of new buildings are of course influenced by a 
set of driving forces and factors. In Kristiansand s well as in Aalborg, commuting across the 
city border has increased over the last 10-15 years, and it is very likely that the new road 
capacity will work together with and strengthen thefactors pushing for sprawl. The proposed 
Norwich Northern Distributor road will probably have the same traffic generating effects, but 
how it will affect land use is more uncertain. This is due to a much larger regional population 
and the way the region will be influenced by the Greater London area. The two growth 
corridors London-Cambridge-Peterbourgh and the Thames Get Away will also impact on the 
development of Norwich in the coming years.  
 
Davis has had a high-class main road system with sufficient capacity for years, so the issue of 
major road investment in the city is not applicable. However, the Davis case show that land 
use can be controlled. Sprawl is not “a force of nature”, but is the result of the land use plans 
and policies run over the years. Urban sprawl is insuch a perspective a result of a deliberate 
policy in the sense that the politicians in positions either have let it happen, or been active in 
making it happen. They have had the means to contain land use and prevent sprawl, but 
chosen not to use these instruments.  
 
9.3.8 Risk and vulnerability. 
 
A side issue of land use and transport planning and implementation in Kristiansand is the very 
high vulnerability of the road network. The land use development has taken place a short 
distance from the trunk road passing through the city. The planned use of the national trunk 
                                                
421 Cervero, R. (2002)  
422 Olav Fosli: Vegutbygging og kollektivtransport. En studie av virkninger av større vegtiltak i Bergens 
regionen. TØI-rapport 355/1977. 
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road as the main artery in the transport system lowered the costs of new development and 
gave Kristiansand a competitive advantage at that time. However, the resulting city and 
transport structure is very vulnerable to accidents or abotage since there are no other 
connections, which can serve as substitutes or altern tives. If Kristiansand were to experience 
a “French type of transport strike” where trucks are used to block roads, the city would be 
brought to a standstill only with three-four trucks. This vulnerability and high risk should 
have been an issue in the municipal plan, but the lack of coordinated planning and the 
implementation of the transport infrastructure laggin  many years behind the land use 
development have brought the present vulnerable road system. In Aalborg there are only two 
crossings of the Limfjord making it vulnerable to sabotage and accidents. The 3rd Limfjord 
crossing was also argued from a risk and vulnerability perspective, without that being a major 
issue. Norwich and Davis have a much wider road network and are hence less vulnerable to 
such incidents.  
 
9.3.9 Hindrances. 
 
The lack of public money for road investment has been a major hindrance for the 
implementation of the strategic land use and transport plans in the three European cities. The 
land use development has gone ahead while the transport infrastructure lagged behind. With 
increasing income and car ownership, car traffic increased and congestion grew gradually 
worse. Public transport patronage and cycling both fell with the increasing car ownership. The 
political problem increased with the increase in local queues and congestion. This was never a 
problem in Davis but a major one in each of the thre other cities. In Kristiansand the 
financing of roads by the toll road ring has “solved” the problem of car accessibility to a large 
extent. But the institutions formed have meant thate public transport and cycling modes 
have suffered from lack of investment and the financing of services423.  
 
In Aalborg the 3rd Limfjord crossing was not expected to be built for many years, but is now 
in place in case money for investment should come. Th  public transport and cycling modes 
have in Aalborg as in Kristiansand suffered from the lack of priority and money.  
 
The congestion in Norwich is worse than in Kristians d and Aalborg, but the major road 
they are planning seems contrary to the Government’s “New Realism” policy. Whether and 
when the road will be decided and implemented is uncertain. Public transport was deregulated 
and privatized in the eighties, with the effect that Norwich has the poorest public transport 
services of the four cities. Cycling has not for many years been taken seriously in British 
transport planning as a mode of transport for short distances to work, school, shopping, etc. 
The Norwich bike network, which has got little attention and little money for years, is also 
poor in comparison with the networks in Kristiansand d Aalborg. The Local Plan from 
2002 tries to readdress this with a mode hierarchy putting walking and cycling as the top 
modes.  
 
“A key element of the strategy is the adoption of ahierarchy of transport modes in which, as 
a general principle, greatest priority is given to transport modes with the least environment 
impact. The mode hierarchy is: 
 
                                                
423 In late 2007 there is a discussion of using the toll road income to finance better public transport se vices.  
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1. walking 
2. cycling 
3. public transport 
4. taxis 
5. essential motor vehicles 
6. non-essential motor vehicles” 
 
Time will tell if this mode hierarchy will become the guiding principle for land use and 
transport planning in the Norwich district or urban area. In Aalborg a similar mode hierarchy 
was launched many years ago, but it soon disappeared from the planning documents.  
 
9.4 Summing up the discussion.  
 
The discussion can be summed up in a few sentences. Firstly, the quest for growth and inward 
investment has ruled the land use and transport development in the three European cities. In 
this growth perspective the car has been a major driver, wanted, supported and facilitated by 
the land use and transport planning system.  
 
Major efforts to create a more environmentally sustainable transport development have been 
done as the Sustainable City project in Kristiansand and the Aalborg Charter and 
Commitments are prominent examples of. The evidence on the ground, however, still shows 
an unsustainable trend and an increasing gap between goals and achievements. As such the 
mode hierarchy introduced in Norwich represents another effort to change the former path. 
The question is if it will challenge the car-led land use and transport planning and facilitate a 
trend break, or will it only be a symbol of the right “sustainable” intentions to conceal the 
business as usual planning practice?  
 
The City of Davis has over many years managed to foll w a unique land use and transport 
planning path. It is a success story regarding cycling, which is all the more remarkable 
happening in such an extremely car dependent society as California. The most important 
lesson from Davis is the example of direct democracy – an example of “power to the people” 
well worth studying.  
 
The prospects for the future and the lessons will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
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Appendix Chapter 9: Comparison of 4 cities, regarding LU&T issues 
 
 
 
 Kristiansand Aalborg Norwich Davis 
Background  
and  
Land Use &  
Transport 
connection 
After several years with slow growth, 
the population has grown 1% per year 
last decade. 
Designated as Sustainable City 1993-
2000 by MoE. 
Toll Roads finance major Highways 
E18 & E39. 
ATP project aims at making LU&T 
planning and financing more 
integrated. 
Bursting of confidence 2005! 
 
Aalborg Charter 1994, pledging more 
sustainable city development, has 
reached far out, 1800 cities have 
joined.  
Population growth very slow, and far 
behind earlier expectations. 
Strong centre-periphery issues. 
E45 & E39 finished from German 
border to northern ports.  
 
Norwich is proud of being no. 9 
major retail shopping centre in UK. 
NATS – Norwich Area Transport 
Strategy, is put together by a 
partnership consisting of 4 partners: 
Norfolk County, Norwich City 
District, Broadland and South 
Norfolk Districts.  
 
The US Bike City from the mid sixties 
and still is. University city with no 
jurisdiction over UCD, which grows 
strongly. Davis General Plan aims at 
slow growth, city expansion to be 
decided in referendum (NIMBY) 
Highly educated university employed 
citizens, commuting increasing, house 
prices soar.  
1st year undergraduates are not allowed 
to bring cars. Students are extensive 
bike users. 
Special Land Use  
&  
Transport 
Issues 
 
 
SC goals fail. PT and BW volumes 
after less than when SC-project started, 
contrary to goals. E18 road 
infrastructure built – selected 
information /effectiveness. E39 plan 
based on 85% Tolls financings. 
Innsigelse from HA state against local 
authority. 
Contradiction between car culture and 
planning for sustainable transport 
development. Car commuting and 
sprawl increases.  
The “right” LU&T goals, but no 
instruments to promote/push LU.  
E45 & 3rd Limfjord are winners and 
influence strongly future LU. 
Allocation to Trafik- og 
Miljøhandlingsplanen skewed, car 
culture the winner. 
Job creation seen as the major task.  
Redevelopment of old industrial sites 
in the city centre has added thousands 
of square meters of floor area of 
shopping, offices and parking (Castle 
Mall, Chapelfield, etc). Poor PT, but 
major improvements planned 
(information system, bus priority 
schemes and bus terminal to £5 
million). Gov. allocated 30000 
houses to city region. The Northern 
Distributor Road (NDR) is the major 
LU&T planning issue.  
No-growth island in a sea of sprawling 
growth. Measure “J”:  
Democracy enhanced by referendum. 
Bike City, but the car culture wins in 
the long term? University of California, 
Davis, UCD, an own jurisdiction that 
has pushed for and implemented 
environmentally sustainable transport 
policies.  
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Land Use 
 
LU planning has secured great reserves 
of building land within municipality 
(>30 years). 
LU and T have been uncoordinated. 
Major new roads paid for by local tolls 
will influence strongly on LU in large 
area. 
Commuting and regional LU are 
changing rapidly. 
Weak/fragmented steering of 
investment in infrastructure. 
Growth focus. “Sunset” industries are 
turning into “sunrise” industries as 
Elkem Solar. 
 
Reserve land for building will last 
decades, both close to the city centre 
with redevelopment on both side along 
Limfjord, and in the outskirts where 
large growth areas are planned. 
Considerable investment in utilities for 
these areas, are sunk (put in ground) 
making LU steering difficult. 
Large need for new jobs. 
 
Strong growth in Norwich urban area, 
but takes place outside city border 
(Broadland, South Norfolk). Major 
redevelopment areas in city centre 
changing from industry to mix use 
shopping / offices/flats with ample 
parking 5000 parking places in six 
Park and Ride schemes with bus 
shuttles to city centre The NDR 
which lies outside Norwich District 
border, will relieve through traffic 
and improve conditions in the city. 
But also give access to employment 
area at the airport, for commuters and 
developers of new housing estates.  
 
No reserve land for building, except 
densification.  
Annexation of agricultural land outside 
city borders necessary to grow.  
City Council decision to annex land for 
urban development must be put to the 
people in a referendum, Measure “J”, 
eg Covell Village 2005.  
Strong steering possible, but “No 
Growth” Davis is limited of being an 
“Island Paradise” in a sea of sprawling 
metropolis. 
The close neighbor jurisdiction UCD 
secures strong growth in jobs for many 
years, hence growth is of little concern 
for City of Davis.  
LU&T Policy  
 
Long term security for ample land 
reserves to facility growth in 
jobs/population. 
Within this policy framework marginal 
shift of emphasis in policy over time 
(restrictive/not restrictive). 
Ample supply of land for housing 
building to secure affordable housing 
has been and isa keystone in Krs 
policy.  
Land allocation for the road system a 
technical issue like other utilities 
(water, sewage, electricity, etc). 
The main highway structure fixed since 
the mid-fifties with only marginal 
changes since. 
LU and investment in road capacity has 
not been coordinated.  
Sørlandsparken - shopping to be 
expanded or prevented? Innsigelse 
from County. Tension between 
planning (planners) and policy (centre 
hierarchy, densification, parking, 
environment, sea shore). 
LU&T policy has aimed at establishing 
Aalborg as the growth pole and 
prospering regional centre in north 
Jutland. Reserves for building land for 
at least twenty years. The city can 
receive the location of a major 
company “over night”. 
Ample areas along the waterfront being 
released due to decline in industries.  
3rd Limfjord corridor being fixed in 
2003 after decades of discussion, 
controversial and contested. 
City Syd has had consequences for the 
shop structure in the region, by 
attracting shoppers from a large area. 
Development of City Nord not relevant 
because of this reason.  
Shopping in the city centre versus 
peripheral shopping discussed.  
Transport corridors and junctions have 
influenced LU more than the opposite 
way. 3rd Limfjord is already said to 
influence land prices.  
 
The Norfolk County Council has 
ruled the city for 3 decades. The 
NATS area is divided between three 
district councils with their different 
problems and opportunities, which 
explains a string of retail centers just 
outside the Norwich border.  
LU policy and strategy is different in 
England/Norwich compared to the 
other cities, because of no abundance 
of building land.  
The public inquiry stopped the Inner 
Ring Road and created a lot of bad 
feelings between the county and city, 
some of it is still there.  
The structure plan 1997 has not NDR 
in it, and neither the first LTP. It 
emerges in 2001, and is presented as 
an important part of the LTP being 
prepared. Norfolk County Council 
decided which alignment NDR 
crossing the river Wensum, strong 
environmental objections came.  
The Bike City with bike network and 
Village Homes have strongly 
influenced the design of new housing 
estates (eg Covell Village) green, 
parks, water, paths, etc.  
Downtown however very car 
dominated with parking everywhere 
along streets and off street, instead of 
bike lanes/ paths.  
LU for shopping in the city strongly 
managed. No edge developments or 
major Shopping Mall in city outskirts! 
Ample, wide corridors for road 
infrastructure secured, even in new 
housing estates, but also one example 
of New Urbanism: Aggie Village built 
by UCD.  
Well connected to Interstate highway 
and rail system. 
Two major bikeway projects built: one 
where house was demolished and the 
Putah Creek underpass to 5 mill $.  
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Transport  
Planning 
& 
Financing  
 
of  
 
Infrastructure and 
Public Transport 
Services 
 
 
How to get money for roads? 
Road infrastructure. National 
government final say (Stortinget). 
NTP planning instrument, road 
investment program.  
Partial funding of stretch of road, 
essential for each stretch to get into 
program. 
Toll road financing became a necessity 
in the nineties. 
E18 & E39 pre-emptive consensus 
planning by regime coalition. Task to 
get: local & county support and 
agreement crucial. E18 success, E39 
success (partial highway agency 
success, tunnel instead of bridge). The 
price to pay for the road investment 
agreement with toll financing, was 
money for PT, BW and Traffic Safety 
projects.  
PT services are financed by the county, 
and as such of little concern to the city. 
Walk/Bike infrastructure paid for by 
road owner.  
“The car embedded society”.  
3rd Limfjord decision gives the county 
opportunity to fight for Government 
investment money as part of the 
national highway network system (can 
be contested by the state). Very skilful 
political maneuver by the county 
mayor, while the Aalborg mayor opted 
out of the process. 
Important decision to get financing as 
compensation for investment in 
Copenhagen area. The big H (store H ) 
compromise about the Great Belt 
connection, which led to building the 
motorways E45 and E39, might be a 
model for securing compensation of a 
Femer Belt decision?  
Major changes done in PT network and 
services 2003. the aim was to reverse 
the decline in passenger numbers.  
 
The white paper “A New Deal for 
Transport” sought the decoupling of 
transport growth from GNP growth. 
In effect road building should be 
curbed and PT improved.  Local 
Transport Plan was introduced. The 
old system with a very strong central 
Government, made the policy 
contingent. Who would get financing 
where & when could not be foreseen. 
The new LTP system is supposed to 
be better. 
Also the NDR is part of LTP for 
NATS area, but lies mainly in 
Broadland District with local 
environmental problems. Some might 
ask if alternative ways to road 
building might solve the problems? 
The alternative planning concepts 
“Free Car Use” or using PT as the 
main system in urban areas, may well 
be the decisive factor when they 
apply for financing NDR. PT in 
Norwich is not integrated in the 
transport policy. 
Highways are of no concern to city 
council. 
The F-Street case and controversy 
shows how city administration/ public 
works/ consultants overrule massive 
citizen involvement for less car 
capacity and more secure Bike Walk 
facilities. 
City Council responsible for both 
solution and financing of local roads, 
BW and safety schemes. A very good 
BW network has been created, paid for 
by development. Old Davis has a poor 
BW net, which should be enhanced and 
enlarged over the ordinary city budget. 
PT in Davis is good, it is partly 
financed by student fees and run by the 
UCD students. UCD and Davis city 
finance the remaining of the services. 
The PT net covers Davis fairly well 
and the services cost 1$ per ride, with 
undergraduates riding for free (TAP). 
There are fair regional rail as well as 
bus services.  
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Comments 
 
 
 
Kristiansand did not change towards a 
more environmentally sustainable 
transport development course, even if it 
had opportunity, the right goals, and 
the backing from the Ministry of 
Environment. Why? 1) National policy 
supports car expansion. 2) All 
incentives lead the politicians (and 
planners) to favor the car system. 3) 
The public in general are without any 
direct influence of the local events, 
unless they vote for change, which is 
virtually impossible because local 
elections are the choice between 
national parties. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity and local 
referendums on land use and transport 
matters, would transfer power from 
vested, undemocratic interests to the 
people in Kristiansand.  
 
Aalborg seems to do everything so 
right, but still it is on an unsustainable 
course.  
 
A strategic policy of increasing the 
speed of the waterfront developments 
including affordable housing, 
combined with very restrictive 
development in the outskirts would 
increase density and the opportunities 
for walking and cycling. Such a policy 
could change the course towards more 
PT demand, giving better services, 
which again attract customers, and so 
on. Combined with more restrictive 
parking in the centre and at work 
places, Aalborg might shift course 
towards more environmentally friendly 
transport. 
However, the problem with increasing 
car commuting, which produce many 
vehicle kilometers and large CO2 
emissions has been left to be solved by 
national policies.  
Norfolk County has allowed the 
Norwich expansion to happen across 
the municipality border in the 
surrounding districts. The Norwich 
city council is mainly concerned with 
the reuse of built area. Major 
industrial companies closing down in 
the city centre have opened for 
redevelopment, and more sites will be 
available. Shopping and offices have 
been a priority, like the very well 
designed Castle Mall. The Buchanan 
legacy of coping with the car and at 
the same time give due consideration 
to historic buildings / environment, 
has been followed in Norwich, but 
Norfolk follows a road building path. 
The Inner Ring Road was stopped in 
a Public Inquiry, but the NDR soon 
became the big issue. The conceptual 
model behind LU&T planning and 
P&R as part of this thinking is “free 
car use”. The citizens of Norwich 
may seem “powerless” against 
Norfolk, which follow an 
unsustainable path.  
Development of new housing estates 
pays for connection to existing network 
for all modes. Hence, solution is up to 
the developer, except when annexation 
must be done. Then the developer must 
put forward a proposal which is so 
good that the voters buy it. This gives 
the city administration ample 
bargaining power against the 
developer, limited by the development 
giving adequate returns, i.e. a 
functioning market. 
The F-street case, which was a conflict 
between traffic safety for vulnerable 
road users versus car traffic capacity 
and level of service, and the lack of 
B&W facilities Downtown show that 
Davis still have far to go in an 
environmentally sustainable transport 
development direction. 
 
Still, Davis, the Bike City has managed 
to follow an environmentally friendly 
path few if any other city has managed. 
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10 Experiences and lessons for the future 
 
This study of four cities in four countries has revealed some interesting results, but that does 
not mean that the results can be planted in another city in another country with success. The 
conclusions drawn in this chapter should therefore be looked on as a source of information 
and hopefully inspire some thoughts on how to improve land use and transport planning in 
other cities.  
 
The use of a referendum to decide urban extensions as in Davis, seems to have much in favor: 
enhanced democracy, transparent planning and more accountable politicians. I will guess 
that such a proposal will in Norway and Kristiansand be met with silence and ignored. If a 
response comes then it will be on a high level of principles, a horde of referendums will 
undermine the national state, etc. but the vested interests in keeping things as they are will not 
be discussed. There will be little help that local referendums are used a lot in Switzerland, 
and as we have seen in Davis California. 
 
The evidence from the past makes the belief in the ci ies’ ability to change from an 
unsustainable trend towards an environmentally sustainable transport future, very low. 
However, the direct democracy in Davis offers hope that the three European cites may 
change, a necessary change long overdue.  
 
 
10.1 Introduction  
 
In this concluding chapter we return to the research question and findings discussed in chapter 
nine. To make recommendations for the future it is necessary to have some notion of what the 
future entail for land use and transport in medium sized cities. To create some knowledge of 
such future challenges we did three simulations in chapter 8. The results from chapter 8 are 
presented in the next section 10.2 and are together with the results from the city studies as 
discussed in the preceding chapter, used in the next sections drawing lessons from this study.  
 
The lessons presented are firstly applicable for land use and transport planning in the four 
cities. But I hope that they may also function as an inspiration more generally about land use 
and transport planning and how it can and should be improved to better meet the major 
challenges facing us.  
 
We briefly touched upon the trends in global population and car growth in chapter two. The 
Business as Usual trend as exemplified in chapter 8, illustrate the eff cts such policies in the 
cities, but few politicians worry. Twenty years after he report Our Common Future and ten 
years after the Kyoto protocol that never was ratified by USA424, the politicians continue to 
push the targets ahead: “by 2050 we shall reduce   ”. This discussion is focusing on what we 
                                                
424 The Kyoto protocol had by 2005 been ratified by countries that together produced more than 55% of the CO2 
emissions in 1990 and entered into force, later Australia also has ratified the protocol (www.wikipedia.org).  
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can do Now. What small incremental change can be done to change the course in medium 
sized cities? Are there any good lessons from abroad?  
 
10.2 The future challenges for the cities 
 
In chapter 8 three simulations about the future were done:   
• Two alternative policies BAU (business as usual) and EST (environmentally 
sustainable transport development) were tested on an im ginary model, the city of 
KAND. 
• What are the effects of alternative home locations f r 15 000 new employees at UCD 
in Davis?  
• What if an oil crisis occurred, how would the people in the cities cope? 
 
BAU or EST? 
In the city of KAND the simulation of BAU and EST policy trajectories and the effect of 
different policies exemplify that present BAU policies lead to devastating consequences. It 
also shows that most people probably would adapt to EST policy without having to change 
their lifestyles completely. An EST policy developed over ten years would save substantial 
amounts of oil and largely reduce CO2 and other emissions, thus fulfilling the stated 
objectives and aims. The question then becomes how to make the change from BAU to EST? 
 
Homes located close to Jobs?  
The alternative locations of the homes of 15 000 new university employees at Davis and in 
Kristiansand illustrate that land use planning can o tribute to shorten trip distances and in an 
integrated policy contribute to mode shift. There is a vast difference in the amount of 
transport produced if new workers locate in city, compared to or in the region outside the city. 
The consumption of fuel could yearly be reduced with 70% (Kristiansand) and 97% (Davis), 
and the CO2 emissions with similar magnitude (work journeys only). The Davis example 
illustrate that a compact city can reduce emissions substantially: from 2.35 tons to only 0.07 
tons in Davis. Associated with this reduction in the amount of transport is the reduction in all 
other negative factors the use of the car produce, such as accidents, local emissions, noise, etc. 
Both in California and Europe the freedom to settle wherever you want, is held in high regard. 
When this value is combined with the freedom to use the car whenever and wherever you 
want, the result is expanding travel to work areas as one see in the Agderbyen, around 
Aalborg and Norwich, and within the Sacramento region. How can homes and jobs be located 
closer together? 
 
What if an oil crisis? 
The first lesson from the simulation of an oil crisis is that the social and economic elite but 
also people in general, would manage fairly well with an oil crisis. The long distance 
commuters and the low-income families with a car would suffer the oil crisis the most. The 
cities with a balanced transport system and policy would manage well, while those cities with 
a policy based on a strong car-ideology would be worst ff. The low-income family with a car 
would experience an oil crisis as negative since the increased cost of fuel would put pressure 
on an already strained economy and some of these families would probably experience 
difficulties with access to the employment market. The other main lesson from the what if an 
oil crisis question was that there will not be created a strong crisis of desperation, most people 
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will adapt to rationing and very high oil prices fairly well. Hence, not even an oil crisis will 
create a strong pressure on the politicians and by that create more demand for sustainable 
transport development. The oil crisis simulation shows that the gap between the 
environmentally sustainable transport development goals and the evidence created on the 
ground may continue to widen. 
 
10.3 What is the problem and how have the different cities 
handled it? 
 
This study shows how four cities have perceived the problem (aims), how the cities wished to 
solve the problem (plans) and how the cities have act d to solve the problem (realpolitik).  
The cities aim for a sustainable development in which care-taking of scarce non-renewable 
resources, reduced climate gas emissions and an adjustment to the carrying capacity of nature 
are important elements. The main problem is the increasing gap between the actual land use 
and transport development in the cities and an enviro mentally sustainable transport 
development trajectory. 
 
Among the four cities, only Davis in USA has been able to control land use and implement a 
policy aiming at an environmentally sustainable transport system. Davis has actively pursued 
a policy to make the city a good place to live, it has put “use value” above “exchange value”. 
The principle of subsidiarity – decisions to be made t the lowest competent level – is part of 
the foundation of the US federation. In Davis this principle has put the inhabitants in the 
driver seat, not the developers and municipal administration. The European Union has also 
adopted the principle of subsidiarity, but it is not followed in Denmark or England. The land 
use and transport planning and policymaking in the thr e European cities are fragmented and 
dysfunctional. National policy represents a major hindrance for a more sustainable transport 
development at the city level. Some key comments to he four cities follow below. The 
description of likeness and unlikeness, agreements and disagreements, for each issue and city 
can be contained in these metaphors:  
 
Kristiansand – the tale of two cities 
Aalborg – the mother of the famous Charter, but…   
Norwich – a puppet on a Government string  
Davis – the bike city, well prepared for a climate crisis 
 
Kristiansand – the tale of two cities 
The land use and transport planning in the – Sustainable City – Kristiansand is both praised 
for sustainable development and a prize winner, but the institutions (rules of the game) have 
prevented / excluded other solutions than car based plans. Even the seven year Sustainable 
City project failed to achieve its goals. The institutions have structured the actors to work for 
more road building with the aid of media, organizations and individuals. The car is rapidly 
transforming the land use and transport in the Kristian and region. Pursuit of growth 
(exchange value) led to the success in road investment, but failure in reaching sustainability 
goals and targets. Kristiansand is at the same time the prize-winning Sustainable City and the 
Climate Villain, the latter being subdued in the marketing of the city, which perhaps can be 
said to be double talk, or “the tale of two cities”.  
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Aalborg – the mother of the famous Charter, but…   
More than 1800 cities have signed the Aalborg Charter. In Aalborg there is still, contrary to 
the Charter ideas, a market-led land use and location policy that to an increasing degree has 
led to homes being spread over a large region and jobs concentrated to highly accessible areas 
along the major trunk roads. There is also another trend of both people and jobs moving back 
into the city centre. Individual car transport is both a major driving force in and caused by this 
transport-geographical development. The forces of sprawl seem stronger than the forces of 
concentration. Growth interests (exchange value) us the rules to maximize local inward 
investment. The great success for the Aalborg Charter nd the Aalborg Commitments is so far 
mainly symbolic, with only marginal effect on land use and transport policy.  
 
Norwich – a puppet on a Government string  
Norwich is among the Top Ten retail cities in England, and very proud of the 5000 Park & 
Ride places established. The fragmented governance structure for the Norwich urban area 
both geographically concerning borders, across levels and organizations, and within layers 
(quangos, NGOs and business organizations) has made governing and management by 
objectives very difficult, possibly impossible? The output and outcome of the land use and 
transport planning processes are very uncertain. The strong Government and formal 
institutional structure in England, has made Norwich the “city of lost opportunities”. 
Institutions and organization have prevented building a strong city identity: “I am from 
Broadland District, not Norwich”. A city not so poor that the Government had to intervene, 
not so rich to do it on their own and severely limited by the fragmented institutions.  
 
Davis – the bike city, well prepared for a climate crisis 
Davis has kept on a course towards sustainable developm nt, and is the US Bike City. There 
has for years been a contest between fast growth and slow growth. Davis is a “contained 
island paradise” in a sea of regional sprawl. The people in Davis have so far decided to follow 
a slow growth and environmentally friendly development path. A different mood in the 
population may change this. The future for Davis will depend on how and to what extent the 
strong forces leading to the sprawl in the Sacramento region will affect Davis. Up to now the 
city with extensive self-rule has in practice put Place value above Exchange value. The 
principle of subsidiarity is the basis for the US-federation. Davis like Ulysses (binding 
himself to the mast not to be lured astray) has made rules that give the people power over the 
city council and developers. These rules, among them referendum to be used for urban 
extension, enhance democracy. Davis has succeeded btt r than most cities to curb car use 
and promote public transport, walking and cycling.  
 
10.3.1 Politicians are clinging to power and positions 
 
The comparison clearly shows that the national authorities have been the main hindrance to 
EST in the cities. The institutional set up and the framework guiding the authorities’ actions 
and inactions must therefore be looked at to explain the lack of achievements of the 
sustainable development goals. Behind the individual events described in the cities one often 
finds an active person driving the innovation through despite opposition, but few of them 
were politicians. The elected leaders played more of an administrator’s role than that of a 
 
 363 
leader fighting for a more sustainable future for the city. How can that be explained? An 
explanation can be that the formal and informal institutions rule and the politicians clinging to 
positions don’t dare or manage to change the dysfunctional institutions. The EST goals may 
be sincerely wanted by the politicians, but not wanted enough to drive a goal directed action, 
far less to implement the goals.  
 
10.3.2 Land use, development control and transport 
 
The development in the cities did not function as expected by the model introduced in chapter 
two: that there is a reciprocal development of land use and transport, guided and governed by 
planning and development control. Land use (and also the increasing car ownership) has come 
first and created a strong demand for car transport afterwards. The result has been an increase 
in the commuting across municipality borders and the Travel to Work Area. Development 
control could not stem this expansion of the cities into new jurisdictions, apart from in Davis.  
 
Investment in the transport system has lagged behind t e land use development, but still the 
investment made in road capacity has “shrunk the region” – increased the area covered within 
a set travel time – with the effect that people settle further away from the city centre and 
accordingly commuting to work has been fast increasing during the later years. Development 
control has not functioned as an instrument to govern land use and tr sport development, it 
has become a mechanism for facilitating growth. Institutions (rules and structure) that drive 
forward a car dependent society have been created. Those without access to the car are losers. 
This lack of ability and/or will to control the car use is the main land use and transport 
problem in Kristiansand, Aalborg and Norwich. It is al o the prime reason for the present 
unsustainable path these cities follow. 
 
In Norway the rapid economic growth has further strengthened this development because the 
car users have paid large sums in road tolls, sums that are invested in new roads in the cities, 
which again generate new car traffic. In Aalborg the institutions have brought about new road 
plans for crossing the Limfjord. It is uncertain when the plans will be implemented, but 
politics are the art of improvisation, clever actors may maneuver in such a way that the third 
crossing will be implemented in the short term. In Norwich the situation is more complex. 
The huge migration to Southeast England is very important for the economic growth in the 
country. However, the Government is not able to finance the necessary infrastructure as roads, 
houses, railways, etc. The competition about scarce resources is greater in Norwich than in the 
other three cities. It is the growth ideology that rules, the planning of the Norwich Northern 
Distributor Road is an example of the car alternative having hegemony. Congestion is a 
means, albeit possibly unintended, which may increase the understanding for the lack of 
public money and thereby for the Government transport policy on the one side, while on the 
other it leads to frustration over the waste of time and money, over the politicians lacking 
ability to solve problems and not least pressure to force solutions of the congestion problem. 
Park&Ride is a cheap way for the Government to keep th  demand for money for road 
building from Norfolk County pending. It can also be used to sell Norwich as a progressive 
city having an EST policy.  
 
Solutions on the congestion problem will to a great extent be decided by local conditions 
(conf. London Congestion Charging). How the institutions governing land use and transport 
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are made up and how the organizations are formed (regions, county, unitary, district and 
where the tasks are placed), are together with the gen ral driving forces crucial for how the 
cities will develop in the future.  
 
Davis is in a unique position compared to the European cities since it is not dependent on the 
national authority. The principle of subsidiarity is part of federal state and through that Davis 
has self-rule contrary to the three other cities. The city has used this self-rule to introduce the 
option of a referendum in cases regarding urban extension, which makes the local politicians 
accountable to a degree unknown in the other cities. One may go to Davis to learn about 
active and direct democracy. 
 
To sum up:  
• The belief that the cars solve most transport problems for most people is strong. 
• The lag behind in funding of the roads compared to land use development, has made 
national road investments the first and only (?) priority. 
• Most politicians do not really see public transport as an alternative to the car, the 
emphasis is therefore to provide an acceptable minimum level of public transport 
services.  
• The gap between the goals and results of the land use and transport policy can be 
explained by the time-lag from the governmental adoption of a road proposal until 
road financing become available, which is a lag that as practice shows must be closed 
before other modes get attention.  
• That the local and global emission from car traffic is not at such a level that makes it 
necessary for local politicians to act with negative instruments to reduce car traffic. 
The Government has to introduce major incentives to promote the use of such negative 
instruments in the cities.  
• The use of parking regulation, as a means to curb traffic is unlikely at the local level, 
unless a national framework that governs parking policy is in place. 
 
10.4 How could this situation have been avoided?  
 
10.4.1 Potentials  
 
To take the potential of public transport as an alternative to the car first: It can’t compete with 
the car door to door on travel time. It can’t compete with the car on price (out of pocket 
costs). These two basic imperatives must be taken into consideration when defining the role of 
public transport in cities. If public transport is to have a role as the sustainable development 
goals entail – goals all the cities have adopted – then public money should/must be used to 
secure that the public transport has an adequate and ffective route network, that the 
frequency and quality of the services are good, and the fares are attracting passengers, not 
pushing users away. This role should be defined for each city as part of an integrated land use 
and transport policy and financed to be able to fulfill such a role. The present system quasi- 
market and user financed public transport services ar  not working effectively in any of the 
three European cities, and certainly not towards the s ated goals. The knowledge is there to 
substantially improve public transport in the three cities. It must therefore be other and more 
important reasons that make governments continue with institutions and organizations that are 
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barriers for public transport to play an effective role in an environmentally sustainable 
transport development.  
 
The same can be said for the cycling policy. There is nothing to hinder a government to use 
say a few percent of the national road investment program per year on a national cycling 
investment program, hardly noticeable in the road sector but an amount that would represent a 
huge improvement for the bike mode and networks in a few years. Why does this not happen 
when cycling is an important mode in an environmentally sustainable transport development? 
There must be strong forces that prevent governments and politicians to achieve their goals. 
Who, what, where, when are these forces? It is too simple only to blame the formal 
institutions, because far greater changes in institutions and organizations have been done for 
example within the health sector in these countries h  later years. Why does not the same 
type of change happen in the transport sector? It has not been because of lack of knowledge, 
well-researched improvements have been proposed. On the contrary there exist a fair amount 
of research pointing in the same direction (LOKTRA 2000, CfIT 2004, 2006 ) and also as this 
study shows, Davis has managed to develop and practice a land use and transport policy that 
achieve the sustainability goals far better than the three European cities.  
 
Parking policy is not used instrumental to regulate traffic volumes in any of the cities. Paid 
parking in the city centre has been introduced to regulate the length of stay and thus increase 
car accessibility to the city centre shops and servic s. A few hundred meters from the city 
centers in the three European cities there is free parking where one can stay all day. Davis has 
not introduced paid parking. Norwich has 5000 parking spaces on six Park&Ride sites with 
shuttle buses to the city centre. The building codes ar  still based on a parking requirement for 
free car use, with minimum norms for the number of places required according to the floor 
area and use of each building. It is discussed in Kristiansand to set maximum limits on the 
number of places allowed, but not yet adopted. The requirements are somewhat modified for 
the city centers with fewer places required than in the outskirts, Norwich having the most 
detailed regulation. Kristiansand has for the central business district a system of reducing the 
parking requirement against paying for each place less than the required number into a 
parking fund “free-purchase”. This fund is then used to provide multistory parking in the city 
centre. The neighboring jurisdiction to the city of Davis, UCD does use parking policy as a 
means to regulate car traffic and facilitate mode shift. 
Local parking policy is a blunt instrument in a carembedded and car dependent society. An 
effective local policy can only function within the frame of a strong national parking policy, 
possibly with the exception for the city centers.  
 
10.4.2 Hindrances  
 
There are major barriers for the three European cities to change course. First and foremost 
there is the notion that politicians in positions will not give any of their power away. The 
same goes for the officials and administration, they cling to their power. I have claimed that 
fragmentation of powers between sectors, levels and layers is the main cause of the land use 
and transport planning system not delivering and the major barrier to sustainable development 
of the cities. The cities must have a local authoriy that develops a vision for the city, a 
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strategy to reach the vision and the powers to imple ent that strategy together with the 
citizens and wide body of stakeholders425.  
 
Davis has such powers and has succeeded. None of thParliaments of the three European 
countries is willing to devolve the necessary powers. In Norwich we have seen that local party 
politics and positions twice prevented administrative reform. In Norway the MPs have for a 
long time been “allowed” to come back to their county and take the praise for some budget 
money for a road or for support of cultural activity. These two areas have become the only 
ones where a MP can operate individually, the rest of the policies are ingrained in a bigger 
system. If the authority and money for roads (except trunk roads) and public transport were 
devolved to the cities, the lawmakers would be left with little to show off at home. 
Devolvement of road authority and finance to the cities except for the trunk roads would also 
leave the Highway Agency with less resources and power. The Minister of Transport, the 
Department of Transport and the Highway Agency are not willing to accept that as earlier 
discussions have shown426. There are apparently very strong powers in central Government 
that must change attitude to devolution of powers bfore the cities can develop in a 
sustainable direction (the opposite possibility that central government force or induce cities to 
change is not very realistic as long as the governmnt to such an extent depend on taxation of 
the car for its income). Both England and Denmark are members of the European Union and 
should be obliged according to the principle of subsidiarity to devolve powers, but are moving 
very slowly on this point. Neither Norwich nor Aalborg can for many years expect to 
experience a situation where all powers over land use and transport planning and policy are 
devolved to the City Council (except trunk roads and rail lines) judged by the recent history.  
 
The hindrances for changing this policy may seem small and meaningless, but still the 
hindrances are not removed. Take for example the organization of public transport and 
financing in Norway, which is placed at the county level. One could imagine that the money 
used on public transport in the five biggest cities ( xcept Oslo that is more complex) was 
transferred from the counties and given directly to the cities as a sum to be used on public 
transport. The major argument against doing that is that the Government should not 
“earmark” funds since it reduces the autonomy of elect d county and city councils. Then one 
could say that the municipality get a lump sum of mney for public transport, but is free to 
use it as they please. The similar argument that road investment money could be transferred to 
these five cities and allocated as the city councils preferred, is not acceptable because of 
national goals and interests. That these two systems historically and at present are giving 
results that are contrary to the national goals is somehow a different matter. The vested 
interest, the power of status quo (jobs, roles, statu , profit) and the resistance to change, make 
Norway continue to organize public transport in a way that benefits the car and hides the 
responsible decision makers: “The established organizational structure is suitable if one 
wishes a further increase in car use in cities, andt the same time finds it appropriate that no 
one is directly responsible for this development.”427 
 
This pointed statement fits very well with the findi gs in this study. To cater for the car there 
have been active and proactive effort to expand the road network, even if the challenge of 
                                                
425 See Richard Rodgers and Mark Fisher A new London 1992 for a similar idea.  
426 See Sverre Knutsen and Knut Boge, V gvesenets historie 1960 – 2000  
427 Oddgeir Osaland and Torgeir Kråkenes, 1999. Kollektivtransport og forpliktelser. Innspill til endringer i 
organisasjon i norske byområder. Universitetet i Bergen. My translation. 
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future congestion is years ahead. The public transport and cycling modes get positive support 
verbally, but the same politicians avoid responsibility for the lack of goals achievement. The 
fragmented governance system makes it possible for politicians to remove themselves from 
any responsibility of past performance and turn focus on what’s most promising for the 
future. Another way to avoid responsibility is put emphasis on and glorify what they do as the 
present Norwegian Government has repeatedly done lately: “We have increased rail 
investment with 50%, the best ever.” The fact that rail investment has for years been very low, 
which make a small increase huge, when it is present d as a percent increase, is kept silent.  
 
The car is such an object we all like to have and have come to be dependent upon. We are not 
easily giving this good up, as already Colin Buchanan warned about in Traffic in Towns. 
Instead of building a system to facilitate a shift from the car to more environmentally friendly 
modes, we have built barriers and hindrances to prevent a sustainable transport development. 
Most of these barriers are at the national level. They are man made and thus they can 
hopefully be changed? 
 
10.4.3 Democratic deficit – exchange value and use value rvisited. 
 
Policy makers are often faced with significant conflict between two broad strategic 
objectives428:  
• To enhance mobility within the urban economy through reduction in congestion and 
other dis-benefits associated with road traffic. 
• To improve levels of accessibility to urban amenities for all residents. 
 
The mobility aim falls into the category “city as economic space” where the prime role of 
urban transport is to maximize mobility of labor and capital (work journeys, business trips 
and goods transport). The policy objective is to increase economic growth and the means used 
are road building to increase capacity. This fits with “exchange value” of the city and also 
with Tönnies’ “Gesellschaft” – the shifting urban association (Kristiansand and Aalborg can 
be put in this category while Norwich has in a political and administrative meaning lost its 
city status, and people their sense of Norwich as a place forming their identity?).  
 
The accessibility aim falls into the category “city as social place”. It is the “use value” of the 
place, which is in focus. The policy objective is social development, which urban transport 
contributes to by maximizing individual accessibility to urban amenities. With this individual 
accessibility perspective one must also include othr modes than the car: public transport and 
cycling and walking. The individual perspective must al o include universal transport or 
“transport for all”. Again perspectives close to ”Gemeinshaft” or community, a less flexible 
social construct putting more emphasis on place and less willingness to change. Davis clearly 
belongs in this category. These two perspectives on the city – the exchange value or the use 
value of place – show that in the three European cities th  exchange value has had preference, 
while in Davis the use value was dominant. This reflects the lack of local power over land use 
and transport policy in the three European cities. The representative democracy is not able to 
include the citizens’ feelings for their place when the quest for growth is on the agenda. 
 
                                                
428 Docherty 1999:12  
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Sustainable development requires among other things, that people shall forego consumption 
today to save resources for future generations. Sustainable development is therefore not 
possible without broad and active involvement from the public in planning and governance. 
To achieve EST in the three European cities, fundamental changes in institutions must be 
made. I have proposed the subsidiarity principle as one way to stop fragmentation and 
achieve integrated planning. But, this principle is not enough by itself because no city can in 
the long run behave contrary to the development in the surrounding region. Davis has the 
basic framework necessary and has managed to pursue a completely different and more 
sustainable course than the Sacramento region. To maintain such a trajectory in the future 
Davis need that the city policies are supported by the policies at the state and federal level.  
 
10.4.4 A perspective from the interviews  
 
From the interviews with politicians, but also top leaders in the municipalities, it was clearly 
expressed that the welfare of people and especially work opportunities was their most 
important task429. Sustainable development was one of their important tasks, but not one of 
their most important tasks judging from their answers and according to the role they had. This 
was surprising for me with my focus on LU&T planning, but among the planners I found a 
problem-understanding fitting with my expectations. That may be understood as EST is one 
of many important issues and tasks, which occupy decision makers at the local level, but not 
an overriding aim that forms the frame for the municipal activity. Apart from Davis, the 
municipal or city LU&T plans can be said to promote and aim for Sustainable Development 
as a premise for the municipal planning. This is the case for Kristiansand, which has 
strengthened the sustainability vision and aims in the latest plan (Kommuneplan 2005), for 
Norwich (LTP 2001/05) and not least Aalborg that has further developed the Charter from 
1994 into the Commitments 2004. Davis in California uses less time, energy and effort on the 
goals and objectives, but much more emphasis is put on “what Davis is doing and can do”.  
 
Another dimension coming out of the interviews was that the politicians, top administrators 
and planners seem to live in two different cultures or express different attitudes and values, 
which may be caused by their different roles. In geeral the politicians and top administrators 
had a strong interest and concern for job creation, p pulation and economic growth and less 
interest in sustainable development. The planners exposed the completely opposite view with 
a strong interest in sustainable development and little interest in growth. The interpretation of 
planning and plans will thus be different from planners to politicians. These two views, the 
politician’s and the planner’s, are in the matrix below used to explain the character, the 
importance and the impact attached to LU&T planning:  
 
  ECONOMIC GROWTH CONCERN 
  WEAK STRONG 
WEAK 
 
I Business as Usual 
BAU or Market rules 
II  Politicians 
 
SUSTAINABLE  
DEVELOPMENT  
CONCERN 
 
STRONG 
 
III Planners 
 
IV “Our common future” 
 
 
 
                                                
429 Interviews with Hav, Jensen, Wallevik, Valvik, Austad, Gunson.  
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Box 1: Business as Usual BAU or Market rules 
The present LU&T planning is placed in Box 1 because it was not used actively as an 
instrument neither for employment nor sustainable development. When both politicians and 
planners show a weak interest in using LU&T planning as an instrument it resemblances a 
market driven situation or a business as usual attitude. LU&T planning is done because it is 
statutory, because it is gives an overview and indeed as an instrument to acquire government 
funds for highway infrastructure. Planning then becomes important in the presentation of the 
city to central government, or in the marketing of the local solutions and the benefits that will 
accrue if government funds are allocated to the city. The presentation or marketing will then 
often put emphasis on different aspects according to what the city wants and who the provider 
of funds is, etc. 
 
Box 2: LU&T planning used in job creation 
The politicians interviewed were interested in the people’s welfare. Employment and access 
to jobs therefore became the main task. Land use and tr sport planning should provide 
building land for new employment and new housing. There should always be attractive 
building land available for the municipality to attr ct new firms to localize. Transport 
planning was used to develop a functional road network ith high service traffic flow level 
for cars and minimum congestion. Transport planning also served as basis for getting 
Government funding for highway infrastructure.  
 
Box 3: Strong concern for sustainable development, low concern for employment. 
In this box many of the planners can be found, theyoften identify with Sustainable 
Development. The “Sustainable City” Kristiansand is such an example, created by local and 
central government experts together with consultants. The aims were splendid, but the gap to 
the unsustainable LU&T development path of Kristians d increased. The politicians 
supported the project, but did only show weak interest in it.  
 
Box 4: Strong concern for both growth and sustainability.  
The Brundtland report Our common future advocated sustainable development through 
economic growth and this is also the situation advocated in many Government documents on 
environmentally sustainable transport430. Land use planning should plan for compact cities 
with mixed use and high density at transport nodes (TOD). Transport planning should 
facilitate maximum of bike and walk modes for local trips and energy efficient public 
transport between the city centre and nodes in the transport network431. How can politicians’ 
interests for the welfare of the voters here and now, be combined with perspectives of 
sustainable development, which is welfare in the long-term?  
 
What can the matrix tell? 
If the gap between unsustainable and EST development increase, and one wants to narrow or 
close the gap, then land use and transport planning should be put in Box 4, where both 
politicians/top-leaders and planners have a strong interest in promoting both economic growth 
and policies to mitigate climate change. This will probably require both incentive changes and 
                                                
430 The broad discussion if economic growth and sustainable development are in conflict or compatible, is not 
included here. See Næss 2006b for further discussion.  
431 For further discussion see Næss (2006), Newman and Ke worthy (1989, 1999), and on Smart Growth and 
New Urbanism: Katz, Reid, Ewing  
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changes in institutions. First and foremost the local politicians, who are responsible to the 
voters, must be given the opportunity and incentives to behave rationally according to EST 
goals. This is not the case at present, when central government institutions “force” local 
politicians to work for “automobility” rather than “sustainability”.  
 
The principle of subsidiarity may help solve many of the present LU&T imperfections or 
paradoxes. In USA this principle is a part of how the federal constitution is built up. The 
development of Davis clearly shows that it is possible to get on to a sustainable LU&T path 
for a local authority. This is hardly possible in the three other cities with the present 
institutions. The European Union has adopted the princi le of subsidiarity, but national 
institutions and traditional practice hamper the change towards such practice. Unless strong 
external forces are applied, it will take many years before “the principle of subsidiarity” 
becomes the “rule” in the three European cities. 
 
Another path can then be to introduce incentives for local politicians to behave according to 
the interests of the local authority. Again Davis is a good example. The city has itself 
developed rules so that the voters can control the ci y council through referendums. Two 
highly successful cases (see ch. 7) show that power has been shifted from planners to the 
politicians and to the voters. This shift from mainly a representative democracy to a more 
direct democracy has enhanced LU&T planning and policy in Davis.  
 
10.4.5 Competence 
 
“The planner” was a highly esteemed profession in the sixties and the seventies. With the new 
liberalism and New Public Management long-term planning has gradually been replaced with 
short-term strategy and city branding, as if the city is a commodity that can be sold (exchange 
value) and not a cultural community where people liv and interact.  
 
This general development has influenced planning law and practice. The role of the planner 
and her self-esteem has changed accordingly432. The planner’s status also differs depending 
on where he is employed, which may affect outcomes of planning negotiations433. This has 
probable over time weakened the land use planners mo e than the transport planners and 
lessened the impact of integrated planning and plans (place value) on behalf of sector plans 
(exchange value). Kristiansand is a good example of this where the seven-year Sustainable 
City project, which should develop the whole city in a more sustainable way, came to nought. 
At the same time the very unsustainable road building project were realized. The resources 
available and the competence of the planners clearly did influence the output of these two 
processes.  
 
The change towards city marketing instead of city planning, also make necessary that 
information is controlled and streamlined. Professor emeritus Røyne Kyllingstad434 claims 
that: “Where earlier the planners took an active part in public discussion, they are now silent 
in Norway. The result is that lobbying and short-tem perspectives steer land use planning, - 
                                                
432 Many of the interviewed planners looked back and stated ”before it was - better” 
433 Road planners in Norway allocating huge investments, are far more esteemed than a planner in a 
municipality. 
434 Røyne Kyllingstad Norsk fysisk planlegging gjennom hundre år. Kommunalteknikk 6A/2007.  
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a development tailor-made for property speculators”. Another result is that the professional 
planning competence has become less in demand and perhaps irrelevant. Politicians and 
administrative leaders may deliberately give biased an  misleading information about plan 
proposals in the press, without in practice any possibility for the planners who has made the 
plan proposals to correct it.  
 
To solve this – I think – increasing problem of sidel ning the land use and transport planning 
profession and competence, Kyllingstad435 proposes to “give the planners power in the 
planning process, as they had before the 1965 Building Act.” My proposal would rather go in 
the different direction, not using the law, but using the principle of subsidiarity and devolve 
powers so that people feel that the land use and planning process is concerned with their 
welfare and future. In addition the process must be transparent and access to information 
open. The discussion on the way on forward and on pla  alternatives and solutions should be 
created through participation of as many as possible. Together with a referendum clause as in 
Davis, a better democracy can be created, a democracy with open planning processes making 
the possibilities of corruption less.     
 
10.5 Lessons and learning  
 
10.5.1 Lessons  
 
The focus in this study has been on local travel in medium-sized cities436 and I will draw three 
lessons from the study: 
 
Lesson one is that we can “relatively easily” reduce our car use and shift to public 
transport, cycling and walking. There are two ways of doing this: a) by a holistic 
national and local policy, or b) that the climate change will force us to change.  
 
Lesson two is that land use and transport planning and policy can be controlled 
and managed. It is possible to set goals and achieve them, but it requires long-
term and visionary leadership instead of the present short-term policies. I 
strongly believe that the public, given the chance, would facilitate such changes in 
land use and transport policy. 
 
Lesson three, which ties in with lessons one and two, is that there is an urgent 
need to make politics transparent and politicians accountable. I believe the way 
to go to achieve this is decentralization and devolution of powers according to the 
principle of subsidiarity.  
 
These lessons are supported by a recent report: --The actions have only to a small degree led 
to active processes of learning with systematic reviews. They have not contributed to 
institutional changes that to a greater extent could have resulted in more holistic assessments 
                                                
435 Røyne Kyllingstad Når problemet er kunnskapsmangel – Blir det da bedre om staten overtar? Plan 5/2007  
436 I am by that not saying that our recreational trips out of the city or our flights to exciting destinations don’t 
matter, on the contrary.  
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and actions in cities. The result from three decades of planning has to the contrary been a 
continual effort on building road infrastructure, reductions in public transport services, 
environmental problems and to a small extent a city development that coordinates land use 
and transport system. City and transport planning i Norway reveal a history of repeated 
actions to change the policies in a more environment friendly direction. The result of this 
planning has been very limited.437  
 
When “obvious” improvements of a system are not taking place, then they may not be so 
obvious. One such obvious thing is that we all want sustainable development, but do we? 
 
10.5.2 Do we really want sustainable development? 
 
I have argued that LU&T planning should be decided at the urban level, according to the 
principle of subsidiarity. Even if that will not solve all problems, there is the advantage that 
decisions carry greater accountability. I assume that there exists a national framework, which 
aims at sustainable development and thus support regional and local authorities aiming at 
sustainable development. We have seen that the presnt national frameworks in Norway, 
Denmark and England are major hindrances to achieve en ironmentally sustainable transport 
development in medium sized cities.  
 
Even after a national framework supporting sustainable development is in place, there will 
still be a need to get people to change their consumption patterns: less car use and more use of 
environmentally friendly modes. Active politicians and city council will still be needed to 
make the local land use policy and the local transport olicy support sustainable development, 
but success will be more likely since the basic natio l framework will be supportive of such 
policies, not a hindrance as at present.  
 
The output from the planning process and the outcome was mainly formed by the institutions 
and organizations set up to build roads. To make it possible for a city to turn towards 
environmentally sustainable transport system development, alternative modes to the car must 
be given a chance. The present system excludes other solutions than the car solution. To 
change the system it is necessary to make new rules – n w institutions. I believe that 
sustainable development is only possible through broad public participation on the grass roots 
level in the local urban area in question. To make people shift from cars to other modes they 
must be willing to make the shift and also act accordingly. A shift may be caused by moral, 
economic or other reasons and therefore incentives hat support these reasons should be 
created. We have seen that the present rules made by th  national state are dysfunctional for 
the promotion of sustainable development in cities. These rules will prevail if the public are 
not really wanting sustainable development.  
 
10.5.3 Learning from experiences in the four cities.  
 
Two well known lessons (Kleven 1990, Olsen 1994) are confirmed by this study:  
1. Planning may come into conflict with wished action (a paradox if planning has to do 
with certain knowledge based thought processes before action) and then planning has 
                                                
437 Lian, J. I. et. al. (2007). Scenarier for bærekraftig byutvikling – sluttrapport. Oslo: TØI rapport 888/2007. 
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to give way, or it is broadened, or toned down, or discarded to make this conflict 
disappear. 
2. Decision makers (politicians) have a resistance to prioritize between aims because, if 
they do they may soon find themselves out of office. It seems that they think: It’s 
better that I compromise and go on with the job, than the opposition taking over.  
 
In Kristiansand there are several examples of how these two general lessons crop up and were 
dealt with. The major item was how the Sustainable City and the E18 processes could run in 
parallel without the major conflict between road building and sustainable development being 
questioned. The answer to that is that the institutions are made such that the apparent conflict 
never had to be confronted, it was organized out. The representative democracy is working on 
consensus as a rule. It is put under strain when having to choose between conflicting goals. 
Institutions are made such that politicians can say yes I choose both, and never be confronted 
with the paradox at the same time of aiming at reducing while the policies are increasing the 
use of cars. Institutions are purposely built over a long time period and among many other 
issues, also to prevent that these two situations arise. Institutions are therefore not easy to 
change, which both the Norwegian and the British case show by the misfit between 
administrative borders and the urban area. Still they are man made and they can be changed as 
the Danish administrative reform from 2007 shows. Davis is the prime example of how 
institutions enhance democracy.  
 
This study reveals that the needs for changes are first and foremost changes at the national 
level – the devolution of power to the cities. This should be accompanied by minor reforms:  
• Road planning and financing. 
• Public transport planning, financing of services and infrastructure. 
• How environmentally sustainable transport development is dealt with/not dealt with. 
• The role of cycling and walking, planning and financing of infrastructure.  
 
These four points show that there is a lack of integration, of comprehensiveness, of holistic 
thinking. Why are these issues not integrated, when it seems the most natural, self-evident 
thing to do? Obviously there must be strong interests opposing integration. Some explanations 
may be that  
• the car is deeply embedded in the structure  
• our dependency of the car in everyday life  
• the Highway Agency tradition, competence and role, and the employees’ self interest  
 
It is not enough to change organizations and increase the money for public transport to attain 
the EST goals, because of the complexity of interess behind the present structure and 
instruments. I think there are three different ways to go, remembering the two imperatives 
with which we started this discussion:  
 
• To make the politicians accountable and encourage political leadership, the decisions 
on major conflicts must be forced into the open andma e transparent. Questions like 
these should be put to the voters: Do you choose mor  sustainable development and 
less road building, or the other way around?  
• Work with the market by using levers or means supporting market forces to turn in the 
right direction, for example as I have suggested by Green Grants to support 
environmentally friendly behavior.  
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• Extensive use of the principle of subsidiarity, which would give people more say and 
enhance local democracy. 
 
Behind these three proposals lie questions about the way our democracy works. All three 
ways must be used if Land Use and Transport planning i  cities are to contribute in the effort 
of reducing the climate challenge and shift towards environmentally sustainable transport 
development in the cities. I believe that more selfrule to cities will show that people are 
willing to change lifestyle and make sacrifices if they feel it is sensible and worthwhile, and 
that their contribution matters. I also believe that people are far more willing to act than the 
Government and politicians in power are.  
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APPENDIX   I  
 
Definitions and glossary 
 
EST  environmentally sustainable transport  
LU&T  land use and transport (planning, policy, etc) 
PT   Public Transport  
P&R   Park and Ride  
SC  sustainable city  
VKT  vehicle kilometers traveled 
pbl  the Norwegian planning act 
 
CAQA  clean air quality act 
EIR  Environment Impact Report 
EIS  Environment Impact Statement 
CBD   Central Business District 
 
Abbreviations and some terms used Norwegian political parties:  
 
Norwegian political parties, names , abbreviation and English translation:  
 
Arbeiderpartiet   Ap Labour party 
Fremskrittspartiet   Frp Progress/Future party  
Høyre     H Conservative party 
Kristelig Folkepart   KrF Christian democrats 
Senterpartiet    Sp Centerparty 
Sosialistisk Venstreparti  SV Socialist party 
Venstre   V Liberal party  
 
 
Norwich case, abbreviations used: 
 
NATS - Norwich Area Transport Strategy   
IRR - Inner Ring Road    
NDR - Northern Norwich Distributor Road (also abbreviated NNDR) 
PI - Public Inquiry     
 
RTS – Regional Transport Strategy 
SEA – Strategic Environmental Assessment. (E.g. SEARTS is the strategic environmental 
assessment of the regional transport strategy) 
EIA – Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIP – Examination In Public 
IRS – Inter Regional Strategy 
TWA – Travel to Work Area 
 
GO EE - The government office in East England: www.go-east.gov.uk 
EERA - The East of England Regional Assembly (electd/appointed): www.eera.gov.uk 
The public-private partnership web side: www.eastofengland.uk.com 
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Quango – QUasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization, have been used to describe a 
range of organizations to which governments may have devolved power. 
 
 
Kristiansand Case 
 
Persons interviewed  
 
Bjørg Wallevik, H, mayor, 1992-2004 
Bjarne Ugland, Ap, deputy mayor, 2004-2008 
Harald Furre, group leader, H 
Harald Sødal, deputy mayor, Krf 
Tore Austad, group leader, H, also former PM and Minister of Education,  
Bernt Erik Olsen, leader city planning commission, Krf 
Kjell Landmark, prominent left councilor, Green City Party  
Alf Holmlid, group leader, SV 
Harald Synnes, former mayor, former MP, Krf og Sp 
 
Asbjørn Grøvan, technical director 
Tor Sommerseth, city director 
Erling Valvik, city director 
Øystein Holvik, environment director 
Ingvald Kårikstad, planning director 
Grethe Sjøholt, city planner 
Arne Bulie, chief architect 
Riseng, Kåre, planner 
 
Andreas Setsaa, HA director 
Kjell Abildsnes, County planning director 
Leif Storsve, County transport planning director 
Inge Os, chief public transport planner  
 
Kristiansand documents 
 
Documents have been looked into for all the cases in the list of important land use and 
transport plans, projects and decisions in Kristians d 1987-2005.  
 
MIK miljøvern i kommunene 1989-1992 
Miljøhandlingsplanen 1994 
Miljøby 1993-2000  
 
Kommuneplan 1987. 1990. 1995. 2000. 2005. 
Bråvann, strid om gjennomføring av kommuneplanen 1987. Omkamp 2005 
Odderøya forsvaret tilbyr Kristiansand deler av øya. Lokal strid om boliger. 
Otra nedre del. Mange utbyggingsprosjekter som Høivoll, Tangen, Kjøita. 
 
TP10 1989-1991 
KT forsøk 1991-1994 
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Kollektivpakke I og II 1995- 
Metro Kristiansand 1999- 
E18 regulering og bompenger 1991-1996 
E18 Varoddbrua bompenger 1986-1994 
NVVP 1986. 1993 
NTP 2001-2011 
NTP 2006-2016 
E39 Gartnerløkka og vestover 
Plan og finansieringspakke presentert våren 2004. Aksjonsgruppa for Tunnel startet i 
mai. 
Andre: veg til Kjevik 
 Veg til havn Kongsgård 
 
Sørlandsparken med handel fra 1986. Næringsklynge bil fra 95-. 
HiA sammenslåing og lokalisering. 1995-1998 
Krigsskolen 1990-1992 
 
Kvadraturen 
 Havneplanen 1985-1993 
 Euroterminalen 1998- 
 Murbyen bevaringsplan 1992-2000 
 Kulturhus 2000- 
 Parkering 
 Estetikk 
Arealpolitikken 
 Boligtomter og priser 
 Næringstomter 
 Fortetting 
 
Reports  
 
Meland, Solveig. 2007. RVU 2005 – Hovedresultater for Agderbyen. SINTEF 
 
National program Sustainable Cities project an be found on:  
http://odin.dep.no/md/norsk/dok/andre_dok/rapporter/022005-990517/dok-bn.html 
 
Vibe, Nils et. al, 2005. Persontransport i norske byområder. TØI report 761/2005 
Side xx Kristiansand hadde best utvikling I takst, 1992-2003 80% av 1990, alle andre byer 
mellom 100% og 160%. 
 
RVU Agderbyen, Sintef 2006,  
RVU Nord-Jæren, IRIS 2006. 
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Aalborg Case  
 
Aalborg Interviews 
 
Borgmester Henning Jensen 
Amtsborgmester Orla Hav 
Rådmann Henrik Thomsen 
Engineer Svend Tøfting 
Architect Peter Nordskov Kristensen 
Planner Tommy Madsen 
Architect Eric Møller 
Planner Henrik Jess Jensen 
Senior lecturer Anker Lohman-Hansen 
Lecturer Carsten Jahn Hansen  
Chief public transport planner Jan Øhlenschlæger 
 
Journalist Mogens Møller, NordJyske Stiftstiende  
 
Aalborg documents 
 
Stadsarkitekten i Aalborg 1949 Redegørelse for Trafikundersøgelsen: Tirsdag den 9. august 
1949.  
 
Aalborg kommune (1973) Aalborg Generalplan. Arbeidsrapport nr. 3, Teknisk forvaltning, 
Aalborg. 
 
Aalborg kommune (1974) Aalborg Generalplan. Tanker bag planen. Hefte til  publikum. 
Teknisk forvaltning, Aalborg. 
 
Aalborg kommune (1974) Generalplan: Aalborg 1990.  
 
Aalborg kommune, Magistratens 2. avd, (1974) Fornyelsen af Aalborg Bykerne 1973-1990.  
 
Aalborg kommune, Magistratens 2. avd, (1979). en større trafikkanalyse for Aalborg Bykerne, 
basert på trafikk data fra 1971, men supplert med snittellinger og OD midtbyen, men ikke MS 
beregnet, rapportert i flere rapporter: 
1. Aalborg Bykerne Reg Arealanvendelse 
2. Aalborg Bykerne Reg Trafikk 
3. Aalborg kommune (1979) Aalborg bykerne. Forslag til målsætting og overordnet 
struktur. Trafikk og arealanvendelse. Rapport nr. 3, Teknisk forvaltning, Aalborg. 
4. Aalborg kommune (1979) Aalborg bykerne. Forslag til trafikplan. Rapport nr. 4, 
Teknisk forvaltning, Aalborg. 
5. Aalborg Bykerne Idekatalog  
 
Aalborg kommune og Nordjyllands Amt (1993) . Limfjordsforbindelse. Fase 1. 
Sammenfattende rapport. Report produced by COWIconsult for Aalborg municipality and 
County of North Jutland. 
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City of Aalborg, Technical Department, (2004). Sustainable mobility. What has happened in 
Aalborg during the last 10 years? This is the summing up of the actions since the Aalborg 
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City of Aalborg, Technical Department, (2004)”Sustainable utility supply in Aalborg”  
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Government publications Denmark 
 
Trafikministeriet (1990) Regjeringens transporthandlingsplan for miljø og udvikling. 
København. 
 
Miljøministeriet (1992) Miljø og trafik i kommuneplanlæggingen. Planstyrelsen, København. 
 
Trafikministeriet (1993) Trafik 2005. København. 
 
 
Norwich Case 
 
Norwich interviews 
 
Cooke, Hereward. Councillor Lib Dem. 
Gledhill, Bob. Councillor Green Party  
Lubbock, Judith. Councillor Lib Dem. 
Morrey, Brian. Councillor Labour. 
Reid, Rupert, prof philosophy, EAU, Councillor Green Party  
 
Watt, Andy. Chief transport planner, Norwich City  
 
Gunson, Adrian. Councillor Conservative, Norfolk County Council.  
 
Interviews Norfolk County admin:  
Mark Thomsen,  
David Cummings  
Chris Kutesko  
Allison McErlane 
 
Lowthorpe, Shawn. Journalist, Eastern Daily Press 
Greenaway, John. Senior lecturer, EAU  
 
Norwich documents  
 
Urban & Regional Policy (practice of Alan Wenban-Smith) Final Report to Norwich and 
Norfolk Transport Action Group, August 2004  
 
NATS: Norwich Northern Distributor Road. Stage 2 Environment Assessment Report. Need 
for the Scheme. 8 JB/R1C093 Rev 
 
Some of the most important Land use and transport policy papers to Blair’s Government 
were:  
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998) A New Deal for 
Transport: Better for Everyone, Cm 3950, The Stationery Office, London. 
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Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000) Transport 2010. The 10 
Year Plan, DETR, London. 
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000) Planning Policy Guidance 
Note 3: Housing, The Stationery Office, London. 
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2001) Planning Policy Guidance 
Note 13: Transport, The Stationery Office, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2004) The Future of Transport-A Network for 2030,  DfT, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2004) Full Guidance on Local Transport Plans, DfT, London. 
 
Commission for Integrated Transport, CfIT. 2001 and2006 update, European best practice in 
delivering integrated transport UK. 
 
CfIT November 2006 Integrating Transport Delivery – Is it Working Across Government 
Departments? Gov London  
 
CfIT March 2007 Moving forward: Better Transport for City Regions. Gov London 
CfIT March 2007 Moving forward: Better Transport for City Regions, Annex 1: 
Performance 
CfIT March 2007 Moving forward: Better Transport for City Regions, Annex 2: 
Summary of legislative powers and duties 
 
PPG438 13 Transport.  Guidance on Regional Transport Strategies and Local Tr nsport Plans 
 
East of England Region 
 
Government Office for the East of England (1999) Draft Regional Planning Guidance for 
East Anglia: sustainability appraisal of the recommendation of the Panel conducting the 
Public Examination. GOEE. 
 
East of England Development Agency (2001) East of England 2010. 
Cambridge, EEDA.East of England Regional Assembly (2001) Regional Sustainable 
Development Framework for the East of England. EERA. 
 
Government Office for the East of England (2000) Draft Regional Planning Guidance for 
East Anglia: Proposed Changes by the Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the 
Regions. Volumes 1 and 2. GOEE. 
 
Government Office for the East of England (2000) RPG6: Regional Planning Guidance for 
East Anglia to 2016. London, The Stationery Office. 
 
East of England Plan (2004) Non-technical Summary of the Sustainable Appraisal Report. 
EERA. 
                                                
438 Planning Policy Guidelines  
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Special on road financing and charging 
 
DoBERR (2007) Review of sub-national economic development and regeneration, 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/citiesandregions/snr     which stated that the 
government would allow those city regions that wished to work together to form a statutory 
framework for city regional activity, including powers over transport, skills, planning and 
economic development. Under the government's Transport Innovation Fund, city regions can 
band together to pilot forms of road pricing, such as the Manchester Congestion Charge being 
considered by councils in Greater Manchester. 
 
The Transport Innovation Fund (TIF)  is a transport funding mechanism in England. Its 
creation was announced by Her Majesty's Government in the July 2004 White Paper, ’The 
Future of Transport’. The fund has two strands for supporting different types of project: 
Congestion TIF where local authorities bid for funds for their own schemes; and 
Productivity TIF  where the DfT will identify schemes of national importance 
TIF represents a new approach by the Department for Transport (DfT) to allocating some of 
its budget for England. 
 
 
Davis Case  
 
Davis interviews and talks:  
 
Bob Wolcott, City planner 
Tim Bustos, City bicycle coordinator 
David Takemoto-Weerts, UCD bicycle coordinator 
 
Robert Segar, UCD planning director 
 
Rob Thayer, UCD professor emeritus  
Mark Francis, UCD professor  
 
Johnson, Robert. UCD professor 
Susan Handy  UCD professor  
Ted Buehler, UCD student 
Chris Congleton, UCD student 
 
Seminars and meetings 
 
I had the pleasure of participating in a series of three public seminars arranged by UCD phd 
students, on “The Future of our Region.” The seminar dealt with: 1) The City of Davis. 2) The 
Yolo County. 3) The Sacramento Region.  
Moderators and panels were:  
The City of Davis seminar: Sharon Huntsman moderator, Dick Dorf prof, Chuck Roe 
builder, Mark Spencer teacher and activist, Cully Thomas politician. 
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The Yolo County: Prof Jeff Loux, UCD extension, moderator. Farmer Charlie 
Rominger. Director Judy Corbett. Prof emeritus Al Sokolow. Yolo County Supervisor 
Helen Thomsen. 
 
Participated in the public meeting in Davis on Fifth Street. Steve Tracy, was the professional 
engineer that presented the Diet plan.  
 
Seminar on Sustainable Campus Transportation Davis 24 May 2005, with Will Toor, 
University of Boulder Colorado the author of Transportation and Sustainable Campus 
Communities.  
 
Davis documents  
 
City of Davis 1958. General Plan. This was the first GP. 
City of Davis 1964. General Plan amendment of 1958 plan. 
City of Davis 1969. General Plan amendment of 1964 plan. 
City of Davis 1973. General Plan. 
City of Davis 1979. General Plan amendment of 1973 plan. 
City of Davis 1984. General Plan amendment of 1979 plan. 
City of Davis 1987. General Plan. 
 
City of Davis 2001. General Plan. Present  
 
City of Davis 1987. Comprehensive Bicycle Plan. First bike plan.  
City of Davis 2001. Comprehensive Bicycle Plan. 
 
City of Davis 2005. Fifth Street Traffic Operation Study, CIP NO. 8138. 
 
Yolo County General Plan 
Yolo County Bikeway Plan 
 
UCDAVIS October 2003. Davis Long Range Development Plan, LDRP. 
UCDAVIS October 2003. Neigborhood master plan 2003-2015. 225 acres (53 faculty/staff, 
30 student housing, 17 mix-use housing, open space 52, recreation fields 20, elementary 
school 3, circulation system 48) Bike paths 4,2 miles. 
UCDAVIS May 6, 2005 Alternative Transportation and Parking Investment Study 
UC Davis, 1988. Housing and Transportation Survey. Arthur C. Lowe, Planning and Budget 
Office. 
 
Sacramento Region Blueprint – Transportation and Land Use Study, information can be 
found on: www.sacregionblueprint.org/ 
 
Sacramento Region Travel Survey 2000. Analysis of the 2000 SACOG Household Travel 
Survey. Prepared by DKS Associates for Sacramento Area Council of Governments. July 25, 
2001. 
Rodier C & S Shaheen. Path program. Appendix D. A case study of Sacramento, CA Region. 
Carsharing and Carfree housing.  
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APPENDIX II:   
Charter of European Cities & Towns Towards Sustainability 
(as approved by the participants at the European Conference on Sustainable 
Cities & Towns in Aalborg, Denmark on 27 May 1994) 
 
• Part I: Consensus Declaration: European Cities & Towns Towards Sustainability 
• Part II: The European Sustainable Cities & Towns Camp ign 
• Part III: Engaging in Local Agenda 21 Processes: Local Action Plans Towards Sustainability 
 
Part I 
 
Consensus Declaration: European Cities & Towns Towards Sustainability 
I.1 The Role of European Cities and Towns 
We, European cities & towns, signatories of this Charter, state that in the course of history, our towns have 
existed within and outlasted empires, nation states, and regimes and have survived as centres of social life, 
carriers of our economies, and guardians of culture, h ritage and tradition. Along with families and 
neighbourhoods, towns have been the basic elements of our societies and states. Towns have been the centres of 
industry, craft, trade, education and government. We understand that our present urban lifestyle, in particular our 
patterns of division of labour and functions, land-use, transport, industrial production, agriculture, consumption, 
and leisure activities, and hence our standard of living, make us essentially responsible for many enviro mental 
problems humankind is facing. This is particularly relevant as 80 percent of Europe's population live in urban 
areas. We have learnt that present levels of resource consumption in the industrialised countries cannot be 
achieved by all people currently living, much less by future generations, without destroying the natural capital. 
We are convinced that sustainable human life on this globe cannot be achieved without sustainable local 
communities. Local government is close to where enviro mental problems are perceived and closest to the 
citizens and shares responsibility with governments at all levels for the well-being of humankind and ature. 
Therefore, cities and towns are key players in the process of changing lifestyles, production, consumption and 
spatial patterns. 
 
I.2 The Notion and Principles of Sustainability 
We, cities & towns, understand that the idea of sustainable development helps us to base our standard of living 
on the carrying capacity of nature. We seek to achieve social justice, sustainable economies, and environmental 
sustainability. Social justice will necessarily have to be based on economic sustainability and equity, which 
require environmental sustainability. Environmental sustainability means maintaining the natural capital. It 
demands from us that the rate at which we consume ren wable material, water and energy resources does not 
exceed the rate at which the natural systems can replenish them, and that the rate at which we consume non-
renewable resources does not exceed the rate at which sustainable renewable resources are replaced. 
Environmental sustainability also means that the rat of emitted pollutants does not exceed the capacity of the 
air, water, and soil to absorb and process them. Furthermore, environmental sustainability entails the 
maintenance of biodiversity; human health; as well as air, water, and soil qualities at standards sufficient to 
sustain human life and wellbeing, as well as animal and plant life, for all time. 
 
I.3 Local Strategies Towards Sustainability 
We are convinced that the city or town is both the largest unit capable of initially addressing the many urban 
architectural, social, economic, political, natural resource and environmental imbalances damaging our m dern 
world and the smallest scale at which problems can be meaningfully resolved in an integrated, holistic and 
sustainable fashion. As each city is different, we have to find our individual ways towards sustainability. We 
shall integrate the principles of sustainability in all our policies and make the respective strengths of our cities 
and towns the basis of locally appropriate strategies. 
 
I.4 Sustainability as a Creative, Local, Balance-Seking Process 
We, cities & towns, recognise that sustainability is neither a vision nor an unchanging state, but a cre tive, local, 
balance-seeking process extending into all areas of local decision-making. It provides ongoing feedback in the 
management of the town or city on which activities are driving the urban ecosystem towards balance and which 
are driving it away. By building the management of a city around the information collected through such a 
process, the city is understood to work as an organic whole and the effects of all significant activities are made 
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manifest. Through such a process the city and its cit zens may make informed choices. Through a management 
process rooted in sustainability, decisions may be made which not only represent the interests of current 
stakeholders, but also of future generations.  
 
I.5 Resolving Problems by Negotiating Outwards 
We, cities & towns, recognise that a town or city cannot permit itself to export problems into the larger 
environment or to the future. Therefore, any problems or imbalances within the city are either brought towards 
balance at their own level or absorbed by some larger entity at the regional or national level. This is the principle 
of resolving problems by negotiating outwards. The implementation of this principle will give each city or town 
great freedom to define the nature of its activities. 
 
I.6 Urban Economy Towards Sustainability 
We, cities & towns, understand that the limiting factor for economic development of our cities and towns has 
become natural capital, such as atmosphere, soil, water and forests. We must therefore invest in this capital. In 
order of priority this requires 
• investments in conserving the remaining natural capital, such as groundwater stocks, soil, habitats for 
rare species; 
• encouraging the growth of natural capital by reducing our level of current exploitation, such as of non-
renewable energy; 
• investments to relieve pressure on natural capital stocks by expanding cultivated natural capital, such as 
parks for inner-city recreation to relieve pressure on natural forests); and  
• increasing the end-use efficiency of products, such as energy-efficient buildings, environmentally 
friendly urban transport. 
 
I.7 Social Equity for Urban Sustainability 
We, cities and towns, are aware that the poor are worst affected by environmental problems (such as noi e and 
air pollution from traffic, lack of amenities, unhealthy housing, lack of open space) and are least able to solve 
them. Inequitable distribution of wealth both causes unsustainable behaviour and makes it harder to change. We 
intend to integrate people's basic social needs as well as healthcare, employment and housing programmes with 
environmental protection. We wish to learn from initial experiences of sustainable lifestyles, so thatwe can work 
towards improving the quality of citizens' lifestyles rather than simply maximising consumption. We will try to 
create jobs which contribute to the sustainability of the community and thereby reduce unemployment. When 
seeking to attract or create jobs we will assess the effects of any business opportunity in terms of sustainability in 
order to encourage the creation of long-term jobs and long-life products in accordance with the principles of 
sustainability. 
 
I.8 Sustainable Land-Use Patterns 
We, cities & towns, recognise the importance of effective land-use and development planning policies by our 
local authorities which embrace the strategic environmental assessment of all plans. We should take advantage 
of the scope for providing efficient public transport and energy which higher densities offer, while maintaining 
the human scale of development. In both undertaking urban renewal programmes in inner urban areas and in 
planning new suburbs we seek a mix of functions so as to reduce the need for mobility. Notions of equitable 
regional interdependency should enable us to balance the flows between city and countryside and prevent cities 
from merely exploiting the resources of surrounding areas. 
 
I.9 Sustainable Urban Mobility Patterns 
We, cities & towns, shall strive to improve accessibility and sustain social welfare and urban lifestyles with less 
transport. We know that it is imperative for a sustainable city to reduce enforced mobility and stop promoting 
and supporting the unnecessary use of motorised vehicles. We shall give priority to ecologically sound means of 
transport (in particular walking, cycling, public transport) and make a combination of these means the centre of 
our planning efforts. Motorised individual means of urban transport ought to have the subsidiary functio  of 
facilitating access to local services and maintaining the economic activity of the city. 
 
I.10 Responsibility for the Global Climate 
We, cities & towns, understand that the significant risks posed by global warming to the natural and built 
environments and to future human generations requir a response sufficient to stabilise and then to reduc  
emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as soon as possible. It is equally important to protect global 
biomass resources, such as forests and phytoplankton, which play an essential role in the earth's carbon cycle. 
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The abatement of fossil fuel emissions will require policies and initiatives based on a thorough understanding of 
the alternatives and of the urban environment as an energy system. The only sustainable alternatives ar  
renewable energy sources. 
 
I.11 Prevention of Ecosystems Toxification 
We, cities & towns, are aware that more and more toxic and harmful substances are released into the air, w ter, 
soil, food, and are thereby becoming a growing threat to human health and the ecosystems. We will undertak  
every effort to see that further pollution is stopped and prevented at source.  
 
I.12 Local Self-Governance as a Pre-Condition 
We, cities and towns, are confident that we have the strength, the knowledge and the creative potential to 
develop sustainable ways of living and to design and manage our cities towards sustainability. As democratically 
elected representatives of our local communities we are ready to take responsibility for the task of re- organising 
our cities and towns for sustainability. The extent to which cities and towns are able to rise to thischallenge 
depends upon their being given rights to local self-governance, according to the principle of subsidiarity. It is 
essential that sufficient powers are left at the loca  level and that local authorities are given a solid financial base. 
 
I.13 Citizens as Key Actors and the Involvement of the Community 
We, cities & towns pledge to meet the mandate given by Agenda 21, the key document approved at the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, to work with all sectors f our communities - citizens, businesses, interest groups - 
when developing our Local Agenda 21 plans. We recognise the call in the European Union's Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme "Towards Sustainability" for the responsibility for the implementation of the 
programme to be shared among all sectors of the community. Therefore, we will base our work on co-operation 
between all actors involved. We shall ensure that all citizens and interested groups have access to information 
and are able to participate in local decision-making processes. We will seek opportunities for education and 
training for sustainability, not only for the general population, but for both elected representatives and officials in 
local government. 
 
I.14 Instruments and Tools for Urban Management Towards Sustainability 
We, cities & towns, pledge to use the political and technical instruments and tools available for an ecosystem 
approach to urban management. We shall take advantage of a wide range of instruments including those for 
collecting and processing environmental data; enviro mental planning; regulatory, economic, and 
communication instruments such as directives, taxes nd fees; and mechanisms for awareness raising includ g 
public participation. We seek to establish new environmental budgeting systems which allow for the 
management of our natural resources as economically as our artificial resource, 'money'. We know that we must 
base our policy-making and controlling efforts, in particular our environmental monitoring, auditing, impact 
assessment, accounting, balancing and reporting systems, on different types of indicators, including those of 
urban environmental quality, urban flows, urban patterns, and, most importantly, indicators of an urban systems 
sustainability. We, cities & towns, recognise that a whole range of policies and activities yielding positive 
ecological consequences have already been successfully applied in many cities through Europe. However, while 
these instruments are valuable tools for reducing the pace and pressure of unsustainability, they do not in and of 
themselves reverse society's unsustainable direction. Still, with this strong existing ecological base, the cities are 
in an excellent position to take the threshold step of integrating these policies and activities into the governance 
process for managing local urban economies through a comprehensive sustainability process. In this process we 
are called on to develop our own strategies, try them out in practice and share our experiences. 
 
Part II 
 
The European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign 
We, European cities & towns, signatories of this charter, shall move forward together towards sustainability in a 
process of learning from experience and successful loca examples. We shall encourage each other to establish 
long-term local action plans (Local Agendas 21), thereby strengthening inter-authority co-operation, and relating 
this process to the European Union's actions in the field of the urban environment. 
We hereby initiate The European Sustainable Cities & Towns Campaign to encourage and support cities and 
towns in working towards sustainability. The initial phase of this Campaign shall be for a two-year period, after 
which progress shall be assessed at a Second European Conference on Sustainable Cities & Towns to be held in 
1996. We invite every local authority, whether city, own or county and any European network of local 
authorities to join the Campaign by adopting and signing this Charter. We request all the major local authority 
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networks in Europe to undertake the co-ordination of the Campaign. A Co-ordinating Committee shall be 
established of representatives of these networks. Arrangements will be made for those local authorities which are 
not members of any network. We foresee the principal activities of the Campaign to be to: 
• facilitate mutual support between European cities and towns in the design, development and 
implementation of policies towards sustainability; 
• collect and disseminate information on good examples at the local level; 
• promote the principle of sustainability in other local authorities; 
• recruit further signatories to the Charter; 
• organise an annual "Sustainable City Award"; 
• formulate policy recommendations to the European Commission; 
• provide input to the Sustainable Cities Reports of the Urban Environment Expert Group; 
• support local policy-makers in implementing appropriate recommendations and 
• legislation from the European Union; 
• edit a Campaign newsletter. 
 
These activities will require the establishment of a Campaign Co-ordination. 
We shall invite other organisations to actively support the Campaign. 
 
Part III 
 
Engaging in The Local Agenda 21 processes: Local Action Plans Towards Sustainability 
We, European cities & towns, signatories of this Charter, pledge by signing this Charter and joining the 
European Sustainable Cities & Towns Campaign that we will seek to achieve a consensus within our 
communities on a Local Agenda 21 by the end of 1996. This will meet the mandate established by Chapter 28 of 
Agenda 21 as agreed at the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992. By means of our individual local action plans we 
shall contribute to the implementation of the European Union's Fifth Environmental Action Programme 
"Towards Sustainability". The Local Agenda 21 processes shall be developed on the basis of Part One of this 
Charter. We propose that the process of preparing a local action plan should include the following stages: 
 
• recognition of the existing planning and financial fr meworks as well as other plans and programmes; 
• the systematic identification, by means of extensive public consultation, of problems and their causes; 
• the prioritisation of tasks to address identified problems; 
• the creation of a vision for a sustainable community through a participatory process involving all 
sectors of the community; 
• the consideration and assessment of alternative strategic options; 
• the establishment of a long-term local action plan towards sustainability which includes measurable 
targets; 
• the programming of the implementation of the plan including the preparation of a timetable and 
statement of allocation of responsibilities among the partners; 
• the establishment of systems and procedures for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the 
plan. 
 
We will need to review whether the internal arrangements of our local authorities are appropriate and efficient to 
allow the development of the Local Agenda 21 processes, including long-term local action plans towards 
sustainability. Efforts may be needed to improve th capacity of the organisation which will include reviewing 
the political arrangements, administrative procedurs, corporate and inter-disciplinary working, human resources 
available and inter-authority cooperation including associations and networks. 
 
Signed in Aalborg, Denmark, 27 May 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
